y 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

PRESENTED  BY 

PROF.  CHARLES  A.  KOFOID  AND 

MRS.  PRUDENCE  W.  KOFOID 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/analogyofreligiOObutlrich 


THE 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

NATURAL    AND    REVEALED, 

TO   THK 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 

TO  WBIOH  ARE  ADDED 

TWO  BRIEF    DISSERTATIONS  ON  PERSONAL  IDENTITY, 
AND  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

By    JOSEPH    BUTLER,    LL.D., 

LORD    BISHOP   OF  DURHAM. 


•*Ejus  (Analogiz)  haec  vis  est,  ut  id  quod   dubium  est,  ad  aliquid  simile,  de 

quo  non  quaeritur,  refeiat,  ut  incerta  certis  probet.    — 

QuiNCT.,  Inst.  Orat.^  i,  i,  c.  6. 


WITH    A    LIFE    OF    THE    AUTHOR,    COPIOUS    NOTES, 
AND   AN    AMPLE    INDEX. 

THE    WHOLE   EDITED   BY 

Rev.  JOSEPH  CUMMINGS.  U.D..  LL.D., 

FRBSIDENT   OF    WESI-EyAN    ONIVKKSITY. 


NEW  YORK  :  HUNT  &  EATON 
CINCINNATI  :  CRANSTON  &  CURTS 


Xy 


Vt^ 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1875,  by 
NET.SON    «fc    PHILLIPS, 

In  the  Office  o/  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


BTIIOO 


EDITOR'S   PREFACE. 


T  N  preparing  this  edition  of  Butler's  Analogy  the 
-*■  Editor  has  endeavored  to  adapt  it  to  Students, 
and  to  render,  in  a  simple  and  concise  form,  the  aid 
they  need. 

The  marginal  titles,  presenting  the  subjects  of  the 
paragraphs,  and  constituting  an  analysis  of  the  sev- 
eral chapters,  are  an  important  part  of  his  work. 

He  has  given  much  attention  to  the  text,  which, 
with  a  few  corrections  obviously  necessary,  is  that 
of  the  second  edition,  prepared  by  the  Right  Rev. 
William  Fitzgerald,  D.D.,  Lord  Bishop  of  Cork, 
Cloyne,  and  Ross,  published  in  London  in  i860. 
Dr.  Fitzgerald  has  given  a  collation  of  Butler's  first 
edition  of  his  work,  which  is  a  literary  curiosity,  and 
shows  the  singular  pains  he  took  with  his  style,  in 
which  he  has  commonly  been  censured  for  care- 
lessness. 

The  Editor  of  this  edition  has  taken  the  liberty  to 
break  up  several  long  paragraphs  into  two  or  more, 
in  order  that  their  meaning  may  more  readily  be 
apprehended. 

The  Index  has  been  made  very  full  and  complete. 


ivi368l45 


4  Editor's  Preface. 

It  will  afford  great  help  to  those  who  may  wish  to 
understand  the  work,  or  make  occasional  references 
to  the  sentiments  of  the  author. 

The  Editor  has  taken  from  other  editions,  and  from 
Dr,  Chalmers,  all  the  material  he  deemed  of  special 
value,  and  has  added  a  few  notes  of  his  own. 

He  was  led  to  prepare  this  edition  with  special 
reference  to  the  wants  of  Students  in  our  higher  in- 
stitutions of  learning,  but  he  hopes  it  will  be  found 
acceptable  to  Teachers,  to  Ministers,  and  to  all  others 
who  desire  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  this  great 
work. 

The  Biographical  Sketch  was  written  by  Professor 
Henry  Rogers,  author  of  "  The  Eclipse  of  Faith," 
"The  Supernatural  Origin  of  the  Bible,"  etc.  It 
was  prepared  for  the  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 
The  same  sketch  is  prefaced  to  the  excellent  edition 
prepared  by  Rev.  J.  T.  Champlin,  D.D. 

*^*  AH  the  Notes  except  the  Author's  are  inclosed  in  brackets. 
Dr.  Fitzgerald  is  the  author  of  the  notes  signed  "  F." 

MiDDLETOWN,  May,  1875. 


SKETCH  OF  JOSEPH  BUTLER. 


JOSEPH  BUTLER,  Bishop  of  Durham— one  of  the 
most  profound  and  original  thinkers  this  or  any  other 
country  ever  produced — well  deserves  a  place  among 
the  dii  majores  of  English  philosophy,  with  Bacon, 
Newton,  and  Locke. 

The  following  brief  sketch  will  comprise  an  outline 
of  his  life  and  character,  some  remarks  on  the  pecul- 
iarity of  his  genius,  and  an  estimate  of  his  principal 
writings. 

He  was  born  at  Wantage,  in  Berkshire,  May  i8,  1692. 
His  father,  Thomas  Butler,  had  been  a  linen-draper  in 
that  town,  but  before  the  birth  of  Joseph,  who  was  the 
youngest  of  a  family  of  eight,  had  relinquished  business. 
He  continued  to  reside  at  Wantage,  however,  at  a 
house  called  the  Priory,  which  is  still  shown  to  the 
curious  visitor. 

Young  Butler  received  his  first  instructions  from  the 
Rev.  Philip  Barton,  a  clergyman,  and  master  of  the 
grammar  school  at  Wantage.  The  father,  who  was  n 
Presbyterian,  was  anxious  that  his  son,  who  early  gave 
indications  of  capacity,  should  dedicate  himself  to  the 
ministry  in  his  own  communion,  and  sent  him  to  a  Dis- 
senting academy  at  Gloucester,  then  kept  by  Mr.  Samuel 
Jones.  "  Jones,"  says  Professor  Fitzgerald  with  equal 
truth  and  justice,  "  was  a  man  of  no  mean  ability  or  eru- 
dition;" and  adds,  with  honorable  liberality,  "could 
number  among  his   scholars  many  names  that    might 


6  Analogy  of  Religion. 

confer  honor  on  any  university  in  Christendom."*  He 
instances  among  others  Jeremiah  Jones,  the  author 
of  the  excellent  work  on  the  Canon;  Seeker,  after- 
ward Archbishop  of  Canterbury ;  and  two  of  the  most 
learned,  acute,  and  candid  apologists  for  Christianity 
England  has  produced — Nathaniel  Lardner  and  Samuel 
Chandler. 

The  academy  was  shortly  afterward  removed  to 
Tewkesbury.  While  yet  there  Butler  first  displayed  his 
extraordinary  aptitude  for  metaphysical  speculation  in 
the  letters  he  sent  to  Clarke  on  two  supposed  flaws  in 
the  reasoning  of  the  recently  published  a  priori  demon- 
strations ;  one  respecting  the  proof  of  the  Divine  omni- 
presence^ and  the  other  respecting  the  proof  of  the  unity 
of  the  "necessarily  existent  Being."  It  is  but  just  to 
Clarke  to  say  that  his  opponent  subsequently  surren- 
dered both  objections.  Whether  the  capitulation  be 
judged  strictly  the  result  of  logical  necessity  will  de- 
pend on  the  estimate  formed  of  the  value  of  Clarke's 
proof  of  the  truths  in  question — truths  which  are  hap- 
pily capable  of  being  shown  to  be  so,  independently  of 
any  such  a  priori  metaphysical  demonstration.  In  this 
encounter,  Butler  showed  his  modesty  not  less  than  his 
prowess.  He  was  so  afraid  of  being  discovered,  that  he 
employed  his  friend  Seeker  to  convey  his  letters  to  the 
Gloucester  post-office,  and  bring  back  the  answers. 

About  this  time  he  began  to  entertain  doubts  of  the 
propriety  of  adhering  to  his  father's  Presbyterian  opin- 
ions, and,  consequently,  of  entering  the  ministry  of  that 
communion ;  doubts  which  at  length  terminated  in  his 
joining  the  Church  of  England.  His  father,  seeing  all 
opposition  vain,  at  length  consented  to  his  repairing  to 

*  Life  of  Butler,  prefixed  to  Professor  Fitzgerald's  very  valuable 
edition  of  the  Analogy,  Dublin,  1849.  The  memoir  is  derived  chiefly 
from  Mr.  Bartlett's  more  copious  "  Life  ;"  it  is  very  carefully  compiled, 
and  is  frequently  cited  in  the  present  article. 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  7 

Oxford,  where  he  was  entered  as  a  commoner  of  Onel 
College,  March  17,  17 14.  Here  he  early  formed  an  inti- 
mate friendship  with  Mr.  Edward  Talbot,  second  son  of 
the  Bishop  of  Durham,  a  connection  to  which  his  future 
advancement  was  in  a  great  degree  owing. 

The  exact  period  at  which  Butler  took  orders  is  not 
known,  but  it  must  have  been  before  1717,  as  by  that 
date  he  was  occasionally  supplying  Talbot's  living, 
at  Hendred,  near  Wantage.  In  1718,  at  the  age  of 
twenty-six,  he  was  nominated  preacher  at  the  Rolls,  on 
the  united  recommendation  of  Talbot  and  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke. 

At  this  time  the  country  was  in  a  ferment.  What  is 
called  the  "  Bangorian  Controversy,"  and  which  origin- 
ated in  a  sermon  of  Bishop  Hoadley,  "On  the  Nature 
of  Christ's  Kingdom,"  (a  discourse  supposed  to  imperil 
"all  ecclesiastical  authority,")  was  then  raging.  One 
pamphlet  which  that  voluminous  controversy  called 
forth  has  been  attributed  to  Butler.  "The  external 
evidence,  however,  is,"  as  Mr.  Fitzgerald  judges,  "but 
slight ;  and  the  internal,  for  the  negative,  at  least  equal- 
ly so."  The  writer  says,  "  On  the  whole,  I  feel  unable 
to  arrive  at  any  positive  decision  on  the  subject." 
Readers  curious  respecting  it  may  consult  Mr.  Fitzger- 
ald's pages,  where  they  will  find  a  detail  of  the  circum- 
stances which  led  to  the  publication  of  the  pamphlet, 
and  the  evidence  for  and  against  its  being  attributed  to 
Butler. 

In  1 72 1  Bishop  Talbot  presented  Butler  with  the  liv- 
ing of  Haughton,  near  Dorkington,  and  Seeker  (who 
had  also  relinquished  nonconformity,  and  after  some 
considerable  fluctuations  in  his  religious  views  had  at 
length  entered  the  Church)  with  that  of  Haughton-le- 
Spring.  In  1725  the  same  liberal  patron  transferred 
Butler  to  the  more  lucrative  benefice  of  Stanhope. 

He  retained  his  situation  of  preacher  at  the  Rolls  till 


8  Analogy  of  Religion. 

the  following  year,  (1726,)  and  before  quitting  it,  pub- 
lished the  celebrated  Fifteen  Sermons  delivered  there ; 
among  the  most  profound  and  original  discourses  which 
philosophical  theologian  ever  gave  to  the  world  As 
these  could  have  been  but  a  portion  of  those  he  preached 
at  the  Rolls,  it  has  often  been  asked  what  could  become 
of  the  remainder?  We  agree  with  Mr.  Fitzgerald  in 
thinking  that  the  substance  of  many  was  afterward 
worked  into  the  Analogy.  That  many  of  them  were 
equally  important  with  the  Fifteen  may  be  inferred 
from  Butler's  declaration  in  the  preface,  that  the  selec- 
tion of  these  had  been  determined  by  "  circumstances 
in  a  great  measure  accidental."  At  his  death,  Butler 
desired  his  manuscripts  to  be  destroyed ;  this  he  would 
hardly  have  done,  had  he  not  already  rifled  their  chief 
treasures  for  his  great  work.  Let  us  hope  so,  at  all 
events;  for  it  would  be  provoking  to  think  that  dis- 
courses of  equal  value  with  the  Fifteen  had  been  wan- 
tonly committed  to  the  flames. 

After  resigning  his  preachership  at  the  Rolls,  he  re- 
tired to  Stanhope,  and  gave  himself  up  to  study  and  the 
duties  of  a  parish  priest.  All  that  could  be  gleaned  of 
his  habits  and  mode  of  life  there  has  been  preserved  by 
the  present  Bishop  of  Exeter,  his  successor  in  the  living 
of  Stanhope  eighty  years  after,  and  it  is  little  enough. 
Tradition  said  that  "  Rector  Butler  rode  a  black  pony, 
and  always  rode  very  fast ;  that  he  was  loved  and  re- 
spected by  all  his  parishioners ;  that  he  lived  very  retired, 
was  very  kind,  and  could  not  resist  the  importunities  of 
common  beggars,  who,  knowing  his  infirmity,  pursued 
him  so  earnestly  as  sometimes  to  drive  him  back  into  his 
house  as  his  only  escape."  The  last  fact  the  bishop 
reports  doubtful ;  but  Butler's  extreme  benevolence  is 
not  so. 

In  all  probability,  Butler  in  this  seclusion  was  medi- 
tating and  digesting  that  great  work  on  which  his  fame. 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  9 

and  what  is  better  than  fame,  his  usefulness,  principally 
rests,  the  Analogy.  "  In  a  similar  retirement,"  says 
Professor  Fitzgerald,  "  The  Ecclesiastical  Polity  of 
Hooker,  The  Intellectual  System  of  Cudworth,  and  The 
Divine  Legation  of  Warburton  —  records  of  genius 
*  which  posterity  will  not  willingly  let  die  * — were  ripened 
into  maturity."  Queen  Caroline  once  asked  Arch- 
bishop Blackburne  whether  Butler  was  not  "dead." 
"  No,"  said  he,  "but  he  is  buried.''  It  was  well  for  pos- 
terity that  he  was  thus,  for  awhile,  entombed. 

He  remained  in  this  meditative  seclusion  seven  years 
At  the  end  of  this  period,  his  friend  Seeker,  who  thought 
Butler's  health  and  spirits  were  failing  under  excess  of 
solitude  and  study,  succeeded  in  dragging  him  from  his 
retreat.  Lord  Chancellor  Talbot,  at  Seeker's  solicita- 
tion, appointed  him  his  chaplain  in  1733,  and  in  1736 
a  prebendary  of  Rochester.  In  the  same  year.  Queen 
Caroline,  who  thought  her  Court  derived  as  much  luster 
from  philosophers  and  divines  as  from  statesmen  and 
courtiers — who  had  been  the  delighted  spectator  of  the 
argumentative  contests  of  Clarke  and  Berkeley,  Hoadley 
and  Sherlock — appointed  Butler  clerk  of  the  closet,  and 
commanded  his  "  attendance  every  evening  from  seven 
till  nine." 

It  was  in  1736  that  the  celebrated  Analogy  was  pub- 
lished, and  its  great  merits  immediately  attracted  pub- 
lic attention.  It  was  perpetually  in  the  hands  of  his 
royal  patroness,  and  passed  through  several  editions 
before  the  author's  death.  Its  greatest  praise  is  that  it 
has  been  almost  universally  read,  and  never  answered. 
**I  am  not  aware,"  says  Mr.  Fitzgerald,  "that  any  of 
those  whom  it  would  have  immediately  concerned  have 
ever  attempted  a  regular  reply  to  the  Analogy;  but 
particular  parts  of  it  have  met  with  answers,  and  the 
whole,  as  a  whole,  has  been  sometimes  unfavorably 
criticised."     Of  its  merits,  and  precise  position  in  rela- 


lo  Analogy  of  Religion. 

tion  "  to  those  whom  it  immediately  concerns,"  we  shall 
speak  presently. 

Some  strange  criticisms  on  its  general  character  in 
Tholuck's  Vermischte  Scriften,  showing  a  singular  infe- 
licity in  missing  Butler's  true  ^^ stand-punkty'  as  Tho- 
luck's own  countrymen  would  say,  and  rather  unreason 
ably  complaining  of  obscurity,  considering  the  quality 
of  German  theologico-philosophical  style  in  general,  are 
well  disposed  of  by  Professor  Fitzgerald.  (Pp.  47-50.) 

About  this  time,  Butler  had  some  correspondence 
with  Lord  Kames,  on  the  Evidences  of  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Religion.  Kames  requested  a  personal  interview, 
which  Butler  declined  in  a  manner  very  characteristic 
of  his  modesty  and  caution.  It  was,  "  on  the  score  of 
his  natural  diffidence  and  reserve,  his  being  unaccus- 
tomed to  oral  controversy,  and  his  fear  that  the  cause 
of  truth  might  thence  suffer  from  the  unskillfulness  of 
its  advocate." 

Hume  was  a  kinsman  of  Lord  Kames,  and  when  pre- 
paring his  treatise  of  Humafi  Nature  for  the  press,  was 
recommended  by  Lord  Kames  to  get  Butler's  judgment 
on  it.  "  Your  thoughts  and  mine,"  says  Hume,  "  agree 
with  respect  to  Dr.  Butler,  and  I  should  be  glad  to  be 
introduced  to  him."  The  interview,  however,  never 
took  place,  nor  was  Butler's  judgment  obtained.  One 
cannot  help  speculating  on  the  possible  consequences 
Would  it  have  made  any  difference  } 

In  the  year  1737  Queen  Caroline  died,  but  on  her 
death -bed  recommended  her  favorite  divine  to  her  hus- 
band's care.  In  1738  Butler  was  accordingly  made  Bishop 
of  Bristol,  in  place  of  Dr.  Gooch,  who  was  translated  to 
Norwich.  This  seems  to  have  been  a  politic  stroke 
of  Walpole,  "  who  probably  thought,"  says  Fitzgerald, 
"  that  the  ascetic  rector  of  Stanhope  was  too  unworldly 
a  person  to  care  for  the  poverty  of  his  preferment,  01 
perceive  the  slight   which   it   implied."     In   the  reply 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  ii 

however,  in  which  Butler  expresses  his  sense  of  the 
honor  conferred,  he  shows  that  he  understood  the  posi- 
tion of  matters  very  clearly.  The  hint  he  gave  seems 
to  have  had  its  effect,  for  in  1740  the  king  nominated 
him  to  the  vacant  Deanery  of  St.  Paul's,  whereupon  he 
resigned  Stanhope,  which  he  had  hitherto  held  in  com- 
mendam.  The  revenues  of  Bristol,  the  poorest  see,  did 
not  exceed  j[,\oo. 

A  curious  anecdote  of  Butler  has  been  preserved  by 
his  domestic  chaplain,  Dr.  Tucker,  afterward  Dean  of 
Gloucester.  He  says :  "  His  custom  was,  when  at  Bris- 
tol, to  walk  for  hours  in  his  garden  in  the  darkest  night 
which  the  time  of  year  could  afford,  and  I  had  fre- 
quently the  honor  to  attend  him.  After  walking  some 
time,  he  would  stop  suddenly  and  ask  the  question, 
'  What  security  is  there  against  the  insanity  of  individ- 
uals? The  physicians  know  of  none,  and  as  to  divines 
we  have  no  data,  either  from  Scripture  or  from  reason, 
to  go  upon  in  relation  to  this  affair.'  '  True,  My  Lord, 
no  man  has  a  lease  of  his  understanding  any  more  than 
of  his  life ;  they  are  both  in  the  hands  of  the  Sovereign 
Disposer  of  all  things.'  He  would  then,  take  another 
turn,  and  again  stop  short :  *  Why  might  not  whole  com- 
munities and  public  bodies  be  seized  with  fits  of  insani- 
ty, as  well  as  individuals  }  '  *  My  Lord,  I  have  never 
considered  the  case,  and  can  give  no  opinion  concern- 
ing it.'  '  Nothing  but  this  principle,  that  they  are  lia- 
ble to  insanity  equally  at  least  with  private  persons,  can 
account  for  the  major  part  of  those  transactions  of  which 
we  read  in  history.*  1  thought  little  of  that  odd  conceit 
of  the  bishop  at  that  juncture ;  but  I  own  I  could  not 
avoid  thinking  of  it  a  great  deal  since,  and  applying 
it  to  many  ca.ses." 

In  1747,  on  the  death  of  Archbishop  Potter,  it  is  said 
that  the  primacy  was  offered  to  Butler,  who  declined  it, 
with  the   remark   that  "  it  is  too  late  for  me  to  try  to 


12  Analogy  of  Religion. 

support  a  falling  Church."  If  he  really  said  so  it  must 
have  been  in  a  moment  of  despondency,  to  which  his 
constitutional  melancholy  often  disposed  him.  No  such 
feeling,  at  all  events,  prevented  his  accepting  the  bish- 
opric of  Durham  in  1750,  on  the  death  of  Dr.  Edward 
Chandler.  About  the  time  of  his  promotion  to  this  dig- 
nity he  was  engaged  in  a  design  for  consolidating  and 
extending  the  Church  of  England  in  the  American  Col- 
onies. With  this  object  he  drew  up  a  plan  marked  by 
his  characteristic  moderation  and  liberality ;  the  project, 
however,  came  to  nothing. 

Soon  after  his  translation  to  the  see  of  Durham,  But- 
ler delivered  and  published  his  charge  on  the  Use  and 
Importance  of  External  Religion,  which  gave  rise,  in 
conjunction  with  his  erection  of  a  "  white  marble  cross  " 
over  the  communion  table  in  his  chapel  at  Bristol,  and 
one  or  two  other  slight  circumstances,  to  the  ridiculous 
and  malignant  charge  of  popery ;  a  charge,  as  Mr.  Fitz- 
gerald observes,  "  destitute  of  a  shadow  of  positive  evi- 
dence, and  contradicted  by  the  whole  tenor  of  Butler's 
character,  life,  and  writings." 

The  revenues  from  his  see  were  lavishly  expended  in 
the  support  of  public  and  private  charities,*  while  his 
own  mode  of  life  was  most  simple  and  unostentatious. 
Of  the  frugality  of  his  table  the  following  anecdote  is 
proof:  "A  friend  of  mine,  since  deceased,  told  me," 
says  the  Rev.  John  Newton,  "  that  when  he  was  a  young 
man  he  once   dined  with  the   late  Dr.  Butler,  at  that 

*  Butler  must  have  been  of  a  naturally  munificent  as  well  as  benev 
olent  disposition.  He  was  extremely  fond,  it  appears,  of  planning 
and  building;  a  passion  not  always  very  prudently  indulged,  or  with- 
out danger,  in  early  days,  of  involving  him  in  difficulties ;  from  which, 
indeed,  on  one  occasion  Seeker's  intervention  saved  him.  He  spent 
large  sums  in  improving  his  various  residences.  It  was  probably  in 
the  indulgence  of  the  love  of  ornamentation  to  which  this  passion  led 
that  the  "  marble  cross,"  and  other  imprudent  symbols  which  were  so 
ridiculously  adduced  to  support  the  charge  of  popery,  orij^inated. 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  13 

time  Bishop  of  Durham ;  and,  though  the  guest  was 
a  man  of  fortune,  and  the  interview  by  appointment, 
the  provision  was  no  more  than  a  joint  of  meat  and  a 
pudding.  The  bishop  apologized  for  his  plain  fare  by 
saying  that  it  was  his  way  of  living ;  *  that  he  had  long 
been  disgusted  with  the  fashionable  expense  of  time  and 
money  in  entertainments,  and  was  determined  that  it 
should  receive  no  countenance  from  his  example.'  "  No 
prelate  ever  owed  less  to  politics  for  his  elevation,  or 
took  less  part  in  them.  If  he  was  not  "  wafted  to  his 
see  of  Durham,"  as  Horace  Walpole  ludicrously  said, 
"  on  a  cloud  of  metaphysics,"  he  certainly  was  not  car- 
ried there  by  political  intrigue  or  party  maneuvers.  He 
was  never  known  to  speak  in  the  House  of  Peers,  though 
constant  in  his  attendance  there. 

He  had  not  long  enjoyed  his  new  dignity  before 
symptoms  of  decay  disclosed  themselves.  He  repaired 
to  Bath  in  1752,  in  the  hope  of  recovering  his  health, 
where  he  died,  June  16,  in  the  sixty-first  year  of  his  age. 

His  face  was  thin  and  pale,  but  singularly  expressive 
of  placidity  and  benevolence.  "  His  white  hair,"  says 
Hutchinson,*  "  hung  gracefully  on  his  shoulders,  and 
his  whole  figure  was  patriarchal."  He  was  buried  in  the 
cathedral  of  Bristol,  where  two  monuments  have  been 
erected  to  his  memory.  They  record  in  suitable  in- 
scriptions (one  in  Latin  by  his  chaplain.  Dr.  Foster,  and 
the  other  in  English  by  the  late  Dr.  Southey)  his  virtues 
and  genius.  Though  epitaphs,  they  speak  no  more  than 
simple  truth. 

A  singular  anecdote  is  recorded  of  his  last  moments. 
As  Mr.  Fitzgerald  observes,  "  it  wants  direct  testimony," 
but  is  in  itself  neither  uninstructive  nor  incredible,  for 
a  dying  hour  has  often  given  strange  vividness  and  in- 
tensity to  truths  neither  previously  unknown  nor  unin- 
fluential.  It  is  generally  given  thus:  "When  Bishop 
♦  History  of  Durham,  vol.  i,  p.  578  ;  cited  in  Fitzgerald's  "Life." 


14  Analogy  of  Religion. 

Butler  lay  on  his  death-bed,  he  called  for  his  chaplain 
and  said,  *  Though  I  have  endeavored  to  avoid  sin,  and 
to  please  God  to  the  utmost  of  my  power ;  yet,  from  the 
consciousness  of  perpetual  infirmities,  I  am  still  afraid 
to  die.'  'My  Lord,'  said  the  chaplain,  'you  have  for 
gotten  that  Jesus  Christ  is  a  Saviour.'  '  True,'  was  the 
answer,  *  but  how  shall  I  know  that  he  is  a  Saviour  foi 
me?  *  *  My  Lord,  it  is  written.  Him  that  cometh  unto 
me,  I  will  in  nowise  cast  out.'  *  True,'  said  the  bishop, 
*  and  I  am  surprised  that  though  I  have  read  that  Script- 
ure a  thousand  times  over,  I  never  felt  its  virtue  till  this 
moment;  and  now  I  die  happy.'  " 

The  genius  of  Butler  was  almost  equaLy  distinguished 
by  subtilty  and  comprehensiveness,  though  the  latter 
quality  was  perhaps  the  most  characteristic.  In  his 
juvenile  correspondence  with  Clarke — already  referred 
to — he  displays  an  acuteness  which,  as  Sir  James  Mack- 
intosh observes,  "neither  himself  nor  any  other  ever 
surpassed ;"  an  analytic  skill,  which,  in  earlier  ages, 
might  easily  have  gained  him  a  rank  with  the  most  re- 
nowned of  the  schoolmen.  But  in  his  mature  works, 
though  they  are  every-where  characterized  by  subtle 
thought,  he  manifests  in  combination  with  it  qualities 
yet  more  valuable:  patient  comprehensiveness  in  the 
survey  of  complex  evidence,  a  profound  judgment  and 
a  most  judicial  calmness  in  computing  its  several  ele- 
ments, and  a  singular  constructive  skill  in  combining  the 
materials  of  argument  into  a  consistent  logical  fabric. 
This  "  architectural  power  "  of  mind  may  be  wholly  or 
nearly  wanting,  where  the  mere  analytic  faculty  may 
exist  in  much  vigor.  The  latter  may  even  be  possessed 
in  vicious  excess,  resulting  in  little  more  than  the  dis- 
integration of  the  subjects  presented  to  its  ingenuity. 
Synthetically  to  reconstruct  the  complex  unity,  when 
the  task  of  analysis  is  completed,  to  assign  the  recipro- 
cal relations  and  law  of  subordination  of  its  various 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  15 

parts,  requires  something  more.  Many  can  take  a  watch 
to  pieces  who  would  be  sorely  puzzled  to  put  it  together 
again. 

Butler  possessed  these  powers  of  analysis  and  synthe- 
sis in  remarkable  equipoise.  What  is  more,  he  could 
not  only  recombine,  and  present  in  symmetrical  har- 
mony, the  elements  of  a  complex  unity  when  capable  of 
being  subjected  to  an  exact  previous  analysis — as  in  his 
remarkable  sketch  of  the  Moral  Constitution  of  Man — 
but  he  had  a  wonderfully  keen  eye  for  detecting  remote 
analogies  and  subtle  relations  where  the  elements  are 
presented  intermingled  or  in  isolation,  and  insusceptible 
of  being  presented  as  a  single  object  of  contemplation 
previous  to  the  attempt  to  combine  them.  This  is  the 
case  with  the  celebrated  Analogy.  In  the  Sermons  on 
Human  Nature^  he  comprehensively  surveys  that  nature 
z.%  z.  system  ox  constitution;  and  after  a  careful  analysis 
of  its  principles,  affections,  and  passions,  views  these 
elements  in  combination,  endeavors  to  reduce  each  of 
these  to  its  place,  assigns  to  them  their  relative  impor- 
tance, and  deduces  from  the  whole  the  law  of  subordi- 
nation— which  he  finds  in  the  Moral  Supremacy  of  Con- 
science, as  a  key-stone  to  the  arch — the  ruling  principle 
of  the  "Constitution."  In  the  Analogy  he  gathers  up 
and  combines,  from  a  wide  survey  of  scattered  and  dis- 
jointed facts,  those  resemblances  and  relations  on  which 
the  argument  is  founded,  and  works  them  into  one  of 
the  most  original  and  symmetrical  logical  creations  to 
which  human  genius  ever  gave  birth.  The  latter  task 
was  by  far  the  more  gigantic  of  the  two?  To  recur  to 
our  previous  illustration,  Butler  is  here  like  one  who 
puts  a  watch  together  without  being  permitted  to  take 
it  to  pieces — from  the  mere  presentation  of  its  disjointed 
fragments.  In  the  former  case  he  resembled  the  physi- 
ologist who  has  an  entire  animal  to  study  and  dissect; 
in  the  latter  he  resembled  Cuvier,  constructing  out  of 


i6  Analogy  of  Religion 

disjecta  membra — a  bone  scattered  here  and  there — an 
organized  unity  which  man  had  never  seen  except  in 
isolated  fragments. 

All  Butler's  productions — even  his  briefest — display 
much  of  this  "  architectonic  "  quality  of  mind ;  in  all  he 
not  only  evinces  a  keen  analytic  power  in  discerning 
the  **  differences,"  (one  phase  of  the  philosophic  genius, 
according  to  Bacon,  and  hardly  the  brightest,)  but  a  still 
higher  power  of  detecting  the  "  analogies  "  and  "  resem- 
blances of  things,"  and  thus  of  showing  their  relation 
and  subordination.  These  peculiarities  make  his  writ- 
ings difficult ;  but  it  makes  them  profound,  and  it  gives 
them  singular  completeness. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  assign  the  precise  sphere  in  which 
Butler,  with  eminent  gifts  for  abstract  science  in  general, 
felt  most  at  home.  Facts  show  us,  not  only  that  there 
are  peculiarities  of  mental  structure  which  prompt  men 
to  the  pursuit  of  some  of  the  great  objects  of  thought  and 
speculation  rather  than  others — peculiarities  which  cir- 
cumstances may  determine  and  education  modify ;  but 
which  neither  circumstances  nor  education  can  do  more 
than  determine  or  modify;  but  that  even  in  relation  to 
the  very  same  subject  of  speculation,  there  are  minute 
and  specific  varieties  of  mind,  which  prompt  men  to  ad- 
dict themselves  rather  to  this  part  of  it  than  to  that. 
This  was  the  case  with  Butler.  Eminently  fitted  for  the 
prosecution  of  metaphysical  science  in  general,  it  is  al- 
ways the  philosophy  of  the  moral  nature  of  man  to  which  he 
most  naturally  attaches  himself,  and  on  which  he  best 
loves  to  expatiate.  Neither  Bacon  nor  Pascal  ever  re- 
volved more  deeply  the  phenomena  of  our  moral  nature, 
or  contemplated  its  inconsistencies,  its  intricacies,  its 
paradoxes,  with  a  keener  glance  or  more  comprehensive 
survey,  or  drew  from  such  survey  reflections  more  orig- 
inal or  instructive.  As  in  reading  Locke  the  young 
metaphysician  is  perpetually  startled  by  the  palpable 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  17 

apparition,  in  distinct,  sharply  defined  outline,  of  facts  of 
consciousness  which  he  recognizes  as  having  been  par- 
tially and  dimly  present  to  his  mind  before — though  too 
fugitive  to  fix,  too  vague  to  receive  a  name ;  so  in  read- 
ing Butler  he  is  continually  surprised  by  the  statement 
of  moral  facts  and  laws  which  he  then  first  adequately 
recognizes  as  true,  and  sees  in  distinct  vision  face  to 
face.  It  is  not  without  reason  that  Sir  James  Mackin- 
tosh says  of  the  sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  "  That 
in  them  Butler  has  taught  truths  more  capable  of  being 
exactly  distinguished  from  the  doctrines  of  his  predeces- 
sors, more  satisfactorily  established  by  him,  more  compre- 
hensively applied  to  particulars,  more  rationally  connect- 
ed with  each  other,  and  therefore  more  worthy  of  the  name 
of  discovery^  than  any  with  which  we  are  acquainted." 

His  special  predilections  for  the  sphere  of  speculation 
we  have  mentioned  are  strikingly  indicated  in  his  choice 
of  iheg7'ound  from  which  he  proposes  to  survey  the  ques- 
tions of  morals.  "  There  are  two  ways,"  says  he,  in  the 
preface  to  his  three  celebrated  sermons  on  Human  Na- 
ture, "  in  which  the  subject  of  morals  may  be  treated. 
One  begins  inquiring  into  the  abstract  relations  of 
things;  the  other  from  a  matter  of  fact,  namely,  what 
the  particular  nature  of  man  is,  its  several  parts,  their 
economy  or  constitution ;  from  whence  it  proceeds  to 
determine  what  course  of  life  it  is  which  is  correspond- 
ent to  this  whole  nature."  As  might  be  expected,  from 
the  tendencies  of  his  mind,  he  selects  his  latter  course. 

The  powers  of  observation  in  Butler  must  have  been, 
iu  spite  of  his  studious  life  and  his  remarkable  habits 
of  abstraction,  not  much  inferior  to  his  keen  faculty  of 
introspection,  though  this  last  was  undoubtedly  the 
main  instrument  by  which  he  traced  so  profoundly  the 
mysteries  of  our  nature.  There  have  doubtless  been 
other  men,  far  less  profound,  who  have  had  a  more 
quick  and  more  vivid  perception  of  the  peculiarities 
2 


-i8  Analogy  of  Religion. 

of  character  which  discriminate  individuals,  or  small 
classes  of  men,  (evincing  after  all,  however,  not  so 
much  a  knowledge  of  man  as  a  knowledge  of  men  •) 
still  the  masterly  manner  in  which  Butler  often  sketch- 
es  even  these,  shows  that  he  must  have  been  a  very 
sagacious  observer  of  those  phenomena  of  human  na- 
ture which  presented  themselves  from  without^  as  well 
as  of  those  which  revealed  themselves  from  within.  In 
general,  however,  it  is  the  characteristics  of  man^  the 
generic  phenomena  of  our  nature,  in  all  their  complex- 
ity and  subtilty,  that  he  best  loves  to  investigate  and 
exhibit.  The  spirit  of  his  profound  philosophy  is  mean- 
time worthy  both  of  the  Christian  character  and  ample 
intellect  of  him  who  excogitated  it.  It  is  the  very  re- 
verse of  that  of  the  philosophical  satirist  or  caricaturist; 
however  severely  just  the  foibles,  the  inconsistencies, 
the  corruptions  of  our  nature,  it  is  a  philosophy  every- 
where compassionate,  magnanimous,  and  philanthropic. 
Its  tone,  indeed,  like  that  of  the  philosophy  of  Pascal, 
(though  not  shaded  with  the  same  deep  melancholy,)  is 
entirely  modulated  by  a  profound  conviction  of  the 
frailty  and  ignorance  of  man,  of  the  little  we  know  com- 
pared with  what  is  to  be  known,  and  of  the  duty  of 
humility,  modesty,  and  caution,  in  relation  to  all  those 
great  problems  of  the  universe,  which  tempt  and  exer- 
cise man's  ambitious  speculations.  His  constant  feeling 
amid  the  beautiful  and  original  reasonings  of  the  Anal- 
ogy^ is  identical  with  that  of  Newton  when,  reverting  at 
the  close  of  life  to  his  sublime  discoveries,  he  declared 
he  seemed  only  like  a  child  who  had  been  amusing  him- 
self with  picking  up  a  few  shells  on  the  margin  of  (he 
ocean  of  universal  truth,  while  the  infinite  still  lay  un- 
explored before  him.  In  a  word,  it  is  the  feeling,  not 
only  of  Pascal  and  of  Newton,  but  of  all  the  profoundest 
speculators  of  our  race,  whose  grandest  lesson  from  all 
they  learned  was  the  vanishing  ratio  of  man's  knowledge 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  19 

to  man's  ignorance.  Hence  the  immense  value  (if  only 
as  a  discipline)  of  a  careful  study  of  Butler's  writings  to 
every  youthful  mind.  They  cannot  but  powerfully 
tend  to  check  presumption,  and  teach  modesty  and 
self-distrust. 

The  feebleness  of  Butler's  imagination  was  singularly 
contrasted  with  the  inventive  and  constructive  qualities 
of  his  intellect,  and  the  facility  with  which  he  detected 
and  employed  "  analogies "  in  the  way  of  argument. 
He  is,  indeed,  almost  unique  in  this  respect.  Other 
philosophic  minds,  (Bacon  and  Burke  are  illustrious  ex- 
amples,) which  have  possessed  similar  aptitudes  for 
"  analogical  "  reasoning,  have  usually  had  quite  suffi- 
cient of  the  kindred  activity  of  imagination  to  employ 
"  analogies  "  for  the  purpose  of  poetical  illustration.  If 
Butler  possessed  this  faculty  by  nature  in  any  tolerable 
measure,  it  must  (as  has  been  the  case  with  some  other 
great  thinkers)  have  been  repressed  and  absorbed  by 
his  habits  of  abstraction.  His  defect  in  this  respect  is, 
in  some  respects,  to  be  regretted,  since  unquestionably 
the  illustrations  which  imagination  would  have  supplied 
to  argument,  and  the  graces  it  would  have  imparted  to 
style,  would  have  made  his  writings  both  more  intelligi- 
ble and  more  attractive.  It  is  said  that  once,  and  once 
only,  "  he  courted  the  muses,"  having  indited  a  solitary 
"acrostic  to  a  fair  cousin  "  who  for  the  first  and,  as  it 
seems,  the  only  time,  inspired  him  with  the  tender 
passion*  But,  as  one  of  his  biographers  says,  we  have 
probably  no  great  reason  to  lament  the  loss  of  this  frag- 
ment of  his  poetry. 

Butler's  composition  is  almost  as  destitute  of  wit  as 
of  the  graces  of  imagination.  Yet  is  he  by  no  means 
without  that  dry  sort  of  humor  which  often  accompanies 
very  vigorous  logic,  and,  indeed,  is  in  some  instances 
inseparable  from  it ;  for  the  neat  detection  of  a  sophism, 
or  the  sudden  and  unexpected  explosion  of  a  fallacy, 


20  Analogy  of  Religion. 

produces  much  the  same  effect  as:  wit  on  those  who  are 
capable  of  enjoying  close  and  cogent  reasoning.  There 
is  also  a  kind  of  simple,  grave,  satirical  pleasantry,  with 
which  he  sometimes  states  and  refutes  an  objection,  by 
no  means  without  its  piquancy. 

As  to  the  complaint  of  obscurity,  which  has  been  so 
often  charged  on  Butler's  style,  it  is  difficult  to  see  its 
justice  in  the  sense  in  which  it  has  usually  been  preferred. 
He  is  a  difficult  author,  no  doubt,  but  he  is  so  from  the 
close  packing  of  his  thoughts,  and  their  immense  gener- 
ality and  comprehensiveness  ;  as  also  from  what  may  be 
called  the  breadth  of  his  march,  and  from  occasional 
lateral  excursions  for  the  purpose  of  disposing  of  some 
objection  which  he  does  not  formally  mention,  but  which 
might  harass  his  flank ;  it  certainly  is  not  from  inde- 
terminate language  or  (ordinarily)  involved  construction. 
All  that  is  really  required  in  the  reader,  capable  of  un- 
derstanding him  at  all,  is  to  do  just  what  he  does  with 
lyrical  poetry,  (if  we  may  employ  an  old,  and  yet  in  this 
one  point  not  inapt  comparison ;)  he  must  read  suffi- 
ciently often  to  make  all  the  transitions  of  thought  fa- 
miliar, he  must  let  the  mind  dwell  with  patience  on  each 
argument  till  its  entire  scope  and  bearing  are  properly 
appreciated.  Nothing  certainly  is  wanting  in  the  method 
or  arrangement  of  the  thoughts,  and  the  diction  seems 
to  us  selected  with  the  utmost  care  and  precision.  In- 
deed, as  Professor  Fitzgerald  justly  observes,  a  colla- 
tion of  the  first  with  the  subsequent  editions -of  the 
Analogy  (the  variations  are  given  in  Mr.  Fitzgerald's 
edition)  will  show,  by  the  nature  of  the  alterations,  what 
pains  Butler  bestowed  on  a  point  on  which  he  is  errone- 
ously supposed  to  have  been  negligent.  In  subjects  so 
abstruse,  and  involving  so  much  generality  of  expression, 
the  utmost  difficulty  must  always  be  experienced  in  se- 
lecting language  which  conveys  neithef  more  nor  less 
than  what  is  intended ;  and  this  point  Butler  must  have 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  21 

labored  immensely,  it  may  be  added  successfully,  since 
he  has  at  least  produced  works  which  have  seldom  giv- 
en rise  to  disputes  as  to  his  meaning.  Though  he  may 
be  difficult  to  be  understood,  few  people  complain  of 
his  being  liable  to  be  w/xunderstood.  In  short,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  any  man  of  so  comprehensive  a 
mind,  and  dealing  with  such  abstract  subjects,  ever  con- 
densed the  results  of  twenty  years*  meditations  into  so 
small  a  compass  with  so  little  obscurity.  No  doubt 
greater  amplification  would  have  made  him  more  pleas- 
ing, but  it  may  be  questioned  whether  the  perusal  of  his 
writings  would  have  been  so  useful  a  discipline,  and 
whether  the  truths  he  has  delivered  would  have  fixed 
themselves  so  indelibly  as  they  now  generally  do  in  the 
minds  of  all  who  diligently  study  him.  It  is  the  result 
of  the  very  activity  of  mind  his  writings  stimulate  and 
demand.  But,  at  any  rate,  if  precision  in  the  use  of 
language,  and  method  and  consecutiveness  in  the 
thoughts,  are  sufficient  to  rebut  the  charge  of  obscurity, 
Butler  is  not  chargeable  with  the  fault  in  the  ordinary 
sense.  We  must  never  forget  what  Whately  in  his 
Rhetoric  has  so  well  illustrated — that  perspicuity  is  a 
"  relative  quality."  To  the  intelligent,  or  those  who  are 
willing  to  take  sufficient  pains  to  understand,  Butler  will 
not  seem  chargeable  with  obscurity.  The  diction  is 
plain,  downright  Saxon-English,  and  the  style,  however 
homely,  has,  as  the  writer  just  mentioned  observes,  the 
great  charm  of  transparent  simplicity  of  purpose  and 
unaffected  earnestness. 

The  immortal  Analogy  has  probably  done  more  to  si- 
lence the  objections  of  infidelity  than  any  other  ever 
written,  from  the  earliest  "apologies"  downward.  It 
not  only  most  critically  met  the  spirit  of  unbelief 'in  the 
author's  own  day,  but  is  equally  adapted  to  meet  that 
which  chiefly  prevails  in  all  time.  In  every  age  some  of 
the  principal,  perhaps  the  principal,  objections  to  the 


22  Analogy  of  Religion. 

Christian  Revelation  have  been  those  which  men's  pre- 
conceptions of  the  Divine  character  and  administration — 
of  what  God  must  be,  and  what  God  must  do — have  sug- 
gested against  certain  facts  in  the  sacred  history,  or  cer- 
tain doctrines  it  reveals.  To  show  the  objector  then 
(supposing  him  to  be  a  theist,  as  nine  tenths  of  all  such 
objectors  have  been)  that  the  very  same  or  similar  dif* 
nculties  are  found  in  the  structure  of  the  universe  and 
the  divine  administration  of  it,  is  to  wrest  every  such 
weapon  completely  from  his  hands,  if  he  be  a  fair  rea- 
soner  and  remains  a  theist  at  all.  He  is  bound  by  strict 
logical  obligation  either  to  show  that  the  parallel  diffi- 
culties do  not  exist,  or  to  show  how  he  can  solve  them, 
while  ht  cannot  solve  those  of  the  Bible.  In  default  of 
doing  either  of  these  things,  he  ought  either  to  renounce 
all  such  objections  to  Christianity,  or  abandon  theism  al- 
together. It  is  true,  therefore,  that  though  Butler  leaves 
the  alternative  of  atheism  open,  he  hardly  leaves  any  oth- 
er alternative  to  nine  tenths  of  the  theists  who  have  ob- 
jected to  Christianity. 

It  has  been  sometimes  said,  by  way  of  reproach,  that 
Butler  does  leave  that  door  open  ;  that  his  work  does  not 
confute  the  atheist.  The  answer  is,  that  it  is  not  its  ob- 
ject to  confute  atheism  ;  but  it  is  equally  true,  that  it 
does  not  diminish  by  one  grain  any  of  the  arguments 
against  it.  It  leaves  the  evidence  for  theism — every 
particle  of  it — just  where  it  was.  Butler  merely  avails 
himself  of  facts  which  exist,  undeniably  exist,  (whether 
men  be  atheists  or  theists,)  to  neutralize  a  certain  class 
of  objections  against  Christianity.  And,  as  the  exhibi- 
tion of  such  facts  as  form  -the  pivot  on  which  Butler's 
argument  turns  does  not  impugn  the  truth  of  theism,  but 
leaves  its  conclusions,  and  the  immense  preponderance 
and  convergence  of  evidence  which  establish  them,  just 
as  they  were,  so  it  is  equally  true  that  Butler  has  suffi- 
ciently guarded  his  argument  from  any  perversion;  for 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  23 

example,  in  Part  I,  chap,  vi,  and  Part  II,  chap.  viii.  He 
has  also,  with  his  accustomed  acuteness  and  judgment, 
shown  that,  even  on  the  principles  of  atheism  itself,  its 
confident  assumption  that,  //  its  principles  be  granted, 
a  future  life,  future  happiness,  future  misery,  is  a 
dream  —  cannot  be  depended  on;  for  since  men  have 
existed,  they  may  again ;  and  if  in  a  bad  condition  now, 
in  a  worse  hereafter.  It  is  not,  on  such  an  hypothesis, 
a  whit  more  unaccountable  that  man's  life  should  be  re- 
newed or  preserved,  or  perpetuated  forever,  than  that 
it  should  have  been  originated  at  all.  On  this  point 
he  truly  says,  "That  we  are  to  live  hereafter  is  just 
as  reconcilable  with  the  scheme  of  atheism,  and  as 
well  to  be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now 
alive,  is;  and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd 
than  to  argue  from  that  scheme  that  there  can  be  no 
future  state." 

It  has  been  also  alleged  that  the  analogy  only  "  shifts 
the  difficulty  from  revealed  to  natural  religion,"  and  that 
"  atheists  might  make  use  of  the  arguments,  and  have 
done  so.  The  answer  is,  not  only  (as  just  said)  that  the 
arguments  of  Butler  leave  every  particle  of  the  evidence 
for  theism  just  where  it  was,  and  that  he  has  sufficient- 
ly guarded  against  all  abuse  of  them  ;  but  that  tht/acfSj 
of  which  it  is  so  foolishly  said  that  the  atheist  migAi 
make  ill  use,  had  always  been  the  very  arguments  which 
he  /la^  used,  and  of  which  Butler  only  made  a  new  and 
beneficial  application.  The  objections  with  which  he 
perplexes  and  baffles  the  deist,  /le  did  not  give  to  the 
atheist's  armory;  he  took  them  from  thence  merely  to 
make  an  unexpected  and.  more  legitimate  use  of  them. 
The  atheist  had  never  neglected  such  weapons,  nor  was 
likely  to  do  so,  previous  to  Butler's  adroit  application  of 
them.  The  charge  is  ridiculous.  As  well  might  a  man, 
who  had  wrested  a  stiletto  from  an  assassin  to  defend 
himself,  be  accused  of  having  put  the  weapon  into  tlic 


24  Analogy  of  Religion. 

assassin's  hands !    It  was  there  before ;  he  merely  wrest- 
ed it  thence.     It  is  just  so  with  Butler. 

Further,  we  cannot  but  think  that  the  conclusiveness 
of  Butler's  work  as  against  its  true  object,  The  Deist, 
has  often  been  underrated  by  many  even  of  its  genuine 
admirers.  Thus  Dr.  Chalmers,  for  instance,  who  gives 
such  glowing  proofs  of  his  admiration  of  the  work,  and 
expatiates  in  a  congenial  spirit  on  its  merits,  affirms 
that  "  those  overrate  the  power  of  analogy  who  look  to  it 
for  any  very  distinct  or  positive  contribution  to  the  Chris- 
tian argument.  To  repel  objections,  in  fact,  is  the  great 
service  which  analogy  has  rendered  to  the  cause  of  Rev- 
elation, and  it  is  the  only  service  which  we  seek  for  at 
its  hands."*  This,  abstractedly,  is  true;  but  in  fact^ 
considering  \\\^  position  of  the  bulk  of  the  objectors,  that 
they  have  been  invincibly  persuaded  of  the  truth  of 
theism,  and  that  their  objections  to  Christianity  have 
been  exclusively  or  chiefly  of  the  kind  dealt  with  in  the 
Analogy^  the  work  is  much  more  than  an  argumentum  ad 
hominemj  it  is  not  simply  of  negative  value.  To  such 
objectors  it  logically  establishes  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
or  it  forces  them  to  recede  from  theism,  which  the  bulk 
will  not  do.  If  a  man  says,  "  I  am  invincibly  persuad- 
ed of  the  truth  of  proposition  A,  but  I  cannot  receive 
proposition  B,  because  objections  a  (i  y  are  opposed  to 
it;  if  these  were  removed,  my  objections  would  cease;" 
then,  if  you  can  show  that  a  j3  y  equally  apply  to  the 
proposition  A,  his  reception  of  which,  he  says,  is  based 
on  invincible  evidence,  you  do  really  compel  such  a 
man  to  believe  that  not  only  B  may  be  true,  but  that  it 
is  true,  unless  he  be  willing  (which  few  in  the  parallel 
case  are)  to  abandon  proposition  A  as  well  as  B.  This 
is  precisely  the  condition  in  which  the  majority  of  deists 
have  ever  been,  if  we  may  judge  from  their  writings. 
It  is  usually  the  a  priori  assumption,  that  certain  facts 
*  Prelections  on  Butler^  etc.,  p.  7. 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  25 

in  the  history  of  the  Bible,  or  some  portions  of  its  doc- 
trine, are  unworthy  of  the  Deity,  and  incompatible  with 
his  character  or  administration,  that  has  chiefly  excited 
the  incredulity  of  the  deist ;  far  more  than  any  dissatis- 
faction with  the  positive  evidence  which  substantiates 
the  Divine  origin  of  Christianity.  Neutralize  these  ob- 
jections by  showing  that  they  are  equally  applicable  to 
what  he  declares  he  cannot  relinquish — the  doctrine  of 
theism — and  you  show  him,  if  he  has  a  particle  of  logical 
sagacity,  not  only  that  Christianity  may  be  true,  but 
that  it  is  so ;  and  his  only  escape  is  by  relapsing  into 
atheism,  or  resting  his  opposition  on  other  objections  of 
a  very  feeble  character  in  comparison,  and  which,  prob- 
ably, few  would  have  ever  been  contented  with  alone ; 
for  apart  from  these  objections  which  Butler  repels,  the 
historical  evidence  of  Christianity — the  evidence  on  be- 
half of  the  integrity  of  its  records,  and  the  honesty  and 
sincerity  of  its  founders,  showing  that  they  could  not 
have  constructed  such  a  system  if  they  mouldy  and  would 
not,  supposing  them  impostors,  if  they  could — is  stronger 
than  that  for  any  fact  in  history. 

In  consequence  of  this  position  of  the  argument,  But- 
ler's book,  to  large  classes  of  objectors,  though  practi- 
cally an  argumentum  ad  hofuinem^  not  only  proves  Chris- 
tianity may  be  true,  but  in  all  logical  fairness  proves  it 
is  so.  This  he  himself,  with  his  usual  judgment,  points 
out.  He  says :  "  And  objections,  which  are  equally  ap- 
plicable to  both  natural  and  revealed  religion,  are, 
properly  speaking,  answered  by  its  being  shown  that 
they  are  so,  provided  the  former  be  admitted  to  be  true'' 

The  praise  which  Mackintosh  bestowed  on  this  great 
work  is  alike  worthy  of  it  and  himself.  "  Butler's  great 
work,  though  only  a  commentary  on  the  singularly  orig- 
inal and  pregnant  passage  of  Origen,  which  is  so  honestly 
prefixed  to  it  as  a  motto,  is,  notwithstanding,  the  most 
original  and  profound  work  extant  in  any  language  oa 


26  Analogy  of  Religion. 

the  Philosophy  of  Religion.''*  The  favorite  topics  of 
the  Sermons  are,  of  course,  largely  insisted  on  in  the 
Analogy:  such  as  the  ''ignorance  of  man;"  the  restric- 
tions which  the  limitations  of  his  nature  and  his  position 
in  the  universe  should  impose  on  his  speculations ;  hia 
subjection  to  "probability  as  the  guide  of  life;"  the 
folly  and  presumption  of  pronouncing,  ^  priori^  on  the 
character  and  conduct  of  the  Divine  Ruler  from  our 
contracted  point  of  view,  and  our  glimpses  of  but  a  very 
small  segment  of  his  universal  plan.  These  topics 
Butler  enforces  with  a  power  not  less  admirable  than 
the  sagacity  with  which  he  traces  the  analogies  between 
the  "  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature,"  and  the  dis- 
closures of  "  Divine  Revelation."  These  last,  of  course, 
form  the  staple  of  the  argument ;  but  to  enforce  the 
proper  deductions  from  them  the  above  favorite  topics 
are  absolutely  essential. 

It  has  been  sometimes,  though  erroneously,  surmised 
that  Butler  was  considerably  indebted  to  preceding 
writers.  That  in  the  progress  of  the  long  deistical  con- 
troversy many  theologians  should  have  caught  glimpses 
of  the  same  line  of  argument,  is  not  wonderful.  The 
constant  iteration  by  the  English  deists  of  that  same 
class  of  difficulties  to  which  the  Analogy  replies,  could 
not  fail  to  lead  to  a  partial  perception  of  the  powerful 
instrument  it  was  reserved  for  Butler  effectually  to  wield. 
It  has  been  here  as  with  almost  every  other  great  intel- 
lectual achievement  of  man ;  many  minds  have  been 
simultaneously  engaged  by  the  natural  progress  of  events 
about  the  same  subject  of  thought ;  there  have  been 
"coming  shadows"  and  "vague  anticipations,"  perhaps 

*  A  far  different  and  utterly  inconsistent  judgment  in  all  respects 
is  reported,  in  his  "  Life,"  to  have  fallen  from  him.  But  as  Professor 
Fitzgerald  shows,  it  is  so  strangely,  and,  indeed,  amusingly  contrary 
to  the  above,  that  it  must  have  been  founded  on  some  mistake  of 
something  that  must  have  been  said  in  conversation. 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler.  27 

even  simultaneous  inventions  or  discoveries ;  and  then 
ensues  much  debate  as  to  the  true  claimants.  Thus  it 
was  in  relation  to  the  calculus,  the  analysis  of  water, 
the  invention  of  the  steam-engine,  and  the  discovery  of 
Neptune. 

In  the  present  case,  however,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  merit  of  the  systematic  construction  of  the  en- 
tire argument  rests  with  Butler.  Nor  would  it  have  much 
detracted  from  his  merit,  even  if  he  had  derived  far 
larger  fragments  of  the  fabric  from  his  contemporaries 
than  we  have  any  reason  to  believe  he  did.  They 
would  have  been  but  single  stones ;  the  architectural 
genius  which  brought  them  from  their  distant  quarries 
and  polished  them,  and  wrought  them  into  a  massive 
evidence,  was  his  alone. 

Professor  Fitzgerald  has  truly  remarked,  that  the  work 
of  Dr.  James  Foster  against  Tindal  (an  author  Butler 
evidently  has  constantly  in  his  eye)  presents  some  curi- 
ous parallelisms  with  certain  passages  of  the  Analogy.  We 
have  ourselves  noted  in  Conybeare's  reply  to  the  same 
infidel  writer  (published  six  years  before  the  Analogy) 
other  parallelisms  not  less  striking.  But  it  seems  quite 
improbable  that  Butler  should  have  derived  aid  from 
any  such  sources,  since  his  work  was  being  excogitated 
for  many  years  before  it  was  published ;  nay,  as  we  have 
seen,  it  may  be  conjectured  that  he  largely  transfused 
into  it  portions  of  the  sermons  delivered  so  long  before 
at  the  Rolls,  and  of  which  a  far  greater  number  must 
have  been  preached  than  the  fifteen  he  published ;  so 
that  perhaps,  it  is  more  near  the  truth  to  say  that  con- 
temporary writers  had  been  indebted  to  him  than  he  to 
them. 

The  "  pregnant  sentence  "  from  Origen,  however,  is 
not  the  only  thing  which  may  have  suggested  to  Butler 
his  great  work.  Berkeley,  in  a  long  passage  of  the 
"  Minute  Philosopher,"  cited  by  Mr.  Fitzgerald,  clearly 


28  Analogy  of  Religion. 

lays  down  the  principle  on  which  such  a  woik   as  the 
Analogy  might  be  constructed. 

The  spirit  of  the  Analogy  is  admirable.  Though  em- 
inently controversial  in  its  origin  and  purpose ;  and 
though  the  author  must  constantly  have  had  the  dcistical 
writers  of  the  day  in  his  eye,  his  work  is  calm  and  dig- 
nified, and  divested  of  every  trace  of  the  controversial 
spirit.  He  does  not  even  mention  the  names  of  the 
men  whose  opinions  he  is  refuting ;  and  if  their  systems 
had  been  merely  some  new  minerals  or  aerolites  dropped 
upon  the  world  from  some  unknown  sphere,  he  could 
not  have  analyzed  them  with  less  of  passion. 

Of  Butler's  ethical  philosophy,  as  expounded  especial- 
ly in  the  Sermons  on  Human  Nature^  Sir  James  Mackin- 
tosh's remarks  prefixea  to  this  Encyclopaedia*  super- 
sede further  notice  in  the  present  brief  article.  But  it 
may  be  remarked  in  general  of  the  sermons  preached  at 
the  Rolls,  that  though  not  so  much  read  (if  we  except, 
perhaps,  the  three  just  mentioned)  as  the  Analogy^  they 
are  to  the  full  as  worthy  of  being  read ;  they  deserve 
all  that  is  so  strikingly  said  of  them  in  the  Preliminary 
Dissertation.  Some  of  them  fill  one  with  wonder  at  the 
sagacity  with  which  the  moral  paradoxes  in  human  na- 
ture are  investigated  and  reconciled.  Take,  for  exam- 
ple, the  sermon  on  Balaam.  The  first  feeling  in  many 
a  mind  on  reading  the  history  in  the  Old  Testament  is, 
that  man  could  not  so  act  in  the  given  circumstances. 
We  doubt  if  ever  any  man  deeply  pondered  the  sermon 
of  Butler,  in  which  he  dwells  on  the  equally  unaccount- 
able phenomena  of  human  conduct,  less  observed,  in- 
deed, only  because  more  observable,  and  questioned 
any  longer  man's  powers  of  self-deception,  even  to  such 
feats  of  folly  and  wickedness  as  are  recorded  of  the 
prophet. 

The  editions  of  Butler's  writings,  separately  or  alto- 
*  Encyclopaedia  Britannica. 


Sketch  of  Joseph  Butler,  29 

gether,  have  been  numerous,  and  it  is  impossible  within 
the  limits  of  this  article  to  specify  them,  still  less  to  do 
justice  to  the  literature  which  they  have  produced.  His 
commentators  have  been  many  and  most  illustrious  : 
seldom  has  a  man  who  wrote  so  little  engaged  so  many 
great  minds  to  do  him  homage  by  becoming  his  expo- 
nents and  annotators.  It  may  be  permitted,  however,  to 
mention  with  deserved  honor  the  remarks  of  Sir  James 
Mackintosh,  prefixed  to  this  Encyclopaedia  ;  the  "  Pre- 
lections "  of  Dr.  Chalmers  on  the  Analogy;  the  valuable 
"  Essay  "  of  Dr.  Hampden  on  the  "  Philosophical  Evi- 
dences of  Christianity;"  some  beautiful  applications  of 
Butler's  principle  in  Whately's  "  Essays  on  the  Pecul- 
iarities of  Christianity;"  and  the  admiral^  edition  of 
the  Analogy  by  Professor  Fitzgerald,  which  is  enriched 
by  many  very  acute  and  judicious  notes,  and  by  a 
copious  and  valuable  index. 


ADVERTISEMENT  PREFIXED  TO  THE  FIRST 
EDITION. 


IF  the  reader  should  meet  here  with  any  thing  which 
he  had  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in 
the  observations  upon  the  constitution  and  course  of 
nature,  these  being  all  obvious ;  but  in  the  application 
of  them :  in  which,  though  there  is  nothing  but  what 
appears  to  me  of  some  real  weight,  and  therefore  of 
great  importance,  yet  he  will  observe  several  things 
which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little,  if  he  can  think 
things  to  l^  of  little  importance  which  are  of  any  real 
weight  at  all  upon  such  a  subject  as  religion.  How- 
ever, the  proper  force  of  the  following  treatise  lies  in 
the  whole  general  analogy  considered  together. 

It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for  granted, 
by  many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  so  much  a 
subject  of  inquiry,  but  that  it  is  now  at  length  discov- 
ered to  be  fictitious.  And  accordingly  they  treat  it  as 
if,  in  the  present  age,  this  were  an  agreed  point  among 
all  people  of  discernment,  and  nothing  remained  but  to 
set  it  up  as  a  principal  subject  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as 
it  were,  by  way  of  reprisals  for  its  having  so  long  inter- 
rupted the  pleasures  of  the  world.  On  the  contrary, 
thus  much,  at  least,  will  be  here  found — not  taken  for 
granted,  but  proved — that  any  reasonable  man  who  will 
thoroughly  consider  the  matter  may  be  as  much  assured 
as  he  is  of  his  own  being,  that  it  is  not,  however,  so  cleat 
a  case  that  there  is  nothing  in  it.  There  is,  I  think, 
strong  evidence  of  its  truth ;  but  it  is  certain  no  one 
can,  upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied  of  the  con- 
trary. And  the  practical  consequence  to  be  drawn  from 
this  is  not  attended  to  by  every  one  who  is  concerned  in  it 

May,  1736. 


CONTENTS, 


Page 

Sketch  OF  Joseph  Butler 5 

Introduction 33 


PART    I. 

OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

Cbafter 

I.  Of  a  Future  Life 45 

II.  Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Pun- 
ishments,  AND   particularly   OF  THE  LAITER 69 

III.  Of  THE  Moral  Government  of  God 84 

IV.  Of  A  State  of  Probation,  as  Implying  Trial,  Dif- 

ficulties,  and  Danger 113 

V.  Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  Intended  for  Moral 

Discipline  and  Improvement 124 

VI.  Or  THE  Opinion  of  Necessity,  Considered  as  In- 

FLUENaNG  Practice 152 

VII.  Of  the  Government  of  God,  Considered  as  a 
Scheme  or  Constitution,  Imperfectly  Compre- 
hended   171 

Conclusion 184 


32  Contents. 


PART    II. 

OF  REVEALED  RELIGION 

Chaptkr  Page 

I.  Oe  the  Importance  of  Christianity 191 

II.  Of  the  Supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revela- 
tion, Considered  as  Miraculous 212 

III.  Of  our  Incapacity  of  Judging  what  were  to  be 

Expected  in  a  Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility, 
FROM  Analogy,  that  it  must  Contain  Things 
Appearing  Liable  to  Objections 222 

IV.  Of  Christianity,  Considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Con- 

stitution, Imperfectly  Comprehended 240 

V.  Of  the  Particular  System  of  Christianity  ;  the 
Appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemp- 
tion of  the  World  by  him 249 

VI.  Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation; 
AND  of  the  Supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof 

OF    IT 271 

VII.  Of  the  Particular  Evidence  for  Christianity..  292 

VIII.  Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against 
Arguing  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Re- 
ligion   333 

Conclusion 347 

DISSERTATIONS. 

I.  Of  Personal  Identity 357 

II.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue 365 

Index 377 


INTRODUCTION 


PROBABLE  Evidence  is  essentially  distinguished 
from  Demonstrative  by  this,  that  it  admits  of  de- 
grees; and  of  all  variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  moral 
certainty  to  the  very  lowest  presumption.  Difference  be- 
We  cannot,  indeed,  say  a  thing  is  probably  SDeS^Jf^t-A 
true  upon  one  very  slight  presumption  for  ^^^e  Evidence.  >^v^ 
it ;  because,  as  there  may  be  probabilities  on  both  sides 
of  a  question,  there  may  be  some  against  it ;  and  though 
there  be  not,  yet  a  slight  presumption  does  not  beget 
that  degree  of  conviction  which  is  implied  in  saying  a 
thing  is  probably  true.  But  that  the  slightest  possible 
presumption  is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability  appears 
from  hence — that  such  low  presumption,  often  repeated, 
will  amount  even  to  moral  certainty.  Thus  a  man's  hav- 
ing observed  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  to-day,  affords 
some  sort  of  presumption,  though  the  lowest  imaginable, 
that  it  may  happen  again  to-morrow.  But  the  observa- 
tion of  this  event  for  so  many  days,  and  months,  and 
ages  together,  as  it  has  been  observed  by  mankind,  gives 
us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will. 

2.  That  which  chiefly  constitutes  Probability  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  word  likely^  that  is,  like  some  truth  *  or 
tnie  event ;  like  it  in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in      Likeneas  con- 

/.  r   -i.         •  J.  1    stltutes    Proba- 

some  more  or  fewer  of  its  circumstances.f  biiity. 

*  Verisimile. 

f  ["  Like  it  in  itself,"  seems  to  indicate  the  case  in  which  we  have 
ascertained  the  whole  nature  of  the  truth  or  known  fact ;  for  example, 
ascertained  the  whole  of  the  conditions  upon  which  a  given  conse- 
3 


34  Analogy  of  Religion. 

For  when  we  determine  a  thing  to  be  probably  true — 
suppose  that  an  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass — it  is 
from  the  mind's  remarking  in  it  a  likeness  to  some 
other  event  which  we  have  observed  has  come  to  pass. 
And  this  observation  forms,  in  numberless  daily  in- 
stances, a  presumption,  opinion,  or  full  conviction,  that 
such  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass ;  according  as  the 
observation  is,  that  the  like  event  has  sometimes,  most 
commonly,  or  always,  so  far  as  our  observation  reaches, 
come  to  pass  at  like  distances  of  time,  or  place,  or  upon 
like  occasions.    Hence  arises  the  belief  that 

Illustrations.  ,.,,...,.  .„ 

a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow 
up  to  the  stature  and  strength  of  a  man  ;  that  food  will 
contribute  to  the  preservation  of  its  life,  and  the  want 
of  it  for  such  a  number  of  days,  be  its  certain  destruc- 
tion. So,  likewise,  the  rule  and  measure  of  our  hopes 
and  fears  concerning  the  success  of  our  pursuits ;  our 
expectations  that  others  will  act  so  and  so  in  such  cir- 
cumstances ;  and  our  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed 
from  such  principles ; — all  these  rely  upon  our  having 
observed  the  like,  to  what  we  hope,  fear,  expect,  judge ; 
I  say  upon  our  having  observed  the  like,  either  with  re- 
spect to  others  or  ourselves.  And  thus,  whereas  the 
prince  *  who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  climate  natu- 
rally concluded,  in  the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was  no 
such  thing  as  water's  becoming  hard,  because  he  had  al- 
ways observed  it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding ; — we,  on  the 
contrary, -from  analogy,  conclude  that  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption at  all  against  this;  that  it  is  supposable  there 

quence  takes  place.  This  is  the  case  of  a  strict  induction.  "  Like  in 
its  evidence,"  when  the  same  testimony  or  proof  which  we  have  fouud 
credible  for  >ome  cases  leads  us  to  believe  something  else.  "  Like  it 
in  some  more  or  fewer  of  its  circumstances,"  refers  to  analogies,  in  the 
popular  sense  of  the  term,  as  before  explained, — F.] 

*  The  story  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke,  in   the  chapter  on  Probability 
Essay  on  :he  Human  Understanding,  book  iv,  chap,  xv,  §  5. 


Introduction.  35 

may  be  frost  in  England  any  given  day  in  January  next 
probable  that  there  will  on  some  day  of  the  month ;  and 
that  the«  is  a  moral  certainty,  that  is,  ground  for  an 
expectation,  without  any  doubt  of  it,  in  some  part  or 
other  of  the  winter. 

3.  Probable  Evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but 
an  imperfect  kind  of  information,  and  is  to  be  consid- 
ered as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  probability  the 
capacities.  For  nothing  which  is  the  possi-  i^^uiaLn  aiS 
ble  object  of  knowledge,  whether  past,  pres-  ^^^^ 
ent,  or  future,  can  be  probable  to  an  Infinite  Intelli- 
gence; since  it  cannot  but  be  discerned  absolutely,  as  it 
is  in  itself,  certainly  true  or  certainly  false.  But,  to  us, 
probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of  diffi- 
culty, or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  satisfactory 
evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen,  if  the  result  of 
examination  be,  that  there  appears,  upon  the  whole,  any, 
even  the  lowest,  presumption  on  one  side,  and  none  on  the 
other,  or  a  greater  presumption  on  one  side,  though  in 
the  lowest  degree  greater,  this  determines  the  question, 
even  in  matters  of  speculation;  and,  in  matters  of  prac- 
tice, will  lay  us  under  an  absolute  and  formal  obligation, 
in  point  of  prudence  and  of  interest,  to  act  upon  that 
presumption,  or  low  probability,  though  it  be  so  low  as 
to  leave  the  mind  in  very  great  doubt  which  is  the  truth.* 
For  surely  a  man  is  as  really  bound  in  prudence  to  do 
what,  upon  the  whole,  appears  according  to  the  best  of 
his  judgment  to  be  for  his  happiness,  as  what  he  cer- 
tainly knows  to  be  so.  Nay,  further,  in  questions  of 
;5reat  consequence,  a  reasonable  man  will  think  it  con 

[♦  This  course  is  reasonable,  but  more  is  required  in  religion.  Its 
evidence  must  be  sufficient  not  only  to  show  how  its  duties  may  be 
performed,  and  to  indicate  the  pnidence  of  obedience,  but  strong 
enough  to  cause  full  belief  in  a  reasonable  mind.  Belief  is  a  condi- 
tion of  salvation,  and  is  involved  in  full  submission  to  God.] 


36  Analogy  of  Religion. 

cerns  him  to  remark  lower  probabilities  and  presump- 
tions than  these  ;  such  as  amount  to  no  more  than  show- 
ing one  side  of  a  question  to  be  as  supposable  alfd  cred- 
ible as  the  other ;  nay,  such  as  but  amount  to  much  less 
even  than  this.  For  numberless  instances  might  be  men- 
tioned respecting  the  common  pursuits  of  life,  where  a 
man  would  be  thought,  in  a  literal  sense,  distracted,  who 
would  not  act,  and  with  great  application,  too,  not  only 
upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon  much  less,  and  where  the 
probability  or  chance  was  greatly  against  his  succeeding.* 
4.  It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the 
nature,  the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability ;  or 
Analogy  of  whence  it  proceeds,  that  likeness  should  be- 
S^t^thsStog  get  that  presumption,  opinion,  and  full  con- 
objections.  viction  which  the  human  mind  is  formed  to 

receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does  necessarily  produce 
in  every  one ;  or  to  guard  against  the  errors  to  which 
reasoning  from  analogy  is  liable.  This  belongs  to  the 
subject  of  logic,!  and  is  a  part  of  that  subject  which  has 
not  yet  been  thoroughly  considered.  Indeed,  I  shall 
not  take  upon  me  to  say  how  far  the  extent,  compass,  and 
force  of  analogical  reasoning  can  be  reduced  to  general 
heads  and  rules,  and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a  system. 
But  though  so  little  in  this  way  has  been  attempted  by 
those  who  have  treated  of  our  intellectual  powers,  and 
the  exercise  of  them,  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  we  may 
be,  as  we  unquestionably  are,  assured  that  analogy  is  of 
weight,  in  various  degrees,  toward  determining  our  judg- 
ment, and  our  practice.  Nor  does  it  in  any  wise  cease 
to, be  of  weight  in  those  cases,  because  persons,  either 
given  to  dispute,  or  who  require  things  to  be  stated  with 
greater  exactness  than  our  faculties  appear  to  admit  of 
in  practical  matters,  may  find  other  cases,  in  which  it  is 
not  easy  to  say  whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  of  any  weight ; 

♦  See  part  ii,  chap.  vi. 

\\  See  Mills'  System  of  Logic,  hook  iii,  chap  xx,] 


Introduction.  37 

Qr  instances  of  seeming  analogies,  which  are  really  of 
none.  It  is  enough  to  the  present  purpose  to  observe, 
that  this  general  way  of  arguing  is  evidently  natural, 
just,  and  conclusive.  For  there  is  no  man  can  make  a 
question  but  that  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,  and  be 
seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all,  in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and 
not  in  that  of  a  square. 

5.  Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Origen* 
has  with  singular  sagacity  observed,  that  "  he  who  be- 
lieves the  Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from      ^_,     , 

^  ^  Ongen'a     r©- 

Him  who  is  the  Author  of  Nature,  may  well   mark— its appU- 

.  .        ,       cation. 

expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties  in 
it  as  are  found  in  the  constitution  of  nature."  And  in 
a  like  way  of  reflection,  it  may  be  added,  that  he  who 
denies  the  Scripture  to  have  been  from  God,  upon  ac- 
count of  these  difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  same  reason, 
deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  there  be  an  analogy,  or  likeness,  between 
that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Providence 
which  revelation  informs  us  of,  and  that  system  of 
things  and  dispensation  of  Providence  which  experi- 
ence, together  with  reason,  informs  us  of,  that  is,  the 
known  course  of  nature,  this  is  a  presumption  that 
they  have  both  the  same  author  and  cause,  at  least 
so  far  as  to  answer  objections  against  the  former  be- 
ing from  God,  drawn  from  any  thing  which  is  analog- 
ical or  similar  to  what  is  in  the  latter,  which  is  ac- 
knowledged to  be  from  him ;  for  an  author  of  nature  is 
here  supposed. 

♦  Xp7  fiev  Tol  ye  tov  uira^  irapade^dfievov  tov  KTiaavrot  ivv  Kda/iot 
elvai  TavTOi  rdf  ypa<^g  ireTreladai,  bri  baa  irepl  TTjq  KTiaeuq  anavr^ 
rotf  i^TjTovai  TOV  irepl  avrtj^  "kdyov^  ravTa  koI  Trept  tuv  ygaijtiJv.  Phi- 
local.,  p,  23,  Ed.  Cant.  [This  sagacious  remark  is,  however,  strange- 
ly misapplied  by  Origen  to  the  establishment  of  one  of  his  favorite 
theories — that  there  is  a  mystical  meaning  in  every  word,  and  ever 
letter,  of  Scripture. — F.] 


38  Analogy  of  RELidioN. 

6.  Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  founda- 
tion for  the  principles  which  we  assume,  whether  from 
the   attributes    of  God   or  any  thing  else,  is  building 

a  world   upon    hypothesis,    like    Descartes 
vain— Analogy     Forminof  our  notions  upon  reasoning?  from 

prmciples  which  are  certam,  but  applied  to 
cases  to  which  we  have  no  ground  to  apply  them,  (like 
those  who  explain  the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and 
the  nature  of  diseases  and  medicines,  from  mere  mathe- 
matics, without  sufficient  data,)  is  an  error  much  akin 
to  the  former ;  since  what  is  assumed  in  order  to  make 
the  reasoning  applicable  is  hypothesis.  But  it  must  be 
allowed  just,  to  join  abstract  reasonings  with  the  ob- 
servation of  facts,  and  argue  from  such  facts  as  are 
known  to  others  that  are  like  them ;  from  that  part  of 
the  divine  government  over  intelligent  creatures  which 
comes  under  our  view,  to  that  larger  and  more  general 
government  over  them  which  is  beyond  it;  and,  from 
what  is  present,  to  collect  what  is  likely,  credible,  or 
not  incredible,  will  be  hereafter. 

7.  This  method,  then,  of  concluding  and  determining 
being  practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all,  we  can- 

X,.  :.   not  but  act  upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of 

This    method      .  .  ^ .  ... 

conclusive —ap-  life;  being  evidently  conclusive,  in  various 

plied  to  religion.     ,       '  ^  -        \,  ,         j 

degrees,  proportionable  to  the  degree  and 
exactness  of  the  whole  analogy  or  likeness ,  and  having 
so  great  authority  for  its  introduction  into  the  subject 
of  religion,  even  revealed  religion,  my  design  is  to  apply 
it  to  that  subject  in  general,  both  natural  and  revealed  \ 
talcing  for  proved  that  there  is  an  intelligent  author  of 
nature,  and  natural  governor  of  the  world.  For  as 
there  is  no  presumption  against  this  prior  to  the  proof 
of  it,  so  it  has  been  often  proved,  with  accumulated  evi- 
dence, from  this  argument  of  analogy  and  final  causes, 
from  abstract  reasonings,  from  the  most  ancient  tradition 


Introduction.  39 

aiid  testimony,  and  from  the  general  consent  of  mankind. 
Nor  does  it  appear,  so  far  as  I  can  find,  to  be  denied  by 
the  generality  of  those  who  profess  themselves  dissatis- 
fied with  the  evidence  of  religion. 

8.  As  there  are  some  who,  instead  of  thus  attending 
to  what  is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  nature,  form  their 
notions  of  God's  government  upon  hypothe- 
sis,  so  there  are  others  who  indulge  them-  tion^— their  ro- 
selves  m  vam  and  idle  speculations,*  how 
the  world  might  possibly  have  been  framed  otherwise  than 
it  is ;  and  upon  supposition  that  things  might,  in  imag- 
ining that  they  should,  have  been  disposed  and  carried 
on  after  a  better  model  than  what  appears  in  the  pres- 
ent disposition  and  conduct  of  them.  Suppose,  now,  a 
person  of  such  a  turn  of  mind  to  go  on  with  his  reveries, 
till  he  had  at  length  fixed  upon  some  particular  plan  of 
nature  as  appearing  to  him  the  best — one  shall  scarce 
be  thought  guilty  of  detraction  against  human  under- 
standing if  one  should  say,  even  beforehand,  that  the 
plan  which  this  speculative  person  would  fix  upon, 
though  he  were  the  wisest  of  the  sons  of  men,  prob- 
ably would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  according  to 
his  own  notions  of  best ;  whether  he  thought  that  to  be 
so  which  afforded  occasions  and  motives  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  greatest  virtue,  or  which  was  productive  of 
the  greatest  happiness;  or  that  these  two  were  neces- 
sarily connected,  and  ran  up  into  one  and  the  same  plan. 
However,  it  may  not  be  amiss,  once  for  all,  to  see  what 
would  be  the  amount  of  these  emendations  and  imagin- 
ary improvements  upon  the  system  of  nature,  or  how 
far  they  would  mislead  us.  And  it  seems  there  could 
be  no  stopping  till  we  came  to  some  such  conclusions 

[■*  In  an  illustration  of  these  idle  speculations,  see  Bayle's  Response 
aux  Questions  Wtin  Provincial.  See  also  notes  to  the  Articles 
Manichaeus,  Ori{ieii,  Paulicians,  in  Bayle's  Critical  Dictionary.  Fitz- 
gerald supposes  Butler  had  Bayle  in  mind  in  this  passage.] 


40  Analogy  of  Religion. 

as  these  : — That  all  creatures  should  at  first*  be  made  as 
perfect  and  as  happy  as  they  were  capable  of  ever  be- 
ing; that  nothing,  to  be  sure,  of  hazard  or  danger  should 
be  put  upon  them  to  do,  (some  indolent  persons  would 
perhaps  think,  nothing  at  all,)  or  certainly,  that  effectual 
care  should  be  taken  that  they  should,  whether  necessa- 
rily or  not,  yet  eventually  and  in  fact,  always  do  what 
was  right  and  most  conducive  to  happiness,  which  would 
be  thought  easy  for  infinite  power  to  effect ;  either  by 
not  giving  them  any  principles  which  would  endanger 
their  going  wrong,  or  by  laying  the  right  motive  of  ac- 
tion, in  every  instance,  before  their  minds  continually  in 
so,strong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of  inducing  them 
to  act  conformably  to  it ;  and  that  the  whole  method  of 
government  by  punishments  should  be  rejected  as  ab- 
surd ;  as  an  awkward,  roundabout  method  of  carrying 
things  on ;  nay,  as  contrary  to  a  principal  purpose  for 
which  it  would  be  supposed  creatures  were  made, 
namely,  happiness. 

9.  Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in 

particular  to  the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and 

extravagance,  what  has  been  above  intimat- 

for  8uch  specu-  ed  is  a   full,   direct,  general  answer  to  it, 

lations.        This  , 

Bhown  In  uttie  namely,  that  we  may  see  beforehand  that  we 

aflPalrs,  etc.  ... 

have  not  faculties  for  this  kind  of  specula- 
tion. For  though  it  be  admitted,  that,  from  the  first 
principles  of  our  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge  or  deter- 
mine some  ends  to  be  absolutely  in  themselves  prefera- 
ble to  others,  and  that  the  ends  now  mentioned,  or,  if 
they  run  up  into  one,  that  this  one  is  absolutely  the  best, 
and,  consequently,  that  we  must  conclude  the  ultimate 
end  designed  in  the  constitution  of  nature  and  conduct 
of  Providence  is  the  most  virtue  and  happiness  possible, 
yet  we  are  far  from  being  able  to  judge  what  particular 

[*  That  is,  from  birth,  without  the  results  of  experience.] 


Introduction.  41 

disposition  of  things  would  be  most  friendly  and  assist- 
ant to  virtue ;  or  what  means  might  be  absolutely  nec- 
essary to  produce  the  most  happiness  in  a  system  of 
such  extent  as  our  own  world  may  be,  taking  in  all  that 
is  past  and  to  come,  though  we  should  suppose  it  de- 
tached from  the  whole  of  things.  Indeed,  we  are  so  fai 
from  being  able  to  judge  of  this  that  we  are  not  judges 
what  may  be  the  necessary  means  of  raising  and  con- 
ducting one  person  to  the  highest  perfection  and  happi- 
ness of  his  nature.  Nay,  even  in  the  little  affairs  of  the 
present  life,  we  find  men  of  different  educations  and 
ranks  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  conduct  of  each 
other.  Our  whole  nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral 
perfection  to  God,  and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him. 
And  this  will  forever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral 
character  to  such  as  will  consider  what  a  practical  proof 
is,  because  it  is  the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  And 
from  hence  we  conclude,  that  virtue  must  be  the  happi- 
ness, and  vice  the  misery,  of  every  creature ;  and  that 
regularity,  and  order,  and  right,  cannot  but  prevail  final- 
ly, in  a  universe  under  his  government.  But  we  are  in  no 
sort  judges  what  are  the  necessary  means  of  accomplish- 
ing this  end. 

10.  Let  us,  then,  instead  of  that  idle,  and  not  very  in- 
nocent, employment  of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a 
world,  and  schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our  compare  tho 
thoughts  to  what  we  experience  to  be  the  JSS^?ReB|.' 
conduct  of  nature  with  respect  to  intelli-  '°°' 
gent  creatures ;  which  may  be  resolved  into  general  laws 
or  rules  of  administration,  in  the  same  way  as  many  of 
the  laws  of  nature  respecting  inanimate  matter  may  be 
collected  from  experiments.  And  let  us  compare  the 
known  constitution  and  course  of  things  with  what  is 
said  to  be  the  moral  system  of  nature ;  the  acknowl- 
edged dispensations  of  Providence,  or  that  government 
which    we    find    ourselves    under,   with    what    religion 


42  Analogy  of  Religion. 

teaches  us  to  believe  and  expect,  and  see  whether  they 
are  not  analogous  and  of  a  piece.  And  upon  such  a 
comparison  it  will,  I  think,  be  found  that  they  are  very 
much  so;  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  same 
general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same  principles 
of  Divine  conduct. 

11.  The  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered  is  of 
pretty  large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts;  m 

.  .  *  some  more,  in  others  less  exact.     In  some 

The  extent  o?  ,  ' 

Auiiiogy— what  few  instances,  perhaps,  it  may  amount  to  a 

it  shows.  _        >  r  r  >  j 

real,  practical  proof,  in  others  not  so ;  yet  in 
these  it  is  a  confirmation  of  what,  is  proved  otherwise. 
It  will  undeniably  show,  what  too  many  want  to  have 
shown  them,  that  the  system  of  religion,  both  natural 
and  revealed,  considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior  to 
the  proof  of  it,  is  not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless  that 
of  nature  be  so  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  answer  to 
almost  all  objections  against  the  system  both  of  natural 
and  of  revealed  religion ;  though  not,  perhaps,  an  answer 
in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  considerable  degree 
an  answer,  to  the  objections  against  the  evidence  of  it ; 
for  objections  against  a  proof,  and  objections  against 
what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the  reader  will  observe,  are 
different  things. 

12.  Now  the  Divine  government  of  the  world,  implied 
in  the  notion  of  religion  in  general,  and  of  Christianity, 

^,     ,   ^.     contains  in  it, — That  mankind  is  appointed 

What  the  Di-  ,.         .  ^  /    ,  .    x     ,  , 

vine  Govern-  to  livc  in  a  futurc  State,  (chap.  1 ;)  that  there 
every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished 
(chap,  ii;)  rewarded  or  punished  respectively  for  all 
that  behavior  here  which  we  comprehend  under  the 
words  virtuous  or  vicious,  morally  good  or  evil,  (chap, 
iii ;)  that  our  present  life  is  a  probation,  a  state  of  trial 
(chap,  iv)  and  of  discipline  (chap,  v)  for  that  future  one, 
notwithstanding  the  objections  which  men  may  fancy 
they  have,  from  notions  of  necessity,  against  there  being 


Introduction.  43 

any  such  moral  plan  as  this  at  all,  (chap,  vi ;)  and  what- 
ever objections  may  appear  to  lie  against  the  wisdom 
and  goodness  of  it,  as  it  stands  so  imperfectly  made 
known  to  us  at  present,  (chap,  vii;)  that  this  world  be- 
ing in  a  state  of  apostasy  and  wickedness,  and  conse- 
quently of  ruin,  and  the  sense  both  of  their  conditior 
and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted  among  men,  this  gave 
occasion  for  an  additional  dispensation  of  Providence, 
of  the  utmost  importance,  (part  ii,  chap,  i,)  proved  by 
miracles,  (chap,  ii,)  but  containing  in  it  many  things  ap- 
pearing to  us  strange,  and  not  to  have  been  expected, 
(chap,  iii;)  a  dispensation  of  Providence,  which  is  a 
scheme  or  system  of  things,  (chap,  iv,)  carried  on 
by  the  mediation  of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in 
order  to  the  recovery  of  the  world,  (chap,  v ;)  yet  not 
revealed  to  all  men,  nor  proved  with  the  strongest  pos- 
sible evidence  to  all  those  to  whom  it  is  revealed ;  but 
only  to  such  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  such  par- 
ticular evidence,  as  the  wisdom  of  God  thought  fit. 
Chap,  vi,  vii. 

13.  The  design,  then,  of  the  following  Treatise  will 
be  to  show  that  the  several  parts  principally  objected 
against  in  this  moral  and  Christian  dispen-  The  design  of 
sation,  including  its  scheme,  its  publication.  Treatise. 
and  the  proof  which  God  has  afforded  us  of  its  truth ; 
that  the  particular  parts  principally  objected  against  in 
this  whole  dispehsation  are  analogous  to  what  is  expe- 
rienced in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  or 
providence;  that  the  chief  objections  themselves  which 
are  alleged  against  the  former,  are  no  other  than  what 
may  be  alleged  with  like  justness  against  the  latter, 
where  they  are  found  in  fact  to  be  inconclusive ;  and  that 
this  argument  from  analogy  is  in  general  unanswer- 
able, and  undoubtedly  of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion, 
(chap,  viii,)  notwithstanding  the  objections  which  may 
seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the  real  ground  which   tliere 


44  Analogy  of  Religion. 

may  be  for  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  particular  de- 
gree of  weight  which  is  to  be  laid  upon  it.  This  is  a 
general  account  of  what  may  be  looked  for  in  the  fol- 
lowing Treatise.  And  I  shall  begin  it  with  that  which 
is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  of  all  our  fears — 
all  our  hopes  and  fears  which  are  of  any  consideration — 
[  mean  a  Future  Life, 


THE 

ANALOGY   OF   RELIGION 


PART  I. 

OF    NATURAL    RELIGION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF    A    FUTURE    LIFE.* 

STRANGE  difficulties  have  been  raised  by  some  con- 
cerning personal  identity^  or  the  sameness  of  living 
agents,  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  existing  Dig^cnities— 
now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  the  question  to 

.  .  1      ^  considered. 

moments;  which  whoever  thmks  it  worth 
while  may  see  considered  in  the  first  Dissertation  at 
the  end  of  this  Treatise.  But,  without  regard  to  any  of 
them  here,  let  us  consider  what  the  analogy  of  nature, 
and  the  several  changes  which  we  have  undergone,  and 
those  which  we  know  we  may  undergo  without  being 
destroyed,  suggest,  as  to  the  effect  which  death  may,  or 
may  not,  have  upon  us ;  and  whether  it  be  not  from 
thence  probable  that  we  may  survive  this  change,  and 
exist  in  a  future  state  of  life  and  perception. 

2,  I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in 

[♦  Clialmers  regards  this  chapter  as  the  least  satisfactory  in  the 
book,  because  it  is  infected  with  the  obscure  metaphysics  of  the  age. 
He  particularly  alludes  to  what  Butler  says  of  the  indivisibility  of 
consciousness,  and  his  argument  based  on  this.  The  ailment  is 
analyzed  and  severely  criticised  in  Duke's  Systematic  Analysis  of  the 
Analogy,  Appendix  I.  See  also  Whately's  Essays  on  Some  of  the 
Peculiarities  of  the  Christian  Religion,  page  63.] 


46  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPart  I, 

the  helpless,  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having  ar- 
^    ,       ,    rived  from  thence  to  mature  age,  we  find  it 

The   law  of  . 

change  indicatea   to  be  a  general  law  of  nature,  in  our  own 

Rfliturelifft  .  ,  ,  , 

Species,  that  the  same  creatures,  the  same 
individuals,  should  exist  in  degrees  of  life  and  percep- 
tion, with  capacities  of  action,  of  enjoyment  and  suffer- 
ing, in  one  period  of  their  being  greatly  different  from 
those  appointed  them  in  another  period  of  it.  And  in 
other  creatures  the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference 
of  their  capacities  and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go 
no  higher)  and  in  maturity ;  the  change  of  worms  into 
flies,  and  the  vast  enlargement  of  their  locomotive  powers 
by  such  change ;  and  birds  and  insects  bursting  the 
shell,  their  habitation,  and  by  this  means  entering  into 
a  new  world,  furnished  with  new  accommodations  for 
them,  and  finding  a  new  sphere  of  action  assigned  them 
— these  are  instances  of  this  general  law  of  nature. 
Thus  all  the  various  and  wonderful  transformations  of 
animals  are  to  be  taken  into  consideration  here.  But 
the  states  of  life  in  which  we  ourselves  existed  formerly, 
in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy,  are  almost  as  different 
from  our  present,  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  possible  to  con- 
ceive any  two  states  or  degrees  of  life  can  be.  There- 
fore, that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a  state  as  different 
(suppose)  from  our  present  as  this  is  from  our  former,  is 
but  according  to  the  analogy  of  nature;  according  to  a 
natural  order  or  appointment  of  the  very  same  kind 
with  what  we  have  already  experienced.* 

*  [I  am  not  sure  that  this,  at  least  at  the  present  stage  of  the  ar- 
gument, is  a  perfectly  fair  statement  of  the  matter.  For  there  is  tMs 
essential  difference  between  the  state  in  which  death  appears  to  place 
us,  and  any  state  previously  known  by  experience — that  in  the  former 
we  seem  wholly  deprived  of  any  bodily  organization.  Previous  expe- 
rience might,  indeed,  go  the  length  of  showing  that  a  thinking  being 
might  continue  the  same,  and  retain  the  exercise  of  its  living  powers. 
under  infinite  varieties  of  organization.  But  this  surely  is  a  different 
thing  from  continuance  without  any  organization  whatever,  nor  capa- 


Chap.  I.I  Of  a  Future  Life.  47 

3.  II.  We  know  that  we  are   endued  with  capacities 
of  action,  of  happiness,  and  misery;  for  we  are  con- 
scious of  acting,  of  enjoying  pleasure,  and  of     ^h     1 
suffering  pain.     Now,  that  we   have   these   continuance  in- 

.  .  11-  dicatee  the  same 

powers  and  capacities  before  death,  is  a  pre- 
sumption that  we  shall  retain  them  through  and  after 
death  ;  indeed,  a  probability  of  it  abundantly  sufficient 
to  act  upon,  unless  there  be  some  positive  reason  to 
think  that  death  is  the  destruction  of  those  living  pow- 
ers :  because  there  is  in  every  case  a  probability  that 
all  things  will  continue  as  we  experience  they  are,  in  all 
respects,  except  those  in  which  we  have  some  reason  to 
think  they  will  be  altered.  This  is  that  kind*  of  pre- 
sumption or  probability  from  analogy,  expressed  in  the 
very  word  continuance,  which  seems  our  only  natural 
reason  for  believing  the  course  of  the  world  will*  con- 
tinue to-morrow,  as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  experience 
or  knowledge  of  history  can  carry  us  back.  Nay,  it 
seems  our  only  reason  for  believing  that  any  one  sub- 
stance now  existing  will  continue  to  exist  a  moment 
longer,  the  Self-existent  Substance  only  excepted.    Thus 

hie  of  being  reached  by  the  present  proof,  unless  we  take  in  some 
such  additional  considerations  as  Butler  proceeds  to  allege  after- 
ward. However,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  natural  religion  does 
not  necessarily  teach  that  we  shall  exist  hereafter  without  any  bodily 
organization, — for  we  may  pass,  at  death,  into  a  bodily  organization, 
inappreciable  by  our  present  senses,  for  any  thing  we  know  to  the 
contrary, — and  revealed  religion  does  expressly  teach  that,  in  at 
least  one  part  of  our  future  existence,  we  shall  have  a  corporeal  or- 
ganization. In  effect,  the  ancient  theistical  philosophers,  who  held  a 
future  state  of  retribution,  almost  universally  supposed  the  soul  to 
pass  into  or  retain  some  other  body  after  its  separation  from  the  pres- 
ent ;  either,  as  in  the  vulgar  metempsychosis,  passing  into  another 
gross  body  of  the  same  kind,  or  retaining  a  certain  ethereal  vehicle 
of  its  own. — F.] 

♦  T  say  kind  of  presumption  or  probability ;  for  I  do  not  mean  to 
affirm  that  there  is  the  same  degree  of  conviction,  that  our  living 
powers  will  continue  after  death,  as  there  is  that  our  substances  will. 


48  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

if  men  were  assured  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  was 
not  the  destruction  of  our  faculties  of  perception  and  of 
action,  there  would  be  no  apprehension  that  any  other 
power  or  event,  unconnected  with  this  of  death,  would 
destroy  these  faculties  just  at  the  instant  of  each  crea- 
ture's death  ;  and  therefore  no  doubt  but  that  they 
would  remain  after  it :  which  shows  the  high  probabili- 
ty that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after  death,  un- 
less there  be  some  ground  to  think  that  death  is  their 
destruction.*  For  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner  certain 
that  we  should  survive  death,  provided  it  were  certain 
that  death  would  not  be  our  destruction,  it  must  be 
highly  probable  that  we  shall  survive  it,  if  there  be  no 
ground  to  think  death  will  be  our  destruction. 

4.  Now,  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
prior  fo  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future  life 

Two  reasons  commonly  insisted  upon,  there  would  arise 
for  fear.  ^  general  confused   suspicion    that   in   the 

great  shock  and  alteration  which  we  shall  undergo  by 
death,  we,  that  is,  our  living  powers,  might  be  wholly 
destroyed ;  yet,  even  prior  to  those  proofs,  there  is  really 
no  particular  distinct  ground  or  reason  for  this  appre- 
hension at  all,  so  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it  must 
arise  either  from  t/ie  reason  of  the  things  or  from  the 
analogy  of  Natwe, 

*  Destruction  of  living  powers,  is  a  manner  of  expression  unavoida- 
bly ambiguous;  and  may  signify  either  the  destrtiction  of  a  living  be- 
ing, so  as  that  the  same  living  being  shall  be  incapable  of  ever  per- 
ceiving or  acting  again  at  all;  or  the  destruction  of  those  means  and 
instruments  by  which  it  is  capable  of  its  present  life,  of  its  present 
state  of  perception  and  of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the  former 
sense.  When  it  is  used  in  the  latter,  the  epithet  present  is  added. 
The  loss  of  a  man's  eye  is  a  destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  latter 
sense.  But  we  have  no  reason  to  think  the  destruction  of  living 
powers  in  the  former  sense  to  be  possible.  We  have  no  more  reason 
to  think  a  being  endued  with  living  powers  ever  loses  them  during  its 
whole  existence,  than  to  believe  that  a  stone  ever  acquires  them. 


"'^^HA^.  I.]  Of  K  Future  Life.  49 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that 
death  is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  because  we 
know  not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itself;  but      „  ,  ^     ,^ 

.  '  Not  from  the 

only  some  of  its  effects,  such  as  the  dissolu-  reason  of  the 

.  .  thing. 

lion  of  flesh,  skin,  and  bones.  And  these 
effects  do  in  nowise  appear  to  imply  the  destruction  of 
a  living  agent.  And  besides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the 
dark  upon  what  the  exercise  of  our  living  powers  de- 
pends, so  we  are  wholly  ignorant  what  the  powers  them- 
selves depend  upon ;  the  powers  themselves,  as  distin- 
*^*^  guished  not  only  from  their  actual  exercise,  but  also 
^^  from  the  present  capacity  of  exercising  them ;  and  as  op- 
posed to  their  destruction :  for  sleep,  or  however,*  a 
swoon,  shows  us  not  only  that  these  powers  exist  when 
they  are  not  exercised,  as  the  passive  power  of  motion 
does  in  inanimate  matter,  but  shows  also  that  they  exist 
when  there  is  no  present  capacity  of  exercising  them ;  or 
that  the  capacities  of  exercising  them  for  the  present,  as 
*  well  as  the  actual  exercise  of  them,  may  be  suspended,  and 
yet  the  powers  themselves  remain  undestroyed.  Since, 
then,  we  know  not  at  all  upon  what  the  existence  of  our 
living  powers  depends,  this  shows  further,  there  can  no 
probability  be  collected  from  the  reason  of  the  thing, 
that  death  will  be  their  destruction  :  because  their  ex- 
istence may  depend  upon  somewhat  in  no  degree  affect- 
ed by  death ;  upon  somewhat  quite  out  of  the  reach  of 
this  king  of  terrors.  So  that  there  is  nothing  more  cer- 
tain than  that  the  reason  of  the  thing  shows  us  no  con- 
nection between  death  and  the  destruction  of  living 
agents. 

Nor  can  we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  anal- 
ogy of  Nature  to  afford  us  even  the  slight-     Not  from  anai- 
est  presumption  that  animals  ever  lose  their  ogyo'^'^'-'ir*- 
living  powers;  much  less,  if  it  were  possible,  that  they 
lose  them  by  death  ;  for  we  have  no  faculties  wherewith 

*  However,  in  the  sense  of  <i/  Ucut,  or  rather, 

4 


50  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

to  trace  any  beyond  or  through  it,  so  as  to  see  what  be- 
comes of  them.  This  event  removes  them  from  our 
view.  It  destroys  the  sensible  proof,  which  we  had  be- 
fore their  death,  of  their  being  possessed  of  living  pow- 
ers, but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least  reason  to 
believe  that  they  are  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived 
of  them. 

And  our  knowing  that  they  were  possessed  of  these 
powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have  faculties 
capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probability  of  their 
retaining  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirmed,  and  a 
sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  observing  the  very 
great  and  astonishing  changes  which  we  have  experi- 
enced ;  so  great,  that  our  existence  in  another  state  of 
life,  of  perception  and  of  action,  will  be  but  according 
to  a  method  of  providential  conduct,  the  like  to  which 
has  been  already  exercised,  even  with  regard  to  our- 
selves; according  to  a  course  of  nature,  the  like  to 
which  we  have  already  gone  through. 

5.  However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible 
how  difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to  make 

^     ^  the  voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in 

Imaginary  .  ■' 

presumptions,     this  case,  as  wc  are  accustomed,  from  our 

1.  We  are  com-  .     ,    ,  ^  r  1     1    1       • 

pound,  so  dis-  youth  up,  to  mdulgc  that  forward  delusive 

cerptlble.  r         1.  -u.       j-  i  j     •.  u 

faculty,  ever  obtrudmg  beyond  its  sphere, 
(of  some  assistance,  indeed,  to  apprehension,  but  the 
author  of  all  error :)  as  we  plainly  lose  ourselves  in  gross 
and  crude  conceptions  of  things,  taking  for  granted  that 
we  are  acquainted  with  what,  indeed,  we  are  wholly 
ignorant  of — it  may  be  proper  to  consider  the  imaginary 
presumptions,  that  death  will  be  our  destruction,  arising 
from  these  kinds  of  early  and  lasting  prejudices ;  and  to 
show  how  little  they  can  really  amount  to,  even  though 
we  cannot  wholly  divest  ourselves  of  them.     And, 

I.  All  presumption  of  death's  being  the  destruction 
of  living  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that  they  are 


Chap.  IJ  Of  a  Future  Life.  51 

compounded,  and  so  discerptible.  But  since  conscious- 
ness is  a  single  and  indivisible  power,  it  should  seem 
that  the  subject  in  which  it  resides  must  be  so  too.  For 
were  the  motion  of  any  particle  of  matter  absolutely  one 
and  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  should  imply  a  contradic- 
tion to  suppose  part  of  this  motion  to  exist  and  part  not 
to  exist — that  is,  part  of  this  matter  to  move,  and  part 
to  be  at  rest — then  its  power  of  motion  would  be  indi- 
visible ;  and  so  also  would  the  subject  in  which  the 
power  inheres,  namely,  the  particle  of  matter :  for  if  this 
could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part  might  be  moved  and 
the  other  at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to  the  supposition. 

In  like  manner,  it  has  been  argued,*  and  for  any  thing 
appearing  to  the  contrary,  justly,  that  since  the  percep- 
tion or  consciousness  which  we  have  of  our  own  exist- 
ence is  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to 
suppose  one  part  of  it  should  be  here  and  the  other 
there;  the  perceptive  power,  or  the  power  of  conscious- 

*  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodwell,  and  the  Defenses  of  it. 

[This  celebrated  controversy  was  occasioned  by  a  strange  book  of 
Dodwell's  entitled  An  Epistolary  Discourse  Touching  the  Natural 
Mortality  of  the  Human  Soul,  etc.,  in  which  he  maintained  that  the 
human  soul  is  naturally  mortal,  but  supematurally  immortalized  by 
the  Holy  Spirit,  conferred  in  the  sacrament  of  baptism,  when  per- 
formed by  legitimately  ordained  ministers.  Dr.  Clarke  answered  his 
book  and  wrote  four  tracts  on  the  controversy.  Anthony  Collins 
wrote  "  in  support  of  Dodwell's  views  of  the  natural  mortality  of  the 
soul."— F. 

Ancient  writers  believed  the  soul  to  be  indivisible.  Cicero  makes 
Cato  say,  "  The  soul  is  a  simple,  uncompounded  substance,  without 
parts  or  mixture  ;  it  cannot  be  divided,  and  so  cannot  perish."  And 
again,  "  I  could  never  believe  that  the  soul  lost  its  senses  by  escaping 
from  senseless  matter ;  or  that  such  a  release  will  not  enlarge  and 
improve  its  poA^ers.  ...  I  am  persuaded  that  I  shall  only  begin 
truly  to  live  when  I  cease  to  live  in  this  world."  Xenophon  reports 
Cyrus  as  saying,  in  his  last  moments,  "  O,  my  son,  do  not  imagine 
that  when  death  has  taken  me  from  you  I  shall  cease  to  exist"— 
Malcom.] 


52  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

ness,  is  indivisible  too;  and  consequently  the  subject 
in  which  it  resides,  that  is,  the  conscious  being.  Now 
upon  supposition  that  the  living  agent  each  man  calls 
himself  is  thus  a  single  being,  which  there  is  at  least 
Ouro  anized  ^^  "fiore  difficulty  in  conceiving  than  in  con- 
bodies  not  our-  ceiving  it  to  be  a  compound,  and  of  which 

selves.  ,  r     .  .  .  ,      .     ^   „ 

there  is  the  proof  now  mentioned ;  it  follows 
that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or  part 
of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us.  And  it 
is  as  easy  to  conceive  how  matter,  which  is  no  part  of 
ourselves,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  in  the  manner 
which  our  present  bodies  are,  as  how  we  can  receive  im- 
pressions from,  and  have  power  over,  any  matter.  It  is 
as  easy  to  conceive,  that  we  may  exist  out  of  bodies 
as  in  them  ;  that  we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any 
other  organs  and  senses  wholly  different  from  these  now 
given  us,  and  that  we  may  hereafter  animate  these  same 
or  new  bodies  variously  modified  and  organized,  as  to 
conceive  how  we  can  animate  such  bodies  as  our  pres- 
ent. And,  lastly,  the  dissolution  of  all  these  several 
organized  bodies,  supposing  ourselves  to  have  success- 
ively animated  them,  would  have  no  more  conceivable 
tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings,  ourselves,  or  de- 
prive us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of  perception 
and  of  action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any  foreign  mat- 
ter, which  we  are  capable  of  receiving  impressions  from, 
and  making  use  of  for  the  common  occasions  of  life. 

6.  II.  The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  living 
agent  cannot,  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 

This  proved  properly  proved  by  experimental  observa- 

bs  experience.       jj^^g        g^^  ^^  ^j^^^^  y^^^  -^  ^-^j^  ^^^  ^^pp^^ 

sition  of  its  unity,  so  they  plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  cer- 
tainly, that  our  gross  organized  bodies,  with  which  we 
perceive  the  objects  of  sense,  and  with  which  we  act, 
are  no  part  of  ourselves,  and  therefore  show  us  that  we 
have  no  reason  to  believe  their  destruction  to  be  ours; 


Chap.  IJ  Of  a  Future  Life.  53 

even  without  determining  whether  our  living  substance 
be  material  or  immaterial.  For  we  see  by  experience 
that  men  may  lose  their  limbs,  their  organs  of  sense,  and 
even  the  greatest  part  of  these  bodies,  and  yet  remain 
the  same  living  agents.  And  persons  can  trace  up  the 
existence  of  themselves  to  a  time  when  the  bulk  of  their 
bodies  was  extremely  small  in  comparison  of  what  it  is 
in  mature  age  :  and  we  cannot  but  think  that  they  might 
then  have  lost  a  considerable  part  of  that  small  body, 
and  yet  have  remained  the  same  living  agents,  as  they 
may  now  lose  great  part  of  their  present  body  and  re- 
main so.  And  it  is  certain,  that  the  bodies  of  all  ani- 
mals are  in  a  constant  flux,  from  that  never-ceasing  attri- 
tion which  there  is  in  every  part  of  them.  Now,  things 
of  this  kind  unavoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish  between 
these  living  agents,  ourselves,  and  large  quantities  of 
matter,  in  which  we  are  very  nearly  interested ;  since 
these  may  be  alienated,  and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course 
of  succession,  and  changing  their  owners ;  while  we  are 
assured  that  each  living  agent  remains  one  and  the  same 
permanent  being.*  And  this  general  observation  leads 
us  on  to  the  following  ones. 

(i.)  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  experi- 
ence what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being  each 
man  calls  himself;  and  yet,  till  it  be  deter-  BuikofUving 
mined  that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than  the  solid  ^°*' 
elementary  particles  of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground 
to  think  any  natural  power  can  dissolve,  there  is  no  sort 
of  reason  to  think  death  to  be  the  dissolution  of  it,  of 
the  living  being,  even  though  it  should  not  be  absolutely 
indiscerptibie. 

'(2.)  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to,  .y^tSj^o*?'^^ 

and  interested  in,  certain  systems  of  matter,   wE^uJ''"  "^' 

suppose  our  flesh  and  bones,  and  afterward 

ceasing  to  be  at  all  related  to  them,  the  living  agents, 

♦  See  Dissertation  I. 


pi  ^n^^fj.  n 


/ 


54  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

ourselves,  remaining  all  this  while  undestroyed,  not- 
withstanding such  alienation ;  and  consequently  these 
systems  of  matter  not  being  ourselves :  it  follows,  fur- 
ther, that  we  have  no  ground  to  conclude  any  other, 
suppose  internal  systems  oi  matter,  to  be  the  living  agents 
ourselves ;  because  we  can  have  no  ground  to  conclude 
this  but  from  our  relation  to,  and  interest  in,  such  other 
systems  of  matter ;  and  therefore  we  can  have  no  rea- 
son to  conclude  what  befalls  those  systems  of  matter  at 
death,  to  be  the  destruction  of  the  living  agents.  We  have 
already,  several  times  over,  lost  a  great  part,  or  perhaps 
the  whole,  of  our  body,  according  to  certain  common  es- 
tablished laws  of  nature ;  yet  we  remain  the  same  living 
agents ;  when  we  shall  lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the  whole, 
by  another  common  established  law  of  nature,  death, 
why  may  we  not  also  remain  the  same  .'*  That  the  alien- 
ation has  been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the  other 
will  be  more  at  once,  does  not  prove  any  thing  to  the 
contrary.  We  have  passed  undestroyed  through  those 
many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter,  so  peculiarly  ap- 
propriated to  us  ourselves ;  why  should  we  imagine  death 
will  be  so  fatal  to  us.f*  Nor  can  it  be  objected,  that 
Objection—  what  is  thus  alienated,  or  lost,  is  no  part  of 
pifofS'JS  o"^  o^^gin^l  solid  body,  but  only  adventi- 
naibody.  tious   matter   because   we  may  lose    entire 

limbs,  which  must  have  contained  many  solid  parts  and 
vessels  of  the  original  body :  or  if  this  be  not  admitted, 
we  have  no  proof  that  any  of  these  solid  parts  are  dis- 
solved or  alienated  by  death ;  though,  by  the  way,  we 
are  very  nearly  related  to  that  extraneous  or  adventi- 
tious matter,  while  it  continues  united  to  and  distend- 
ing  the  several  parts  of  our  solid  body.  But  after  all, 
the  relation  a  person  bears  to  those  parts  of  his  body  to 
which  he  is  the  most  nearly  related,  what  does  it  appear 
to  amount  to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent  and  those 
parts  of  the  body  mutually  affect  each  other.?     And  the 


Chap.  I.]  Of  a  Future  Life.  55 

same  thing,  the  same  thing  in  kind  though  not  in  degree, 
may  be  said  of  all  foreign  matter  which  gives  us  ideas, 
and  which  we  have  any  power  over.  From  these  ob- 
servations the  whole  ground  of  the  imagination  is  re- 
moved, that  the  dissolution  of  any  matter  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  living  agent,  from  the  interest  he  once  had  in 
such  matter. 

(3.)  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more  distinct- 
ly, as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of  perception 
and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same 
conclusion.  Thus,  the  common  optical  ex-  rgsed  of  organs, 
periments  show,  and  even  the  observation 
how  sight  is  assisted  by  glasses  shows,  that  we  see  with 
our  eyes  in  the  same  sense  as  we  see  with  glasses.  Nor  is 
there  any  reason  to  believe  that  we  see  with  them  in 
any  other  sense ;  any  other,  I  mean,  which  would  lead 
us  to  think  the  eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like  is  to 
be  said  of  hearing  :  and  our  feeling  distant  solid  matter 
by  means  of  somewhat  in  our  hand,  seems  an  instance 
of  the  like  kind,  as  to  the  subject  we  are  considering. 
All  these  are  instances  of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as  is 
no  part  of  our  body,  being  instrumental  in  preparing 
objects  for,  and  conveying  them  to,  the  perceiving  power, 
in  a  manner  similar  or  like  to  the  manner  in  \^hich  our 
organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey  them.  Both  are,  in 
a  like  way,  instruments  of  our  receiving  such  ideas  from 
external  objects  as  the  Author  of  nature  appointed  those 
external  objects  to  be  the  occasions  of  exciting  in  us. 
However,*  glasses  are  evidently  instances  of  this ;  namely 
of  matter  which  is  no  part  of  our  body  preparing  objects 
for,  and  conveying  them  toward,  the  perceiving  power, 
in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  organs  do.  And  if  we  see 
with  our  eyes  only,  in  the  same  manner  as  we  do  with 
glasses,  the  like  may  justly  be  concluded,  from  analogy, 

♦  [In  the  sense  of  at  least,  at  any  rate.     The  case  is  presented  as 
one  that  will  not  be  disputed.] 


$6  Analogy  of  Religion.  I  Part  I. 

of  all  our  other  senses.     It  is  not  intended,  b>  any  thing 

here  said,  to  affirm  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vision, 

^   or  of  perception  by  any  other  of  our  senses, 

Perception  not  r  r  j         j         ^  7 

traceable  to  its  can  be  traced  through  all  its  steps  quite  up 

Bource.  ....  .  .  .    . 

to  the  living  power  of  seeing,  or  perceiving ; 
but  that  so  far  as  it  can  be  traced  by  experimental  ob- 
servations, so  far  it  appears  that  our  organs  of  sense 
prepare  and  convey  on  objects,  in  order  to  their  being 
perceived,  in  like  manner  as  foreign  matter  does,  with- 
out affording  any  shadow  of  appearance  that  they  them- 
selves perceive.  And  that  we  have  no  reason  to  think 
our  organs  of  sense  percipients,  is  confirmed  by  instances 
of  persons  losing  some  of  them,  the  living  beings  them- 
selves, their  former  occupiers,  remaining  unimpaired. 
It  is  confirmed  also  by  the  experience  of  dreams;  by 
which  we  find  we  are  at  present  possessed  of  a  latent 
and  what  would  otherwise  be  an  unimagined,  unknown 
power  of  perceiving  *  sensible  objects  in  as  strong  and 
lively  a  manner  without  our  external  organs  of  sense  as 
with  them. 

7.  So,  also,  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving  or 
directing  motion  by  will  and  choice  :  upon  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  limb,  this  active  power  remains,  as  it 

Power  remaJns 

after  the  organs  evidently  scems,  unlessened  ;  so  as  that  the 
^  living  being,  who  has  suffered  this  loss, 
would  be  capable  of  moving  as  before,  if  it  had  another 
limb  to  move  with.  It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  arti- 
ficial leg,  just  as  it  can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  lever  to 
reach  toward  itself,  and  to  move  things  beyond  the 
length  and  the  power  of  its  natural  arm  :  and  this  last  it 
does  in  the  same  manner  as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with 
its  natural  arm,  things  nearer  and  of  less  weight.  Nor 
is  there  so  much  as  any  appearance  of  our  limbs  being 
endued  with  a  power  of  moving  or  directing  themselves ; 
though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  several  parts  of  a  ma- 
*  That  is,  of  imagining  or  conceiving. 


Chap.  I.]  Of  a  Future  Life.  5; 

chine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion  to  each  other; 
and  some  parts  of  the  same  limb,  to  be  instruments  of 
motion  to  other  parts  of  it. 

8.  Thus  a  man  determines  that  he  will  look  at  such 
an  object  through  a  microscope ;  or,  being  lame,  sup- 
pose, that  he  will  walk  to  such  a  place  with      _,   ^^ 

^        '  ^  .  Illustrations: 

a  staff  a  week  hence.     His   eyes   and  his  the  microscope, 

staff,  etc 

feet  no  more  determine  in  these  cases  than 
the  microscope  and  the  staff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground 
to  think  they  any  more  put  the  determination  in  prac- 
tice, or  that  his  eyes  are  the  seers,  or  his  feet  the  mov- 
ers, in  any  other  sense  than  as  the  microscope  and  the 
staff  are.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  our  organs  of  sense 
and  our  limbs  are  certainly  instruments  which  the  living 
persons,  ourselves,  make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move 
with  :*  there  is  not  any  probability  that  they  are  any 
more ;  nor,  consequently,  that  we  have  any  other  kind 

*  ["  S.  What  shall  we  say,  then,  of  the  shoemaker  ?  That  he  cuts 
with  his  insiniments  only,  or  with  his  hands  also  ?  " 

"A.  With  his  hands  also," 

"  S.  Does  he  use  his  eyes  also  in  making  shoes  '  " 

*'A.  Yes." 

"  S.  The  shoemaker,  then,  and  harper  are  different  from  the  hands 
and  eyes  they  use  ?  " 

"A.  It  appears  so." 

"  S.  Does  a  man  then  usf  his  whole  body  ?  " 

"A.  Certainly." 

"  S.  But  he  who  uses,  and  that  which  he  uses,  are  different  ?  " 

•M.  Yes." 

"  S.  A  man,  then,  is  something  different  from  his  own  body?'' 
-  Plato,  Alcil/i.  P)im.,  p.  129,  D.  Stallb.  Ed. 

"  It  may  easily  be  perceived  that  the  mind  both  sees  and  hears, 
and  not  those  parts  which  are,  so  to  speak,  windows  of  the  mind. 
Neither  are  we  bodies  ;  nor  do  I,  while  speaking  this  to  thee,  speak  to 
thy  body.  What  ever  is  done  by  thy  mind  is  done  by  thee." — Cioero, 
Tusc.  Disput.,  I,  20,  46  and  22,  52. 

"  The  mind  of  each  man  is  the  man  ;  not  that  figure  which  may 
be  pointed  out  with  the  finger." — Cicero,  de  ^p.,  book  vi,  §  24.— 
Malcom.] 


58  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

of  relation  to  thei.i  than  what  we  may  have  to  any  other 
foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of  perception 
and  motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff,  (I  say, 
any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking  of  the 
degree  of  it;)  nor,  consequently,  is  there  any  probabili- 
ty that  the  alienation  or  dissolution  of  these  instru- 
ments is  the  destruction  of  the  perceiving  and  moving 
agent. 

9.  And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dissolution  of  mat- 
ter in  which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested  is 

General  con-  ^^t  their  dissolution ;  and  that  the  destruc- 
ciusion.  ^Jqj^  q|-  several  of  the  organs  and  instruments 

of  perception,  and  of  motion  belonging  to  them,  is  not 
their  destruction ;  shows  demonstratively  that  there  is 
no  ground  to  think  that  the  dissolution  of  any  other 
matter,  or  destruction  of  any  other  organs  and  instru- 
ments, will  be  the  dissolution  or  destruction  of  living 
agents,  from  the  like  kind  of  relation.  And  we  have  no 
reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any.  other  kind  of  relation 
to  any  thing  which  we  find  dissolved  by  death. 

10.  But  it  is  said,  these  observations  are  equally  ap- 
plicable to  brutes ;  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  dif- 

,    ficulty,  that  they  should  be  immortal,  and 

Objections  rel-  -"  •'  .       ' 

ative  to  brutes,  by  consequcnce,  capable  of  everlasting  hap- 
piness. Now  this  manner  of  expression  is 
both  invidious  and  weak ;  but  the  thing  intended  by  it 
is  really  no  difficulty  at  all,  either  in  the  way  of  natural 
or  moral  consideration.  For,  first.  Suppose  the  invidi- 
ous thing  designed  in  such  a  manner  of  expression  were 
really  implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  least,  in  the  natural 
immortality  of  brutes;  namely,  that  they  must  arrive 
at  great  attainments,  and  become  rational  and  moral 
agents ;  even  this  would  be  no  difficulty,  since  we  know 
not  what  latent  powers  and  capacities  they  may  be  en- 
dued with.  There  was  once,  prior  to  experience,  as 
great  presumption  against  human  creatures,  as  there  is 


Chap.  I.J  Of  a  Future  Life.  59 

against  the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at  that  degree  of 
understanding  which  we  have  in  mature  age,  for  we  can 
trace  up  our  own  existence  to  the  same  oiiginal  with 
theirs.  And  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature, 
that  creatures  endued  with  capacities  of  virtue  and  re- 
ligion should  be  placed  in  a  condition  of  being  in  which 
they  are  altogether  without  the  use  of  them  for  a  con- 
siderable length  of  their  duration,  as  in  infancy  and 
childhood.  And  great  part  of  the  human  species  go  out 
of  the  present  world  before  they  come  to  the  exercise 
of  these  capacities  in  any  degree  at  all.  But  then,  sec- 
ondly, The  natural  immortality  of  brutes  does  not,  in 
the  least,  imply  that  they  are  endued  with 
any  latent  capacities  of  a  rational  or  moral 
nature.  And  the  economy  of  the  universe  might  re- 
quire that  there  should  be  living  creatures  without  any 
capacities  of  this  kind.  And  all  difficulties,  as  to  the 
manner  how  they  are  to  be  disposed  of,  are  so  apparent- 
ly and  wholly  founded  in  our  ignorance,  that  it  is  won- 
derful they  should  be  insisted  upon  by  any,  but  such 
as  are  weak  enough  to  think  they  are  acquainted  with 
the  whole  system  of  things.  There  is,  then,  absolute- 
ly nothing  at  all  in  this  objection,  which  is  so  rhetor- 
ically urged  against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural 
proofs  or  presumptions  of  the  immortality  of  human 
minds :  I  say,  the  greatest  part ;  for  it  is  less  applicable 
to  the  following  observation,  which  is  more  peculiar  to 
mankind : — * 

*  [This  objection  caused  great  perplexity  formerly,  and  led  Des 
Cartes,  in  order  to  evade  its  force,  to  maintain  that  brutes  are  little 
more  than  machines — an  opinion  maintained  by  leading  materialists 
of  the  present  day.  The  immortality  of  brutes  is  discussed  in  Des 
Cartes  on  the  Passions;  Baxter  on  the  Nature  of  the  Soul ;  Hume's 
Essays.  Essay  ix ;  Search's  Light  of  Nature  ;  Cheyne's  Philosophical 
Principles;  Wagstaffon  the  Immortality  of  Brutes;  Edwards'  Crit- 
ical and  Philosophical  Exercitations  ;  Watts'  Essays,  Essay  ix  ;  Colli. 
bet's  Inquiry;    Locke  on   the    Understanding,  book   ii,  chap,  ix 


6q  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

II.  III.  That  as  it  is  evident  our /r^j-^/^/ powers  and 
capacities  of  reason,  memory,  and  affection,  do  not  de- 

Keason  mem-  P^^^  upon  our  gross  body,  in  the  manner  in 
ory, etc.  depend  which  perception  by  our  organs  of  sense 
as  perception,  does,  SO  they  do  not  appear  to  depend  upon 
it  at  all  in  any  such  manner  as  to  give 
ground  to  think  that  the  dissolution  of  this  body  will  be 
the  destruction  of  these  our  present  ipowers  of  reflection, 
as  it  will  of  our  powers  of  sensation,  or  to  give  ground 
to  conclude,  even,  that  it  will  be  so  much  as  a  suspen- 
sion of  the  former. 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of  life 
and  perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other ;  each 
of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own  peculiar 
enjoyments  and  sufferings.  When  any  of  our  senses  are 
affected,  or  appetites  gratified  with  the  objects  of  them, 
we  may  be  said  to  exist,  or  live,  in  a  state  of  sensation. 
When  none  of  our  senses  are  affected,  or  appetites  grat- 
ified, and  yet  we  perceive,  and  reason,  and  act,  we  may 
be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a  state  of  reflection.  Now  it 
is  by  no  means  certain,  that  any  thing  which  is  dissolved 
by  death  is  any  way  necessary  to  the  living  being,  in 
this  its  state  of  reflection,  after  ideas  are  gained.  For 
though  from  our  present  constitution  and  condition  of 

Power  of  re-  being,  our  external  organs  of  sense  are  nec- 
penSt  ?/^"  essary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflect- 
death.  -j^g   powers,   as   carriages   and   levers    and 

scaffolds  are  in  architecture ;  yet  when  these  ideas  are 
brought  in,  we  are  capable  of  reflecting  in  the  most  in- 
tense degree,  and  of  enjoying  the  greatest  pleasure,  and 
feeling  the  greatest  pain,  by  means  of  that  reflection, 
without  any  assistance  from  our  senses;  and  without 
any  at  all,  which  we  know  of,  from  that  body  which  will 

Ditton  on  the  Resurrection  ;  Willis'  De  Anima  Bruta  ;  Bayle's  Dic- 
tionary, under  the  articles  Pereira  and  Rorarius  ;  Polignac's  Anti- 
Lucretius.] 


Chap.  I.]  Of  a  Future  Life.  6\ 

be  dissolved  by  death.  It  does  not  appear,  then,  that 
the  relation  of  this  gross  body  to  the  reflecting  being  is, 
in  any  degree,  necessary  to  thinking;  to  our  intellectual 
enjoyments  or  suff"erings :  nor,  consequently,  that  the 
dissolution  or  alienation  of  the  former  by  death  will  be 
the  destruction  of  those  present  powers,  which  render  us 
capable  of  this  state  of  reflection. 

12.  Further,  there  are  instances  of  mortal  diseases, 
which  do  not  at  all  affect  our  present  intellectual  pow- 
ers, and  this  affords  a  presumption,  that  Mortal diseas- 
those  diseases  will  not  destroy  these  present  powerao? reK 
powers.  Indeed,  from  the  observations  made  ^**°' 
above,*  it  appears  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from 
their  mutually  affecting  each  other,  that  the  dissolution 
of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent.f  And 
by  the  same  reasoning  it  must  appear,  too,  that  there  is 
no  presumption,  from  their  mutually  affecting  each  other, 
that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of 
our  present  reflecting  powers ;  but  instances  of  their  not 
affecting  each  other  afford  a  presumption  to  the  con- 
trary. Instances  of  mortal  diseases  not  impairing  our 
present  reflecting  powers,  evidently  turn  our  thoughts 
even  from  imagining  such  diseases  to  be  the  destruction 
of  them.  Several  things,  indeed,  greatly  affect  all  our 
living  powers,  and  at  length  suspend  the  exercise  of 
them  ;  as,  for  instance,  drowsiness,  increasing  till  it  ends 
in  sound  sleep :  and  from  hence  we  might  have  imagined 
it  would  destroy  them,  till  we  found,  by  experience,  the 
weakness  of  this  way  of  judging.  But  in  the  diseases 
now  mentioned,  there  is  not  so  much  as  this  shadow  of 
probability,  to  lead  us  to  any  such  conclusion,  as  to  the 
reflecting  powers  which  we  have  at  present ;  for  in  those 
diseases,  persons,  the  moment  before  death,  appear  to 

♦  Pages  52-54. 

f  [Observe  the  distinction  between  the  "  living  agent "  or  livinp 
powers  and  "  reflecting  powers."] 


62  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I, 

be  in  the  highest  vigor  of  life.  They  discover  appre- 
hension, memory,  reason,  all  entire;  with  the  utmost 
force  of  affection,  sense  of  a  character  of  shame  and 
honor;  and  the  highest  mental  enjoyments  and  suffer- 
ings, even  to  the  last  gasp;  and  these  surely  prove  even 
greater  vigor  of  life  than  bodily  strength  does.  Now 
what  pretense  is  there  for  thinking  that  a  progressive 
disease,  when  arrived  to  such  a  degree — I  mean  that 
degree  which  is  mortal — will  destroy  those  powers,  which 
were  not  impaired,  which  were  not  affected  by  it,  dur- 
ing its  whole  progress,  quite  up  to  that  degree  ?  And  if 
death,  by  diseases  of  this  kind,  is  not  the  destruction  of 
our  present  reflecting  powers,  it  will  scarce  be  thought 
that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

13.  It  is  obvious  that  this  general  observation  maybe 

carried  on  further :  and  there  appears  so  little  connec- 

^    ^  tion  between  our  bodily  powers  of  sensa- 

Death  may  not     .  "^     ^ 

even  suspend      tion  and  our  present  powers  of  reflection, 

them.  ,  ,  .  ^  ,      ,        , 

that  there  is  no  reason  to  conclude  that 
death,  which  destroys  the  former,  does  so  much  as  sus- 
pend the  exercise  of  the  latter,  or  interrupt  our  contitiu- 
ing  to  exist  in  the  like  state  of  reflection  which  we  do 
now.  For  suspension  of  reason,  memory,  and  the  affec- 
tions which  they  excite,  is  no  part  of  the  idea  of  death, 
nor  is  implied  in  our  notion  of  it.  And  our  daily  expe- 
riencing these  powers  to  be  exercised,  without  any  as- 
sistance, that  we  know  of,  from  those  bodies  which  will 
be  dissolved  by  death ;  and  our  finding  often,  that  the 
exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last ;  these  things 
afford  a  sensible  apprehension  that  death  may  not,  per- 
haps, be  so  much  as  a  discontinuance  of  the  exercise  of 
these  powers,  nor  of  the  enjoyments  and  sufferings 
which  it  implies  ;*  so  that  our  posthumous  life,  what- 

*  There  are  three  distinct  questions  relating  to  a  future  life  here 
considered  :  Whether  death  be  the  destruction  of  living  agents  ?  If 
not,  Whether  it  be  the  destruction  of  \\\€\x  present  powers  of  reflec- 


Chap.  IJ  Of  a  Future  Life.  63 

ever  there  may  be  in  it  additional  to  our  present,  yet 
may  not  be  entirely  beginning  anew,  but  going  on. 
Death  may,  in  some  sort,  and  in  some  respects,  answer 
to  our  birth,  which  is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties 
which  we  had  before  it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of 
life  in  which  we  existed  when  in  the  womb,  but  a  con- 
tinuation of  both,  with  such  and  such  great  alterations. 
14.  Nay,  for  aught  we  know  of  ourselves — of  our  pres- 
ent life,  and  of  death — death  may  immediately,  in  the 
natural  course  of  things,  put  us  into  a  high- 

,  .    ,,-  °  Death  may  in- 

er  and  more  enlarged  state  of  life,  as  our  troduce  ns  to  a 

,  .     ,      ,  -.         ^    ^      .  I  •    1  •^-         higher  state. 

birth  does  ;*  a  state  m  which  our  capacities 
and  sphere  of  perception  and  of  action  may  be  much 
greater  than  at  present.  For  as  our  relation  to  our  ex- 
ternal organs  of  sense  renders  us  capable  of  existing  in 
our  present  state  of  sensation,  so  it  may  be  the  only 
natural  hinderance  to  our  existing,  immediately  and  of 
course,  in  a  higher  state  of  reflection.  The  truth  is 
reason  does  not  at  all  show  us  in  what  state  death  natu- 
rally leaves  us.  But  were  we  sure  that  it  would  suspend 
all  our  perceptive  and  active  powers,  yet  the  suspension 
of  a  power  and  the  destruction  of  it  are  effects  so  totally 
different  in  kind,  as  we  experience  from  sleep  and  a 
swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  anywise  argue  from  one  to  the 

Hon,  as  it  certainly  is  the  destruction  of  their  present  powers  of  sen- 
sation ?  and,  if  not.  Whether  it  be  the  suspension  or  discontinuance 
of  the  exercise  of  these  present  reflecting  powers  ?  Now,  if  there  be 
no  reason  to  believe  the  last,  there  will  be,  if  that  were  possible,  less 
for  the  next,  and  less  still  for  the  first. 

*  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brahmins ; 
SofilCetv  fikv  yap  St/  tov  fjiv  hddde  filov,  (if  uv  uK/irfv  Kvo/xivuv  elvar 
rdv  di  'ddvarov,  ytvtatv  clf  tov  6vrwf  fSiov,  Kal  tov  evAalfiova  Toiq  i^iXoa- 
o^oaa^. — Lib.  xv,  p,  1039.  Ed.  Amst.,  1707.  To  which  opinion, 
perhaps  Antoninus  may  allude  in  these  words;  'Qg  vvv  irepijaiveig, 
n&re  IfiSpvov  sk  r^f  yaoTpb^  tt)^  ywaiKo^  anv  k^iXB^,  ourwf  kxiexeadai 
r^v  &pav  kv  i  Tb  yfrvxapiAv  aov  tov  iMrpov  tovtov  kKireaeirac. — Lib. 
ix,  c.  3. 


64  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

other ;  or  conclude,  even  to  the  lowest  degree  of  probabil- 
ity, that  the  same  kind  of  force  which  is  sufficient  to  sus- 
pend our  faculties,  though  it  be  increased  ever  so  much, 
will  be  sufficient  to  destroy  them. 

15.  These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to 

show  how  little  presumption  there  is  that  death  is  the 

Analogy  from   destruction  of  liumau  creatures.     However, 
plants  fanciful.     ^^^^^  -^  ^^^  ghadow  of  an  analogy,  which  may 

lead  us  to  imagine  it  is — the  supposed  likeness  which  is 
observed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables  and  of  living 
creatures.  And  this  likeness  is  indeed  sufficient  to  af- 
ford the  poets  very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of  the 
field,  in  their  pictures  of  the  frailty  of  our  present  life. 
But  in  reason,  the  analogy  is  so  far  from  holding,  that 
there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the  comparison,  as  to 
the  present  question ;  because  one  of  the  two  subjects 
compared  is  wholly  void  of  that,  which  is  the  principal 
and  chief  thing  in  the  other,  the  power  of  perception 
and  of  action ;  and  which  is  the  only  thing  we  are  in- 
quiring about  the  continuance  of.  So  that  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  vegetable  is  an  event  not  similar,  or  analogous, 
to  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent. 

16.  But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  de- 
lusive custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the  room  of 

,   ,       experience,  we  would  confine  ourselves  to 

The  conclusion.         r  7 

what  we  do  know  and  understand;  if  we 
would  argue  only  from  that,  and  from  that  form  our  ex- 
pectations, it  would  appear  at  first  sight  that  as  no  proba- 
bility of  living  beings  ever  ceasing  to  be  so,  can  be  con- 
cluded from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  so  none  can  be 
collected  from  the  analogy  of  Nature  ;  because  we  can- 
not trace  any  living  beings  beyond  death.  But  as  we 
are  conscious  that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  per- 
ception and  of  action,  and  are  living  persons,  what  we 
are  to  go  upon  is,  that  we  shall  continue  so,  till  we  fore- 
see some  accident  or  event  which  will  endanger  those 


Chap.  I.]  Of  a  Future  Life.  65 

capacities,  or  be  likely  to  destroy  us ;  which  death  does 
in  nowise  appear  to  be. 

17.  And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
pass  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and  action, 
just  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  pres-  The  ftiture 
ent.  And  this  new  state  may  naturally  be  «tate natural, 
a  social  one.  And  the  advantages  of  it,  advantages  of 
every  kind,  may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some 
fixed  general  laws  of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  propor- 
tion to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And  though  the  ad- 
vantages of  that  future  natural  state  should  not  be  be- 
stowed, as  these  of  the  present  in  some  measure  are,  by 
the  will  of  the  society,  but  entirely  by  His  more  immedi- 
ate action  upon  whom  the  whole  frame  of  nature  depends, 
yet  this  distribution  may  be  just  as  natural,  as  their  be- 
ing distributed  here  by  the  instrumentality  of  men. 
And,  indeed,  though  one  were  to  allow  any  confused, 
undetermined  sense  which  people  please  to  put  upon 
the  word  fiatural,  it  would  be  a  shortness  of  thought 
scarce  credible  to  imagine  that  no  system  or  course  of 
things  can  be  so,  but  only  what  we  see  at  present;* 
especially  while  the  probability  of  a  future  life,  or  the 
natural  immortality  of  the  soul,  is  admitted  upon  the 
evidence  of  reason;  because  this  is  reaJiy  both  admit- 
ting and  denying,  at  once,  a  state  of  being  different  from 
the  present  to  be  natural.  But  the  only  distinct  mean- 
ing of  that  word  is,  stated^  fixed^  or  settled ;  Moaning  of 
since  what  is  natural  as  much  requires  and  "*'""^- 
presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so — that  is, 
to  effect  it  continually,  or  at  stated  times — as  what  is 
supernatural  or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once. 
And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  persons'  notion  of 
what  is  natural  will  be  enlarged  in  proportion  to  their 
greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of  God,  and  the  dispen- 
sations of  his  providence.     Nor  is  there  any  absurdity 

*  See  part  ii,  chap,  ii,  and  part  ii,  chap.  iii. 
6 


66  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

in  supposing,  that  there  may  be  beings  in  the  universe 
whose  capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views  may  be  so 
extensive,  as  that  the  whole  Christian  dispensation  may 
to  them  appear  natural ;  that  is,  analogous  or  conforma- 
ble to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of  his  creation  ; 
as  natural  as  the  visible  known  course  of  things  appears 
to  us.  For  there  seems  scarce  any  other  possible  sense 
to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that  only  in  which  it  is 
here  used  :  similar,  stated,  or  uniform. 

1 8.  This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been 

here  insisted  upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our 

Pr  babie     •    ^^^^^^^^^7'  seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes 

denceofafiiture   of  religion,  in  like  manner  as  a  demonstra- 

life  ss  ©fltectivo 

as  demonstra-  tivc  proof  would.  Indeed,  a  proof,  even  a 
demonstrative  one,  of  a  future  life,  would 
not  be  a  proof  of  religion.  For  that  we  are  to  live  here- 
after is  just  as  reconcilable  with  the  scheme  of  atheism, 
and  as  well  to  be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are 
now  alive  is;  and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd 
than  to  argue  from  that  scheme  that  there  can  be  no  fu- 
ture state.  But  as  religion  implies  a  future  state,  any 
presumption  against  such  a  state  is  a  presumption  against 
religion.  And  the  foregoing  observations  remove  all 
presumptions  of  that  sort,  and  prove,  to  a  very  consider- 
able degree  of  probability,  one  fundamental  doctrine  of 
religion  ;  which,  if  believed,  would  greatly  open  and  dis- 
pose the  mind  seriously  to  attend  to  the  general  evidence 
of  the  whole. 

NOTE. 

[As  peculiar  difficulty  is  often  found  in  gaining  a  connected  view 
of  the  whole  argument  in  this  important  chapter,  it  seems  advisable 
to  subjoin  an  abstract  of  it. 

We  must  remember  that  there  are  three  questions  involved  in  the 
subject  of  this  chapter : — 

Does  death  destroy  the  living  agent  we  call  ourself  ? 

Does  it  destroy  our  powers  of  thinking,  willing,  etc.  ? 

Does  it  destroy  the  evercise  of  those  powers? 


Chap.  IJ  Of  a  Future  Life.  6y 

Now  the  presumption  in  nature  is  always  for  the  lontinuance  of 
what  we  know  to  exist ;  and,  therefore,  the  antecedent  presumption, 
in  each  of  these  three  cases,  is  in  favor  of  the  negative.  It  is  the 
same  kind  of  presumption  in  each  case,  but  it  is  much  stronger  in  the 
two  former  than  in  the  latter,  because,  though  there  are  some  appear- 
ances that  might  lead  us  to  conjecture  that  death  may  interrupt  the 
exercise  of  our  living  powers,  there  are  none  to  favor  the  supposition 
of  its  destroying  them  or  ourselves. 

We  are  bound,  then,  to  presume  that  we  shall  continue  through 
and  after  death  in  the  enjoyment  and  exercise  of  our  present  living 
powers,  unless  something  appears  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  or  the 
analogy  of  nature,  to  make  us  think  that  death  destroys  us,  or  those 
powers,  or,  at  least,  the  exercise  of  them. 

Now,  nothing  of  this  sort  can  be  concluded  directly,  at  least  with 
respect  to  the  two  first  questions,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  because 
death  removes  a  being  wholly  from  our  experience  ;  and,  so  far  as  any 
analogy  can  be  drawn  from  other  changes  any  way  similar  to  death, 
we  know  that  they  do  not  destroy  the  living  agent  or  its  powers,  even 
where  (as  in  the  case  of  sleep  or  a  swoon)  they  suspend  the  exercise 
of  those  jKJwers. 

Any  presumption  from  the  nature  of  the  thing  must  be  founded 
upon  the  probability  that  we  are  discerptible,  and  that  our  substance 
is  actually  discerped  by  death,  since  all  we  know  of  death  is  the  effect 
which  it  produces  in  dissipating  the  grosser  parts  of  our  bodies. 

Now,  the  absolute  oneness  of  living  agents  cannot,  indeed,  be 
proved  by  actual  observation,  but  it  seems  to  follow  as  a  consequence 
from  what  we  know  of  the  unity  of  consciousness ;  and  all  that  we 
observe  falls  as  a  consequence  in  with  it,  and,  at  any  rate,  certainly 
proves  that  our  gross  organized  bodies  are  not  ourselves ;  whence  it 
will  follow,  that  we  can  have  no  reason  to  presume  that  what  de- 
stroys them  must  needs  destroy  us. 

1.  For  we  see  by  experience  that  men  lose  their  limbs,  their  organs 
of  sense,  and  even  the  greatest  part  of  their  bodies,  and  yet  remain 
the  same  living  agents.  Nay,  it  is  probable  that  most  men  do,  in 
their  growth  and  decline  from  infancy  to  age,  lose  the  whole  frame 
of  their  body  more  than  once,  and  yet  remain  the  same  ;  whence  it 
appears  that,  even  though  we  are  material,  we  cannot  determine  the 
bulk  of  the  living  agent,  nor,  consequently,  conclude  that  it  is  affected 
by  the  dissolution  of  death. 

2.  Since  the  dissolution  of  systems  of  matter  with  which  we  are  so 
nearly  connected  as  our  bodies,  is  not  the  destruction  of  ourselves,  we 
can  have  no  reason  to  think  that  we  are  any  system  of  matter  at  all. 

3.  Since  the  loss  of  organs  or  limbs  involves  not  the  destruction  of 


68  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

Ihe  powers  of  perception  or  will,  we  must  consider  those  limbs  and 
organs  merely  as  instruments ;  and  then  the  destruction  of  those  in- 
struments will  no  more  involve  a  presumption  of  the  destruction  of 
the  powers  they  ministered  to,  than  the  destruction  of  any  other  in- 
struments of  perception  or  motion,  as  an  eye-glass  or  a  walking-stick  ; 
while  the  phenomena  of  dreaming  show  us  that  we  have,  in  some 
cases,  the  power  of  receiving  the  impressions  ordinarily  conveyed  by 
the  organs  of  sense,  without  the  aid  of  those  organs. 

It  is  no  objection  to  the  previous  arguments  that  they  apply  equal- 
ly to  brutes  as  to  men. 

1.  For,  even  if  it  were  implied  in  the  notion  of  their  immortality, 
that  brutes  should  hereafter  become  rational  and  moral  agents,  this 
is  no  more  impossible  than  that  a  child  should  become  such  an  agent, 
which  we  know,  in  fact,  to  be  true. 

2.  The  economy  of  the  world  may  require  the  future  as  much  as 
the  present  existence  of  brute  natures,  for  any  thing  we  know  to  the 
contrary. 

However,  there  are  other  arguments  for  a  future  life  to  be  enjoyed 
by  man,  which  do  not  hold  equally  for  brutes. 

We  exist,  at  present,  in  two  different  states,  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion ;  and  though,  for  the  exercise  of  our  powers  of  sensation,  we  or- 
dinarily (except  in  the  case  of  dreaming)  require  the  instruments  of 
bodily  organs,  we  cannot  perceive  that  our  powers  of  reflection  de- 
pend upon  the  body,  even  for  their  present  exercise  ;  nay,  the  ob- 
serving that  severe  illness  has  uo  tendency  to  impair  them,  even  up 
to  the  point  of  death,  makes  it  probable  that  death  does  not  suspend 
their  exercise. 

We  can  thus  trace,  to  some  extent,  some  of  our  living  powers  up 
to  death,  and  find  them  unaff'ected  by  it ;  and,  with  respect  to  oth- 
ers, it  is  not  impossible  that  our  present  bodily  organs,  while  they  are 
the  means  of  giving  us  one  sort  of  sensations,  may  be  the  impedi- 
ment to  receiving  others ;  or  that  the  connection  of  the  mind  with 
the  present  body  may  be  the  limitation  of  its  perceptivity  to  a  nar- 
row sensorium,  so  that  death  may  be  a  change  analogous  to  biith, 
and  introduce  us  to  a  higher  state  of  being.— Fitzgerald] 


Chap.  II.l  Of  the  Government  of  God  69 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUN- 
ISHMENTS, AND   PARTICULARLY  OF  THE  LATTER. 

'T^HAT  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a  fu- 
"^X  ture  life  to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us  is,  our 
capacity  of  happiness  and  misery.  And  The  question 
that  which  makes  the  consideration  of  it  to  whereta'iinpm^ 
be  of  so  great  importance  to  us  is,  the  sup-  **°^ 
position  of  our  happiness  and  misery  hereafter  depend- 
ing upon  our  actions  here.  Without  this,  indeed,  curi- 
osity could  not  but  sometimes  bring  a  subject  in  which 
we  may  be  so  highly  interested,  to  our  thoughts ;  espe- 
cially upon  the  mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  prospect 
of  our  own.  But  reasonable  men  would  not  take  any 
further  thought  about  hereafter  than  what  should  hap- 
pen thus  occasionally  to  rise  in  their  minds,  if  it  were 
certain  that  our  future  interest  no  way  depended  upon 
our  present  behavior  :  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  there 
be  ground,  either  from  analogy  or  any  thing  else,  to 
think  it  does,  then  there  is  reason  also  for  the  most  active 
thought  and  solicitude  to  secure  that  interest ;  to  behave 
so  as  that  we  may  escape  that  misery,  and  obtain  that 
happiness,  in  another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose 
ourselves  capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also  is 
put  in  our  own  power.  And  whether  there  be  ground 
for  this  last  apprehension,  certainly  would  deserve  to  be 
most  seriously  considered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of 
a  future  life  and  interest  than  that  presumptive  one 
which  the  foregoing  observations  amount  to. 

2.  Now,  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and 


70  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPaki  1 

a  great  part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  oivn  power. 
For  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  ac- 
tions ;  and  we  are  endued  by  the  Author  of 

Here  pleaeure  '  .  .  ,    -^ 

and  pain  chiefly   our   nature   with    capacities    of   foreseeing 

in  our  power.  ^  ,<      ,  ,  • 

these  consequences.  We  find  by  experience 
he  does  not  so  much  as  preserve  our  lives,  exclusively 
of  our  own  care  and  attention  to  provide  ourselves  with, 
and  to  make  use  of  that  sustenance,  by  which  he  has 
appointed  our  lives  shall  be  preserved,  and  without 
which  he  has  appointed  they  shall  not  be  preserved  at 
all.  And  in  general,  we  foresee  that  the  external  things 
which  are  the  objects  of  our  various  passions,  can 
neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed  without  exerting  our- 
selves ill  such  and  such  manners  ;  but  by  thus  exerting 
ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy  these  objects  in  which 
our  natural  good  consists ;  or  by  this  means  God  gives 
us  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know  not 
that  we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment  but 
by  the  means  of  our  own  actions.  And  by  prudence  and 
care,  we  may,  for  the  most  part,  pass  our  days  in  toler- 
able ease  and  quiet :  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  may,  by 
rashness,  ungoverned  passion,  willfulness,  or  even  negli- 
gence, make  ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever  we  please. 
And  many  do  please  to  make  themselves  extremely  mis- 
erable ;  that  is,  to  do  what  they  know  beforehand  will  ren- 
der them  so.  They  follow  those  ways  the  fruit  of  which 
they  know,  by  instruction,  example,  experience,  will  be 
disgrace,  and  poverty,  and  sickness,  and  untimely  death. 
This  every  one  observes  to  be  the  general  course  of 
things;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  cannot  find  by 
experience,  that  all  our  sufferings  are  owing  to  our  own 
follies. 

3.  Why  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  give  his  crea- 

WhyhasGod   tures  promiscuously  such  and  such  percep- 

thusordcred/      Wqxv^^  without  regard  to  their  behavior;  why 

he  does  not  make  them  happy  without   the   instrumen- 


Chap.  II. 1    Of  the  Government  of  God.  71 

tality  of  their  own  actions,  and  prevent  their  bringing 
any  sufferings  upon  themselves — is  another  matter.* 
Perhaps  there  may  be  some  impossibilities  in  the  nature 
of  things  which  we  are  unacquainted  with,  (chap,  vii;) 

*  [Butler  here  hints  at  several  possible  solutions  of  the  old  athe- 
istical dilemma.  God  prevents  not  evil,  either  because  he  cannot,  or 
because  he  will  not.  If  he  cannot,  he  is  not  Almighty :  if  he  will 
not,  he  is  not  All-good.  Butler  shows  us  that  neither  conclusion  can 
he  safely  drawn.  The  supposition  that  God  cannot  remove  these 
evils  does  not  necessarily  imply  any  defect  in  power ;  because,  for 
any  thing  we  know  to  the  contrary,  the  removal  of  them  might  in- 
volve a  contradiction,  and  not  to  be  able  to  do  what  is  self-contra- 
dictory and  impossible  in  the  notion  of  it,  is  plainly  no  limitation  of 
power.  The  supposition  that,  though  he  can,  he  will  not  remove 
them,  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  defect  of  benevolence,  even  tak- 
ing benevolence  io  the  sense  of  a  simple  desire  of  causing  the  great- 
est possible  amount  of  happiness.  Because  it  is  possible  that  the 
happiness  resulting  from  a  good  use  made  of  a  state  of  trial  by  free 
beings  may,  in  the  nature  of  it,  be  so  much  greater  than  what  would 
result  from  any  other  method,  as  to  make  the  sum  of  happiness  so 
obtained,  even  when  all  the  present  incidental  miseries  have  been 
deducted  from  it,  lai^er  than  could  be  procured  by  providing  against 
their  contingency.  Nor,  even  supposing  that  God's  not  choosing  to 
remove  the  sources  of  these  evils  implied  a  defect  of  benevolence  in 
the  sense  explained  above,  would  it  be  certain  that  it  implied  a  de- 
fect of  benevolence,  as  it  is  a  real  perfection.  For  supreme  benev- 
olence may  not  be  a  disposition  simply  to  make  beings  happy,  but  to 
make  good  beings  happy.  — F.] 

[Some  minds  have  great  perplexity  and  trouble  over  the  origin  of 
evil  and  the  permission  of  sin,  and  cannot  see  how  they  are  recon- 
ciled with  the  Divine  wisdom  and  goodness.  God  certainly  did  not 
will  any  sin  and  its  consequent  evil,  but  he  did  choose  to  create  man. 
and  in  so  doing  to  incur  their  liability.  A  voluntary  being  can 
sin,  and  while  in  the  free  exercise  of  his  powers  cannot  be  prevented 
by  any  external  force  from  so  doing.  The  only  way  God  could" 
prevent  sin  would  be  to  bind  nature  fast  in  fate  and  not  leave  free  the 
human  or  any  other  will. 

The  origin  of  evil  involves  no  mystery  in  the  Divine  government, 
but  is  to  be  ascril)cd  to  the  wickedness  of  voluntary  beings,  which 
God  does  all  he  consistently  can  to  prevent.  He  has  provided  a 
remedy  for  sin,  offered  forgiveness  to  all,  and  provided  a  compensa 


72  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPakt  1. 

or  less  happiness,  it  may  be,  and  upon  the  jvhole,  would 
be  produced  by  such  a  method  of  conduct  than  is  by 
the  present:  or,  perhaps.  Divine  goodness,  with  which, 
if  I  mistake  not,  we  make  very  free  in  our  speculations, 
may  not  be  a  bare  single  disposition  to  produce  hap- 
piness, but  a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful, 
the  honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely  perfect 
Mind  may  be  pleased  with  seeing  his  creatures  behave 
suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them ;  to  the 
relations  which  he  has  placed  them  in  to  each  other ;  and 
to  that  which  they  stand  in  to  himself;  that  relation  to 
himself,  which,  during  their  existence,  is  even  necessary;* 
and  which  is  the  most  important  one  of  all.  Perhaps,  I 
say,  an  infinitely  perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased  with  this 
moral  piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and  for  it§elf,  as  well  as 
upon  account  of  its  being  essentially  conducive  to  the 
happiness  of  his  creation.  Or  the  whole  end  for  which 
God  made,  and  thus  governs  the  world,  may  be  utterly 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties  :  there  may  be  some- 
what in  it  as  impossible  for  us  to  have  any  conception 
of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to  have  a  conception  of  colors. 
But  however  this  may  be,  it  is  certainly  matter,  of  uni- 
versal experience,  that  the  general  method  of  Divine 
administration  is,  forewarning  us,  or  giving  us  capaci- 
ties to  foresee,  with  more  or  less  clearness,  that  if  we 
act  so  and  so,  we  shall  have  such  enjoyments  ;  if  so  and  so, 

tion  for  those  who  suffer  in  consequence  of  others'  folly  and  crime. 
All  who  will  accept  his  favor  may  be  saved. 

When  we  ask  was  it  wise  to  permit  evil,  we  ask  was  it  wise  to  create 
free  agents ;  surely  it  will  be  admitted,  that,  on  the  whole,  good  will 
result  to  the  universe  and  glory  to  God  from  the  existence  of  aagelh 
and  men 

Evil,  in  the  sense  of  mistakes  resulting  from  ignorance  and  imper- 
fection, is  necessarily  connected  with  a  limited  progressive  being. 
We  presume  no  one  will  claim  it  were  better  such  being  did  not  exist.] 

*  [Our  relation  to  God  is  necessary  because  we  are  his  creatures 
l)ut  our  relation  to  other  beings  God  might  change. 


Chap.  II.l    Of  the  Government  of  God.  73 

such  sufferings;  and  giving  us  those  enjoyments,  and  mak- 
ing us  feel  those  sufferings,  in  consequence  of  our  actions. 
4.  "  But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course 
of  nature."*  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I 
am  observing.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  objecUon-Aii 
general  course  of  nature ;  that  is,  not  surely  Sibed"  to^  Se 
to  the  words  or  ideas,  course  of  nature,  but  «>"rs«ofnat^ 
to  Him  who  appointed  it,  and  put  things  into  it :  or  to 
a  course  of  operation,  from  its  uniformity  or  constancy, 
called  natural,  (pp.  64,  65,)  and  which  necessarily  im- 
plies an  operating  agent.  For  when  men  find  them- 
selves necessitated  to  confess  an  author  of  nature,  or 

*  The  terms  "  nature  "  and  course  of  nature  are  used  in  various 
senses.  Some  affirm  that  the  frame  of  nature  is  a  machine  construct- 
ed so  as  to  go  on  of  itself,  according  to  the  fixed  laws  of  its  mecha- 
nism, so  as  to  require  no  further  act  in  the  Deity  but  that  which  origi- 
nally created  it.  See  Law's  Notes  on  King's  Origin  of  Evil,  chap,  v, 
§  5,  sub.  4,  note  75. 

This  representation  of  the  world  as  a^  great  machine,  going  on 
without  God's  agency,  as  a  clock  goes  without  the  assistance  of  the 
clock  maker,  is  the  notion  of  materialism,  and  excludes  God's  gov- 
ernment from  the  world.  The  believers  of  this  theory  regard  the 
forces  of  nature  as  inhering  in  matter.  Others,  as  does  Dr.  Clarke, 
regard  the  forces  of  nature  as  the  immediate  and  continual  operation 
of  God  or  intermediate  spirits  upon  matter. 

"  The  terms  nature,  and  powers  of  nature,  and  course  of  nature,  and 
the  like,  are  nothing  but  empty  words,  and  signify  merely  that  a 
thing  usually  or  frequently  comes  to  pass.  The  raising  the  human 
body  out  of  the  dust  of  the  earth,  we  call  a  miracle  ;  the  generation 
of  a  human  body  in  the  ordinary  way  we  call  natural,  for  no  other 
reason  but  because  the  power  of  God  effects,  one  usually,  the  othei 
unusually.  The  sudden  stoppage  of  the  sun  (or  earth)  we  call  a  mir- 
acle, the  continual  motion  of  the  sun  (or  earth)  we  call  natural,  for 
the  very  same  reason  only,  of  the  one  being  usual  and  the  other  un 
usual.  Did  men  rise  usually  out  of  the  grave,  as  corn  grows  out  of 
3eed  sown,  we  should  certainly  call  that  also  natural ;  and  did  the  sun 
(or  earth)  constantly  stand  still,  wc  should  then  think  that  to  be  nat- 
ural, and  its  motion,  at  any  time,  would  l)e  miraculous.*' — Clarke's 
Controversy  with  Leibnitz,  p.  351.  Fifth  Reply,  107-109,  Modified 
from  Fitzgerald's  note 


74  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPart  I. 

that  God  is  the  natural  governor  of  the  world,  they  must 
not  deny  this  again,  because  his  government  is  uniform  ; 
they  must  not  deny  that  he  does  all  things  at  all,  because 
he  does  them  constantly ;  because  the  effects  of  his  acting 
are  permanent,  whether  his  acting  be  so  or  not ;  though 
there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is  not.  In  short,  every 
raan,  in  every  thing  he  does,  naturally  acts  upon  the 
forethought  and  apprehension  of  avoiding  evil,  or  ob- 
taining good  :  and  if  the  natural  course  of  things  be  the 
appointment  of  God,  and  our  natural  faculties  of  knowl- 
edge and  experience  are  given  us  by  him,  then  the  good 
and  bad  consequences  which  follow  our  actions  are  his 
appointment,  and  our  foresight  of  those  consequences  is 
a  warning  given  us  by  him  how  we  are  to  act. 

5.  "Is  the  pleasure,  then,  natufally  accompanying 
every  particular  gratification  of  passion,  intended  to  put 

us  upon  gratifying  ourselves  in  every  such 

Is  pleasure  a  /  . 

reason  for  grat-  particular  mstancc,  and  as  a   reward  to  us 

mention?  ^^  ,    •        ^  „       ^x  •    ,  ^r       •     • 

for  so  domg  ?  No,  certainly.  Nor  is  it  to 
be  said  that  our  eyes  were  naturally  intended  to  give  us 
the  sight  of  each  particular  object  to  which  they  do  or 
can  extend ;  objects  which  are  destructive  of  them,  or 
which,  for  any  other  reason,  it  may  become  us  to  turn 
our  eyes  from.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  our  eyes 
were  intended  for  us  to  see  with.  So  neither  is  there 
any  doubt  but  that  the  foreseen  pleasures  and  pains  be- 
longing to  the  passions,  were  intended,  in  general,  to 
induce  mankind  to  act  in  such  and  such  manners.* 

6.  Now  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to 
every  one,  that  God  has  given  us  to  understand  he  has 
appointed  satisfaction  and  delight  to  be  the  consequence^^ 

*  [Man  has  various  faculties  of  mind  and  body  whose  office  and 
design  will  be  apparent  on  examination.  The  ultimate  design  of  the 
exercise  of  their  powers  is  not  in  any  case  mere  animal  gratification, 
but  intellectual  and  moral  improvement  and  happiness.  The  per- 
version of  tliese  powers  is  sin,  and  causes  sliame  and  misery.] 


Chap.  1 1.  J    Of  the  Government  of  God.  75 

of  pur  acting  in  one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneasiness  o( 
our  acting  in  another,  and  of  our  not  acting  at  all ;  and 
that  we  find   the  consequences,  which  we  ^^^^^ 

were  beforehand  informed  of,  uniformly  to   God'a  govem- 

ment  of  rewards 

follow ;  we  may  learn  that  we  are  at  present   and  punish- 

,,  ,        ,  .  ...  raents. 

actually  under  his  government,  m  the  strict- 
est and  most  proper  sense ;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  he 
rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our  actions.  An  author  of 
nature  being  supposed,  it  is  not  so  much  a  deduction  of 
reason  as  a  matter  of  experience  that  we  are  thus  under 
his  government;  under  his  government,  in  the  same 
sense  as  we  are  under  the  government  of  civil  magis- 
trates. Because  the  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions, 
and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and 
giving  notice  of  this  appointment  beforehand  to  those 
whom  it  concerns,  is  the  proper  formal  notion  of  gov- 
ernment. Whether  the  pleasure  or  pain  which  thus  fol- 
lows upon  our  behavior  be  owing  to  the  Author  of  na- 
ture's acting  upon  us  every  moment  which  we  feel  it, 
or  to  his  having  at  once  contrived  and  executed  his  own 
part  in  the  plan  of  the  world,  makes  no  alteration  as  to 
the  matter  before  us.  For  if  civil  magistrates  could 
make  the  sanctions  of  their  laws  take  place,  without  in- 
terposing at  all,  after  they  had  passed  them ;  without 
a  trial,  and  the  formalities  of  an  execution  :  if  they  were 
able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themselves,  or  every 
offender  to  execute  them  upon  himself,  we  should  be 
just  in  the  same  sense  under  their  government  then,  as 
we  are  now;  but  in  a  much  higher  degree,  and  more 
perfect  manner. 

Vain  is  the  ridicule  with  which  one  foresees  some 
persons  will  divert  themselves,  upon  find-  g,^j.yjg  ^p, 
infl;  lesser  pains  considered  as  instances  of   »tive  to  little 

...  .  ,  rrii  •  -1  -I'         pnins  vam. 

divme  punishment.     There  is  no  possibility 

of  answering  or  evading  the  general  thing  here  intended, 

without  denying  all  final  causes.     V(n  final  causes  being 


70  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  i. 

admitted,  the  pleasures  and  pains  now  mentioned  must 
be  admitted  too,  as  instances  of  them.  And  if  they  are 
— if  God  annexes  delight  to  some  actions  and  uneasiness 
to  others,  with  an  apparent  design  to  induce  us  to  act 
so  and  so — then  he  not  only  dispenses  happiness  and 
misery,  but  also  rewards  and  punishes  actions.  If,  for 
example,  the  pain  which  we  feel  upon  doing  what  tends 
to  the  destruction  of  our  bodies,  suppose  upon  too  near 
approaches  to  fire,  or  upon  wounding  ourselves,  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Author  of  nature  to  prevent  our  doing 
what  thus  tends  to  our  destruction;  this  is  altogether  as 
much  an  instance  of  his  punishing  our  actions,  and  con- 
sequently of  our  being  under  his  government,  as  declar- 
ing, by  a  voice  from  heaven,  that  if  we  acted  so  he 
would  inflict  such  pain  upon  us,  and  inflicting  it  whether 
it  be  greater  or  less. 

7.  Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception 
of  the  Author  of  nature  is  that  of  a  master  or  governor, 
True  notion  of  P^ior  to  the  consideration  of  his  moral  attri- 
^°^'  butes.     The  fact  of  our  case,  which  we  find 

by  experience,  is,  that  he  actually  exercises  dominion  or 
government  over  us  at  present,  by  rewarding  and  pun- 
ishing us  for  our  actions,  in  as  strict  and  proper  a  sense 
of  these  words^,  and  even  in  the  same  sense  as  children, 
servants,  subjects,  are  rewarded  and  punished  by  those 
who  govern  them. 

And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  nature — the  whole 
present  course  of  things — most  fully  shows,  that  there  is 
nothing  incredible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  religion, 
that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions 
hereafter;  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  arising  out  of  the 
notion  of  rewarding  and  punishing,  for  the  whole  course 
of  nature  is  a  present  instance  of  his  exercising  that 
government  over  us  which  implies  in  it  rewarding  and 
punishing. 


Chap.  II. J    Of  the  Government  of  God.  JJ 

8.  Bur, as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly  ob- 
ject against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow,  it  may  be 
proper  to  mention  some  circumstances  in  Analogy  be- 
the  natural  course  of  punishments  at  pres-  Sd^Murepun 
ent,  which  are  analogous  to  what  religion  **^""®°*^ 
teaches  us  concerning  a  future  state  of  punishment ;  in- 
deed, so  analogous,  that  as  they  add  a  further  credibil- 
ity to  it,  so  they  cannot  but  raise  a  most  serious  appre- 
hension of  it  in  those  who  will  attend  to  them. 

It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such  miseries 
naturally  follow  such  and  such  actions  of  imprudence 
and  willfulness,  as  well  as  actions  more  commonly  and 
more  distinctly  considered  as  vicious;  and  that  these 
consequences,  when  they  may  be  foreseen,  are  properly 
natural  punishments  annexed  to  such  actions.  For  the 
general  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  not  that  we  see  a 
great  deal  of  misery  in  the  world,  but  a  great  deal  which 
men  bring  upon  themselves  by  their  own  behavior,  which 
they  might  have  foreseen  and  avoided.  Now  the  cir- 
cumstances of  these  natural  punishments  particularly 
deserving  our  attention  are  such  as  these:  That  often- 
times they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence  of, 
actions  which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are 
accompanied  with  much  present  pleasure  ;  for  instance, 
sickness  and  untimely  death  is  the  consequence  of  in- 
temperance, though  accompanied  with  the  highest  mirth 
and  jollity :  That  these  punishments  are  often  much 
greater  than  the  advantages  or  pleasures  obtained  by 
the  actions  of  which  they  are  the  punishments  or  conse- 
quences :  Thnt  though  we  may  imagine  a  constitution 
of  nature  in  which  these  natural  punishments,  which  are 
in  fact  to  follow,  would  follow  immediately  upon  such 
actions  being  done,  or  very  soon  after;  we  find,  on  the 
contrary,  in  our  world,  that  they  are  often  delayed  a 
great  while,  sometimes  even  till  long  after  the  actions 
occasioning  them  are  forgotten  ;  so  that  the  constitution 


y8  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

of  nature  is  such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort  or 
degree  of  presumption  of  final  impunity :  That  after 
such  delay,  these  natural  punishments  or  miseries  often 
come,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with  violence,  and 
at  once — however,  the  chief  misery  often  does  •  That  as 
certainty  of  such  distant  misery  following  such  actions 
is  never  afforded  persons,  so  perhaps  during  the  actions, 
they  have  seldom  a  distinct  full  expectation  of  its  fol- 
lowing:* and  many  times  the  case  is  only  thus,  that 
they  see  in  general,  or  may  see,  the  credibility,  that  in- 
temperance, suppose,  will  bring  after  it  diseases;  civil 
crimes,  civil  punishments  ;  when  yet  the  real  probability 
often  is,  that  they  shall  escape  :  but  things  notwithstand- 
ing take  their  destined  course,  and  the  misery  inevitably 
follows  at  its  appointed  time,  in  very  many  of  these 
cases.     Thus  also  though  youth  may  be  al- 

Youthfdl  o     J  J 

thoughtiessness   leged  as  an  excuse  for  rashness  and  folly,  as 

no  excuse.  ,      .  1 1        i  i     i  i  11 

bemg  naturally  thoughtless,  and  not  clearly 
foreseeing  all  the  consequences  of  being  untractable  and 
profligate ;  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  these  conse- 
quences follow,  and  are  grievously  felt  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  mature  life.  Habits  contracted,  even 
in  that  age,  are  often  utter  ruin :  and  men's  success  in 
the  world,  not  only  in  the  common  sense  of  worldly  suc- 
cess, but  their  real  happiness  and  misery,  depends  in  a 
great  degree,  and  in  various  ways,  upon  the  manner  in 
which  they  pass  their  youth ;  which  consequences  they, 
for  the  most  part,  neglect  to  consider,  and  perhaps  sel- 
dom can  properly  be  said  to  believe  beforehand.  It 
requires  also  to  be  mentioned,  that  in  numberless  cases 
the  natural  course  of  things  affords  us  opportunities  for 
procuring  advantages  to  ourselves  at  certain  times 
which  we  cannot  procure  when  we  will ;  nor  ever  recall 
the  opportunities,  if  we  have  neglected  them.  Indeed, 
the  general  course  of  nature  is  an  example  of  this,  if, 
*  See  part  "i,  chap.  vi. 


Chap.  II. I  Of  the  Government  of  God.  79 

during  the  opportunity  of  youth,  persons  are  indocile 
and  self-willed,  they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life 
for  want  of  those  acquirements  which  they  neglected 
the  natural  season  of  attaining.  If  the  husbandman  lets 
his  seed-time  pass  without  sowing,  the  whole  year  is 
lost  to  him  beyond  recovery.  In  like  manner,  though 
after  men  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  extravagance  up 
to  a  certain  degree,  it  is  often  in  their  power,  for  instance, 
to  retrieve  their  affairs,  to  recover  their  health  and  char- 
acter, at  least  in  good  measure ;  yet  real  reformation 
is,  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at.  all  toward  Real  reforma- 
preventing  the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  SwaysTrevSnl 
infamy,  naturally  annexed  to  folly  and  ex-  "'^ery. 
travagance,  exceeding  t/iat  degree.  There  is  a  certain 
bound  to  imprudence  and  misbehavior,  which  being 
transgressed,  there  remains  no  place  for  repentance  in 
the  natural  course  of  things.  It  is,  further,  very  much* 
to  be  remarked,  that  neglects  from  inconsiderateness, 
want  of  attention,*  not  looking  about  us  to  see  what  we 
have  to  do,  are  often  attended  with  consequences  alto- 
gether as  dreadful  as  any  active  misbehavior  from  the 
most  extravagant  passion.  And  lastly,  civil  government 
being  natural,  the  punishments  of  it  are  so  too ;  and 
some  of  these  punishments  are  capital,  as  the  effects  of 
a  dissolute  course  of  pleasure  are  often  mortal.  So  that 
many  natural  punishments  are  final  \  to  him  who  incurs 

*  Part  ii,  chap.  vi. 

f  The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment  most 
evidently  belongs  to  the  subject  of  natural  religion.  But  if  any  of 
tlicse  reflections  should  be  thought  to  relate  more  peculiarly  to  this 
doctrine  as  taught  in  Scripture,  the  reader  is  desired  to  observe  that 
Gentile  writers,  both  moralists  and  poets,  speak  of  the  future  pun- 
ishment of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the  duration  and  degree  of  it,  in  a 
like  manner  of  expression  and  description  as  the  Scripture  docs.  So 
that  all  which  can  positively  be  asserted  to  be  matter  of  mere  revela- 
tion, with  regard  to  this  doctrine,  seems  to  be,  that  the  great  distinc- 
tion between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked  shall  be  made  at  the  end 


8o  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

them  if  considered  only  in  his  temporal  capacity  ;  and 
seem  inflicted  by  natural  appointment,  either  to  remove 
the  offender  out  of  the  way  of  being  further  mischiev- 
ous, or  as  an  example,  though  frequently  a  disregarded 
one,  to  those  who  are  left  behind. 

9.  These  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to 
be  met  with  only  now  and  then ;  but  they  are  things  of 
These  are  es-  every  day's  experience  ;  they  proceed  from 
sentiai analogies,  general  laws,  very  general  ones,  by  which 
God  governs  the  world,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  prov- 
idence.* And  they  are  so  analogous  to  what  religion 
teaches  us  concerning  the  future  punishment  of  the 
wicked,  so  much  of  a  piece  with  it,  that  both  would 
naturally  be  expressed  in  the  very  same  words  and  man- 
ner of  description.  In  the  book  of  Proverbs,  for  in- 
stance. Wisdom  is  introduced  as  frequenting  the  most 

of  this  world  ;  that  each  shall  then  receive  according  to  his  deserts. 
Reason  did,  as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it  should  finally,  and 
upon  the  whole,  be  well  with  the  righteous  and  ill  with  the  wicked  ; 
but  it  could  not  be  determined,  upon  any  principles  of  reason,  wheth- 
er human  creatures  might  not  have  been  appointed  to  pass  through 
other  states  of  life  and  being  before  that  distributive  justice  should, 
finally  and  effectually,  take  place.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that  the 
next  state  of  things  after  the  present  is  appointed  for  the  execution  of 
this  justice  ;  that  it  shall  be  no  longer  delayed  ;  but  the  mystery  of 
God,  the  great  mystery  of  his  suffering  vice  and  confusion  to  prevail, 
shall  then  be  finished ;  and  he  will  take  to  him  his  great  power,  and 
will  reign,  by  rendering  to  every  one  according  to  his  works. 

*  [The  paragraph  of  this  chapter  where  the  enumeration  of  these 
resemblances  is  given,  presents  us  with  one  of  the  finest  triumphs  of 
the  analogical  argument,  and  in  which  its  power  as  a  weapon  of  de- 
fense appears  to  great  advantage,  cutting  down,  as  with  a  scythe,  a 
v/hole  army  of  these  objections,  which  are  most  frequent  in  the 
mouths  of  advei-sai-ies,  being  not  only  the  most  plausible  in  them- 
selves, but  the  most  formidable  in  point  of  effect,  from  a  certain 
tone  of  generous  denunciation  against  all  arbitrary  and  tyrannical 
will  in  which  they  are  propcunded,  and  so  as  to  associate  the 
semblance  of  a  protesting  and  moral  indignancy  with  the  infidel 
cause. — Chalmers.] 


Chap.  IIJ  Of  the  Government  of  God.  8i 

public  places  of  resort,  and  as  rejected  when  she  offers 
herself  as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of  human  life. 
"  How  long,  '  speaking  to  those  who  are  passing  through 
it,  '*how  long,  ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love  folly,  ^nd  the 
scomers  delight  in  their  scorning,  and  fools  hate  knowl- 
edge ?  Turn  ye  at  my  reproof.  Behold,  I  will  pour  out 
my  Spirit  upon  you,  I  will  make  known  my  words  unto 
you."  But  upon  being  neglected,  "Because  I  have 
called  and  ye  refused ;  I  have  stretched  out  my  hand, 
and  no  man  regarded ;  but  ye  have  set  at  naught  all  my 
counsel,  and  would  none  of  my  reproof:  I  also  will 
laugh  at  your  calamity;  I  will  mock  when  your  fear 
cometh  ;  when  your  fear  cometh  as  a  desolation,  and  your 
destruction  rometh  as  a  whirlwind ;  when  distress  and 
anguish  cometh  upon  you.  Then  shall  they  call  upon 
me,  but  I  will  not  answer;  they  shall  seek  me  early,  but 
they  shall  not  find  me."  This  passage,  every  one  sees, 
is  poetical,  and  some  parts  of  it  are  highly  figurative ; 
but  their  meaning  is  obvious.  And  the  thing  intended 
is  expressed  more  literally  in  the  following  words  :  "  For 
that  they  hated  knowledge,  and  did  not  choose  the  fear 
of  the  Lord.  .  .  .  Therefore  shall  they  eat  of  the  fruit 
of  their  own  way,  and  be  filled  with  their  own  devices. 
For  the  security  of  the  simple  shall  slay  them,  and 
the  prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them."  And  the 
whole  passage  is  so  equally  applicable  to  what  we  ex- 
perience in  the  present  world  concerning  the  conse- 
quences of  men's  actions,  and  to  what  religion  teaches 
us  is  to  be  expected  in  another,  that  it  may  be  questioned 
which  of  the  two  was  principally  intended. 

10.  Indeed,  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  prop- 
er proofs  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
nothing,  methinks,  can  give  one  so  sensible  Present  nun- 
an  apprehension  of  the  latter,  or  representa-  JjftS^'i^  o/Jie 
tion  of  it  to  the  mind,  as  observing  that  ^^ure. 
after  the  many  disregarded   checks,  admonitions,  and 


82  Analogy  of  Religion.  CPart  I. 

warnings  which  people  meet  with  in  the  ways  of  vice, 
and  folly,  and  extravagance  :  warnings  from  their  very 
nature;  from  the  examples  of  others;  from  the  lesser 
inconveniences  which  they  bring  upon  themselves;  from 
the  instructions  of  wise  and  virtuous  men ;  after  these 
have  been  long  despised,  scorned,  ridiculed ;  after  the 
chief  bad  consequences,  temporal  consequences,  of  their 
follies,  have  been  delayed  for  a  great  while ;  at  length 
they  break  in  irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force ;  repent- 
ance is  too  late  to  relieve,  and  can  serve  only  to  aggra- 
vate their  distress ;  the  case  is  become  desperate ;  and 
poverty  and  sickness,  remorse  and  anguish,  infamy  and 
death,  the  effects  of  their  own  doings,  overwhelm  them 
beyond  possibility  of  remedy  or  escape.  This  is  an 
account  of  what  is  in  fact  the  general  constitution  of 
nature. 

II.  It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,   that  according  to 
what  appears  at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things, 

They  meet  Ob-  ^^^^  ^re  always  uniformly  punished  in  pro- 
fiu-e^punSi-^'^  portion  to  their  misbehavior  ;  but  that  there 
ments.  g^j-g  ygj.y  niany  instances  of  misbehavior  pun- 

ished in  the  several  ways  now  mentioned,  and  very 
dreadful  instances  too,  sufficient  to  show  what  the  laws 
of  the  universe  may  admit ;  and  if  thoroughly  considered 
sufficient  fully  to  answer  all  objections  against  the  cred- 
ibility of  a  future  state  of  punishments  from  any  imagina- 
tions that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external  tempta- 
tions almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices  :  as 
well  as  objections  of  another  sort ;  from  necessity ;  from 
suppositions  that  the  will  of  an  infinite  being  cannot 
be  contradicted ;  or  that  he  must  be  incapable  of  offense 
and  provocation.* 

Such  reflec-       12.  Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  with- 
ror°'  et^to^r-  out  their  terrors  to  serious  persons,  the  most 
tent  to  repress  fj.gg  f^^^  enthusiasm,  and  of  the  greatest 
*  See  chap,  iv  and  vi. 


Chap.  II.]    Of  the  Government  of  God.  83 

strength  of  mind  ;  but  it  is  fit  things  be  stated  and  con- 
sidered as  they  really  are.  And  there  is,  in  the  present 
age,*  a  certain  fearlessness  with  regard  to  what  may  be 
hereafter  under  the  government  of  God,  which  nothing 
but  a  universally  acknowledged  demonstration  on  the 
side  of  Atheism  can  justify,  and  which  makes  it  quite 
necessary  that  men  be  reminded  and,  if  possible,  made 
to  feel,  that  there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being  thus 
presumptuous,  even  upon  the  most  skeptical  principles 
For  may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person,  upon  his  being 
bom  into  the  world,  he  may  behave  so  as  to  be  of  no 
service  to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  example  of  the  woe- 
ful effects  of  vice  and  folly ;  that  he  may,  as  any  one 
may,  if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execution  from  the 
hands  of  civil  justice;  or  in  some  other  course  of  ex- 
travagance shorten  his  days  ;  or  bring  upon  himself  in- 
famy and  diseases  worse  than  death  ?  So  that  it  had 
been  better  for  him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present 
world,  that  he  had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any 
pretense  of  reason  for  people  to  think  themselves  secure, 
and  talk  as  if  they  had  certain  proof,  that  let  them  act 
as  licentiously  as  they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  analo- 
gous to  this  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  general 
interest,  under  the  providence  and  government  of  the 
same  God  ? 

*  [The  age  immediately  following  the  corrupt  reign  of  Charles  II, 
For  a  vivid  picture  of  the  state  of  morals  in  his  reign  see  Macaulay's 
History  of  England,  vol.  i,  p.  140. — Champlin.] 


84  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 


^ 


A 


CHAPTER  III. 

of  the  moral  government  of  god.* 

S  the  manifold  appearance  of  design  and  of  final 
causes  in  the  constitution  of  the  world  prove  it  to 
be  the  work  of  an  intelligent  mind,  so  the 

Final  causes  .       ,        _       ,  _      ,  ,         . 

proTe  an  Intern-  particular  final  causes  of  pleasure  and  pam, 

gentOoTomor.       ,.       .,  ,  ,  .  , 

distributed  among  his  creatures,  prove  that 
they  are  under  his  government — what  may  be  called,  his 

•  [The  subject  of  the  present  chapter  is  as  distinct  from  that  of  the 
former,  as  the  generic  idea  of  a  government  is  distinct  from  the  more 
particular  idea  of  it  as  possessed  of  a  certain  character,  or  as  being  of 
a  certain  kind  and  species.  If  certain  actions  are  followed  up  by 
pleasure  and  others  by  pain,  and  these  are  known  beforehand,  so 
that  the  agent  can  foresee  the  consequence  of  his  doings,  even  as  he 
would  have  done  if  under  a  proclaimed  law,  which  told  at  the  same 
time  of  its  own  rewards  and  its  own  penalties,  these  are  enough  of 
themselves  to  constitute  a  government  having  its  regulations  which 
are  known,  and  its  sanctions  which  are  executed.  So  much  for  gov- 
ernment in  the  general ;  but  should  it  be  found  among  these  general 
phenomena,  that  those  actions  which  are  righteous  were  followed  up 
by  pleasure,  and  those  actions  which  are  wicked  were  followed  up  by 
pain,  this  would  present  us  with  a  moral  government  enveloped,  as 
it  were,  in  the  general  and  natural ;  and  it  is  to  the  manifestations 
of  such  a  government  in  the  course  and  constitution  of  nature  that 
the  author  now  addresses  his  observations. — Chalmers.] 

[This  chapter,  more  than  any  other,  carries  the  force  of  positive  ar- 
gument. If  in  this  world  we  have  proofs  that  God  is  a  moral  gov- 
ernor, then  in  order  to  evince  that  we  shall  be  under  moral  govern- 
ment  hereafter,  we  have  only  to  supply  an  intermediate  consideration, 
namely,  that  God  must  be  unchangeable.  The  argument  assumes  a 
substantive  form :  because  admitted  facts  as  to  this  world,  exhibiting 
the  y&Tj  principles  on  which  God's  government  goes  at  present,  com- 
pel us  not  only  to  suppose  that  the  principles  of  God's  government 
will  remain,  but  to  believe  so. — Malcom.] 


Chap.  III.]   Moral  Government  of  God.  85 

natural  government  of  creatures  endued  with  sense  and 
reason.  This,  however,  implies  somewhat  more  than 
seems  usually  attended  to  when  we  speak  of  God's  nat- 
ural government  of  the  world.  It  implies  government 
of  the  very  same  kind  with  that  which  a  master  exer- 
cises over  his  servants,  or  a  civil  magistrate  over  his 
subjects.  These  latter  instances  of  final  causes  as  really 
prove  an  intelligent  governor  of  the  world,  in  the  sense 
now  mentioned,  and  before  (chap,  ii)  distinctly  treated 
of,  as  any  other  instances  of  final  causes  prove  an  intel- 
ligent tnaker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear,  at  first  sight,  to  de- 
termine any  thing  certainly  concerning  the  moral  char- 
acter of  the  Author  of  nature,  considered  in 


-  .       ,     .         ^  ,  .Not 

this  relation  of  governor  ;  does  not  ascertam  rUy  a  moral  gov 

his  government  to  be  moral,  or  prove  that 
Ji^e  is  the  righteous  Judge  of  the  world.  .  Moral  govern- 
ment consists,  not  barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing 
men  for  their  actions,  which  the  most  tyrannical  person 
may  do ;  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous  and  punishing 
the  wicked ;  in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their  ac- 
tions, considered  as  good  or  evil.  And  the  perfection 
of  moral  government  consists  in  doing  this,  with  regard 
to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exact  proportion  to 
their  personal  merits  or  demerits. 

2.  Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of  the 
Author  of  nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  benevo- 
lence. This,  considered  as  a  principle  of  ood  not  sim- 
action,  and  infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposi-  SSt^^hSSSS 
tion  to  produce  the  greatest  possible  happi-  Ro^emor. 
ness,  without  regard  to  persons'  behavior,  otherwise 
than  as  such  regard  would  produce  higher  degrees  of  it. 
And  supposing  this  to  be  the  only  character  of  God, 
veracity  and  justice  in  him  would  be  nothing  but  be- 
nevolence conducted  by  wisdom.  Now  surely  this 
ought  not  to  be  asserted  unless  it  can  be  proved ;  for 


86  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPart  I. 

we  should  speak  with  cautious  reverence  upon  such  a 
subject.  And  whether  it  can  be  proved  or  not,  is  not 
the  thing  here  to  be  inquired  into ;  but  whether,  in  the 
constitution  and  conduct  of  the  world,  a  righteous  gov- 
ernment be  not  discernibly  plan.ied  out;  which  neces- 
sarily implies  a  righteous  governor.  There  may  possi- 
bly be  in  the  creation  beings  to  whom  the  Author  of 
nature  manifests  himself  under  this  most  amiable  of  all 
characters,  this  of  infinite  absolute  benevolence ;  for  it 
is  the  most  amiable,  supposing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is 
not,  incompatible  with  justice :  but  he  manifests  him- 
self to  us  under  the  character  of  a  righteous  governor. 
He  may,  consistently  with  this,  be  simply  and  absolutely 
benevolent,  in  the  sense  now  explained ;  but  he  is,  for 
he  has  given  us  a  proof  in  the  constitution  and  conduct 
of  the  world  that  he  is,  a  governor  over  servants,  as  he 
rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our  actions.  And  in  the 
constitution  and  conduct  of  it,  he  may  also  have  given, 
besides  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  natural  presages 
of  conscience,  clear  and  distinct  intimations  that  his 
government  is  righteous  or  moral — clear  to  such  as 
think  the  nature  of  it  deserving  their  attention,  and  yet 
not  to  every  careless  person  who  casts  a  transient  reflec- 
tion upon  the  subject.* 

This  govern-  3-  But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed  that, 
moral  'bu?^not  the  divinc  government,  which  we  experience 
perfect.  oursclvcs  undcr  in  the  present  state,  taken 

*  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not  being 
universal,  nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have  been,  may  be  urged 
against  natural  religion  as  well  as  against  revealed.  And  therefore 
the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to  the  first  part  of  this  Treatise, 
as  well  as  the  second.  But  as  these  objections  are  chiefly  urged 
against  revealed  religion,  I  chose  to  consider  them  in  the  second 
part.  And  the  answer  to  them  there,  (chap,  vi,)  as  urged  against 
Christianity,  being  almost  equally  applicable  to  them  as  urged  against 
the  religion  of  nature  ;  to  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to 
that  chapter. 


Chap.  III.]    Moral  Government  of  God.  S/ 

alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the  perfection  of  moral  gov- 
ernment.* And  yet  this  by  no  means  hinders,  but  that 
there  may  be  somewhat,  be  it  more  or  less,  truly  moral 
in  it.  A  righteous  government  may  plainly  appear  to  be 
carried  on  to  some  degree  ;  enough  to  give  us  the  appre- 
hension that  it  shall  be  completed,  or  carried  on  to  that 
degree  of  perfection  which  religion  teaches  us  it  shall; 
but  which  cannot  appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine 
administration  be  seen  than  can  in  the  present  life. 
And  the  design  of  this  chapter  is  to  inquire,  how  far  this 
is  the  case ;  how  far,  over  and  above  the  moral  nature 
(Dissertation  II)  which  God  has  given  us,  and  our  natu- 
ral notion  of  him,  as  righteous  governor  of  those  his 
creatures  to  whom  he  has  given  this  nature,  (chap,  vi ;) 
I  say  how  far,  besides  this,  the  principles  and  beginnings 
of  a  moral  government  over  the  world  may  be  discerned, 
notwithstanding  and  amid  all  the  confusion  and  dis- 
order of  it. 

4.  Now,  one  might  mention  here,  what  has    Difflcuityofvhe 

,  _  1        •  1  r  1  •       argument  from 

been  often  urged  with  great  force,  that  m  the  greater  hap- 

1  I  •  J  ..  •   /•      ^  •  piness  of  virtue. 

general  less  uneasmess  and  more  satisfaction 

are  the  natural  consequences  f  of  a  virtuous  than  of  a 

*  [Butler  seems  here  to  indicate  the  distinction  between  religious 
and  irreligious  optimism.  Irreligious  optimism  considers  \\i& present 
state  of  things  as  absolutely  the  best.  Religious  optimism  considers 
it  as  imperfect  in  itself,  but  necessary  for  bringing  about  that  state 
which  is  absolutely  the  best  possible.  But  this  best  possible  must,  as 
Bishop  Hamilton  (on  the  Attributes,  p.  189)  has  very  truly  re- 
marked, be  understood  with  reference  to  such  beings  as  men  ;  not  to 
mean  the  best  possible  scheme  of  created  things,  because  no  such 
scheme  can  be  conceived.  The  difference  between  finite  and  infinite 
pe;fection  must  always  be  infinite,  so  that  however  excellent  we  may 
suppose  any  one  scheme  of  created  things,  there  will  still  remain  the 
possibility  of  another  more  perfect,  in  infinitum.  See  on  the  general 
subject  of  the  two  schemes  of  optimism,  Warburton's  Reply  to  Cron- 
saz'  Criticism  on  Pope,  and  Johnson's  Review  of  Jenyn's  Essay  upon 
the  Origin  of  Evil. — F.] 

■f  See  Lord  Shaftesbury's  Inquiry  Concerning  Virtue,  part  ii. 


88  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

vicious  course  of  life,  in  the  present  state,  as  an  instance 
of  a  moral  government  established  in  nature ;  an  instance 
of  it,  collected  from  experience  and  present  matter  of  fact. 
But  it  must  be  owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh 
and  balance  pleasures  and  uneasinesses,  each  among 
themselves,  and  also  against  each  other,  so  as  to  make 
an  estimate,  with  any  exactness,  of  the  overplus  of  hap- 
piness on  the  side  of  virtue.  And  it  is  not  impossible, 
that,  amid  the  infinite  disorders  of  the  world,  there  may 
be  exceptions  to  the  happiness  of  virtue,  even  with  re- 
gard to  those  persons  whose  course  of  life,  from  their 
youth  up,  has  been  blameless ;  and  more  with  regard  to 
those  who  have  gone  on  for  some  time  in  the  ways  of 
vice,  and  have  afterward  reformed.  For  suppose  an  in- 
stance of  the  latter  case ;  a  person  with  his  passions  in- 
flamed, his  natural  faculties  of  self-government  impaired 
by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices  about 
him,  like  so  many  harpies,  craving  for  their  accustomed 
gratification, — who  can  say  how  long  it  might  be  before 
such  a  person  would  find  more  satisfaction  in  the  rea- 
sonableness and  present  good  consequences  of  virtue, 
than  difficulties  and  self-denial  in  the  restraints  of  it.^ 
Experience  also  shows,  that  men  can,  to  a  great  degree,  get 
over  their  sense  of  shame,  so  as  that  by  professing  them- 
selves to  be  without  principle,  and  avowing  even  direct 
villainy,  they  can  support  themselves  against  the  infamy 
of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions  of  any  one  will  probably  be 
more  talked  of,  and  oftener  thrown  in  his  way,  upon  his 
reformation ;  so  the  infamy  of  them  will  be  much  more 
felt,  after  the  natural  sense  of  virtue  and  of  honor  is  re- 
covered. Uneasiness  of  this  kind  ought  indeed  to  be 
put  to  the  account  of  former  vices ;  yet  it  will  be  said, 
they  are  in  part  the  consequences  of  reformation.  Still 
I  am  far  from  allowing  it  doubtful  whether  virtue,  upon 
the  whole,  be  happier  than  vice  in  the  present  world : 
but  if  it  were,  yet  the  beginnings  of  a  righteous  admin- 


Chap.  III.]   Moral  Government  of  God.  89 

istration  may,  beyond  all  question,  be  found  in  nature, 
if  we  will  attentively  inquire  after  them.     And, 

5.  I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did 
not  appear  whether  he  were,  in  a  proper  God  naturaiiya 
sense,  our  governor  at  all;  yet  when  it  is  °>o™i &o^e™o'"- 
certain  matter  of  experience,  that  he  does  manifest  him- 
self to  us  under  the  character  of  a  governor,  in  the  sense 
explained,  (chap,  ii,)  it  must  deserve  to  be  considered 
whether  there  be  not  reason  to  apprehend  that  he  may 
be  a  righteous  or  moral  governor.  Since  it  appears  to 
be  fact,  that  God  does  govern  mankind  by  the  method 
of  rewards  and  punishments,  according  to  some  settled 
rules  of  distribution,  it  is  surely  a  question  to  be  asked. 
What  presumption  is  there  against  his  finally  rewarding 
and  punishing  them  according  to  this  particular  rule, 
namely,  as  they  act  reasonably  or  unreasonably,  virtu- 
ously or  viciously  ?  since  rendering  man  happy  or  mis- 
erable by  this  rule  certainly  falls  in,  much  more  falls  in, 
with  our  natural  apprehensions  and  sense  of  things,  than 
doing  so  by  any  other  rule  whatever;  since  rewarding 
and  punishing  actions  by  any  other  rule  would  appear 
much  harder  to  be  accounted  for  by  minds  formed  as 
he  has  formed  ours.  Be  the  evidence  of  religion  then 
more  or  less  clear,  the  expectation  which  it  raises  in  us 
that  the  righteous  shall,  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and 
the  wicked  miserable,  cannot,  however,  possibly  be  con- 
sidered as  absurd  or  chimerical ;  because  it  is  no  more 
than  an  expectation  that  a  method  of  government  al- 
ready begun  shall  be  carried  on — the  method  of  reward- 
ing and  punishing  actions ;  and  shall  be  carried  on  by  a 
particular  rule,  which  unavoidably  appears  to  us,  at  first 
sight,  more  natural  than  any  other,  the  rule  which  we  . 

call  Distributive  Justice.     Nor,  I 

^    6.  II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tran-    ^?<A^  \ 
i^A--5uillity,  satisfaction,  and  external  advantages,  being  the 


90  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

natural  consequences  of  prudent  management  of  our- 
Pradence  re-  ^^^^^^  ^^^  °^^  affairs;  and  rashness,  profli- 
dCTce*^nr£Se3l  ^^^^  negligence,  and  willful  folly,  bringing 
after  them  many  inconveniences  and  suffer- 
ings, these  afford  instances  of  a  right  constitution  of 
nature:  as  the  correction  of  children,  for  their  own 
sakes  and  by  way  of  example,  when  they  run  into  dan- 
ger or  hurt  themselves,  is  a  part  of  right  education. 
And  thus,  that  God  governs  the  world  by  general  fixed 
laws;  that  he  has  endued  us  with  capacities  of  re- 
flecting upon  this  constitution  of  things,  and  foreseeing 
the  good  and  bad  consequences  of  our  behavior,  plainly 
implies  some  sort  of  moral  government ;  since  from  such 
a  constitution  of  things  it  cannot  but  follow  that  pru- 
dence and  imprudence,  which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue 
and  vice,*  must  be,  as  they  are,  respectively  rewarded 
and  punished. 

7.  III.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious  ac- 
tions are,  to  a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as  mis- 
chievous to  society;    and  besides  punish- 

Society  pun-  ,,•„.,  ,  • 

ishes  all  vice  aa  ment  actually  inflicted  upon  this  account, 

hurtftil.  ,  .       ,  ,       ^  , 

there  is  also  the  fear  and  apprehension  of  it 
in  those  persons  whose  crimes  have  rendered  them  ob- 
noxious to  it,  in  case  of  a  discovery ;  this  state  of  fear 
being  itself  often  a  very  considerable  punishment.  The 
natural  fear  and  apprehension  of  it,  too,  which  restrains 
from  such  crimes,  is  a  declaration  of  nature  against 
them.  It  IS  necessary  to  the  very  being  of  society  that 
vices  destructive  of  it  should  be  punished  as  being  so ; 
the  vices  of  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty:  which  punish- 
ment therefore  is  as  natural  as  society,  and  so  is  an  in- 
stance of  a  kind  of  moral  government,  naturally  estab- 
lished and  actually  taking  place.  And  since  the  certain 
natural  course  of  things  is  the  conduct  of  providence, 
or  the  government  of  God^  though  carried  on  by  the  in- 
*  See  Dissertation  II. 


Chap.  III.]    Moral  Government  of  God.  91 

strumentality  of  men,  the  observation  here  made  amounts 
to  this,  that  mankind  find  themselves  placed  by  him  in 
such  circumstances  as  that  they  are  unavoidably  ac- 
countable for  their  behavior,  and  are  often  punished, 
and  sometimes  rewarded,  under  his  government,  in  the 
view  of  their  being  mischievous  or  eminently  beneficial 
to  society. 

If  it  be  objected  that  good  actions,  and  such  as  are 
beneficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in  the  case 
of  persecution  and  in  other  cases,  and  that  objection  r©i- 
ill  and  mischievous  actions  are  often  re-  tehment'ofgoS 
warded,  it  may  be  answered  distinctly,  first,  ^^^^^  ^^ 
that  this  is  in  no  sort  necessary,  and  consequently  not 
natural  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  necessary,  and  there- 
fore natural,  that  ill  or  mischievous  actions  should  be 
punished ;  and  in  the  next  place,  that  good  actions  are 
never  punished,  considered  as  beneficial  to  society,  nor 
ill  actions  rewarded,  under  the  view  of  their  being  hurt- 
ful to  it.*  So  that  it  stands  good,  without  any  thing  on 
the  side  of  vice  to  be  set  over  against  it,  that  the  Author 
of  nature  has  as  truly  directed  that  vicious  actions,  con- 
sidered as  mischievous  to  society,  should  be  punished, 
and  put  mankind  under  a  necessity  of  thus  punishing 
them,  as  he  has  directed  and  necessitated  us  to  preserve 
our  lives  by  food. 

8.  IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue,  ^i-  sucA, 

*  [These  vicious  actions  are  never  rewarded  because  they  are  vicious, 
but  though  they  are  vicious ;  and  virtuous  actions  are  sometimes  pun^ 
ished,  yet  never  as  virtuous,  or  never  because  virtuous,  but  though 
virtuous. — Chalmers.] 

[Dr.  Mandeville,  in  his  "  Fable  of  the  Bees,"  alleges  that  private 
vices  are  often  public  benefits,  and  that  luxury  is  necessary  to  the 
well-being  of  society.     Others  have  maintained  the  same  opinion. 

See  this  doctrine  refuted  in  Browne  on  the  Characteristics,  Essay 
''•  §  5  ;  Warburton's  Divine  Legation,  book  i,  §  6 ;  Berkeley's  Mi- 
nute Philosopher,  dialogue  ii.  See  also  Whately,  and  other  writers, 
on  Political  Economy. — F.] 


92  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

is  actually  rewarded,  and  vice,  as  such,  punished ;  which 
Natural  vir-  ^^^^^^  to  afford  an  instance,  or  example,  not 
t^®' as  8uci^  re-  only  of  government,  but  of  moral  govern- 
and qualities dis-  ment  begun  and  established:  moral  in  the 
Strictest  sense,  though  not  in  that  perfection 
of  degree  which  religion  teaches  us  to  expect.  In  order 
to  see  this  more  clearly,  we  must  distinguish  between 
actions  themselves,  and  that  quality  ascribed  to  them, 
which  we  call  virtuous  or  vicious.  The  gratification  it- 
self of  every  natural  passion  must  be  attended  with 
delight ;  and  acquisitions  of  fortune,  however  made,  are 
acquisitions  of  the  means  or  materials  of  enjoyment. 
An  action,  then,  by  which  any  natural  passion  is  grati- 
fied or  fortune  acquired,  procures  delight  or  advantage, 
abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  morality  of  such 
action.  Consequently,  the  pleasure  or  advantage  in  this 
case  is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the  morality, 
the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it,  though  it  be,  per- 
haps, virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus  to  say  such  an  action 
or  course  of  behavior  procured  such  pleasure  or  advan- 
tage, or  brought  on  such  inconvenience  and  pain,  is 
quite  a  different  thing  from  saying  that  such  good  or 
bad  effect  was  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  action 
or  behavior.  In  one  case,  an  action,  abstracted  from 
all  moral  consideration,  produced  its  effect ;  in  the  oth- 
er case — for  it  will  appear  that  there  are  such  cases — the 
morality  of  the  action,  the  action  under  a  moral  consider- 
ation, that  is,  the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it,  pro- 
duced the  effect.  Now  I  say  virtue,  as  such,  naturally 
procures  considerable  advantages  to  the  virtuous ;  and 
vice,  as  such,  naturally  occasions  great  inconvenience, 
and  even  misery,  to  the  vicious,  in  very  many  instances. 
The  immediate  The  immediate  effects  of  virtue  and  vice 
m^^liS^^'l!  upon  the  mind  and  temper  are  to  be  men- 
trate  this.  tioned  as  instances  of  it.     Vice,  as  such,  is 

naturally  attended  with  some  sort  of  uneasiness,  and  not 


Chap.  IIIJ    Moral  Government  of  God.  93 

uncommonly  with  great  disturbance  and  apprehension. 
That  inward  feeling,  which,  respecting  lesser  matters 
and  in  familiar  speech,  we  call  being  vexed  with  one's 
self,  and  in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more  serious 
language,  remorse,  is  an  uneasiness  naturally  arising 
from  an  action  of  a  man's  own,  reflected  upon  by  him- 
self as  wrong,  unreasonable,  faulty,  that  is,  vicious,  in 
greater  or  less  degrees;  and  this  manifestly  is  a  different 
feeling  from  that  uneasiness  which  arises  from  a  sense 
of  mere  loss  or  harm.  What  is  more  common  than  to 
hear  a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or  event,  and  adding 
— but,  however,  he  has  the  satisfaction  that  he  cannot 
blame  himself  for  it ;  or  on  the  contrary,  that  he  has  the 
uneasiness  of  being  sensible  it  was  his  own  doing?  Thus, 
also,  the  disturbance  and  fear  which  often  follow  upon  a 
man's  having  done  an  injury,  arise  from  a  sense  of  his 
being  blameworthy ;  otherwise  there  would,  in  many 
cases,  be  no  ground  of  disturbance,  nor  any  reason  to 
fear  resentment  or  shame.  On  the  other  hand,  inward 
security  and  peace,  and  a  mind  open  to  the  several  grat- 
ifications of  life,  are  the  natural  attendants  of  innocence 
and  virtue ;  to  which  must  be  added,  the  complacency, 
satisfaction,  and  even  joy  of  heart,  which  accompany 
the  exercise,  the  real  exercise,  of  gratitude,  friendship, 
benevolence. 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned  the  fears 
of  future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of    ^Aisohopesand 

,.r      ■         ,  ,         r   ,,      ,     ,.  fears  for  tho  fti- 

a  better  life  m  those  who  fully  believe  or  ture. 

have  any  serious  apprehension  of  religion;*  because 

•  [When  one  supposes  he  is  about  to  die  there  comes  over  him  a 
fear  and  anxiety  about  things  in  regard  to  which  he  felt  none  before 
for  the  stories  which  are  told  about  Hades,  that  such  as  have  prac- 
ticed wrong  must  there  suffer  punishment,  although  made  light  of  for 
awhile,  then  torment  the  soul  lest  they  should  be  true.  But  he  who 
is  conscious  of  innocence  has  a  pleasant  and  good  hope  which  wilJ 
support  old  age. — Plato,  Repub.,  i,  §  5. — Malcom.] 


94  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

these  hopes  and  fears  are  present  uneasiness  and  satis- 
faction to  the  mind,  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  great 
part  of  the  world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought  most 
thoroughly  upon  that  subject  of  religion.  And  no  one 
can  say  how  considerable  this  uneasiness  and  satisfaction 
may  be,  or  what,  upon  the  whole,  it  may  amount  to. 

In  the  next  place,  comes  in  the  consideration  that  all 

honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  honest 

Also  t]\e  di8-  and  good  men,  as  such,  and  to  discounte- 

position  of  good  .    . 

men  toward  the  nance   the   vicious,  as  such,  and  do  so  in 

virtuous  and  the  .     ,        .     .  .  ,        ,  ,       , 

vicious.  some  degree — nideed,  m  a  considerable  de- 

gree ;  from  which  favor  and  discouragement  cannot  but 
arise  considerable  advantage  and  inconvenience.  And 
though  the  generality  of  the  world  have  little  regard  to 
the  morality  of  their  own  actions,  and  may  be  supposed 
to  have  less  to  that  of  others,  when  they  themselves  are 
not  concerned,  yet,  let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  man 
of  virtue,  somehow  or  other  he  will  be  favored,  and  good 
offices  will  be  done  him  from  regard  to  his  character, 
without  remote  views,  occasionally,  and  in  some  low 
degree,  I  think,  by  the  generality  of  the  world,  as  it  hap- 
pens to  come  in  their  way.  Public  honors,  too,  and  ad- 
vantages, are  the  natural  consequences,  are  sometimes, 
at  least,  the  consequences,  in  fact,  of  virtuous  actions, 
of  eminent  justice,  fidelity,  charity,  love  to  our  country, 
considered  in  the  view  of  being  virtuous.  And  some- 
times even  death  itself,  often  infamy  and  external  incon- 
veniences, are  the  public  consequences  of  vice  as  vice. 
For  instance,  the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny, 
injustice,  oppression,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling  or 
fear  of  misery,  has  doubtless  been  instrumental  in  bring- 
ing about  revolutions  which  make  a  figure  even  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  For  it  is  plain,  men  resent  inju- 
ries as  implying  faultiness,  and  retaliate,  not  merely  un- 
der the  notion  of  having  received  harm,  but  of  having 
received  wrong ;  and  they  have  this  resentment  in  be- 


Chap.  IIIJ    Moral  Government  of  God.  95 

half  of  others,  as  well  as  of  themselves.  So,  likewise, 
even  the  generality  are,  in  some  degree,  grateful,  and 
disposed  to  return  good  offices,  not  merely  because  such 
a  one  has  been  the  occasion  of  good  to  them,  but  under 
the  view  that  such  good  offices  implied  kind  intention  and 
good  desert  in  the  doer.  To  all  this  may  be  added  two 
or  three  particular  things,  which  many  per-  The  rule  of  do 
sons  will  think  frivolous ;  but  to  me  noth-  gOTerameJt'^e'2- 
ing  appears  so  which  at  all  comes  in  toward  **^^^®^- 
determining  a  question  of  such  importance,  as  whether 
there  be  or  be  not  a  moral  institution  of  government, 
in  the  strictest  sense  moral,  visibly  established  and  be- 
gun in  nature.  The  particular  things  are  these :  that 
in  domestic  government,  which  is  doubtless  natural, 
children  and  others  also  are  very  generally  punished  for 
falsehood,^ and  injustice,  and  ill  behavior,  as  such,  and  re- 
warded for  the  contrary;  which  are  instances  where  ve- 
racity, and  justice,  and  right  behavior,  as  such,  are  natu- 
rally enforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  whether  more 
or  less  considerable  in  degree  :  that  though  civil  govern- 
ment be  supposed  to  take  cognizance  of  actions  in  no 
other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  society,  without  re- 
spect to  the  immorality  of  them,  yet  as  such  actions  are 
immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men  have  of  the  immorality 
of  them  very  greatly  contributes,  in  different  ways,  to 
bring  offenders  to  justice ;  and  that  entire  absence  of  all 
crime  and  guilt,  in  the  moral  sense,  when  plainly  ap- 
pearing, will  almost  of  course  procure,  and  circum- 
stances of  aggravated  guilt  prevent,  a  remission  of  the 
penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in  many  cases,  though 
by  no  means  in  all. 

9.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  besides  the  good  thJ^OTiTSi^rnl 
and  bad  effects  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  JJ^^'of'^JJ^S*' 
own  minds,  the  course  of  the  world  does,  in  «*<^ 
some  measure,  turn  upon  the  approbation  and  disappro- 
bation of  them,  as  such,  in  others.     The  sense  of  well 


96  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

and  ill  doing,  the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love  of 
good  characters  and  dislike  of  bad  ones,  honor,  sharae, 
resentment,  gratitude ;,  all  these,  considered  in  them- 
selves and  in  their  effects,  do  afford  manifest  real  in- 
stances of  virtue,  as  such,  naturally  favored,  and  of  vice, 
as  such,  discountenanced,  more  or  less,  in  the  daily 
course  of  human  life ;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in 
every  general  circumstance  of  it.  That  God  has  given 
us  a  moral  nature,*  may  most  justly  be  urged  as  a  proof 
of  our  being  under  his  moral  government ;  but  that  he 
has  placed  us  in  a  condition  which  gives  this  nature^  as 
one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate,  and  in  which  it  does  un 
avoidably  operate,  that  is,  influence  mankind  to  act,  so 
as  thus  to  favor  and  reward  virtue,  and  discountenance 
and  punish  vice ;  this  is  not  the  same,  but  a  further  ad- 
ditional proof  of  his  moral  government ;  for  it  is  an  in- 
stance of  it.  The  first  is  a  proof  that  he  will  finally 
favor  and  support  virtue  effectually ;  the  second  is  an 
example  of  his  favoring  and  supporting  it  at  present,  in 
some  degree. 

lo.  If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it 

arises  that  virtue,  as  such,  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice, 

.    as  such,  is  punished,  and  this  rule  never  in- 

Why  virtue  Is  '..,,,.'  -     . 

rewarded  and     vcrtcd,  it  Will  be  found  to  proceed,  m  part, 

vice  punished.       .  , •        i       /-  -,  i  •       ^r 

immediately  from  the  moral  nature  itself 
which  God  has  given  us ;  and  also,  in  part,  from  his 
having  given  us,  together  with  this  nature,  so  great  a 
power  over  each  other's  happiness  and  misery.  For, 
j^rsf,  it  is  certain  that  peace  and  delight,  in  some  degree 
and  upon  some  occasions,  is  the  necessary  and  present 
effect  of  virtuous  practice  ;  an  effect  arising  immediately 
from  that  constitution  of  our  nature.  We  are  so  made 
that  well-doing,  as  such,  gives  us  satisfaction,  at  least, 
in  some  instances;  ill-doing,  as  such,  in  none.  And. 
^econdlyy  from  our  moral  nature,  joined  with  God's  hav- 
*  See  Dissertation  II. 


Chap.  1 1 1.1   Moral  Government  of  God.  97 

ing  put  our  happiness  and  misery  in  many  respects  in 
each  other's  power,  it  cannot  but  be  that  vice,  as  such, 
some  kinds  and  instances  of  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous, 
and  men  will  be  disposed  to  punish  it  as  in  itself  de- 
testable; and  the  villain  will  by  no  means  be  able  al- 
ways to  avoid  feeling  that  infamy,  any  more  than  he  will 
be  able  to  escape  this  further  punishment  which  man- 
kind will  be  disposed  to  inflict  upon  him,  under  the  no- 
tion of  his  deserving  it.  But  there  can  be  nothing  on 
the  side  of  vice  to  answer  this,  because  there  is  nothing 
in  the  human  mind  contradictory,  as  the  ^^^^^^  ^^^ 
logicians  speak,  to  virtue.     For  virtue  con-  mind  contradic- 

.         .  !  ,         .       .    ,  ,  tory  to  virtue. 

sists  in  a  regard  to  what  is  right  and  reason- 
able, as  being  so ;  in  a  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  charity, 
in  themselves :  and  there  is  surely  no  such  thing  as  a 
like  natural  regard  to  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty.  If  it 
be  thought  that  there  are  instances  of  an  approbation  of 
vice,  as  such,  in  itself,  and  for  its  own  sake,  (though  it 
does  not  appear  to  me  that  there  is  any  such  thing  at 
all,)  but  supposing  there  be,  it  is  evidently  monstrous ; 
as  much  so  as  the  most  acknowledged  perversion  of  any 
passion  whatever.  Such  instances  of  perversion,  then, 
being  left  out  as  merely  imaginary,  or,  however,  unnat- 
ural ;  it  must  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our  nature,  and 
from  our  condition  in  the  respects  now  described,  that 
vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but  be,  favored, 
as  such,  by  others,  upon  some  occasions,  and  happy  in 
itself,  in  some  degree.  For  what  is  here  insisted  upon 
is,  not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  dis- 
tinguished, but  only  the  thing  itself,  that  they  are  so  in 
some  degree ;  though  the  whole  good  and  bad  effect  of 
virtue  and  vice,  as  such,  is  not  inconsiderable  in  degree. 
But  that  they  must  be  thus  distinguished,  in  some  de- 
gree, is  in  a  manner  necessary ;  it  is  matter  of  fact  of 
daily  experience,  even  in  the  greatest  confusion  of 
human  affairs. 
7 


98  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

11.  It  IS  not  pretended  but  that,  in  the  natural  course 
of  things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed 

by  other  rules  than  only  the  personal  merit 

ness  and  misery  and  demerit  of  characters.  They  may  some- 
are  distributed.  .  ,  ,,  .,  ,  ,  ^ -^  ,.  • 
times  be  distributed  by  way  of  mere  disci- 
pline. There  may  be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons  why 
the  world  should  be  governed  by  general  laws,  from 
whence  such  promiscuous  distribution,  perhaps,  must 
follow ;  and  also  why  our  happiness  and  misery  should 
be  put  in  each  other's  power,  in  the  degree  which  they 
are.  And  these  things,  as  in  general  they  contribute  to 
the  rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such ;  so 
they  often  contribute  also,  not  to  the  inversion  of  this, 
which  is  impossible,  but  to  the  rendering  persons  pros- 
perous though  wicked,  afflicted  though  righteous;  and, 
which  is  worse,  to  the  rewarding  some  actions^  though 
vicious,  and  punishing  other  actions^  though  virtuous. 
But  all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of  nature  in  the 
yi^-  Natnraiiy  dis-  conduct  of  Providencc,  plainly  declaring  it- 
*^°*®^  self  for  virtue,  by  way  of  distinction  from 
vice,  and  preference  to  it.  For,  our  being  so  constituted 
as  that  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  naturally  favored  and  dis- 
countenanced, rewarded  and  punished  respectively  as 
such,  is  an  intuitive  proof  of  the  intent  of  nature  that 
it  should  be  so ;  otherwise  the  constitution  of  our  mind, 
from  which  it  thus  immediately  and  directly  proceeds, 
would  be  absurd.  But  it  cannot  be  said,  because  vir- 
tuous actions  are  sometimes  punished  and  vicious  ac- 
tions rewarded,  that  nature  intended  it.  For,  though 
this  great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all  actions  are 
done,  by  means  of  some  natural  passion,  yet  this  may  be, 
as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about  by  the  perversion  of 
such  passion,  implanted  in  us  for  other,  and  those  very- 
good,  purposes.  And  indeed  these  other  and  good  pur- 
poses, even  of  every  passion,  may  be  clearly  seen. 

12.  We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of 


Chap.  III.]    Moral  Government  of  God.  99 

present  effect,  from  Him  who  is  supreme  in  nature,  \^hich 
side  he  is  of,  or  what  part  he  takes;  a  ood  declares 
declaration  for  virtue  and  against  vice.  So  ^°^  "^^^^ 
far,  therefore,  as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and 
justice,  to  equity  and  charity,  and  the  right  of  the  case, 
in  whatever  he  is  concerned,  so  far  he  is  on  the  side  of 
the  divine  administration,  and  co-operates  with  it ;  and 
from  hence,  to  such  a  man,  arises  naturally  a  secret  sat- 
isfaction and  sense  of  security,  and  implicit  hope  of 
somewhat  further.     And, 

13.  V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  ten- 
dencies of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  effect, 
yet  are  at  present  discernible  in  nature,  and  This  hope  con- 
so  afford  an  instance  of  somewhat  moral  in  Su^^ndeSJa 
the  essential  constitution  of  it.  There  is,  of  virtue. 
in  the  nature  of  things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to 
produce  the  good  and  bad  effects  now  mentioned,  in  a 
greater  degree  than  they  do  in  fact  produce  them.  For 
instance,  good  and  bad  men  would  be  much  more  re- 
warded and  punished  as  such,  were  it  not  that  justice  is 
often  artificially  eluded,  that  characters  are  not  known, 
and  many  who  would  thus  favor  virtue  and  discourage 
vice,  are  hindered  from  doing  so  by  accidental  causes. 
These  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  are  obvious  with 
regard  to  individuals.  But  it  may  require  more  particu- 
larly to  be  considered,  that  power  in  a  society^  by  being 
under  the  direction  of  virtue,  naturally  increases,  and 
has  a  necessary  tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite  power 
not  under  the  direction  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  power, 
by  being  under  the  direction  of  reason,  increases,  and 
has  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  There  are 
several  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  several  of  superior, 
strength  to  that  of  men ;  and  possibly  the  sum  of  the 
whole  strength  of  brutes  may  be  greater  than  that  of 
mankind :  but  reason  gives  us  the  advantage  and  supe- 
riority over  them,  and  thus  man  is  the  acknowledged 


icx)  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

governing  animal  upon  the  earth.  Nor  is  this  superior- 
ity considered  by  any  as  accidental ;  but  as  what  reason 
has  a  tendency,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  obtain. 
And  yet,  perhaps,  difficulties  may  be  raised  about  the 
meaning,  as  well  as  the  truth,  of  the  assertion,  that  virtue 
has  tlie  like  tendency. 

14,  To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  dis- 
tinctly how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to  reason,  which 
^   ^        ,        is  so  readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  ad- 

Tendencyofrea-  •'  ° 

son  to  triumph   vanta^eous   tendency.     Suppose,  then,  two 

over  brute  force.  ,    ^  ^    ,       ,  ,  • 

or  three  men  of  the  best  and  most  miproved 
understanding,  in  a  desolate  open  plain,  attacked  by  ten 
times  the  number  of  beasts  of  prey ;  would  their  reason 
secure  them  the  victory  in  this  unequal  combat  ?  Power, 
then,  though  joined  with  reason,  and  under  its  direction, 
cannot  be  expected  to  prevail  over  opposite  power, 
though  merely  brutal,  unless  the  one  bears  some  pro- 
portion to  the  other.  Again,  put  the  imaginary  case, 
that  rational  and  irrational  creatures  were  of  a  like  ex- 
ternal shape  and  manner;  it  is  certain,  before  there 
were  opportunities  for  the  first  to  distinguish  each  other, 
to  separate  from  their  adversaries  and  to  form  a  union 
among  themselves,  they  might  be  upon  a  level,  or  in 
several  respects,  upon  great  disadvantage,  though  united 
they  might  be  vastly  superior ;  since  union  is  of  such 
efficacy  that  ten  men,  united,  might  be  able  to  accom- 
plish what  ten  thousand  of  the  same  natural  strength 
and  understanding,  wholly  ununited,  could  not.  In  this 
case,  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain  its 
ground  against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among -the 
rational  creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to  land 
upon  an  island  inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts ;  a  number 
of  men,  who,  by  the  regulations  of  civil  government,  the 
inventions  of  art,  and  the  experience  of  some  years, 
could  they  be  preserved  so  long,  would  be  really  suffi- 
cient to  subdue  the  wild  beasts,  and  to  preserve  them- 


Chap.  III.]   Moral  Government  of  God.  loi 

selves  in  security  from  them  ;  yet  a  conjuncture  of  acci- 
dents might  give  such  advantage  to  the  irrational  animals 
as  that  they  might  at  once  overpower,  and  even  extirpate, 
the  whole  species  of  rational  ones.  Length  of  lime, 
then,  proper  scope  and  opportunities  for  reason  to  exert 
itself,  may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  its  prevailing  over 
brute  force. 

Further  still :  there  are  many  instances  of  brutes  suc- 
ceeding in  attempts  which  they  could  not  have  under- 
taken had  not  their  irrational  nature  ren-      „         ^    . 

Supposea  tn- 

dered  them  incapable  of  foreseeing  the  dan-  nmph  of  brutes. 

°  .  Inverted  order. 

ger  of  such  attempts,  or  the  fury  of  passion 
hindered  their  attending  to  it;  and  there  are  instances 
of  reason  and  real  prudence  preventing  men's  undertak- 
ing what,  it  hath  appeared  afterward,  they  might  have 
succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashness.  And  in  certain  con- 
junctures, ignorance  and  folly,  weakness  and  discord, 
rnay  have  their  advantages.  So  that  rational  animals 
have  not  necessarily  the  superiority  over  irrational  ones ; 
but  how  improbable  soever  it  may  be,  it  is  evidently  pos- 
sible that  in  some  globes  the  latter  may  be  superior. 
And  were  the  former  wholly  at  variance  and  disunited, 
by  false  self-interest  and  envy,  by  treachery  and  injustice, 
and  consequent  rage  and  malice  against  each  other, 
while  the  latter  were  firmly  united  among  themselves  by 
instinct,  this  might  greatly  contribute  to  the  introducing 
such  an  inverted  order  of  things.  For  every  one  would 
consider  it  as  inverted ;  since  reason  has,  in  the  nature 
of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force,  notwith- 
standing the  possibility  it  may  not  prevail,  and  the  ne- 
cessity which  there  is  of  many  concurrent  circumstances 
to  render  it  prevalent. 

Now  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like   virtue'to'^^ipe! 
tendency  to  procure  superiority  and  addi-  ■^<*''**y'  <*'«• 
tional  power,  whether  this  power  be  considered  as  the 
means  of  security  from  opposite  power,  or  of  obtaining 


I02  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

other  advantages.  And  it  has  this  tendency,  by  render- 
ing public  good  an  object  and  end  to  every  member  of  the 
society :  by  putting  every  one  upon  consideration  and 
diligence,  recollection  and  self-government,  both  in  or- 
der to  see  what  is  the  most  effectual  method,  and  also 
in  order  to  perform  their  proper  part,  for  obtaining  and 
preserving  it ;  by  uniting  a  society  within  itself,  and  so 
increasing  its  strength,  and,  which  is  particularly  to  be 
mentioned,  uniting  it  by  means  of  veracity  and  justice. 
For  as  these  last  are  principal  bonds  of  union,  so  benev- 
olence, or  public  spirit,  undirected,  unrestrained  by 
them,  is — nobody  knows  what. 

15.  And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible 

dispensations  of  Providence,  to  be  in  any  sort  analogous 

to  what  appears ;  or  that  both  together  make 

cv  throughout    up  One  uniform   scheme,  the  two  parts  of 

the  universe.  , 

which,  the  part  which  we  see,  and  that  which 
is  beyond  our  observation,  are  analogous  to  each  other ; 
then  there  must  be  a  like  natural  tendency  in  the  de- 
rived power,  throughout  the  universe,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over  that  which  is 
not  under  its  direction ;  as  there  is  in  reason,  derived 
reason  in  the  universe,  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  But 
then,  in  order  to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or  that  it  may 
actually  produce  what  it  has  a  tendency  to  produce,  the 
like  concurrences  are  necessary  as  are  to  the  prevalence 
of  reason.  There  must  be  some  proportion  between 
the  natural  power  or  force  which  is,  and  that  which  is 
not,  under  the  direction  of  virtue :  there  must  be  suffi- 
cient length  of  time ;  for  the  complete  success  of  virtue, 
as  of  reason,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 
otherwise  than  gradual :  there  must  be,  as  one  may 
speak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  extensive 
enough,  proper  occasions  and  opportunities  for  the  vir- 
tuous to  join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against  law- 
less force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labors. 


Chap.  IIIJ  Moral  Government  of  God.  103 

Now  indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  disproportion  be- 
tween the  good  and  the  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  is  not 
so  great,  but  that  the  former  have  natural  ninderances 
power  sufficient  to  their  prevailing  to  a  con-  ^^x^JJ^g^^ 
siderable  degree,  if  circumstances  would 
permit  this  power  to  be  united.  For  much  less,  very 
much  less,  power,  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  would 
prevail  over  much  greater,  not  under  the  direction  of  it.* 
However,  good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  cannot 
unite ;  as  for  other  reasons,  so  because  they  cannot  be 
sufficiently  ascertained  of  each  other's  characters.  And 
the  known  course  of  human  things,  the  scene  we  are 
now  passing  through,  particularly  the  shortness  of  life, 
denies  to  virtue  its  full  scope  in  several  other  respects. 
The  natural  tendency  which  we  have  been  considering, 
though  real,  is  hindered  from  being  carried  into  effect  in 
the  present  state, but  these hinderances  maybe  removed 
in  a  future  one.     Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Christian  allu- 

*  With  reference  to  this  point  Fitzgerald  quotes  a  forcible  passage 
from  Coleridge  :  "  Often  have  I  reflected  with  awe  on  the  great  and 
disproportionate  power  which  an  individual  of  no  extraordinary  tal- 
ents or  attainments  may  exert  by  merely  throwing  off  all  restraint  of 
conscience.  ...  It  is  not  vice,  as  vice,  which  is  thus  mighty,  but  sys- 
tematic vice.  The  abandonment  of  all  principle  of  right  enables  the 
soul  to  choose  and  act  upon  a  principle  of  wrong,  and  to  subordinate 
to  this  one  principle  all  the  various  vices  of  human  nature.  For  it 
b  a  mournful  truth,  that  as  devastation  is  incomparably  an  easier 
work  than  production,  so  may  all  its  means  and  instruments  be  more 
easily  arranged  into  a  scheme  and  system."  (Friend,  i,  158  159  ; 
Pickering,  1837.) 

As  soon  as  it  is  understood  that  bad  men  make  no  profession  of  vir- 
tue, and  have  thrown  off  all  the  restraints  of  conscience,  their  power 
declines. 

There  is  an  intensity  and  continuity  of  effort  in  great  wickedness, 
rarely  manifested  by  most  men  who  are  esteemed  as  good,  in  the 
usual  sense  of  the  word.  Moreover,  the  results  of  wickedness  are 
more  striking  and  directly  manifest  to  the  senses  than  the  influence 
of  virtue,  which  is  often  more  quiet  and  unobserved,  though  more 
abiding  and  really  more  powerful. 


104  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

sion,  is  militant  here,  and  various  untoward  accidents 
contribute  to  its  being  often  overborne ;  but  it  may  com- 
bat with  greater  advantage  hereafter,  and  prevail  com- 
pletely, and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards  in  some  future 
states.*  Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown,  perhaps 
despised  and  oppressed  here,  there  may  be  scenes  in 
eternity  lasting  enough,  and  in  every  other  way  adapted 
to  afford  it  a  sufficient  sphere  of  action,  and  a  sufficient 
sphere  for  the  natural  consequences  of  it  to  follow  in 
fact.  If  the  soul  be  naturally  immortal,  and  this  state 
be  a  progress  toward  a  future  one,  as  childhood  is  toward 
mature  age,  good  men  may  naturally  unite,  not  only 
among  themselves,  but  also  with  other  orders  of  virtuous 
creatures  in  that  future  state.  For  virtue,  from  the  very 
nature  of  it,  is  a  principle  and  bond  of  union,  in  some 
degree,  among  all  who  are  endued  with  it  and  known  to 
each  other;  so  as  that  by  it  a  good  man  cannot  but 
recommend  himself  to  the  favor  and  protection  of  all 
virtuous  beings  throughout  the  whole  universe,  who  can 
be  acquainted  with  his  character,  and  can  any  way 
interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his  duration. 

And  one  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this  advanta- 
geous tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effect  among  one  or 
more  orders  of  creatures,  in  any  distant  scenes  and  peri- 
ods, and  to  be  seen  by  any  orders  of  vicious  creatures, 
throughout  the  universal  kingdom  of  God ;  this  happy 
effect  of  virtue  would  have  a  tendency,  by  way  of  exam- 
ple, and  possibly  in  other  ways,  to  amend  those  of  them 
who  are  capable  of  amendment,  and  being  recovered  to 
a  just  sense  of  virtue.     If  our  notions  of  the  plan  of 

*  [This  is  an  instance  of  Butler's  care  to  avoid  assuming  more  than 
his  premises  will  warrant.  He  is  arguing  here  on  the  foot  of  reason 
alone ;  and,  as  he  had  before  observed  that  mere  reason  could  not 
show  that  probation  would  terminate  with  this  life,  so  he  speaks  here 
of  the  supposition  (consistent  with  such  a  state  of  knowledge)  of  its 
passing  through  some  state  or  states  of  militancy  hereafter. — F.l 


Chap.  IIIJ    Moral  Government  of  God.  105 

Providence  were  enlarged,  in  any  sort  proportionable  to 
what  late  discoveries  have  enlarged  our  views  with  re- 
spect to  the  material  world,  representations  of  this  kind 
would  not  appear  absurd  or  extravagant.  However, 
they  are  not  to  be  taken  as  intended  for  a  literal  delin- 
eation    of  what    is    in    fact   the    particular     ^ 

^  Theae  are  sup- 

scheme  of  the  universe,  which   cannot  be  positions- what 

,  .  ,  ...  .  .  thoyshow. 

known  without  revelation ;  for  suppositions 
are  not  to  be  looked  on  as  true  because  not  incredible, 
but  they  are  mentioned  to  show  that  our  finding  virtue 
to  be  hindered  from  procuring  to  itself  such  superiority 
and  advantages  is  no  objection  against  its  having,  in 
the  essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  procure 
them.  And  the  suppositions  now  mentioned  do  plainly 
show  this ;  for  they  show  that  these  hinderances  are  so 
far  from  being  necessary,  that  we  ourselves  can  easily 
conceive  how  they  may  be  removed  in  future  states,  and 
full  scope  be  granted  to  virtue.  And  all  these  advan- 
tageous tendencies  of  it  are  to  be  considered  as  decla- 
rations of  God  in  its  favor.  This,  however,  is  taking  a 
pretty  large  compass ;  though  it  is  certain  that  as  the 
material  world  appears  to  be,  in  a  manner,  boundless 
and  immense,  there  must  be  some  scheme  of  Providence 
vast  in  proportion  to  it. 

16.  But  let  us  return  to  the  earth,  our  habitation,  and 
we  shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue  by  imagining 
an   instance   not  so  vast   and   remote ;  by     ^ 

...  .  ^  The  trinmph 

supposing  a  kingdom  or  society  of  men  upon   of  virtue  in  a 

.'^.°,.  .  ^  .      ^     ^    perfect  state. 

It,  perfectly  virtuous,  tor  a  succession  of 
many  ages;  to  which,  if  you  please,  may  be  given  a  sit- 
uation advantageous  for  universal  monarchy.  In  such 
a  state  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  faction,  but  men 
of  the  greatest  capacity  would,  of  course,  all  along,  have 
the  chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to  them, 
and  they  would  share  it  among  themselves  without  envy. 
Each  of  these   would  have   the  part  assigned  him  to 


io6  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

which  his  genius  was  peculiarly  adapted ;  and  others, 
who  had  not  any  distinguished  genius,  would  be  safe, 
and  think  themselves  very  happy,  by  being  under  the 
protection  and  guidance  of  those  who  had.  Public  de- 
terminations would  really  be  the  result  of  the  united 
wisdom  of  the  community,  and  they  would  faithfully  be 
executed  by  the  united  strength  of  it.  Some  would 
in  a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  would  in  some 
way  contribute  to  the  public  prosperity,  and  in  it 
each  would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And 
as  injustice,  whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  un- 
known among  themselves,  so  they  would  be  sufficiently 
secured  from  it  in  their  neighbors.  For  cunning  and 
false  self-interest,  confederacies  in  injustice,  ever  slight, 
and  accompanied  with  faction  and  intestine  treachery ; 
these,  on  one  hand,  would  be  found  mere  childish  folly 
and  weakness  when  set  in  opposition  against  wisdom, 
public  spirit,  union  inviolable,  and  fidelity  on  the  other, 
allowing  both  a  sufficient  length  of  years  to  try  their 
force.  Add  the  general  influence  which  such  a  king- 
dom would  have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by  way  of 
example  particularly,  and  the  reverence  which  would  be 
paid  it.  It  would  plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and 
the  world  must  gradually  come  under  its  empire;  not 
by  means  of  lawless  violence,  but  partly  by  what  must 
be  allowed  to  be  just  conquest,  and  partly  by  other 
kingdoms  submitting  themselves  voluntarily  to  it  through- 
out a  course  of  ages,  and  claiming  its  protection,  one 
after  another,  in  successive  exigencies.  The  head  of  it 
would  be  a  universal  monarch,  in  another  sense  than 
any  mortal  has  yet  been,  and  the  eastern  style  would  be 
literally  applicable  to  him,  that  all  people^  nations^  and 
lans'uasres  should  serve  him.    And  though,  in- 

NosuchBtate,      .    ^,  .  ,     ,  ^  ,  ^  , 

yet  a  tendency  deed,  our  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and 
the  whole  history  of  mankind,  show  the  im- 
possibility, without  some  miraculous  interposition,  that 


Chap.  III.]    Moral  Government  of  God.  107 

a  number  of  men  here  on  earth  should  unite  in  one  so- 
ciety or  government,  in  the  fear  of  God  and  universal 
practice  of  virtue,  and  that  such  a  government  should  con- 
tinue so  united  for  a  succession  of  ages ;  yet,  admitting 
or  supposing  this,  the  effect  would  be  as  now  drawn  out 
And  thus,  for  instance,  the  wonderful  power  and  pros- 
perity promised  to  the  Jewish  nation  in  the  Scripture 
would  be,  in  a  great  measure,  the  consequence  of  what 
is  predicted  of  them ;  that  the  "  people  should  be  all 
righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  forever;"  were  we  to  un- 
derstand the  latter  phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only, 
sufficient  to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions 
of  this  kind,  for  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come  to 
pass  in  the  present  known  course  of  nature  ;  but  suppose 
them  to  come  to  pass,  and  then  the  dominion  and  pre- 
eminence promised  must  naturally  follow,  to  a  very 
considerable  degree. 

17.  Consider  now  the  general  system  of  religion  ;  that 
the  government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one,  and 
moral ;  that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally  Tendency  of 
have  the  advantage,  and  prevail  over  fraud  foJt"moraf  ^- 
and  lawless  force — over  the  deceits  as  well  «™ment 

as  the  violence  of  wickedness  —  under  the  conduct 
of  one  supreme  governor ;  and  from  the  observations 
above  made  it  will  appear  that  God  has,  by  our  rea- 
son, given  us  to  see  a  peculiar  connection  in  the  sev- 
eral parts  of  this  scheme,  and  a  tendency  toward  the 
completion  of  it,  arising  out  of  the  very  nature  of  virtue; 
which  tendency  is  to  be  considered  as  somewhat  moral 
in  the  essential  constitution  of  things.  If  any  one  should 
think  all  this  to  be  of  little  importance,  I  desire  him  to 
consider  what  he  would  think  if  vice  had,  essentially 
and  in  its  nature,  these  advantageous  tendencies,  or  if 
virtue  had  essentially  the  direct  contrary  ones. 

18.  But  it  may  be  objected,  that  notwithstanding  all 
these  natural  effects,  and  these  natural   tendencies  of 


io8  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

virtue,  yet  things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout  the 

universe,  and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in   the  same  mixed 

_      way  as  here  at  present  upon  earth ;  virtue 

thingsuow  and   sometimes  prosperous,  sometimes  depressed: 

hereaftermaygo       .  .  •   ,       i  • 

on  in  the  same  vice    sometmies  punished,  sometmies   sue- 

inixod  wflv 

cessful.*  The  answer  to  which  is,  that  it  is 
not  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  nor  of  this  treatise, 
properly  to  prove  God's  perfect  moral  government  over 
the  world,  or  the  truth  of  religion,  but  to  observe  what 
there  is  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  to  con- 
firm the  proper  proof  of  it,  supposed  to  be  known,  and 
that  the  weight  of  the  foregoing  observations  to  this 
purpose  may  be  thus  distinctly  proved.  Pleasure  and 
pain  are,  indeed,  to  a  certain  degree,  say  to  a  very  high 
degree,  distributed  among  us  without  any  apparent  re- 
gard to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  characters.  And  were 
there  nothing  else,  concerning  this  matter,  discernible 
in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  there  would  be 
no  ground,  from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature, 
to  hope  or  to  fear  that  men  would  be  rewarded  or  pun- 
ished hereafter  according  to  their  deserts ;  which,  how- 
ever, it  is  to  be  remarked,  implies  that  even  then  there 
would  be  no  ground,  from  appearances,  to  think  that 
vice,  upon  the  whole,  would  have  the  advantage,  rather 
than  that  virtue  would.  And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future 
state  of  retribution  would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  ar- 
guments for  it ;  which  are,  I  think,  plainly  unanswerable, 
and  would  be  so  though  there  were  no  additioral  con- 
firmation of  them  from  the  things  above  insisted  on.  But 
these  things  are  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  them.  For, 
Godnotindif-       ig.  First,  They  show  that  the  Author  of 

forent  to  virtue  .  .      , .  „  .  ,      . 

and  vice.  nature  IS  not  indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice 

They  amount  to  a  declaration  from  him,  determinate, 

*  [The  objection  is  taken  from  Hume.  Compare  D.  Stewart,  Act- 
ive Powers,  vol.  ii,  pp.  226,  etc.  Archbishop  Whately's  Essays  on 
Peculiarities  of  Christian  Religion,  note,  Essay  I,  §  6. — F.l 


Chap.  III.]    Moral  Government  of  God.  log 

and  not  to  be  evaded,  in  favor  of  one  and  against  the 
other;  such  a  declaration  as  there  is  nothing  to  be  set 
over  against,  or  answer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that 
were  a  man,  laying  aside  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to 
determine,  from  the  course  of  nature  only,  whether  it  were 
most  probable  that  the  righteous  or  the  wicked  would 
have  the  advantage  in  a  future  life,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  but  that  he  would  determine  the  probability  to  be 
that  the  former  would.  The  course  of  nature,  then,  in 
the  view  of  it  now  given,  furnishes  us  with  a  real  practi- 
cal proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion. 

20.  Secondly,  When,  conformably  to  what  religion 
teaches  us,  God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and  vice 
as  such,  so  as  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  Future diswb 
whole,  have  his  deserts,  this  distributive  SSSeiukiod^ 
justice  will  not  be  a  thing  different  in  kind,  'e^ent in  degree, 
but  only  in  degree,  from  what  we  experience  in  his  present 
government.  It  will  be  that  in  effect,  toward  which  we 
now  see  a  tendency.  It  will  be  no  more  than  the  comple- 
tion of  that  moral  government,  X^a^  principles  and  begin- 
ning of  which  have  been  shown,  beyond  all  dispute,  dis- 
cernible in  the  present  constitution  and  course  of  nature. 
And  from  hence  it  follows, 

21.  Thirdly,  That  as  under  the  natural  government 
of  God  our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of 
happiness  and  misery  which  we  do  experi-  Expectation  of 
ence  at  present,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  Sd'Jf  p^n^jj 
for  and  to  fear  higher  degrees  and  other  ™«°'»- 
kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state,  supposing  a  future  state 
admitted ;  so,  under  his  moral  government,  our  experi- 
ence that  virtue  and  vice  are,  in  the  manners  above- 
mentioned,  actually  rewarded  and  punished  at  present, 
in  a  certain  degree,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  and  to 
fear  that  they  maybe  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher 
degree  hereafter.  It  is  acknowledged,  indeed,  that  this 
alone  is  not  sufficient  ground  to  think  that  they  actually 


I  ro  •  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I, 

will  he  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree,  rathei 
than  in  a  lower :  but  then, 

22.  Lastly,  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  from 
the  good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For 
^.  .      these  tendencies  are  essential,  and  founded 

This  expectation    .  ,  '  . 

—how strength-  m  the  nature  of  things:  whereas,  the  hin- 

enecL  ,  ....  „ 

derances  to  their  beccming  effect  are,  m 
numberless  cases,  not  necessary,  but  artificial  only. 
Now  it  may  be  much  more  strongly  argued  that  these 
tendencies,  as  well  as  the  actual  rewards  and  punish- 
ments of  virtue  and  vice  which  arise  directly  out  of  the 
nature  of  things,  will  remain  hereafter,  than  that  the  ac- 
cidental hinderances  of  them  will.  And  if  these  hinder- 
ances  do*  not  remain,  those  rewards  and  punishments 
cannot  but  be  carried  on  much  further  toward  the  per- 
fection of  moral  government,  that  is,  the  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  vice  will  become  effect ;  but  when,  or  where, 
or  in  what  particular  way,  cannot  be  known  at  all  but 
by  revelation. 

23.  Upon  the  whole,  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  govern- 
ment implied  in  God's  natural  government,  (page  89 ;) 

Recapitniation.  virtue  and  vice  are  naturally  rewarded  and 
punished  as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to  society, 
(page  90,)  and  rewarded  and  punished  directly  as  vir- 
tue and  vice,  (page  91,  etc.)  The  notion,  then,  of  a 
moral  scheme  of  government  is  not  fictitious,  but  natu- 
ral ;  for  it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  constitu- 
tion and  course  of  nature ;  and  the  execution  of  this 
scheme  is  actually  begun  in  the  instances  here  men- 
tioned. And  these  things  are  to  be  considered  as  a 
declaration  of  the  Author  of  natare  for  virtue,  and 
against  vice ;  they  give  a  credibility  to  the  supposition 
of  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter,  and 
also  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear  that  they  may  be  re- 
warded and  punished  in  higher  degrees  than  they  are 
here.     And  as  all  this  is  confirmed,  so  the  argument  for 


Chap.  III.]   Moral  Government  of  God.  hi 

religion,  from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  is 
carried  on  further  by  observing  that  there  are  natural 
tendencies,  and  in  innumerable  cases  only  artificial  hin- 
derances,  to  this  moral  scheme  being  carried  on  much 
further  toward  perfection  than  it  is  at  present,  (page 
99,  etc.)  The  notion,  then,  of  a  moral  scheme  of  gov- 
ernment much  more  perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a 
fictitious  but  a  natural  notion ;  for  it  is  suggested  to  our 
thoughts  by  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice. 
And  these  tendencies  are  to  be  considered  as  intima- 
tions, as  implicit  promises  and  threatenings,  from  the 
Author  of  nature,  of  much  greater  rewards  and  punish- 
ments to  follow  virtue  and  vice  than  do  at  present. 
And,  indeed,  every  natural  tendency,  which  is  to  con- 
tinue, but  which  is  hindered  from  becoming  effect  by 
only  accidental  causes,  aff'ords  a  presumption  that  such 
tendency  will,  some  time  or  other,  become  effect:*  a 
presumption  in  degree  proportionable  to  the  length  of 
the  duration  through  which  such  tendency  will  con- 
tinue. And  from  these  things  together  arises  a  real 
presumption  that  the  moral  scheme  of  government  es- 
tablished in  nature  shall  be  carried  on  much  further 

*  [The  Archbishop  of  Dublin  (Pol.  Econ.,  lect.  ix)  has  pointed  out 
the  ambiguity  of  the  word  tendency,  which  has  been  the  occasion  of 
much  confusion  of  thought.  Tendency  toward  a  result  sometimes 
(and  strictly)  only  means  the  existence  of  a  cause  which,  if  operating 
unimpeded,  would  produce  the  result.  But  commonly  it  is  used  to 
imply  the  existence  of  such  a  state  of  things  as  makes  it  likely  that 
the  result  will  actually  be  produced,  that  is,  in  Butler's  language,  that 
the  hinderances  to  its  operation  are  accidental ;  such  as  do  not  act 
steadily  and  uniformly  against  the  cause,  as  such,  but  only  occasion- 
ally, and  in  consequence  of  its  connection  with  other  things  with 
which  it  may  or  may  not  be  united.  There  is  the  clear  presumption 
in  favor  of  continuance  (noticed  by  Butler,  part  i,  chap,  i)  for  the 
tendency  which  we  see  steadily  and  uniformly  operating,  while  there 
is  nothing  like  the  same  presumption  for  the  continuance  of  those 
causes  of  hinderances  which  are  not  permanent  in  their  action,  nor 
aniform  in  their  nature. — F.] 


112  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

toward  perfection  hereafter,  and,  I  think,  a  presumption 
that  it  will  be  absolutely  completed.  But  from  these 
things,  joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God  has 
given  us,  considered  as  given  us  by  him,  arises  a  prac- 
tical proof  *  that  it  will  be  completed;  a  proof  from 
fact,  and  therefore  a  distinct  one,  from  that  which  is 
deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations — the 
fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions. 

*  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  chap.  vi. 


4 


Chap.  IV.]       Of  a  State  of  Trial.  113 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF   A    STATE    OF    PROBATION,  AS    IMPLYING   TRIAL, 
DIFFICULTIES,   AND    DANGER.* 

THE  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  our  present 
life  is  a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  com- 
prehends under  it  several  particular  things  Difference  be- 
distinct  from  each  other.  But  the  first  and  S^S^^T- 
most  common  meaning  of  it  seems  to  be,  that  ®™™«°'- 
our  future  interest  is  now  depending,  and  depending 
upon  ourselves ;  that  we  have  scope  and  opportunities 

*  [It  might  be,  and  often  is,  indeed,  made  an  objection  to  the  re- 
ligious system,  that  our  way  to  the  everlasting  blessedness  which  it 
proposes  should  be  beset  with  so  many  lures  which  tempt  us  aside 
from  the  prosecution  of  it ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  so  many 
hardships  and  difficulties  should  be  attendant  on  our  steadfast  perse- 
verance in  that  way.  The  thing  complained  of  is,  that  our  great  and 
ultimate  good  should  have  been  made  of  such  difficult  attainment, 
insomuch  that  the  frail  powers  of  humanity,  either  for  the  achieve- 
ment of  what  is  good  or  the  resistance  of  what  is  evil,  are  so  greatly 
overtasked,  as  in  the  great  majority  of  instances  to  be  overborne. 
Now  in  this  chapter  we  are  presented  with  a  complete  and  conclusive 
analogy,  which,  if  it  do  not  establish  the  reality  of  our  religious  trial, 
at  least  serves  to  vindicate  it  against  the  exceptions  which  we  have 
just  enumerated.  Whatever  doubt  we  may  stand  in  regarding  those 
doctrines  which  respect  the  future  and  the  unseen,  there  can  be  no 
quarreling  with  present  and  actually  observed  facts.  If  the  doctrine 
be,  that  the  way  to  our  eternal  good  is  a  way  of  labor  and  self-denial, 
it  is  in  perfect  analogy  with  the  fact  that  this  is  the  way  to  our  tem- 
poral good  also.  It  is  quite  palpable  that  often  many  toils  must  be 
undergone,  and  many  temptations  resisted,  ere  we  can  secure  the  most 
highly-prized  advantages  of  the  life  that  now  is ;  and  the  conclusion 
i-S  not  that  similar  toils  and  temptations  must,  but  that  they  may  be^ 
the  precursors  and  the  preparatives  of  our  happiness  in  another  state 
of  being. — Chalmers.] 


1 14  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

here  for  that  good  and  bad  behavior  which  God  will  re- 
ward and  punish  hereafter ;  together  >vith  temptations 
to  one,  as  well  as  inducements  of  reason  to  the  other. 
And  this  is,  in  great  measure,  the  same  with  saying  that 
we  are  under  the  moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give 
an  account  of  our  actions  to  him.  For  the  notion  of  a 
future  account,  and  general  righteous  judgment,  implies 
some  sort  of  temptations  to  what  is  wrong,  otherwise 
there  would  be  no  moral  possibility  of  doing  wrong,  nor 
ground  for  judgment  or  discrimination.  But  there  is  this 
difference,  that  the  wordi  probation  is  more  distinctly  and 
particularly  expressive  of  allurements  to  wrong,  or  dif- 
ficulties in  adhering  uniformly  to  what  is  right,  and  of 
the  danger  of  miscarrying  by  such  temptations,  than  the 
words  moral  government .  A  state  of  probation,  then,  as 
thus  particularly  implying  in  it  trial,  difficulties,  and  dan- 
^ger,  may  require  to  be  considered  distinctly  by  itself. 

2.  And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  re- 
ligion teaches  us,  implies  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial 
This  is  ft  state  with  regard  to  a  future  world;  so  also  his 
tare  anS^he  natural  government  over  us  implies  that  we 

present  world.       ^^.g  -^  ^  g^^j-g  ^f  |.^-^i^  -^^  ^^^  j-j^g  SCnsC,  with 

regard  to  the  present  world.  Natural  government,  by 
rewards  and  punishments,  as  much  implies  natural  trial, 
as  moral  government  does  moral  trial.  The  natural 
government  of  God  here  meant  (chap,  ii)  consists  in 
his  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions  and  pain  to  oth- 
ers, which  are  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  in  giv- 
ing us  notice  of  such  appointment  beforehand.  This 
necessarily  implies  that  he  has  made  our  happiness  and 
misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend  in  part  upon  ourselves. 
And  so  far  as  men  have  temptations  to  any  course  of 
action  which  will  probably  occasion  them  greater  tem- 
por^-l  inconvenience  and  uneasiness  than  satisfaction,  so 
far  their  temporal  interest  is  in  danger  from  themselves, 
or  they  are  in  a  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  it.     Now 


Chap.  IVJ      Of  a  State  of  Trial.  115 

people  often  blame  others,  and  even  themselves,  for 
their  misconduct  in  their  temporal  con-  impHedinour 
cerns.  And  we  find  many  are  greatly  want-  <*°^'^''®'- 
ing  to  themselves,  and  miss  of  that  natural  happiness 
which  they  might  have  obtained  in  the  present  life  ; 
perhaps  every  one  does  in  some  degree.  But  many 
run  themselves  into  great  inconvenience,  and  into  ex- 
treme distress  and  misery,  not  through  incapacity  of 
knowing  better,  and  doing  better  for  themselves,  which 
would  be  nothing  to  the  present  purpose,  but  through 
their  own  fault.  And  these  things  necessarily  imply 
temptation,  and  danger  of  miscarrying,  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  with  respect  to  our  worldly  interest  or  hap- 
piness. Every  one  too,  without  having  religion  in  his 
thoughts,  speaks  of  the  hazards  which  young  people  run 
upon  their  setting  out  in  the  world — hazards  from  other 
causes  than  merely  their  ignorance  and  unavoidable  ac- 
cidents. And  some  courses  of  vice,  at  least,  being  con- 
trary to  men's  worldly  interest  or  good,  temptations  to 
these  must  at  the  same  time  be  temptations  to  forego 
our  present  and  our  future  interest. 

Thus  in  our  natural  or  temporal  capacity  we  are  in  a 
state  of  trial,  that  is,  of  difficulty  and  danger,  analogous, 
or  like,  to  our  moral  and  religious  trial.  This  will  more 
distinctly  appear  to  any  one  who  thinks  it  worth  while 
more  distinctly  to  consider  what  it  is  which  constitutes 
our  trial  in  both  capacities,  and  to  observe  how  mankind 
behave  under  it. 

3.  And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both 
these  capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our  ex- 
ternal circumstances  or  in  our  nature.  For,  Thlstrislorlp- 
on  the  one  hand,  persons  may  be  betrayed  i"tS"t'"S' 
into  wrong  behavior  upon  surprise,  or  over-  *°*^ 
come  upon  any  other  very  singular  and  extraordinary  ex- 
ternal occasions,  who  would,  otherwise,  have  preserved 
their  character  of  prudence  and  of  virtue :  in  which 


Ii6  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  1. 

cases,  every  one,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  behavior  of 
these  persons,  would  impute  it  to  such  particular  ex- 
ternal circumstances.  And  on  the  other  hand,  men  who 
have  contracted  habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or 
have  some  particular  passions  in  excess,  will  seek  oppor- 
tunities, and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of  their  way,  to  gratify 
themselves  in  these  respects,  at  the  expense  of  their 
wisdom  and  their  virtue ;  led  to  it,  as  every  one  would 
say,  not  by  external  temptations,  but  by  such  habits  and 
passions.  And  the  account  of  this  last  case  is,  that  par- 
ticular passions  are  no  more  coincident  with  prudence, 
or  that  reasonable  self-love,  the  end  of  which  is  our 
worldly  interest,  than  they  are  with  the  principle  of 
virtue  and  religion,  but  often  draw  contrary  ways  to  one 
as  well  as  to  the  other;  and  so  such  particular  passions 
are  as  much  temptations  to  act  imprudently  with  regard 
to  our  worldly  interest  as  to  act  viciously.*  However, 
as  when  we  say,  men  are  misled  by  external  circum- 
Both  unite  In  Stances  of  temptation,  it  cannot  but  be  un- 
^^^  derstood  that  there  is  somewhat  within  them- 

selves to  render  those  circumstances  temptations,  or  to 
render  them  susceptible  of  impressions  from  them  ;  so, 
when  we  say  they  are  misled  by  passions,  it  is  always 
supposed  that  there  are  occasions,  circumstances,  and 
objects,  exciting  these  passions,  and  affording  means  for 
gratifying  them.  And  therefore  temptations  from  with- 
in and  from  without  coincide,  and  mutually  imply  each 
other.  Now  the  several  external  objects  of  the  appe- 
tites, passions,  and  affections  being  present  to  the  senses, 
or  offering  themselves  to  the  mind,  and  so  exciting  emo- 
tions suitable  to  their  nature,  not  only  in  cases  where 
they  can  be  gratified  consistently  with  innocence  and 
prudence,  but  also  in  cases  where  they  cannot,  and  yet 
can  be  gratified  imprudently  and  viciously ;  this  as  real- 

*  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726,  2d  ed.,  205,  etc.     Prcf., 
p.  25,  etc.  Semi.,  p.  21,  etc. 


Chap.  IV.j      Of  a  State  of  Trial.  117 

ly  puts  them  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their 
present  interest  or  good  as  their  future,  and  as  really 
renders  self-denial  necessary  to  secure  one  as  the  other ; 
that  is,  we  are  in  a  like  state  of  trial  with  respect  to 
both,  by  the  very  same  passions  excited  by  the  very 
same  means.  Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  inter- 
est depending  upon  themselves,  and  a  prudent  course 
of  behavior  being  necessary  to  secure  it,  passions  inor- 
dinately excited,  whether  by  means  of  example  or  by 
any  other  external  circumstance,  toward  such  objects, 
at  such  times,  or  in  such  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot  be 
gratified  consistently  with  worldly  prudence,  are  temp- 
tations dangerous,  and  too  often  successful  temptations, 
to  forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for  a  less,  that  is,  to 
forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  temporal  interest, 
for  the  sake  of  a  present  gratification.  This  is  a  de- 
scription of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 
Substitute  now  the  word  future  for  temporal^  and  virtue 
ioi  prudence^  and  it  will  be  just  as  proper  a  description 
of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  religious  capacity,  so  analo- 
gous are  they  to  each  other.* 

4.  If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial 
in  both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  observe  further  how  man- 
kind behave  under  it,  we  shall  find  there  are      „.  „ 

similar  reck- 

some  who  have  so  little  sense  of  it  that  they  lessness  with 

.  refereuco  to  the 

scarce  look  beyond  the  passing  day ;  they  present  and  fu- 
are  so  taken  up  with  present  gratifications 
as  to  have,  in  a  manner,  no  feeling  of  consequences,  no 
regard  to  their  future  ease  or  fortune  in  this  life,  any 
more  than  to  their  happiness  in  another.  Some  appear 
to  be  blinded  and  deceived  by  inordinate  passion  in 

♦  [If  because  of  these  things  we  must  give  up  the  God  of  religion, 
we  should  give  up  the  God  of  nature  also.  If  we  persist  in  our  ob- 
jection not>*  ithstanding  these  analogies,  then  should  we  conclude 
cither  that  we  are  under  the  regimen  of  an  unrighteous  deity,  or  that 
there  is  no  deity  at  all. — Chalmers.] 


ii8  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  1 

their  worldly  concerns  as  much  as  in  religion.  Others 
are  not  deceived,  but,  as  it  were,  forcibly  carried  away 
by  the  like  passions  against  their  better  judgment,  and 
feeble  resolutions,  too,  of  acting  better.  And  there  are 
men.  and  truly  they  are  not  a  few,  who  shamelessly 
avow,  not  their  interest,  but  their  mere  will  and  pleasure, 
to  be  their  law  of  life ;  and  who,  in  open  defiance  of 
evefy  thing  that  is  reasonable,  will  go  on  in  a  course  of 
vicious  extravagance,  foreseeing,  with  no  remorse  and 
little  fear,  that  it  will  be  their  temporal  ruin ;  and  some 
of  them,  under  the  apprehension  of  the  consequences  of 
wickedness  in  another  state.  And  to  speak  in  the  most 
moderate  way,  human  creatures  are  not  only  continually 
liable  to  go  wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that 
they  often  actually  do  so,  with  respect  to  their  temporal 
interests  as  well  as  with  respect  to  religion. 

Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials  in  our 
temporal  and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they  proceed  from 
the  same  causes  and  have  the  same  effect  upon  men's 
behavior,  are  evidently  analogous  and  of  the  same  kind. 

5.  It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dan- 
gers of  miscarrying  in  our  religious  state  of  trial  are 

similar  diffi-  greatly  increased,  and  one  is  ready  to  think, 
ff  educSr  i^  a  manner  wholly  made  by  the  ill  behavior 
^^-  of  others ;  by  a  wrong  education,  wrong  in 

a  moral  sense,  sometimes  positively  vicious ;  by  general 
bad  example ;  by  the  dishonest  artifices  which  are  got 
into  business  of  all  kinds ;  and  in  very  many  parts  of 
the  world,  by  religion's  being  corrupted  into  suoersti- 
tions  which  indulge  men  in  their  vices ;  so  in  like  man- 
ner, the  difficulties  of  conducting  ourselves  prudently  in 
respect  to  our  present  interest,  and  our  danger  of  being 
led  aside  from  pursuing  it,  are  greatly  increased  by  a 
foolish  education,  and  after  we  come  to  mature  age,  by 
the  extravagance  and  carelessness  of  others  whom  we 
have   intercourse  with,  and  by  mistaken   notions,  very 


Chap.  IVJ      Of  a  State  of  Trial.  119 

generally  prevalent  and  taken  up  from  common  opinion, 
concerning  temporal  happiness  and  wherein  it  consists. 
And  persons,  by  their  own  negligence  and  folly  in  their 
temporal  affairs,  no  less  than  by  a  course  of  vice,  bring 
themselves  into  new  difficulties,  and  by  habits  of  indul- 
gence become  less  qualified  to  go  through  them;  and 
one  irregularity  after  another  embarrasses  things  to  such 
a  degree  that  they  know  not  whereabout  they  are,  and 
often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so  intricate  and  per- 
plexed that  it  is  difficult  to  trace  it  out;  difficult  even 
to  determine  what  is  the  prudent  or  the  moral  part. 
Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  behavior  in  one  stage  of  life, 
youth;  wrong,  I  mean,  considering  ourselves  only  in 
our  temporal  capacity,  without  taking  in  religion ;  this, 
in  several  ways,  increases  the  difficulties  of  right  behav- 
ior in  mature  age ;  that  is,  puts  us  into  a  more  disad- 
vantageous state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

6.  We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God : 
there  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state  of 
degradation,  (part  ii,  chap,  v  ;)  and  we  cer-  our  unftvom- 
tainly  are  in  a  condition  which  does  not  seem,  ^Slo^'^cmn^ 
by  any  means,  the  most  advantageous  we  p'*^'"** 
could  imagine  or  desire,  either  in  our  natural  or  moral 
capacity,  for  securing  either  our  present  or  future  inter- 
est. However,  this  condition,  low  and  careful  and  un- 
certain as  it  is,  does  not  afford  any  just  ground  of  com- 
plaint. For  as  men  may  manage  their  temporal  affairs 
with  prudence,  and  so  pass  their  days  here  on  earth  in 
tolerable  ease  and  satisfaction  by  a  moderate  degree  of 
care;  so  likewise  with  regard  to  religion,  there  is  no 
tpore  required  than  what  they  are  well  able  to  do,  and 
what  they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  themselves  if  they 
neglect.*     And  for  persons  to  have  that  put  upon  them 

♦  This  is  an  unsatisfactory  statement,  but  judging  of  sentiments 
that  are  incorrect,  or  expressions  imperfectly  guarded,  it  is  only  just 
to  take  into  consideration  the  well-known  views  of  the  author.     But- 


I20  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

which  they  are  well  able  to  go  through,  and  no  more,  we 
naturally  consider  as  an  equitable  thing,  supposing  it 
done  by  proper  authority.  Nor  have  we  any  more  rea- 
son to  Complain  of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  of  na- 
ture, than  of  his  not  having  given  us  other  advantages 
belonging  to  other  orders  of  creatures. 

7.  But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state 
of  trial  which  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  rendered 
Trial  credible  Credible  by  its  being  throughout  uniform, 
^^^ta'botiTSn-  and  of  a  piece  with  the  general  conduct  of 
Providence  toward  us,  in  all  other  respects 
within  the  compass  of  our  knowledge.  Indeed,  if  man- 
kind, considered  in  their  natural  capacity  as  inhabitants 
of  this  world  only,  found  themselves  from  their  birth  to 
their  death  in  a  settled  state  of  security  and  happiness, 
without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of  their  own,  or  if  they 

ler  did  not  reject  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  man.  The  criticism  of 
Chalmers  on  this  passage  seems  to  us  harsh  when  he  says  of  Butler, 
"  We  fear  that  he  here  makes  the  first,  though  not  the  only,  exhibi- 
tion which  occurs  in  the  work  of  his  meager  and  moderate  theology. 
There  seems  no  adequate  view  in  the  passage  of  man's  total  inability 
for  what  is  spiritually  and  acceptably  good ;  for  by  the  very  analogy 
which  he  institutes,  the  doctrine  of  any  special  help  to  that  obedience 
which  qualifies  for  heaven  is  kept  out  of  sight.  .  .  .  There  is  no  ac- 
count made  here  of  that  peculiar  helplessness  which  obtains  in  matters 
of  religion,  and  does  not  obtain  in  the  matters  of  ordinary  prudence, 
yet  a  helplessness  which  forms  no  excuse,  lying  as  it  does  in  the  resolute, 
and,  by  man  himself,  unconquerable  aversion  of  his  will  to  God  and 
holiness."  That  the  argument,  properly  used,  is  good,  Chalmers  ad- 
mits when  he  says,  "  There  is  nothing  in  this  (helplessness)  to  break 
the  analogies  on  which  to  found  the  negative  vindication  that  forms 
the  great  and  undoubted  achievements  of  this  volume,  and  with  which 
perhaps,  it  were  well  if  both  its  authoi  and  its  readers  would  agree  to 
be  satisfied.  The  analogy  lies  here,  that  if  a  man  wills  to  obtain 
prosperity  in  this  life,  he  may,  if  observant  of  the  rules  which  experi- 
ence and  wisdom  prescribe,  in  general,  make  it  good.  And  if  he  wills 
to  attain  to  blessedness  in  the  next  life,  he  shall,  if  observant  of  what 
religion  prescribes,  and  in  conformity  with  the  declaration  that  he 
who  seeketh  findeth,  most  certainly  make  it  good." 


Chap.  IV.]      Of  a  State  of  Trial.  I2i 

were  in  no  danger  of  being  brought  into  inconveniences 
and  distress  by  carelessness  or  the  folly  of  passion, 
through  bad  example,  the  treachery  of  others,  or  the 
deceitful  appearances  of  things ;  were  this  our  natural 
condition,  then  it  might  seem  strange,  and  be  some  pre- 
sumption against  the  truth  of  religion,  that  it  represents 
our  future  and  more  general  interest,  as  not  secure  of 
course,  but  as  depending  upon  our  behavior,  and  re- 
quiring recollection  and  self-government  to  obtain  it. 
For  it  might  be  alleged,  "  What  you  say  is  our  condi- 
tion in  one  respect  is  not  in  any  wise  of  a  sort  with  what 
we  find,  by  experience,  our  condition  is  in  another. 
Our  whole  present  interest  is  secured  to  our  hands  with- 
out any  solicitude  of  ours,  and  why  should  not  our  fu- 
ture interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so  too?"  But 
since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  consideration,  the  vol- 
untary denying  ourselves  many  things  which  we  desire, 
and  a  course  of  behavior  far  from  being  always  agreeable 
to  us,  are  absolutely  necessary  to  our  acting  even  a  com- 
mon decent  and  common  prudent  part,  so  as  to  pass 
with  any  satisfaction  through  the  present  world,  and  be 
received  upon  any  tolerable  good  terms  in  it ;  since  this 
is  the  case,  all  presumption  against  self-denial  and  at- 
tention being  necessary  to  secure  our  higher  interest  is 
removed. 

Had  we  not  experience,  it  might,  perhaps,  speciously 
be  urged  that  it  is  improbable  any  thing  of  hazard  and 
danger  should  be  put  upon  us  by  an  infinite  Being,  when 
every  thing  which  is  hazard  and  danger  in  our  manner 
of  conception,  and  will  end  in  error,  confusion,  and 
tnisery,  is  now  already  certain  in  his  foreknowledge. 
And,  indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard  and  ^^y  ^^  „q 
danger  should  be  put  upon  such  frail  creat-  '°  danK»? 
ures  as  we  are,  may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in  spec- 
ulation ;  and  cannot  but  be  so  till  we  know  the  whole,  or, 
however,  much  more,  of  the  case.     But  still  the  consti- 


122  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPart  I 

tution  of  nature  is  as  it  is.  Our  happiness  and  misery 
are  trusted  to  our  conduct,  and  made  to  depend  upon  it. 
Somewhat,  and  in  many  circumstances  a  great  deal  too, 
is  put  upon  us,  either  to  do  or  to  suffer,  as  we  choose. 
And  all  the  various  miseries  of  life  which  people  bring 
upon  themselves  by  negligence  and  folly,  and  might 
have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  instances  of  this; 
which  miseries  are,  beforehand,  just  as  contingent  and 
undetermined  as  their  conduct,  and  left  to  be  determined 
by  it. 

8.  These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objections 
against  the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying 
What  this  chap-  temptations,  and  real  danger  of  miscarrying 
ter  shows.  ^^^^^  regard  to  our  general  interest,  under 

the  moral  government  of  God ;  and  they  show,  that  if 
we  are  at  all  to  be  considered  in  such  a  capacity,  and 
as  having  such  an  interest,  the  general  analogy  of  Prov- 
idence must  lead  us  to  apprehend  ourselves  in  danger 
of  miscarrying,  in  different  degrees,  as  to  this  interest, 
by  our  neglecting  to  act  the  proper  part  belonging  to  us 
in  that  capacity.  For  we  have  a  present  interest,  under 
the  government  of  God  which  we  experience  here  upon 
earth.  And  this  interest,  as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,  so 
neither  is  it  offered  to  our  acceptance,  but  to  our  ac- 
quisition ;  in  such  sort,  as  that  we  are  in  danger  of  miss- 
ing it,  by  means  of  temptations  to  neglect  or  act  contrary 
to  it ;  and  without  attention  and  self-denial,  must  and 
do  miss  of  it.  It  is  then  perfectly  credible,  that  this 
may  be  our  case  with  respect  to  that  chief  and  final 
good  which  religion  proposes  to  us. 

NOTE. 

To  the  forcible  reasoning  of  this  chapter,  many  will  object  that  the 
difference  between  temporal  and  eternal  things  is  so  vast  the  cases 
are  not  analogous.  It  cannot  be  denied,  for  it  is  a  matter  of  open  and 
daily  observation,  that  loss,  misery,  and  punishment  follow  neglect  and 
misconduct  here  :  but  the  doctrine  is  resisted  and  rcented  as  an  in- 


Chap.  IVJ      Of  a  State  of  Trial.  123 

credible  outrage,  that  a  ruined  eternity  should  follow  from  the  same 
causes.  But  the  analogy  is  complete  in  kind,  and  the  difference  be- 
tween the  two  hardships  is  only  in  degree.  This  difference  of  degree 
of  suffering  can  form  no  basis  for  an  objection  unless  it  can  be  shown 
that  similar  results  should  not  follow  from  similar  causes  in  the  .wo 
states  of  being.  The  principle  would  seem  plain,  that  if  there  is  in 
justice  in  the  one  case  there  is  injustice  in  the  other.  "What  would  be 
wrong  on  a  great  scale  is  wrong  on  a  small  one.  Many  seem  ready 
to  acquiesce  in  the  operation  of  an  unjust  principle  in  smaller  mat- 
ters which  they  would  regard  as  intolerable  in  things  of  higher  mo- 
ment. But  he  that  is  unjust  in  that  which  is  least  is  unjust  in  much. 
The  admission  that  the  divine  government  is  unjust  in  what  may 
seem  to  be  little  and  temporary  matters  would  impeach  the  righteous- 
ness of  God  and  destroy  all  reverence  for  his  character. 

It  would  be  well  for  those  who  are  ready  to  claim  that  the  good- 
ness manifested  to  man  is  a  compensation  for  what  they  admit  is  an 
injustice  to  the  lower  orders  of  animals,  in  their  suffering  and  de- 
struction, to  remember  the  consequences  to  which  their  principles 
would  lead. 

The  admission  of  this  doctrine  might  force  on  our  attention  the 
uncomfortable  suggestion  that  our  happiness,  present  and  future,  may 
be  sacrificed,  and  as  a  compensation  there  may  be  increased  blessed- 
ness given  to  beings  far  higher  and  nobler  than  we.  Once  admit  in- 
justice in  any  part  of  the  divine  government,  and  there  is  no  conceiv- 
able limit  to  the  extent  to  which  it  may  be  carried.  There  is  no 
injustice  in  the  dependence  on  each  other  of  different  orders  of  beings, 
or  in  any  part  of  God's  government.  We  know  but  parts  of  his  ways 
and  but  little  of  his  universe,  but  all  the  analogies  of  nature  as  well 
as  the  teachings  of  his  Word  assure  us  he  has  done  all  things  well. 
He  is  just  and  holy  in  all  his  ways,  and  there  is  no  unrighteousness 
in  him.    Consult  Chalmers. 


124.  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPart  1 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  A  STATE  OF  PROBATION,  AS  INTENDED  FOR  MORAL 
DISCIPLINE  AND  IMPROVEMENT* 

FROM  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  probation- 
state  of  so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  naturally 
Probation  de-  arises    the   question,  how  we  came   to   be 
firovii/nt  ^'ui  placcd  in  it.     But  such  a  general  inquiry  as 
virtue.  |.]^jg  ^ould  be  found  involved  in  insuperable 

difficulties.  For  though  some  of  these  difficulties  would 
be  lessened  by  observing  that  all  wickedness  is  volun- 
tary, as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion,  and  that  many  of 
the  miseries  of  life  have  apparent  good  effects,  yet  when 
we  consider  other  circumstances  belonging  to  both,  and 
what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the  former  in  a  life  to 
come,  it  cannot  but  be  acknowledged  plain  folly  and 
presumption  to  pretend  to  give  an  account  of  the  whole 
reasons  of  this  matter ;  the  whole  reasons  of  our  being 
allotted  a  condition  out  of  which  so  much  wickedness 
and  misery,  so  circumstanced,  would  in  fact  arise. 
Whether  it  be  not  beyond  our  faculties  not  only  to  find 
out,  but  even  to  understand,  the  whole  account  of  this ; 
or,  though  we  should  be  supposed  capable  of  under- 
standing it,  yet,  whether  it  would  be  of  service  oi 
prejudice  to  us  to  be  informed  of  it,  is  impossible  to  say. 
But  as  our  present  condition  can   in  nowise  be  shown 

*  [The  present  chapter  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  the  one  pre- 
ceding it,  which  that  on  the  moral  does  to  that  on  the  natural  gov- 
ernment of  God.  It  still  treats  of  probation,  but  of  probation  with  a 
particular  end — even  that  of  schooling  men  in  the  practice,  so  a.s  to 
confirm  them  in  the  habits,  of  virtue. — Chalmkrs.] 


Chap. V.J  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      12$ 

inconsistent  with  the  perfect  moral  government  of  God, 
so  religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed  in  it  that  we 
might  qualify  ourselves,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  for 
another  state,  which  is  to  follow  it.  And  this,  though 
but  a  partial  answer,  a  very  partial  one  indeed,  to  the 
inquiry  now  mentioned,  yet  is  a  more  satisfactory  an- 
swer to  another,  which  is  of  real  and  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  us  to  have  answered — the  inquiry,  What  is  our 
business  here  ?  The  known  end,  then,  why  we  are  placed 
in  a  state  of  so  much  affliction,  hazard,  and  difficulty  is, 
our  improvement  in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite 
qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness. 

1.  Now  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  educa- 
tion for  mature  age  in  the  present  world,  appears  plainly 
at  first  sight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for 

°      '  °  .  .  Probation   of 

a  future  one ;  the  former  being,  in  our  tem-  youth,  its  anal- 
poral  capacity,  what  the  latter  is  in  our  re- 
ligious capacity.  But  some  observations  common  to 
both  of  them,  and  a  more  distinct  consideration  of  each, 
will  more  distinctly  show  the  extent  and  force  of  the 
analogy  between  them  ;  and  the  credibility  which  arises 
from  hence,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  that 
the  present  life  was  intended  to  be  a  state  of  discipline 
for  a  future  one. 

2.  I.  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed 
for  a  particular  way  of  life,  to  which  the  nature,  the  ca- 
pacities temper,  and  qualifications  of  each  Man's  adapta- 
species  are  as  necessary  as  their  external  enJand^to^X 
circumstances.  Both  come  into  the  notion  ^^^estato. 
of  such  state,  or  particular  way  of  life,  and  are  constitu- 
ent parts  of  it.  Change  a  man's  capacities  or  character 
to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  conceivable  they  may  be 
changed,  and  he  would  be  altogether  incapable  of  a 
human  course  of  life  and  human  happiness;  as  incapa- 
ble as  if,  his  nature  continuing  unchanged,  he  were 
placed  in  a  world  where  he  had  no  sphere  of  action,  nor 


126  Analogy  of  Rp:ligiOx\.  I  Part  I 

any  objects  to  answer  his  appetites,  passions,  and  affec- 
tions of  any  sort.  One  thing  is  set  over  against  another, 
as  an  ancient  writer  expresses  it.*  Our  nature  corre- 
sponds to  our  external  condition.  Without  this  corre- 
spondence there  would  be  no  possibility  of  any  such 
thing  as  human  life  and  human  happiness  :  which  life 
and  happiness  are,  therefore,  a  result  from  our  nature 
and  condition  jointly ;  meaning  by  human  life,  not  liv- 
ing in  the  literal  sense,  but  the  whole  complex  notion 
commonly  understood  by  those  words.  So  that  without 
determining  what  will  be  the  employment  and  happi- 
ness, the  particular  life,  of  good  men  hereafter,  there 
must  be  some  determinate  capacities,  some  necessary 
character  and  qualifications,  without  which  persons  can- 
not but  be  utterly  incapable  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as 
there  must  be  some  without  which  men  would  be  inca- 
pable of  their  present  state  of  life.     Now, 

3.  II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  in- 
deed, of  all  creatures  which  come   under 

Adaptation  ac-  ,  . 

quired  through  our  notice,  IS  such,  as  that  they  are  ca- 
pable of  naturally  becoming  qualified  for 
states  of  life,  for  which  they  were  once  wholly  un- 
qualified. In  imagination,  we  may  indeed  conceive 
of  creatures,  as  incapable  of  having  any  of  their  fac- 
ulties naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being  unable  natural- 
ly to  acquire  any  new  qualifications ;  but  the  faculties 
of  every  species  known  to  us  are  made  for  enlargement, 
for  acquirements  of  experience  and  habits.  We  find 
ourselves,  in  particular,  endued  with  capacities,  not  only 
of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  knowledge  or  perceiving 
truth,  but  also  of  storing  up  our  ideas  and  knowledge  by 
memory.  We  are  capable,  not  only  of  acting,  and  of 
having  different  momentary  impressions  made  upon  us, 

*  [All  things  are  double  one  against  another :  and  He  hath  made 
nothing  imperfect.  One  thing  establisheth  the  good  of  another :  and 
who  shall  be  filled  with  beholding  his  glory  ! — Ecclus.  xlii,  24,  25J 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      127 

but  of  getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and 
of  settled  alterations  in  our  temper  or  character.  The 
power  of  the  two  last  is  the  power  of  habits.  But  nei- 
ther the  perception  of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  sort, 
are  habits,  though  absolutely  necessary  to  the  forming 
of  them.  However,  apprehension,  reason,  memory, 
which  are  the  capacities  of  acquiring  knowledge,  are 
greatly  improved  by  exercise.  Whether  the  word  habit 
is  applicable  to  all  these  improvements,  and  in  particu- 
lar how  far  the  powers  of  memory  and  of  habits  may  be 
powers  of  the  same  nature,  I  shall  not  inquire.  But 
that  perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily  and  of 
course,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before, 
seems  a  thing  of  the  same  sort,  as  readiness  in  any  par- 
ticular kind  of  action  proceeding  from  being  accustomed 
to  it.  And  aptness  to  recollect  practical  observations 
of  service  in  our  conduct  is  plainly  habit  in  many  cases. 
There  are  habits  of  perception  and  habits  of  action. 
An  instance  of  the  former  is  our  constant  and  even  in- 
voluntary readiness  in  correcting  the  impressions  of  our 
sight  concerning  magnitudes  and  distances,  so  as  to  sub- 
stitute judgment  in  the  room  of  sensation,  impercepti- 
bly to  ourselves.  And  it  seems  as  if  all  other  associa- 
tions of  ideas,  not  naturally  connected,  might  be  called 
passive  habits,  as  properly  as  our  readiness  in  under- 
standing languages  upon  sight,  or  hearing  of  words. 
And  our  readiness  in  speaking  and  writing  them  is  an 
instance  of  the  latter,  of  active  habits. 

For  distinctness,  we  may  consider  habits  as  belonging 
to  the  body  or  the  mind,  and  the  latter  will  HRbiuofbody 
be  explained  by  the  former.  Under  the  '^'^°»*°^- 
former  are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities  or  mo- 
tions, whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which  are  owing 
to  use ;  under  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life  and  con- 
duct, such  as  those  of  obedience  and  submission  to  au- 
thority, or  to  any  particular  person  ;  those  of  veracity. 


128  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

justice,  and  charity;  those  of  attention,  industry,  self- 
government,  envy,  revenge.  And  habits  of  this  latter 
kind  seem  produced  by  repeated  acts,  as  well  as  the 
former.  And  in  like  manner,  as  habits  belonging  to  the 
body  are  produced  by  external  acts,  so  habits  of  the 
mind  are  produced  by  the  exertion  of  inward  practical 
principles ;  that  is,  by  carrying  them  into  act,  or  acting 
upon  them — the  principles  of  obedience,  of  veracity, 
justice,  and  charity.  Nor  can  those  habits  be  formed  by 
any  external  course  of  action  otherwise  than  as  it  pro- 
ceeds from  these  principles ;  because  it  is  only  these 
inward  principles  exerted  which  are  strictly  acts  of 
obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of  charity.  So, 
likewise,  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self-government 
are  in  the  same  manner  acquired  by  exercise ;  and  hab- 
its of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence,  whether  in  out- 
ward act  or  in  thought  and  intention,  that  is,  inward  act ; 
for  such  intention  is  an  act.  Resolutions  also  to  do 
well  are  properly  acts.  And  endeavoring  to  enforce 
upon  our  own  minds  a  practical  sense  of  virtue,  or  to 
beget  in  others  that  practical  sense  of  it  which  a  man 
really  has  himself,  is  a  virtuous  act.  All  these,  there- 
fore, may  and  will  contribute  toward  forming  good  hab- 
its. But  going  over  the  theory  of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts, 
talking  well,  and  drawing  fine  pictures  of  it — this  is  so 
far  from  necessarily  or  certainly  conducing  to  form  a 
habit  of  it  in  him  who  thus  employs  himself,  that  it  may 
harden  the  mind  in  a  contrary  course,  and  render  it 
gradually  more  insensible,  that  is,  form  a  habit  of  insen- 
sibility to  all  moral  considerations.  For,  from  our  very 
faculty  of  habits,  passive  impressions,  by  being  repeated, 
grow  weaker.  Thoughts,  by  often  passing  through  the 
mind,  are  felt  less  sensibly ;  being  accustomed  to  danger 
begets  intrepidity,  that  is,  lessens  fear;  to  distress,  les- 
sens the  passion  of  pity  ;  to  instances  of  others'  mortality, 
lessens  the  sensible  apprehension  of  our  own. 


Chap.VJ  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      129 

And  from  these  two  observations  together,  that  prac- 
tical habits  are  formed  and  strengthened  by  repeated 
acts,  and  that  passive  impressions  grow  as  active  hawts 
weaker  by  being  repeated  upon  us,  it  must  ^^q  £pref- 
follow  that  active  habits  may  be  gradually  «io°«&ro>^  ^-eak 
forming  and  strengthening,  by  a  course  of  acting  upon 
such  and  such  motives  and  excitements,  while  these 
motives  and  excitements  themselves  are,  by  proportion- 
able degrees,  growing  less  sensible ;  that  is,  are  contin- 
ually less  and  less  sensibly  felt,  even  as  the  active  habits 
strengthen.  And  experience  confirms  this ;  for  active 
principles,  at  the  very  time  that  they  are  less  lively  in 
perception  than  they  were,  are  found  to  be  somehow 
wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the  temper  and  character, 
and  become  more  effectual  in  influencing  our  practice. 
The  three  things  just  mentioned  may  afford  instances 
of  it.  Perception  of  danger  is  a  natural  excitement  of 
passive  fear  and  active  caution ;  and  by  being  inured  to 
danger,  habits  of  the  latter  are  gradually  wrought,  at  the 
same  time  that  the  former  gradually  lessens.  Perception 
of  distress  in  others  is  a  natural  excitement,  passively  to 
pity,  and  actively  to  relieve  it ;  but  let  a  man  set  him- 
self to  attend  to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve  distressed  per- 
sons, and  he  cannot  but-grow  less  and  less  sensibly  af- 
fected with  the  various  miseries  of  life  with  which  he 
must  become  acquainted ;  when  yet,  at  the  same  time, 
benevolence,  considered  not  as  a  passion  but  as  a  prac- 
tical principle  of  action,  will  strengthen  ;  and  while  he 
passively  compassionates  the  distressed  less,  he  will  ac- 
quire a  greater  aptitude  actively  to  assist  and  befriend 
them.  So  also,  at  the  same  time  that  the  daily  instances 
of  men's  dying  around  us  give  us  daily  a  less  sensible 
passive  feeling  or  apprehension  of  our  own  mortality, 
such  instances  greatly  contribute  to  the  strengthening  a 
practical  regard  to  it  in  serious  men ;  that  is,  to  forming 
I  habit  of  acting  with  a  constant  view  to  if. 


130  Analogy  of  Religions.  [Part  I. 

And  this  seems  again  further  to  show,  that  passive  im- 
pressions made  upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experi- 
ence, example,  though  they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy, 
and  a  very  great  one,  toward  forming  active 

Active  habits  ■'    "  '        .  ° 

formed  by  exer-  habits,  yet  can  have  this  efficacy  no  other- 

tion.  .         ;  -^     ,       .     ,       .  / 

Wise  than  by  mducmg  us  to  such  a  course 
of  action ;  and  that  it  is  not  being  affected  so  and  so, 
but  acting,  which  forms  those  habits ;  only  it  must  be 
always  remembered,  that  real  endeavors  to  enforce  good 
impressions  upon  ourselves  are  a  species  of  virtuous  ac- 
tion. Nor  do  we  know  how  far  it  is  possible,  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  that  effects  should  be  wrought  in  us  at 
once  equivalent  to  habits,*  that  is,  what  is  wrought  by 
use  and  exercise.  However,  the  thing  insisted  upon  is. 
not  what  may  be  possible,  but  what  is  in  fact  the  ap- 
pointment of  nature,  which  is,  that  active  habits  are  to 
be  formed  by  exercise.  Their  progress  may  be  so  grad- 
ual as  to  be  imperceptible  in  its  steps ;  it  may  be  hard 
to  explain  the  faculty  by  which  we  are  capable  of  hab- 
its, throughout  its  several  parts,  and  to  trace  it  up  to  its 
original,  so  as  to  distinguish  it  from  all  others  in  our 
mind ;  and  it  seems  as  if  contrary  effects  were  to  be 
ascribed  to  it.  But  the  thing  in  general,  that  our  na- 
ture is  formed  to  yield  in  some  such  manner  as  this,  to 
use  and  exercise,  is  matter  of  certain  experience. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of  ac- 
tion, we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on — a  facility,  readiness^ 
Newcharacter  ^^1^  oftcn  pleasure  in  it.  The  inclinations 
formed  by  habit,  ^^^[q}^  rendered  us  averse  to  it  grow  weaker  ; 
the  difficulties  in  it,  not  only  the  imaginary  but  the  real 
ones,  lessen  ;  the  reasons  for  it  offer  themselves  of  course 

*  [In  some  of  the  miracles  there  seems  to  have  been  effects  pro- 
duced at  once,  equivalent  to  habits,  as  in  the  gift  of  tongues  ;  and  as 
pointed  out  by  Dr.  Drought  (in  Dean  Graves'  Works)  in  the  miracle 
by  which  the  blind  man  was  enabled  to  use  the  sight  \\'hich  had  been 
miraculously  given  to  him. — F.] 


Chap. V.J  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      131 

to  our  thoughts  upon  all  occasions ;  and  the  least  glimpse 
of  them  is  sufficient  to  make  us  go  on  in  a  course  of  ac- 
tion to  which  we  have  been  accustomed.  And  practical 
principles  appear  to  grow  stronger,  absolutely  in  them- 
selves, by  exercise,  as  well  as  relatively,  with  regard  to 
contrary  principles ;  which  by  being  accustomed  to  sub- 
mit, do  so  habitually  and  of  course.  And  thus  a  new 
character,  in  several  respects,  may  be  formed ;  and 
many  habitudes  of  life,  not  given  by  nature,  but  which 
nature  directs  us  to  acquire. 

4.  III.  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should 
never  have  had  these  capacities  of  improving  by  experi- 
ence, acquired  knowledge,  and  habits,  had  improvement 
they  not  been  necessary,  and  intended  to  necesS^ry^ffthe 
be  made  use  of.  And  accordingly  we  find  e^StlmatS 
them  so  necessary,  and  so  much  intended,  tyo^oi^po^'era. 
that  without  them  we  should  be  utterly  incapable  of 
that  which  was  the  end  for  which  we  were  made,  con- 
sidered in  our  temporal  capacity  only ;  the  employments 
and  satisfactions  of  our  mature  state  of  life. 

Nature  does  in  nowise  qiialify  us  wholly,  much  less 
at  once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.  Even  maturity  of 
understanding  and  bodily  strength  are  not  only  arrived 
to  gradually,  but  are  also  very  much  owing  to  the  con- 
tinued exercise  of  our  powers  of  body  and  mind  from 
infancy.  But  if  we  suppose  a  person  brought  into  the 
world  with  both  these  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  con- 
ceivable, he  would  plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified  for 
the  human  life  of  mature  age  as  an  idiot.  He  would 
be  in  a  manner  distracted  with  astonishment,  and  appre- 
hension, and  curiosity,  and  suspense ;  nor  can  one  guess 
how  long  it  would  be  before  he  would  be  familiarized  to 
himself,  and  the  objects  about  him,  enough  even  to  set 
himself  to  any  thing.  It  may  be  questioned,  too,  wheth- 
er the  natural  information  of  his  sight  and  hearing  would 
be  of  any  manner  of  use  at  all  to  him  in  acting,  before 


132  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I: 

experience.  And  it  seems  that  men  would  be  strangely 
headstrong  and  self-willed,  and  disposed  to  exert  them- 
selves with  an  impetuosity  which  would  render  society 
insupportable,  and  the  living  in  it  impracticable,  were  it 
not  for  some  acquired  moderation  and  self-government, 
some  aptitude  and  readiness  in  restraining  themselves, 
and  concealing  their  sense  of  things.  Want  of  every 
thing  of  this  kind  which  is  learned  would  render  a  man 
as  incapable  of  society  as  want  of  language  would ;  or 
as  his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  particular  employ- 
ments of  life  would  render  him  incapable  of  providing 
himself  with  the  common  conveniences,  or  supplying  the 
necessary  wants  of  it.  In  these  respects,  and  probably 
in  many  more  of  which  we  have  no  particular  notion, 
mankind  is  left  by  nature  an  unformed,  unfinished  crea- 
ture, utterly  deficient  and  unqualified,  before  the  ac- 
quirement of  knowledge,  experience,  and  habits,  for  that 
mature  state  of  life  which  was  the  end  of  his  creation, 
considering  him  as  related  only  to  this  world, 

5.  But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power  of 

supplying  those  deficiencies  by  acquired  knowledge,  ex- 

^:,^u   A  A.    perience,   and  habits ;  so,  likewise,  we   are 

Childhood  fk-    ^  .  '         '  ' 

vorabie  to  im-  placed  m  a  condition  in  infancy,  childhood, 

provement.  ,»,-._ 

and  youth,  fitted  for  it;  fitted  for  our  ac- 
quiring those  qualifications  of  all  sorts  which  we  stand 
in  need  of  in  mature  age.  Hence  children,  from  their 
very  birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted  with  the  objects 
about  them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are  placed, 
and  to  have  a  future  part ;  and  learning  somewhat  or 
other  necessary  to  the  performance  of  it.  The  subor- 
dinations to  which  they  are  accustomed  in  domestic  life, 
teach  them  self-government  in  common  behavior  abroad 
and  prepare  them  for  subjection  and  obedience  to  civil 
authority.  What  passes  before  their  eyes,  and  daily 
happens  to  them,  gives  them  experience,  caution  against 
treachery  and  deceit,  together  with   numberless   little 


Chap. V.J  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      133 

rules  of  action  and  conduct  which  we  could  not  live 
without,  and  which  are  learned  so  insensibly  and  so  per- 
fectly as  to  be  mistaken,  perhaps,  for  instinct,  though 
they  are  the  effect  of  long  experience  and  exercise;  as 
much  so  as  language,  or  knowledge  in  particular  busi- 
ness, or  the  qualifications  and  behavior  belonging  to  the 
several  ranks  and  professions.  Thus  the  beginning  of 
our  days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a  state  of  educatior\  in 
the  theory  and  practice  of  mature  life.  We  are  much 
assisted  in  it  by  example,  instruction,  and  the  care  of 
others ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to  ourselves  to  do.  And 
of  this,  as  part  is  done  easily  and  of  course,  so  part  re- 
quires diligence  and  care,  the  voluntary  foregoing  many 
things  which  we  desire,  and  setting  ourselves  to  what  we 
should  have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the  necessity  or 
expedience  of  it.  For  that  labor  and  industry  which 
the  station  of  so  many  absolutely  requires  they  would  be 
greatly  unqualified  for  in  maturity;  as  those  in  other 
stations  would  be  for  any  other  sorts  of  application,  if 
both  were  not  accustomed  to  them  in  their  youth.  And 
according  as  persons  behave  themselves,  in  the  general 
education  which  all  go  through,  and  in  the  particular 
ones  adapted  to  particular  employments,  their  character 
is  formed,  and  made  appear;  they  recommend  them- 
selves more  or  less ;  and  are  capable  of,  and  placed  in, 
different  stations  in  the  society  of  mankind.* 

•  [We  are  too  apt  to  overlook  the  effect  of  actions  on  the  actor, 
(which  is  often  the  chief  effect,)  in  improving  or  impairing  his  own 
powers.  A  razor  used  to  cut  wood  or  stone  is  not  only  put  to  an  im- 
proper use,  but  spoiled  for  the  use  which  is  proper.  But  this  is  but  a 
faint  illustration.  The  razor  may  be  sharpened  again  ;  but  how  shall 
we  restore  a  blunted  sensibility,  or  enfeebled  judgment,  or  a  vitiated 
appetite.  Our  wrong-doing  inflicts  worse  results  on  ourselves  than 
on  our  victims,  and  the  evil  may  spread  disaster  over  our  whole  fu- 
ture. Hence  the  young  make  a  fatal  blunder  when  they  suppose  an 
occasional  indulgence  or  impropriety  may  be  compatible  with  gen- 
eral welfare  and  improvement. — Malcom,] 


134  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

6.  The  former  part  of  life,  then,  is  to  be  considered 
as  an  important  opportunity  which  nature  puts  into  our 

The  probation  hands,  and  which,  when  lost,  is  not  to  be 
goa^^tothSr  recovered.  And  our  being  placed  ixi  a  state 
oie  future.  ^^  discipline,  throughout  this  life,  for  anoth- 
er world,  is  a  providential  disposition  of  things,  exactly 
of  the  same  kind  as  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  dis- 
cipline during  childhood,  for  mature  age.  Our  condi- 
tion in  both  respects  is  uniform  and  of  a  piece,  and 
comprehended  under  one  and  the  same  general  law  of 
nature. 

And  if  we  are  not  able  at  all  to  discern  how,  or  in 
what  way,  the  present  life  could  be  our  preparation  for 

Ignorance  of  another,  this  would  be  no  objection  against 
j^rntop^bt  the  credibility  of  its  being  so.  For  we  do 
^°^-  not  discern  how  food  and  sleep  contribute 

to  the  growth  of  the  body,  nor  could  have  any  thought 
that  they  would,  before  we  had  experience.  Nor  do 
children  at  all  think,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  sports 
and  exercises  to  which  they  are  so  much  addicted 
contribute  to  their  health  and  growth  ;  nor,  on  the  oth- 
er, of  the  necessity  which  there  is  for  their  being  re- 
strained in  them ;  nor  are  they  capable  of  understanding 
the  use  of  many  parts  of  discipline  which,  nevertheless, 
they  must  be  made  to  go  through,  in  order  to  qualify 
them  for  the  business  of  mature  age.  Were  we  not  able, 
then,  to  discover  in  what  respects  the  present  life  could 
form  us  for  a  future  one,  yet  nothing  would  be  more 
supposable  than  that  it  might,  in  some  respects  or  other, 
from  the  general  analogy  of  providence.  And  this,  for 
aught  I  see,  might  reasonably  be  said,  even  though  we 
should  not  take  in  the  consideration  of  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world.     But, 

7.  IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently 
that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necessary 
qualification  for  the  future  state,  and  then  we  may  dis- 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      135 

tinctly  see  how,  and  in  what  respects,  the  present  life 
may  be  a  preparation  for  it;  since  we  want^  Howthemode 
and  are  capable  of^  improvement  in  that  char-  ™'*yi>e^o^- 
acter  by  moral  and  religious  habits  ;  and  the  present  life  is 
fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  such  improvement ;  in  like 
manner,  as  we  have  already  observed,  how  and  in  what 
respects  infancy,  childhood,  and  youth  are  a  necessary 
preparation,  and  a  natural  state  of  discipline,  for  ma- 
ture age, 

8.  Nothing  which  we  at  present  see  would  lead  us  to 
the  thought  of  a  solitary  inactive  state  hereafter ;  but, 
if  we  judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  Active  virtues 
we  must  suppose,  according  to  the  Script-  *"  * '^^^'^  "*^- 
ure  account  of  it,  that  it  will  be  a  community.  And 
there  is  no  shadow  of  any  thing  unreasonable  in  conceiv- 
ing, though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  com- 
munity will  be,  as  the  Scripture  represents  it,  under  the 
more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  expression  may  be  used, 
the  more  sensible,  government  of  God.  Nor  is  our  ig- 
norance, what  will  be  the  employments  of  this  happy 
community,  nor  our  consequent  ignorance,  what  partic- 
ular scope  or  occasion  there  will  be  for  the  exercise  of 
veracity,  justice,  and  charity,  among  the  members  of  it 
with  regard  to  each  other,  any  proof  that  there  will  be 
no  sphere  of  exercise  for  those  virtues.  Much  less,  if 
that  were  possible,  is  our  ignorance  any  proof  that  there 
will  be  no  occasion  for  that  frame  of  mind  or  character 
which  is  formed  by  the  daily  practice  of  those  particu- 
lar virtues  here,  and  which  is  a  result  from  it.  This  at 
least  must  be  owned  in  general,  that  as  the  government 
established  in  the  universe  is  moral,  the  character  of  vir- 
tue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  be  the  condi- 
tion of  our  happiness,  or  the  qualification  for  it. 

9.  Now  from  what  is  above  observed  concerning  our 
natural  power  of  habits,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  we  are 
capable  of  moral  improvement  by  discipline.     And  how 


136  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

greatly  we  want  it,  need  not  be  proved  lo  any  one  who 
„, .        ^  ^.     is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickedness  of 

Virtuous  habita  ^  ° 

a  guard  against  mankind,  or  even  with  those  imperfections 

OTor.  I'll  . 

which  the  best  are  conscious  of.  But  it  is 
not,  perhaps,  distinctly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that 
the  occasion  which  human  creatures  have  for  discipline 
to  improve  in  them  this  character  of  virtue  and  piety,  ib 
to  be  traced  up  higher  than  to  excess  in  the  passions  by 
indulgence  and  habits  of  vice.  Mankind,  and  perhaps 
all  finite  creatures,  from  the  very  constitution  of  their 
nature,  before  habits  of  virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in 
danger  of  deviating  from  what  is  right,  and  therefore 
stand  in  need  of  virtuous  habits  for  a  security  against 
this  danger.*  For,  together  with  the  general  principle 
of  moral  understanding,  we  have  in  our  inward  frame 
various  affections  toward  particular  external  objects. 
These  affections  are  naturally,  and  of  right,  subject  to 
the  government  of  the  moral  principle  as  to  the  occa- 
sions on  which  they  may  be  gratified  ;  as  to  the  times,  de- 
grees, and  manner,  in  which  the  objects  of  them  may  be 
pursued ;  but  then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither 
excite  them  nor  prevent  their  being  excited.     On  the 

*  [It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  Aristotle  determines  our'  aoa 
ijnxTei  (rbre  irapa  pvaiv  kyytvovrac  ai  aperai,  aX?M  7rE<j>VKdai  fiev  ^/lu 
de^aadai  avraq,  TeTieLovfievotg  6e  Sia  tov  kdov^. — Ethic.  Nicorn.,  iii,  i. 
"  In  order  to  understand  this,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  virtue  may  be 
considered  either  as  the  quality  of  an  action  or  as  the  quality  of  a  per- 
son. Considered  as  the  quality  of  an  action,  it  consists,  even  accord- 
ing to  Aristotle,  in  the  reasonable  moderation  of  the  affection  from 
which  the  action  proceeds,  whether  this  moderation  be  habitual  tc 
the  person  or  not.  Considered  as  the  quality  of  the  person,  it  con- 
sists  in  the  habit  of  this  reasonable  moderation,  in  its  having  become 
the  customary  and  usual  disposition  of  the  mind.  ...  If  a  single 
action  was  sufficien*  to  stamp  the  character  of  any  virtue  upon  the 
person  who  performed  it,  the  most  worthless  of  mankind  might  lay 
claim  to  all  the  virtues ;  since  there  is  no  man  who  has  not,  upon 
some  occasions,  acted  with  prudence,  justice,  temperance,  and  forti- 
tude."— Smith's  Moral  Sent.,  part  vi.  sec.  2. — F.] 


Chap.V.1  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      137 

contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the  objects  of 
them  are  present  to  the  mind,  not  only  before  all  con- 
sideration whether  they  can  be  obtained  by  lawful  means, 
but  after  it  is  found  they  cannot.  For  the  natural  ob- 
jects of  affection  continue  so ;  the  necessaries,  conven- 
iences, and  pleasures  of  life  remain  naturally  desirable, 
though  they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently ;  nay,  though 
they  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when  the 
objects  of  any  affection  whatever  cannot  be  obtained 
without  unlawful  means,  but  may  be  obtained  by  them, 
such  affection,  though  its  being  excited,  and  its  contin- 
uing some  time  in  the  mind,  be  as  innocent  as  it  is  nat- 
ural and  necessary,  yet  cannot  but  be  conceived  to  have 
a  tendency  to  incline  persons  to  venture  upon  such  un- 
lawful means,  and  therefore  must  be  conceived  as  put- 
ting them  in  some  danger  of  it. 

Now  what  is  the  general  security  against  this  danger 
— against  their  actually  deviating  from  right,'* 

.        ,         ,  .  ,  *=*,  °.  Virtuous  hab- 

As  the  danger  is,  so,  also,  must  the  security  its  a  security 
be  from  within,  from  the  practical  principle  ^^"^  *** 
of  virtue.*  And  the  strengthening  or  improving  this 
principle,  considered  as  practical  or  as  a  principle  of  ac- 
tion, will  lessen  the  danger  or  increase  the  security 
against  it.     And  this  moral  principle  is  capable  of  im- 

*  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effectually 
restrain  creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  by  a  sens^  of  interest  is 
meant  a  speculative  conviction  or  belief  that  such  and  such  indul- 
gence  would  occasion  them  greater  uneasiness,  upon  the  whole,  than 
satisfaction,  it  is  contrary  to  present  experience  to  say  that  this  sense 
of  interest  is  sufficient  to  restrain  them  from  thus  indulging  them- 
selves. And  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant  a  practical  regard  to 
what  is  upon  the  whole  our  happiness,  this  is  not  only  coincident  with 
the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  rectitude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea 
itself.  And,  it  is  evident,  this  reasonable  self-love  wants  to  be  im- 
proved as  really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily  see  it 
overmatched,  not  only  by  the  more  boisterous  passions,  but  by  curi- 
osity, shame,  love  of  imitation — by  any  thing,  even  indolence — es- 
pecially if  the  interest,  the  temporal  interest,  suppose,  which  is  the 


138  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

provement,  by  proper  discipline  and  exercise  ;  by  recol- 
lecting the  practical  impressions  which  example  and 
experience  have  made  upon  us ;  and,  instead  of  follow- 
ing humor  and  mere  inclination,  by  continually  attend- 
ing to  the  equity  and  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we 
are  engaged,  be  it  in  greater  or  less  matters,  and  accus- 
toming ourselves  always  to  act  upon  it,  as  being  itself 
the  just  and  natural  motive  of  action ;  and  as  this  moral 
course  of  behavior  must  necessarily,  under  divine  gov- 
ernment, be  our  final  interest.  Thus  ihe  principle  of 
virtue,  improved  into  a  habit, '^  of  which  improvefnent  we  are 
thus  capable,  will  plainly  be,  in  proportion  to  the  strength 
of  it,  a  security  against  the  danger  which  finite  creatures 
are  in,  from  the  very  nature  of  propension  or  particular 
affections.  This  way  of  putting  the  matter  supposes  par- 
ticular affections  to  remain  in  a  future  state,  which  it  is 
scarce  possible  to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  they  do,  we 
clearly  see  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue  and  self-gov- 
ernment may  be  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  them. 
However,  though  we  were  not  distinctly  to  take  in  this 
supposition,  but  to  speak  only  in  general,  the  thing  really 
comes  to  the  same.  For  habits  of  virtue  thus  acquired 
by  discipline  are  improvement  in  virtue ;  and  improve- 
ment in  virtue  must  be  advancement  in  happiness,  if 
the  government  of  the  universe  be  moral. 

10.  From   these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it   will 

end  of  such  self-love,  be  at  a  distance.  So  greatly  are  profligate  men 
mistaken  when  they  affirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by  interested - 
ness  and  self-love ;  and  so  little  cause  is  there  for  moralists  to  dis- 
claim this  principle.     (See  pp.  it6,  117.) 

*  [We  do  not  understand  that  under  the  economy  of  grace  the 
law  of  habit  has  been  repealed,  or  any  other  indeed  of  those  laws  of 
our  mental  nature  on  which  Butler  proceeds  in  the  reasoning  of  this 
chapter.  Whatever  the  pretensions  and  expedients  of  the  Gospel 
might  be  for  the  perfecting  of  our  meetness  for  heaven,  they  super- 
sede not  the  efficacy  of  that  process  under  which,  by  reason  of  use,  the 
senses  are  exercised  to  discern  between  good  and  evil. — Chalmers.] 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      139 

further  show  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being 
improved  by  discipline,  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  creat- 
ures made  upright,  fall ;  and  that  those  who  How  upright 
preserve  their  uprightness,  by  so  doing  raise  ^®^^  *^ 
themselves  to  a  more  secure  state  of  virtue.  To  say 
that  the  former  is  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of  liberty, 
is  to  say  no  more  than  that  an  event's  actually  happen- 
ing is  accounted  for  by  a  mere  possibility  of  its  happen- 
ing. But  it  seems  distinctly  conceivable  from  the  very 
nature  of  particular  affections  or  propensions.  For 
suppose  creatures  intended  for  such  a  particular  state 
of  life,  for  v/hich  such  propensions  were  necessary ;  sup- 
pose them  endued  with  such  propensions,  together  with 
moral  understanding,  as  well  including  a  practical  sense 
of  virtue  as  a  speculative  perception  of  it ;  and  that  all 
these  several  principles,  both  natural  and  moral,  form- 
ing an  inward  constitution  of  mind,  were  in  the  most 
exact  proportion  possible ;  that  is,  in  a  proportion  the 
most  exactly  adapted  to  their  intended  state  of  life ; 
such  creatures  would  be  made  upright,  or  finitely  per- 
fect. Now  particular  propensions,  from  their  very  na- 
ture, must  be  felt,  the  objects  of  them  being  present, 
though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all,  or  not  with  the 
allowance  of  the  moral  principle.  But  if  they  can  be 
gratified  without  its  allowance,  or  by  contradicting  it 
then  they  must  be  conceived  to  have  some  tendency,  in 
how  low  a  degree  soever — yet  some  tendency — to  induce 
persons  to  such  forbidden  gratification.  This  tendency 
in  some  one  particular  propension  may  be  The  mode  n 
increased,  by  the  greater  frequency  of  occa-  ^"^^^^^^^ 
sions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occasions  exciting 
others.  The  least  voluntary  indulgence  in  forbidden 
circumstances,  though  but  in  thought,  will  increase  this 
wrong  tendency,  and  may  increase  it  further,  till,  pecul- 
iar conjunctures  perhaps  conspiring,  it  becomes  effect ; 
and  danger  of  deviating  from  right,  ends  in  actual  de- 


140  ■  Analogy  of  Religion.  LPart  I. 

viation  from  it :  a  danger  necessarily  arising  frcmi  the 
very  nature  of  propension,  and  which  therefore  could 
not  have  been  prevented  though  it  might  have  been 
escaped,  or  got  innocently  through.  The  case  would  be, 
as  if  we  were  to  suppose  a  straight  path  marked  out  for 
a  person,  in  which  such  a  degree  of  attention  would 
keep  him  steady;  but  if  he  would  not  attend  in  this  de- 
gree, any  one  of  a  thousand  objects  catching  his  eye  might 
lead  him  out  of  it.  Now  it  is  impossible  to  say  how 
much  even  the  first  full  overt  act  of  irregularity  might 
disorder  the  inward  constitution,  unsettle  the  adjust- 
ments, and  alter  the  proportions  which  formed  it,  and 
in  which  the  uprightness  of  its  make  consisted.  But 
repetition  of  irregularities  would  produce  habits :  and 
thus  the  constitution  would  be  spoiled,  and  creatures 
made  upright  become  corrupt  and  depraved  in  their 
settled  character,  proportionably  to  their  repeated  irreg- 
ularities in  occasional  acts.  But,  on  the  contrary,  these 
„        ^  ^      creatures  might  have  improved  and  raised 

How  such  be-      ,  ,  . 

ings  might  rise   themselves   to   a   higher  and   more  secure 

to  a  higher  state.  r      •  i         i  i     i        •         i 

state  of  Virtue  by  the  contrary  behavior,  by 
steadily  following  the  moral  principle,  supposed  to  be 
one  part  of  their  nature,  and  thus  withstanding  that  un- 
avoidable danger  of  defection,  which  necessarily  arose 
from  propension,  the  other  part  of  it.  For  by  thus  pre- 
serving their  integrity  for  some  time  their  danger  would 
lessen,  since  propensions,  by  being  inured  to  submit, 
would  do  it  more  easily  and  of  course ;  and  their  secur- 
ity against  this  lessening  danger  would  increase,  since 
the  moral  principle  would  gain  additional  strength  by 
exercise ;  both  which  things  are  implied  in  the  notion 
of  virtuous  habits.* 

*  Butler's  statement  how  creatures  made  upright  fall,  and  how 
they  are  restored  to  righteousness,  has  been  severely  criticised.  In 
it,  Chahners  says,  we  see  the  meagerness  of  his  Christianity.  It  is 
alleged  that  in  this  chaptei  man's  fall  is  represented  as  gradual,  like 


Chap.VJ  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Disc  ipline.      141 

Thus,  then,  vicious  indulgence  is  not  only  criminal  in 
itself,  but  also  depraves  the  inward  constitution  and 
character.  And  virtuous  self-government  is  not  only 
right  in  itself,  but  also  improves  the  inward  constitution 
or  character ;  and  may  improve  it  to  such  a  degree,  that 
though  we  should  suppose  it  impossible  for  particular 
affections  to  be  absolutely  coincident  with  the  moral 
principle,  and  consequently  should  allow  that  such 
creatures  as  have  been  above  supposed  would  forever 
remain  defectible ;  yet  their  danger  of  actually  deviat- 
ing from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely  lessened,  and 
they  fully  fortified  against  what  remains  of  it;  if  that 
may  be  called  danger  against  which  there  is  an  adequate 
effectual  security.  But  still,  this  their  higher  perfection 
may  continue  to  consist  in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a 
state  of  discipline,  and  this  their  more  complete  security 
remain  to  proceed  from  them. 

And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that  creatures  with- 

the  departure,  by  slight  variations,  from  a  straight  line,  and  that  in 
his  recovery  from  his  lost  condition  nothing  more  is  required  than  a 
strenuous,  earnest  exertion  to  change  his  course,  to  break  the  power 
of  old  habits  and  form  new  ones.  In  the  Scripture  the  fall  of  man  is 
represented  as  sudden  and  complete.  By  a  single  act  man  passed 
into  a  state  of  ruin.  His  recovery  by  his  own  effort  is  impossible. 
Gracious  ability  must  be  imparted  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  This  is  ever 
and  freely  offered,  and  under  its  influence,  not  gradually,  but  by  one 
act,  man  becomes  reconciled  to  God  and  justified  through  the  merit  of 
Christ. 

In  the  day  man  ate  the  forbidden  fruit  he  "  died,"  but  in  the  mo- 
ment he  believed  on  Christ  he  passed  from  death  into  life  and  justi- 
fication. The  statement  of  Butler  might  have  been  better  guarded 
against  misapprehension,  but  we  do  not  see  that  it  contradicts  the 
Bible  doctrine.  On  any  theory  the  first  act  must  have  been  sudden, 
and  Butler  says  it  is  impossible  to  tell  how  much  disorder  and  evil 
might  result  from  it ;  what  he  says  about  the  formation  and  power  of 
habit  cannot  be  denied.  The  fall  and  consequent  depravity  is  not 
the  lowest  condition  possible  to  man,  nor  is  the  stale  of  justification 
the  highest.  There  are  degrees  of  guilt  and  goodness  that  undci 
m.in's4'>rcumstances  <h'pend  on  his  efforts  and  hnlnfs. 


142  Analogy  of  Religion.  iPart  I. 

out  blemish  as  they  came  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  may  be 
Perfectbeings  in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and  so  may  stand 
may  fall.  ^^  need  of  the  security  of  virtuous  habits, 

additional  to  the  moral  principle  wrought  into  their  na- 
tures by  him.  That  which  is  the  ground  of  their  dan- 
ger, or  their  want  of  security,  may  be  considered  as  a 
deficiency  in  them,  to  which  virtuous  habits  are  the  nat- 
ural supply.  And  as  they  are  naturally  capable  of  be- 
ing raised  and  improved  by  discipline,  it  may  be  a  thing 
fit  and  requisite  that  they  should  be  placed  in  circum- 
stances with  an  eye  to  it ;  in  circumstances  peculiarly 
fitted  to  be,  to  them,  a  state  of  discipline  for  their  im- 
provement in  virtue. 

11.  But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold  with 
respect  to  those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are 

^    ^         _,   fallen    from    their   original    rectitude,   and 

Greater  need  .  ° 

of  improvement  whose   passions   are   become   excessive  by 

In  fallen  beings.  ,      .    ,      .  ....  . 

repeated  violations  of  their  inward  constitu- 
tion ?  Upright  creatures  may  want  to  be  improved ; 
depraved  creatures  want  to  be  renewed.  Education 
and  discipline,  which  may  be  in  all  degrees  and  sorts  of 
gentleness  and  of  severity,  is  expedient  for  those,  but 
must  be  absolutely  necessary  for  these.  For  these,  dis- 
cipline, of  the  severer  sort,  too,  and  in  the  higher  de- 
grees of  it,  must  be  necessary,  in  order  to  wear  out 
vicious  habits ;  to  recover  their  primitive  strength  of 
self-government,  which  indulgence  must  have  weakened 
to  repair  as  well  as  raise  into  a  habit,  the  moral  princi- 
ple, in  order  to  their  arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtu- 
ous happiness. 

12.  Now  whoever  will  consider  the  thing,  may  clearly 

see  that  the  present  world  I's,  peculiarly  fit  to 

This  world  pe-    ,  ;i     ,.      .    ,.         ^  ,  . 

cniiariyflttedfor  be  a  State  of  discipline  for  this  puniose  to 

discipline.  ,  .„  f  ,  ,         j 

such  as  will  set  themselves  to  amend  and 
improve.  For,  the  various  temptations  with  which  we 
are  surrounded — our  experience  of  the  deceits  of  wick- 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      143 

edness,  having  been  in  many  instances  led  wroug  our- 
selves— the  great  viciousness  of  the  world — the  infinite 
disorders  consequent  upon  it — our  being  made  acquaint- 
ed with  pain  and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling  of 
it  or  from  the  sight  of  it  in  others — these  things,  though 
some  of  them  may,  indeed,  produce  wrong  effects  upon 
our  minds,  yet  when  duly  reflected  upon  have  all  of 
them  a  direct  tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  settled  modera- 
tion and  reasonableness  of  temper ;  the  contrary  both  to 
thoughtless  levity,  and  also  to  that  unrestrained  self-will 
and  violent  bent  to  follow  present  inclination,  which 
may  be  observed  in  undisciplined  minds. 

Such  experience,  as  the  present  state  affords  of  the 
frailty  of  our  nature,  of  the  boundless  extravagance  of 
ungoverned  passion,  of  the  power  which  an  infinite 
Being  has  over  us  by  the  various  capacities  of  misery 
which  he  has  given  us;  in  short,  that  kind  and  degree 
of  experience  which  the  present  state  affords  us,  that  the 
constitution  of  nature  is  such  as  to  admit  the  possibility, 
the  danger,  and  the  actual  event  of  creatures  losing 
their  innocence  and  happiness,  and  becoming  vicious 
and  wretched ;  hath  a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical 
sense  of  things  very  different  from  a  mere  speculative 
knowledge  that  we  are  liable  to  vice  and  capable  of 
misery.  And  who  knows  whether  the  security  of  crea- 
tures in  the  highest  and  most  settled  state  of  perfection 
may  not,  in  part,  arise  from  their  having  had  such  a  sense 
of  things  as  this  formed  and  habitually  fixed  within 
them,  in  some  state  of  probation  ?  And  passing  througli 
the  present  world  with  that  moral  attention  which  is 
accessary  to  the  acting  a  right  part  in  it,  may  leave  ever- 
lasting impressions  of  this  sort  upon  our  minds. 

But  to  be  a  little  more  distinct :  allurements  to  what 
is  wrong;  difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our 

-  *"  ,      .  ,  ,  -r  This fltnew seen 

duty;  our  not  bemg  able  to  act  a  uniform   in  the  efforts  u 

.    ,  .  ,  ,  ,  ,  practice  vii-tiio. 

nght  part  without  some  thought  and  care ; 


144  Analogy  of  Religion.  I- Part  I 

and  the  opportunities  which  we  have,  or  imagine  we 
have,  of  avoiding  what  we  dislike  or  obtaining  what  we 
desire,  by  unlawful  means,  when  ^ye  either  cannot  do  it 
at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful  ones ;  these 
things,  that  is,  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice,  are 
what  render  the  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline  to  those  who  will  preserve  their  integrity : 
because  they  render  being  upon  our  guard,  resolution, 
and  the  denial  of  our  passions,  necessary  in  order  to 
that  end.  And  the  exercise  of  such  particular  recollec- 
tion, intention  of  mind,  and  self-government,  in  the 
practice  of  virtue,  has,  from  £he  make  of  our  nature,  a 
peculiar  tendency  to  form  habits  of  virtue,  as  implying 
not  only  a  real,  but  also  a  more  continued  and  a  more 
intense  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle ;  or  a  more 
constant  and  a  stronger  effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  act. 
•  Illustration.  Thus  supposc  a  person  to  know  himself  to 
be  in  particular  danger,  for  some  time,  of  doing  any 
thing  wrong,  which  yet  he  fully  resolves  not  to  do  ;  con- 
tinued recollection,  and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  or- 
der to  make  good  his  resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting 
of  that  act  of  virtue  in  a  high  degree^  which  need  have 
been,  and  perhaps  would  have  been,  only  instantaneous 
and  iveak  had  the  temptation  been  so. 

It  is,  indeed,  ridiculous  to   assert  that   self-denial  is 
essential  to  virtue  and  piety ;  but  it  would  have  been 
Use  of  self-   nearer    the   truth,  though    not    strictly  the 
denial  truth  itself,  to  have  said  that  it  is  essential 

to  discipline  and  improvement.  For  though  actions 
materially  virtuous,  which  have  no  sort  of  difficulty,  but 
are  perfectly  agreeable  to  our  particular  inclinations, 
may  possibly  be  done  only  from  these  particular  inclina- 
tions, and  so  may  not  be  any  exercise  of  the  principle  of 
virtue,  that  is,  not  be  virtuous  actions,  at  all ;  yet,  on  the 
contrary,  they  may  be  an  exercise  of  that  principle,  and, 
when  they  are,  they  have  a  tendency  to  form  and  fix  the 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.     145 

habit  of  virtue.  But  when  the  exercise  of  the  virtuous 
principle  is  more  continued,  oftener  repeated,  and  more 
intense,  as  it  must  be  in  circumstances  of  danger,  temp- 
tation, and  difficulty,  of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree, 
this  tendency  is  increased  proportionably,  and  a  more 
confirmed  habit  is  the  consequence. 

13.  This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length,  but 
how  far  it  may  hold  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intel- 
lectual powers  nor  our  bodily  strength  can     ,,     ^ 

be  improved  beyond  such  a  degree ;  and  powers  be  over- 
both  may  be  overwrought.  Possibly  there 
may  be  somewhat  analogous  to  this  with  respect  to  the 
moral  character,  which  is  scarce  worth  considering. 
And  I  mention  it  only,  lest  it  should  come  into  some 
person's  thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the  foregoing 
observations,  which  perhaps  it  is,  but  as  a  confutation 
of  them,  which  it  is  not.  And  there  may  be  several 
other  exceptions.  Observations  of  this  kind  cannot  be 
supposed  to  hold  minutely,  and  in  every  case.  It  is 
enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And  these  plainly 
hold  so  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be  seen  distinctly, 
which  is  all  that  is  intended  by  them,  that  the  present 
world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  our  im- 
provement in  virtue  and  piety;  in  the  same  sense  as  some 
sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the  attention,  not 
to  be  sure  of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of  such  as 
will,  set  themselves  to  them,  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to 
habits  of  attention. 

14.  Indeed  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving,  in 
event,  a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of  men,  that 
on  the  contrary  they  seem  to  make  it  a  dis- 

...  /•     •  A      J     ,  .    •  r    ^  Thevioeofthe 

ciphne  of  vice.  And  the  viciousness  of  the  world  a  disci- 
world  is,  in  different  ways,  the  great  tempta-  ^  * 
tion  which  renders  it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in 
the  degree  it  is  to  good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the 
whole  occasion,  of  mankind's  being  placed  in  such  a 
10 


146  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

state  as  the  present,  is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted 
for.  That  which  appears  amid  the  general  corruption 
is,  that  there  are  some  persons  who,  having  within  them 
the  principle  of  amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to  and 
follow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion,  be  they  more 
clear  or  more  obscure,  which  are  afforded  them ;  and 
that  the  present  world  is  not  only  an  exercise  of  virtue 
in  these  persons,  but  an  exercise  of  it  in  ways  and  de- 
grees peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it ;  apt  to  improve  it,  in 
some  respects,  even  beyond  what  would  be  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  it  required  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  society,  or  in 
a  society  of  equally  imperfect  virtue  with  themselves. 
But  that  the  present -world  does  not  actually  become  a 
The  failure  of  State  of  moral  discipline  to  many,  even  to 
SS^rove^S  the  generality,  that  is,  that  they  do  not  im- 
^°S  ^S  prove  or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged 
**"•  as  a  proof  that  it  was  not  intended  for  moral 

discipline  by  any  who  at  all  observe  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture. For  of  the  numerous  seeds  of  vegetables  and 
bodies  of  animals  which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way 
to  improve  to  such  a  point  or  state  of  natural  maturity 
and  perfection,  we  do  not  see,  perhaps,  that  one  in  a 
million  actually  does.  Far  the  greater  part  of  them 
decay  before  they  are  improved  to  it,  and  appear  to  be 
absolutely  destroyed.  Yet  no  one,  who  does  not  deny 
all  final  causes,  will  deny  that  those  seeds  and  bodies 
which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  per- 
fection, answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  really  de- 
signed by  nature ;  and  therefore  that  nature  designed 
them  for  such  perfection.  And  I  cannot  forbear  adding, 
though  it  is  not  to  the  present  purpose,  that  the  appear- 
ance of  such  an  amazing  waste  in  nature,  with  respect  to 
these  seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is  to  us  as 
unaccountable  as,  what  is  much  more  terrible,  the  pres- 
ent and  future  ruin  pf  so  many  moral  agents  by  them- 
selves, that  is,  by  vice. 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      147 

15.  Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline  it 
may  be  objected,  in  another  way,  that  so  far  as  a  course 
of  behavior  materially  virtuous  proceeds  ^^  suchdis 
from  hope  and  fear,  so  far  it  is  only  a  disci-  cioiineisoniyof 
pline  and  strengthening  of  self-love.*     But 

doing  what  God  commands,  because  he  commands  it, 
is  obedience,  though  it  proceeds  from  hope  or  fear. 
And  a  course  of  such  obedience  will  form  habits 
of  it :  and  a  constant  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  and 
charity,  may  form  distinct  habits  of  these  particular  vir- 
tues, and  will  certainly  form  habits  of  self-government, 
and  of  denying  our  inclinations,  whenever  veracity,  just- 
ice, or  charity  requires  it.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation 
for  this  great  nicety,  with  which  some  affect  to  distin- 
guish in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate  all  religion 
proceeding  from  hope  or  fear.  Forveracity,  justice,  and 
charity,  regard  to  God's  authority,  and  to  our  own  chief 
interest,  are  not  only  all  three  coincident,  but  each  of 
them  is,  in  itself,  a  just  and  natural  motive  or  principle 
of  action.  And  he  who  begins  a  good  life  from  any  one 
of  them,  and  perseveres  in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  some 
degree,  so  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more 
of  that  character  which  is  correspondent  to  the  consti- 
tution of  nature  as  moral,  and  to  the  relation  which  God 
stands  in  to  us  as  moral  governor  of  it;  nor,  consequent- 
ly, can  he  fail  of  obtaining  that  happiness  which  this 
constitution  and  relation  necessarily  suppose  connected 
with  that  character. 

16.  These  several  observations  concerning  the  active 
principle  of  virtue,  and  obedience  of  God's  oh.  Passive vir- 
commands,  are  applicable  to  passive  sub-  !!Sot*S^'ta 
mission  or  resignation  to  his  will;  which  is  'ft^tureatete. 
another  essential  part  of  a  right  character,  connected 
with  the  former,  and  very  much  in  our  power  to  form 

*  [The  reference  here  is  no  doubt  to  I^ord  Shaftesbury's  "Inquiry 
roDcerning  Virtue,"  part  lii,  §  3. — F.] 


148  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

ourselves  to.  It  may  be  imagined  that  nothing  but  af- 
flictions can  give  occasion  for  or  require  this  virtue; 
that  it  can  have  no  respect  to,  nor  be  any  way  necessary 
to  qualify  for  a  state  of  perfect  happiness ;  but  it  is  not 
experience  which  can  make  us  think  thus.  Prosperity 
itself,  while  any  thing  supposed  desirable  is  not  ours,  be- 
gets extravagant  and  unbounded  thoughts.  Imagination 
is  altogether  as  much  a  source  of  discontent  as  any  thing 
in  our  external  condition.  It  is  indeed  true  that  there 
can  be  no  scope  for  patience  when  sorrow  shall  be  no 
more ;  but  there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of  mind, 
which  shall  have  been  formed  by  patience.  For  though 
self-love,  considered  merely  as  an  active  principle  lead- 
ing us  to  pursue  our  chief  interest,  cannot  but  be  uni- 
formly coincident  with  the  principle  of  obedience  to 
God's  commands,  our  interest  being  rightly  understood, 
because  this  obedience  and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  chief 
interest  must  be  in  every  case  one  and  the  same  thing; 
yet  it  may  be  questioned  whether  self-love,  considered 
merely  as  the  desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness, 
can,  from  its  nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and  uniformly 
coincident  with  the  will  of  God,  any  more  than  particu- 
lar affections  can  (page  122)  be  coincident  in  such  sort 
as  not  to  be  liable  to  be  excited  upon  occasions  and  in 
degrees  impossible  to  be  gratified  consistently  with  the 
constitution  of  things,  or  the  divine  appointments.  So 
that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon  this  account,  be 
requisite  for  ah  creatures ;  habits.,  I  say,  which  signify 
what  is  formed  by  use.  However,  in  general,  it  is  ob- 
vious tliat  both  self-love  and  particular  affections  in 
human  creatures,  considered  only  as  pacisive  feelings, 
distort  and  rend  the  mind,  and  therefore  stand  in  need 
of  discipline.  Now  denial  of  those  particular  affections, 
in  a  course  of  active  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  will, 
has  a  tendency  to  moderate  them,  and  seems  also  to 
have  a  tendency  to  habituate  the  mind  to  be  easy  and 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      149 

satisfied  with  that  degree  of  happiness  which  is  allotted 
us,  that  is,  to  moderate  self-love.*  But  the  proper  dis- 
cipline for  resignation  is  affliction.  For  a  right  behav- 
ior under  that  trial,  recollecting  ourselves  so  as  to  con- 
sider it  in  the  view  in  which  religion  teaches  us  to 
consider  it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God — receiving  it  as 
what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to  permit,  in  his 
world,  and  under  his  government — this  will  habituate 
the  mind  to  a  dutiful  submission ;  and  such  submission, 
together  with  the  active  principle  of  obedience,  make 
up  the  temper  and  character  in  us  which  answers  to  his 
sovereignty,  and  which  absolutely  belongs  to  the  condi- 
tion of  our  being  as  dependent  creatures.  Nor  can  it 
be  said  that  this  is  only  breaking  the  mind  to  a  submis- 
sion to  mere  power ;  for  mere  power  may  be  accidental, 
and  precarious,  and  usurped ;  but  it  is  forming  within 
ourselves  the  temper  of  resignation  to  his  rightful  author- 
ity, who  is,  by  nature,  supreme  over  all. 

16.  Upon  the  whole,  such  a  character  and  such  qual- 
ifications are  necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in  the 
present  world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  nowise  bestow, 
but  has  put  it  upon  us  in  great  part  to  acquire,  in  our 
progress  from  one  stage  of  life  to  another  from  childhood 

*  Disengagement  is  absolutely  necessary  to  enjojrment ;  and  a 
person  may  have  so  steady  and  fixed  an  eye  upon  his  own  interest, 
whatever  he  places  it  in,  as  may  hinder  him  from  attending  to  many 
gratifications  within  his  reach,  which  others  have  their  minds  free  and 
open  to.  Over  fondness  for  a  child  is  not  generally  thought  to  be  for 
its  advantage ;  and  if  there  be  any  guess  to  be  made  from  appear- 
ances, surely  the  character  we  call  selfish  is  not  the  most  promising 
for  happiness.  Such  a  temper  may  plainly  be,  and  exert  itself  in  a 
d{^ee'  and  manner  which  may  give  unnecessary  and  useless  solicitude 
and  anxiety — in  a  degree  or  manner  which  may  prevent  obtaining 
the  means  and  materials  of  enjoyment,  as  well  as  the  making  use  of 
them.  Immoderate  self-love  does  very  ill  consult  its  own  interest ; 
and  how  much  soever  a  paradox  it  may  appear,  it  is  certainly  true 
that,  even  from  self-love,  we  should  endeavor  to  get  over  all  inordi- 
nate regard  to  and  consideration  of  ourselves." — Sermons,  xi,  p.  129. 


tgo  •  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

to  mature  age ;  put  it  upon  us  to  acquire  them,  by  giv- 
ing us  capacities  of  doing  it,  and  by  placing  us,  in  the 
beginning  of  life,  in  a  condition  fit  for  it.  And  this  is  a 
general  analogy  to  our  condition  in  the  present  world, 
as  in  a  state  of  moral  discipline  for  another.  It  is  in 
Oh.  Troubieand  vain,  then,  to  object  against  the  credibility  of 
havebeen™Sd-  the  present  life's  being  intended  for  this 
^'  purposes,  that  all  the  trouble  and  the  danger 

unavoidably  accompanying  such  discipline  might  have 
been  saved  us  by  our  being  made  at  once  the  creatures 
and  the  characters  which  we  were  to  be.  For  we  experi- 
ence that  what  we  were  to  be,  was  to  be  the  effect  oi  what 
we  would  do;  and  that  the  general  conduct  of  nature  is, 
not  to  save  us  trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capa- 
ble of  going  through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  us  to  do 
so.  Acquirements  of  our  own,  experience  and  habits, 
are  the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  security 
against  our  dangers ;  since  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  set 
ourselves  to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  external 
things  which  we  stand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it  is 
as  plainly  a  general  law  of  nature  that  we  should,  with 
regard  to  our  temporal  interest,  form  and  cultivate  prac- 
tical principles  within  us,  by  attention,  use,  and  disci- 
pline, as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural  law ;  chiefly  in 
the  beginning  of  life,  but  also  throughout  the  whole 
course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left  to  our  choice, 
either  to  improve  ourselves  and  better  our  condition,  or, 
in  default  of  such  improvement,  to  remain  deficient  and 
wretched.  It  is  therefore  perfectly  credible,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  that  the  same  may  be. our  case,  with 
respect  to  the  happiness  of  a  future  state  and  the  qual- 
ifications necessary  for  it. 

17.  There  is  a  third  thing  which  may  seem  implied  in 

This  world  a  the  present  world's  being  a  state  of  proba- 

S^af  S/Tht"   tion,  that  it  is  a  theater  of  action  for  the 

**^^-  manifestation   of  persons'  characters,  with 


Chap. v.]  Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.      151 

respect  to  a  future  one ;  not,  to  be  sure,  to  an  all-know- 
ing being,  but  to  his  creation,  or  part  of  it.  This  may, 
perhaps,  be  only  a  consequence  of  our  being  in  a  state 
of  probation  in  the  other  senses.  However,  it  is  not  im- 
possible that  men's  showing  and  making  manifest  what 
is  in  their  heart,  what  their  real  character  is,  may  have 
respect  to  a  future  life  in  ways  and  manners  which  we 
are  not  acquainted  with  ;  particularly  it  may  be  a  means, 
for  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  appear  to  do  any  thing 
without  means,  of  their  being  disposed  of  suitably  to 
their  characters,  and  of  its  being  known  to  the  creation, 
by  way  of  example,  that  they  are  thus  disposed  of.  But 
not  to  enter  upon  any  conjectural  account  of  this,  one 
may  just  mention  that  the  manifestation  of  persons' 
characters  contributes  very  much,  in  various  ways,  to 
the  carrying  on  a  great  part  of  that  general  course  of 
nature  respecting  mankind  which  comes  under  our  ob- 
servation at  present.  I  shall  only  add,  that  probation, 
in  both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that  treated  of  in  the 
foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government ;  since 
by  persons'  behavior  under  it,  their  characters  cannot 
but  be  manifested,  and  if  they  behave  well,  improved. 


152  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 


^  (yp 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    OPINION    OF    NECESSITY,*  CONSIDERED   AS 
INFLUENCING   PRACTICE. 


THROUGHOUT  the  foregoing  Treatise  it  appears 
that  the  condition  of  mankind,  considered  as  in- 
The  question  to  habitants  of  this  world  only,  and  under  the 
be  considered,  government  of  God  which  we  experience,  is 
greatly  analogous  to  our  condition  as  designed  for  an- 
other world,  or  under  that  further  government  which 
religion  teaches  us.  If,  therefore,  any  assert,  as  a  fatalist 
must,  that  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity  is  recon- 
cilable with  the  former,  there  immediately  arises  a  ques- 
tion in  the  way  of  analogy ;  whether  he  must  not  also 
own  it  to  be  reconcilable  with  the  latter,  that  is,  with 
the  system  of  religion  itself  and  the  proof  of  it.  The 
reader  then  will  observe,  that  the  question  now  before 
us  is  not  absolute,  whether  the  opinion  of  fate  be  recon- 
cilable with  religion ;  but  hypothetical,  whether,  upon 
supposition  of  its  being  reconcilable  with  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature,  it  be  not  reconcilable  with  religion  also  ? 
or  what  pretense  a  fatalist — not  other  persons,  but  a 
fatalist — has  to  conclude,  from  his  opinion,  that  there  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  religion  ?  And  as  the  puzzle  and 
obscurity  which  must  unavoidably  arise   from  arguing 

*  [Necessity  is  an  ambiguous  word.  There  is,  i.  Logical  necessi- 
ty, which  implies  that  a  consequent  follows  from  a  premise.  2.  Moral 
necessity,  which  requires  means  in  order  to  reach  ends.  3.  Physical 
necessity,  which  implies  that  in  the  material  world  consequences  in- 
evitably and  by  compulsion  follow  antecedents.  4.  Metaphysical 
necessity,  which  belongs  to  God  as  existing  eternally  and  immutably. 
The  word  is  also  used  in  other  senses.] 


Chap. VI.]    Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.  153 

upon  so  absurd  a  supposition  as  that  of  universal  neces- 
sity will,  I  fear,  easily  be  seen,  it  will,  I  hope,  as  easily 
be  excused. 

But  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as  a 
thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  author  of  na- 
ture, or  natural  governor  of  the  world  ;  and 

^  ^  ^  GOc Solly  0.©" 

since  ar.  objection  may  be  made  against  the   stroyB  not  the 

,     ^     ,  .       -  ...  °      .  ,    proof  of  an  tn- 

proof  of  this,  from  the  opinion  of  universal  teuigent  author 

-  Ill      of  nature. 

necessity,  as  it  may  be  supposed  that  such 
necessity  will  itself  account  for  the  origin  and  preserva- 
tion of  all  things,  it  is  requisite  that  this  objection  be 
distinctly  answered  ;  or  that  it  be  shown  that  a  fatality 
supposed  consistent  with  what  we  certainly  experience, 
does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and 
governor  of  nature,  before  we  proceed  to  consider, 
whether  it  destroys  the  proof  of  a  moral  governor  of  it, 
or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  religion. 

2.  Now,  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist  that  the  whole 
constitution  of  nature  and  the  actions  of  men,  that  every 
thing,  and  every  mode  and  circumstance  of  every  thing, 
is  necessary,  and  could  not  possibly  have  been  other- 
wise, it  is  to  be  observed,  that  this  necessity  does  not 
exclude  deliberation,  choice,  preference,  and  j^^^  j^^^  ^^, 
acting  from  certain  principles,  and  to  certain  "'^^^^  design. 
ends;  because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted  experi- 
ence, acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man  may, 
every  moment,  be  conscious  of.  And  from  hence  it  fol- 
lows, that  necessity,  alone  and  of  itself,  is  in  no  sort  an 
account  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  and  how  things 
came  /^  de  and  to  continue  as  they  are ;  but  only  an  ac- 
count of  this  circumstance  relating  to  their  origin  and 
continuance,  that  they  could  not  have  been  otherwise 
than  they  are  and  have  been.  The  assertion,  that  every 
thing  is  by  necessity  of  nature,  is  not  an  answer  to  the 
question,  Whether  the  world  came  into  being  as  it  is,  by 
an  intelligent  agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not ;  but  to  quite 


154  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

another  question,  Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in 
that  way  and  manner  which  we  call  7iecessarily^  or  in 
that  way  and  manner  which  we  call  freely.  For  sup- 
pose, further,  that  one  who  was  a  fatalist,  and  one  who 
kept  to  his  natural  sense  of  things  and  believed  himself 
a  free  agent  were  disputing  together,  and  vindicating 
their  respective  opinions,  and  they  should  happen  to 
instance*  in  a  house,  they  would  agree  that  it  was  built 
by  an  architect.  Their  difference  concerning  necessity 
and  freedom  would  occasion  no  difference  of  judgment 
concerning  this,  but  only  concerning  another  matter, 
whether  the  architect  built  it  necessarily  or  freely. 

Suppose,  then,  they  should  proceed  to  inquire  con- 
cerning the  constitution  of  nature :  in  a  lax  way  of 
speaking,  one  of  them  might  say  it  was  by  necessity, 
and  the  other  by  freedom  ;  but  if  they  had  any  meaning 
to  their  words,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  free  agent  so 
the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an  agent, 
whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  acting  by  necessity  ; 
for  abstract  notions  can  do  nothing.  Indeed,  we  ascribe 
to  God  a  necessary  existence,  uncaused  by  any  agent. 
For  we  find  within  ourselves  the  idea  of  infinity,  that  is, 
immensity  and  eternity,  impossible,  even  in  imagination, 
to  be  removed  out  of  being.  We  seem  to  discern  intui- 
tively that  there  must,  and  cannot  but  be,  somewhat  ex- 
ternal to  ourselves  answering  this  idea,  or  the  archetype 
of  it.  And  from  hence  (for  this  abstracts  as  much  as  any 
other,  implies  a  concrete^  we  conclude  that  there  is,  and 
cannot  but  be,  an  infinite  and  immense  eternal  Being 
existing,  prior  to  all  design  contributing  to  his  existence, 
and  exclusive  of  it.f     And  from  the  scantiness  of  lan- 

*  [  Take  a  house  as  an  instance  or  illustration.] 

f  [This  argument  is  taken  by  Butler  from  Dr.  Clarke.  Like  all  of 
Clarke's  attempted  demonstrations  of  the  being  of  God,  it  has  been 
closely  scrutinized,  and  its  validity  questioned.  See,  for  instance, 
Duke's  Analysis  of  Butler's  Analogy,  Appendix,  p.  83.] 


Chap.  VI.]    Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.  155 

guage,  a  manner  of  speaking  has  been  introduced,  that 
necessity  is  the  foundation,  the  reason,  the  account  of 
the  existence  of  God.  But  it  is  not  alleged,  nor  can  it 
be  at  all  intended,  that  eiiery  thing  exists  as  it  does  by 
this  kind  of  necessity,  a  necessity  antecedent  in  nature 
to  design ;  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  meant  that  every  thing 
exists  as  it  does  by  this  kind  of  necessity  upon  several 
accounts,  and  particularly,  because  it  is  admitted  that 
design  in  the  actions  of  men  contributes  to  many  alter- 
ations in  nature.  For  if  any  deny  this,  I  shall  not  pre- 
tend to  reason  with  them. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  first.  That  when  a  fatal- 
ist asserts  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity^  he  CondaBione. 
must  mean,  by  an  agent  acting  necessarily :  he  must,  I  say, 
mean  this ;  for  I  am  very  sensible  he  would  not  choose 
to  mean  it :  and,  secondly.  That  the  necessity  by  which 
such  an  agent  is  supposed  to  act,  does  not  exclude  in- 
telligence and  design.  So  that  were  the  system  of  fatal- 
ity admitted,  it  would  just  as  much  account  for  the 
formation  of  the  world  as  for  the  structure  of  a  house, 
and  no  more.  Necessity  as  much  requires  and  supposes 
a  necessary  agent  as  freedom  requires  and  supposes  a 
free  agent  to  be  the  former  of  the  world.  And  the  ap- 
pearances oi  design  and  oi  final  causes  \t\  the  constitution 
of  nature,  as  really  prove  this  acting  agent  to  be  an  in- 
telligent designer^  or  to  act  from  choice,  upon  the  scheme 
of  necessity,  supposed  possible,  as  upon  that  of  freedom. 
3.  It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necessity  does  not 
destroy  the  proof  that  there  is  an  intelligent 
author  of  nature  and  natural  governor  of  the   stroys  not  the 

.  ,  .    ,       ,  ,      proof  of  religion- 

world,  the  present  question,  which  the  anal- 
ogy before-mentioned  (page  152)  suggests,  and  which,  I 
think,  it  will  answer,  is  this :  Whether  the  opinion  of 
necessity,  supposed  consistent  with  possibility,  with  the 
constitution  of  the  world,  and  the  natural  government 
which  we  experience  exercised  over  it,  destroys  all  rea- 


I  $6  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

sonable  ground  of  belief  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  relig- 
ion ;  or  whether  that  opinion  be  reconcilable  with  relig- 
ion, with  the  system  and  the  proof  of  it. 

Suppose,  then,  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one  from  his 
youth  up  in  his  own  principles ;  that  the  child  should 
Impracticable  reason  upon  them,  and  conclude  that  since 
in  education, etc.  ^^  cannot  possibly  behave  otherwise  than 
he  does  he  is  not  a  subject  of  blame  or  commendation, 
nor  can  deserve  to  be  rewarded  or  punished ;  imagine 
him  to  eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and 
commendation  out  of  his  mind  by  means  of  this  system  ; 
to  form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  behavior  to  it ; 
and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  expect, 
say,  from  reasonable  men,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into 
the  world ;  as  the  fatalist  judges  from  this  system  what 
he  is  to  expect  from  the  author  of  nature,  and  with  re- 
gard to  a  future  state.  I  cannot  forbear  stopping  here 
to  ask,  whether  any  one  of  common  sense  would  think 
fit  that  a  child  should  be  put  upon  these  speculations 
and  be  left  to  apply  them  to  practice  ?  And  a  man  has 
little  pretense  to  reason  who  is  not  sensible  that  we  are 
all  children  in  speculations  of  this  kind.  However,  the 
child  would  doubtless  be  highly  delighted  to  find  him- 
self freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and  shame  with 
which  his  playfellows  were  fettered  and  embarrassed, 
and  highly  conceited  in  his  superior  knowledge,  so  far 
beyond  his  years.  But  conceit  and  vanity  would  be  the 
least  bad  part  of  the  influence  which  these  principles 
must  have,  when  thus  reasoned  and  acted  upon,  during 
the  course  of  his  education.  He  must  either  be  allowed 
to  go  on,  and  be  the  plague  of  all  about  him,  and  him- 
self too,  even  to  his  own  destruction,  or  else  correction 
must  be  continually  made  use  of  to  supply  the  want  of 
those  natural  perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation 
which  we  have  supposed  to  be  removed,  and  to  give  him 
a  practical  impression  of  what  he  had  reasoned  himself 


Chap.  VI. J  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.  157 

out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was  in  fact  an  accountable 
child,  and  to  be  punished  for  doing  what  he  was  forbid. 
It  is  therefore,  in  reality,  impossible  but  that  the  cor- 
rection which  he  must  meet  with  in  the  course  of  his 
education  must  convince  him,  that  if  the  scheme  he  was 
instructed  in  were  not  false,  yet,  that  he  reasoned  in- 
conclusively upon  it,  and,  somehow  or  other,  misapplied 
it  to  practice  and  common  life ;  as  what  the  fatalist  ex- 
periences of  the  conduct  of  Providence  at  present  ought, 
in  all  reason,  to  convince  him,  that  this  scheme  is  misap- 
plied when  applied  to  the  subject  of  religion.  (Page  153.) 
But  supposing  the  child's  temper  could  remain  still 
formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expectation  of  the  treat- 
ment he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be  regulated  by  it,  so 
as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man  would  blame  or 
punish  him  for  any  thing  which  he  should  do,  because 
he  could  not  help  doing  it ;  upon  this  supposition,  it  is 
manifest  he  would,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the 
world,  be  insupportable  to  society,  and  the  treatment 
which  he  would  receive  from  it  would  render  it  so  to 
him  ;  and  he  could  not  fail  of  doing  somewhat  very  soon 
for  which  he  would  be  delivered  over  into  the  hands  of 
civil  justice.  And  thus,  in  the  end,  he  would  be  con- 
vinced of  the  obligations  he  was  under  to  his  wise 
instructor. 

Or  suppose  this  scheme  of  fatality  in  any  other  way 
applied  to  practice,  such  practical  application  of  it  will 
be  found  equally  absurd,  equally  fallacious,  in  a  practi- 
cal sense  :  for  instance,  that  if  a  man  be  destined  to  live 
such  a  time,  he  shall  live  to  it,  though  he  take  no  care 
of  his  own  preservation  ;  or  if  he  be  destined  to  die  before 
that  time,  no  care  can  prevent  it;  therefore  all  care 
about  preserving  one's  life  is  to  be  neglected;  which  is 
the  fallacy  instanced  in  by  the  ancients.  ^^  absurdity 
But  now,  on  the  contrary,  none  of  these  •^fre^i*""- 
practical  absurdities  can  be  drawn  from  reasoning  upon 


158  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

the  supposition  that  we  are  free ;  but  all  such  reason- 
ing, with  regard  to  the  commorx  affairs  of  life,  is  justified 
by  experience.  And  therefore,  though  it  were  admitted 
that  this  opinion  of  necessity  were  speculatively  true, 
yet  with  regard  to  practice,  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far 
as  our  experience  reaches ;  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our 
present  life.  For  the  constitution  of  the  present  world, 
and  the  condition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is  as 
if  we  were  free.  And  it  may,  perhaps,  justly  be  con- 
cluded that  since  the  whole  process  of  action,  through 
every  step  of  it,  suspense,  deliberation,  inclining  one 
way,  determining,  and  at  last  doing  as  we  determine,  is 
as  if  we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  so.*  But  the  thing 
here  insisted  upon  is,  that  under  the  present  natural 
government  of  the  world  we  find  we  are  treated  and 
dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  consideration 

*  [Compare  Berkeley's  Minute  Philosopher,  dial,  vii,  §  20 : — 

"  Euphr.  Tell  me,  Alciphron,  do  you  think  it  involves  a  contra- 
diction that  God  should  make  man  free  ? 

''Ale.  I  do  not. 

'^ Euphr.  It  is  then  possible  that  there  may  be  such  a  thing? 

"Ale.  This  I  do  not  deny. 

"  Euphr.  Would  not  such  a  one  think  that  he  acted,  and  condemn 
himself  for  some  actions,  and  approve  himself  for  others,  etc.  ?  Tell 
me,  now,  what  other  characters  of  your  supposed  free  agent  may  not 
be  found  in  man  ?  " 

So  Clarke,  Remarks  on  Collins'  Inquiry,  p.  24  :  "  As  to  that  which 
this  gentleman  calls  the  fourth  (but  which  is,  indeed,  the  only)  ac- 
tion of  man,  namely,  doing  as  we  will,  or  actually  exerting  this  self- 
moving  faculty.  Of  this  I  say,  as  before,  that  since,  in  all  cases,  it 
does  now,  by  experience,  seem  to  us  to  be  free,  that  is,  seems  to  us  to 
be  really  a  self-moving  power,  exactly  in  the  same  manner  as  it  would 
do  upon  supposition  of  our  being  actually  free  agents  ;  the  bare  phys- 
ical possibility  of  our  being  so  framed  by  the  Author  of  nature,  as  to  be 
unavoidably  deceived  in  this  matter  by  every  experience  of  every  action 
we  perform,  is  no  more  any  just  ground  to  doubt  the  truth  of  our  lib- 
erty, than  the  bare  natural  possibility  of  our  being  all  our  life-time,  as 
in  a  dream,  deceived  in  our  belief  of  the  existence  of  the  material 
world,  is  any  just  ground  to  doubt  of  the  reality  of  its  existence." — F.l 


Chap.  VI.]  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.  159 

whether  we  are  or  not.  Were  this  opinion,  therefore,  of 
necessity,  admitted  to  be  ever  so  true,  yet  such  is  in 
fact  our  condition  and  the  natural  course  of  Necessity  mis- 
things,  that  AVhenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and  iS^t?4\p^: 
practice,  this  application  of  it  always  mis-  entan^ftiture. 
leads  us,  and  cannot  but  mislead  us,  in  a  most  dreadful 
manner,  with  regard  to  our  present  interest.  And  how 
can  people  think  themselves  so  very  secure,  then,  that 
the  same  application  of  the  same  opinion  may  not  mis- 
lead them  also,  in  some  analogous  manner,  with  respect 
to  a  future,  a  more  general,  and  more  important  interest  ? 
For  religion  being  a  practical  subject,  and  the  analogy 
of  nature  showing  us  that  we  have  not  faculties  to  apply 
this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical  subjects; 
whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  subject  of  religion,  and 
thence  conclude  that  we  are  free  from  its  obligations,  it 
is  plain  this  conclusion  cannot  be  depended  upon. 
There  will  still  remain  just  reason  to  think,  whatever 
appearances  are,  that  we  deceive  ourselves ;  in  some- 
what of  a  like  manner  as  when  people  fancy  they  can 
draw  contradictory  conclusions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 
From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader  will 
see  it  follows,  that  if  upon  supposition  of  freedom  the 
evidence  of  religion  be  conclusive,  it  re- 

°  .  .  ,  ,  ,  Necessity  does 

mams  so  upon  supposition  of  necessity ;  be-  not  destroy  ro- 
cause  the  notion  of  necessity  is  not  applica- 
ble to  practical  subjects;  that  is,  with  respect  to  them 
is  as  if  it  were  not  true.  Nor  does  this  contain  any  re- 
flection upon  reason,  but  only  upon  what  is  unreasona- 
ble. For  to  pretend  to  act  upon  reason  in  opposition 
to  practical  principles  which  the  Author  of  our  nature 
gave  us  to  act  upon,  and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reason  to 
subjects  with  regard  to  which  our  own  short  views,  and 
even  our  experience,  will  show  us  it  cannot  be  depended 
upon, — and  such  at  best  the  subject  of  necessity  must 
be, — this  is  vanity,  conceit,  and  unreasonableness. 


i6o  Analogy  of  Religion.         FPart  I. 

4.  But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within  ourselves  a 
will,  and  are  conscious  of  a  character.     Now  if  this  in 

us  be  reconcilable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcila- 

Notincompat-    ,,.,..,  ,  .  .       . 

ibie  Avith  God's  blc  With  it  in  the  author  of  nature.     And 

moral  character.  .  1  /-       1 

besides,  natural  government  and  final  causes 
imply  a  character  and  a  will  in  the  governor  and  de- 
signer ;*  a  will  concerning  the  creatures  whom  he  gov- 
erns. The  author  of  nature,  then,  being  certainly  of 
some  character  or  other,  notwithstanding  necessity,  it  is 
evident  this  necessity  is  as  reconcilable  with  the  partic- 
ular character  of  benevolence,  veracity,  and  justice  in 
him,  which  attributes  are  the  foundation  of  religion  as 
with  any  other  character;  since  we  find  this  necessity 
no  more  hinders  men  from  being  benevolent  than  cruel ; 
true,  than  faithless ;  just,  than  unjust ;  or,  if  the  fatalist 
pleases,  what  we  call  unjust.  For  it  is  said,  indeed,  that 
what,  upon  supposition  of  freedom,  would  be  just  pun- 
ishment, upon  supposition  of  necessity  becomes  mani- 
festly unjust ;  because  it  is  punishment  inflicted  for  do- 
ing that  which  persons  could  not  avoid  doing.  As  if 
the  necessity  which  is  supposed  to  destroy  the  injustice 
of  murder,  for  instance,  would  not  also  destroy  the  in- 
justice of  punishing  it.  However,  as  little  to  the  purpose 
as  this  objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  very  much  to  the  purpose 
to  observe  from  it  how  the  notions  of  justice  and  injus- 
tice remain,  even  while  we  endeavor  to  suppose  them 
removed ;  how  they  force  themselves  upon  the  mind, 
even  while  we  are  making  suppositions  destructive  of 
them:  for  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world, 
but  would  be  ready  to  make  this  objection  at  first 
thought. 

5.  But  though  it  is  most  evident  that  universal  neces- 

*  By  will  and  character  is  meant  that  which,  in  speaking  of  men, 
we  should  express,  not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by  the  words 
temper^  taste^  disposition,  practical  principles ;  that  whole  franif 
of  mind  from  whence  we  act  in  one  manner  rather  than  another. 


Chap.  VIJ  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.         i6i 

sity,  if  it  be  reconcilable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcilable 
with  that  character  in  the  author  of  nature  which  is  the 
foundation  of  religion;  "Yet,  does  it  not 

°         '  .  Does  not  de- 

pli  inly  destroy  the  proof  that  he  is  of  that   stroy  the  proof 

,  ■,  ,         ,  r      r     ofrellglon. 

character,  and  consequently  the  proof  of 
religion  ?  "  By  no  means.  For  we  find  that  happiness 
and  misery  are  not  our  fate  in  any  such  sense  as  not  to  be 
the  consequences  of  our  behavior,  but  that  they  are  the 
consequences  of  it,  (chap,  ii.)  We  find  God  exercises 
the  same  kind  of  government  over  us  with  that  which  a 
father  exercises  over  his  children,  and  a  civil  magistrate 
over  his  subjects.  Now  whatever  becomes  of  abstract 
questions  concerning  liberty  and  necessity,  jt  evidently 
appears  to  us  that  veracity  and  justice  must  be  the  nat- 
ural rule  and  measure  of  exercising  this  authority,  or 
government,  to  a  being  who  can  have  no  competitions, 
or  interfering  of  interests,  with  his  creatures  and  his 
subjects. 

6.  But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  tTiough  we  experi- 
ence its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties  which 
run  up  into  the  most  abstruse  of  all  specu-  other  prooft 
lations,  and  as  the  opinion  of  necessity  no^^^ected. 
seems  to  be  the  very  basis  upon  which  infidelity  grounds 
itself,  it  may  be  of  some  use  to  off"er  a  more  particular 
proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  which  may  dis- 
tinctly be  shown  not  to  be  destroyed  by  this  opinion. 

The  proof  from  final  causes  of  an  intelli-  Final  causes,  etc. 
gent  author  of  nature  is  not  aff"ected  by  the  opinion  of 
necessity ;  supposing  necessity  a  thing  possible  in  itself, 
and  reconcilable  with  the  constitution  of  things,  (page 
152,  etc.)  And  it  is  a  matter  of  fact,  independent  on 
this  or  any  other  speculation,  that  he  governs  the  world 
by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punishments,  (chap,  ii;) 
and  also  that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty,  by  which 
we  distinguish  between  actions,  and  approve  some  as 
virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disapprove  others  as  vi- 


162  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

cious  and  of  ill  desert,  (Dissertation  ii.)  Now  this  moral 
discernment  implies,  in  the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of  action, 
and  a  rule  of  a  very  peculiar  kind ;  for  it  carries  in  it 
authority  and  a  right  of  direction ;  authority  in  such  a 
sense,  as  that  we  cannot  depart  from  it  without  being 
self-condemned.*  And  that  the  dictates  of  this  moral 
faculty,  which  are  by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover 
the  laws  of  God,  laws  in  a  sense  including  sanctions, 
may  be  thus  proved.  Consciousness  of  a  rule  or  guide 
of  action,  in  creatures  who  are  capable  of  considering  it 
as  given  them  by  their  maker,  not  only  raises  immedi- 
ately a  sense  of  duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  security  in  fol- 
lowing it,  and  of  danger  in  deviating  from  it.  A  direc- 
tion of  the  author  of  nature,  given  to  creatures  capable 
of  looking  upon  it  as  such,  is  plainly  a  command  from 
him :  and  a  command  from  him  necessarily  includes  in 
it,  at  least,  an  implicit  promise  in  case  of  obedience,  or 
threatening  in  case  of  disobedience.  But  then  the  sense 
or  perception  of  good  and  ill  desert,  (Dissertation  ii,) 
which  is  contained  in  the  moral  discernment,  renders 
the  sanction  explicit,  and  makes  it  appear,  as  one  may 
say,  expressed.  For  since  his  method  of  government  is 
to  reward  and  punish  actions,  his  having  annexed  to 
some  actions  an  inseparable  sense  of  good  desert,  and 
to  others  of  ill,  this  surely  amounts  to  declaring  upon 
whom  his  punishments  shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  re- 
wards be  bestowed.  For  he  must  have  given  us  this 
discernment  and  sense  of  things,  as  a  presentiment  of 
what  is  to  be  hereafter ;  that  is,  by  way  of  information 
beforehand,  what  we  are  finally  to  expect  in  this  world. 
There  is,  then,  most  evident  ground  to  think  that  the 
government  of  God,  upon  the  whole,  will  be  found  to 
correspond  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us,  and 
that  in  the  upshot  and  issue  of  things  happiness  and 
misery  shall,  in  fact  and  event,  be  made  to  follow  virtue 
*  Sermon  ii  at  the  Rolls. 


Chap.  VIJ  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.         163 

and  vice  respectively ;  as  he  has  already,  in  so  peculiar 
a  manner,  associated  the  ideas  of  them  in  our  minds. 
And  from  hence  might  easily  be  deduced  the  obliga- 
tions of  religious  worship,  were  it  only  to  be  considered 
as  a  means  of  preserving  upon  our  minds  a  sense  of  this 
moral  government  of  God,  and  securing  our  obedience 
to  it ;  which  yet  is  an  extremely  imperfect  view  of  that 
most  important  duty. 

7.  Now  I  say,  no  objection  from  necessity  can  lie 
against  this  general  proof  of  religion ;  none  against  the 
proposition  reasoned  upon,  that  we  have  Neceaaity  pre^ 
such  a  moral  faculty  and  discernment ;  be-  tiOTUo'Sis  gS- 
cause  this  is  a  mere  matter  of  fact,  a  thing  <**ip«>o^- 
of  experience,  that  human  kind  is  thus  constituted : 
none  against  the  conclusion;  because  it  is  immediate, 
and  wholly  from  this  fact.  For  the  conclusion  that  God 
will  finally  reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked, 
is  not  here  drawn,  from  its  appearing  to  us  fit*  that  he 
should^  but  from  its  appearing  that  he  has  told  us  he  will. 
And  this  he  hath  certainly  told  us  in  the  promise  and 
threatening  which,  it  hath  been  observed,  the  notion  of 

♦  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny  that  the  will  of  God  is 
determined  by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case  ;  though 
one  chooses  to  decline  matters  of  such  abstract  speculation,  and  to 
speak  with  caution  when  one  does  speak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intel- 
ligible to  say,  that  it  is  fit  and  reasonable  for  every  one  to  consult  bis 
own  happiness,  then  fitness  of  action,  or  the  right  and  reason  of  the 
case,  is  an  intelligible  manner  of  speaking.  And  it  seems  as  incon- 
ceivable to  suppose  God  to  approve  one  course  of  action,  or  one  end, 
preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his  acting  at  all  from  design  implies 
that  he  does,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  that  end  to  be 
the  ground  of  the  preference ;  as  to  suppose  him  to  discern  an  ab- 
stract proposition  to  be  true,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  to  it 
to  be  the  ground  of  the  discernment.  It  doth  not,  therefore,  ap- 
pear, that  moral  right  is  any  more  relative  to  perception  than  abstract 
truth  is ;  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper  to  speak  of  the  fitness  and 
rightness  of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  than 
to  speak  of  abstract  truth  as  thus  founded. 


i64  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

a  command  implies,  and  the  sense  of  good  and  ill  desert 
which  he  has  given  us  more  distinctly  expresses.  And 
this  reasoning  from  fact  is  confirmed,  and  in  some  de- 
gree even  verified,  by  other  facts ;  by  the  natural  ten- 
dencies of  virtue  and  of  vice,  (page  99  ;)  and  by  this,  that 
God,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  providence,  punishes 
vicious  actions  as  mischievous  to  society,  and  also 
vicious  actions  as  such,  in  the  strictest  sense,  (page  90, 
e\c.)  So  that  the  general  proof  of  religion  is  unanswer- 
ably real,  even  upon  the  wild  supposition  which  we  are 
arguing  upon. 

8.  It  must  likewise  be  observed  further,  that  natural 
religion  hath,  besides  this,  an  external  evi- 

Does  not  affect  °  i.,i        ,  ■  r 

external  evi-  dcncc,  which  the  doctrme  of  necessity,  if  it 
could  be  true,  would  not  aff'ect.  For  sup- 
pose a  person,  by  the  observations  and  reasoning  above, 
or  by  any  other,  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion  ;  that 
there  is  a  God,  who  made  the  world,  who  is  the  moral 
governor  and  judge  of  mankind,  and  will,  upon  the 
whole,  deal  with  every  one  according  to  his  works ;  I 
say,  suppose  a  person  convinced  of  this  by  reason,  but 
to  know  nothing  at  all  of  antiquity,  or  the  present  state 
of  mankind,  it  would  be  natural  for  such  a  one  to  be  in- 
quisitive, what  was  the  history  of  this  system  of  doc- 
trine ;  at  what  time,  and  in  what  manner,  it  came  first 
into  the  world ;  and  whether  it  were  believed  by  any 
considerable  part  of  it.  And  were  he  upon  inquiry  to 
find,  that  a  particular  person,  in  a  late  age,  first  of  all 
proposed  it  as  a  deduction  of  reason,  and  that  mankind 
were  before  wholly  ignorant  of  it ;  then,  though  its  evi- 
dence from  reason  would  remain,  there  would  be  no  ad- 
ditional probability  of  its  truth  from  the  account  of  its 
discovery.  But  instead  of  this  being  the  fact  of  the 
case,  on  the  contrary,  he  would  find  what  could  not  but 
afford  him  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  its  truth  :  J^t'rsf 
That  somewhat  of  this  system,  with  more  or  fewer  addi- 


Chap.  VIJ  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity  165 

tions  and  alterations,  hath  been  professed  in  all  ages 
and  countries  of  which  we  have  any  certain  information 
relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly^  That  it  is  certain  his- 
torical fact,  so  far  as  we  can  trace  things  up,  that  this 
whole  system  of  belief,  that  there  is  one  God,  the  creator 
and  moral  governor  of  the  world,  and  that  mankind  is 
in  a  state  of  religion,  was  received  in  the  first  ages. 
And,  Thirdly^  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation 
in  history  that  this  system  was  first  reasoned  out;  so 
there  is  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  an- 
cient as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by  revelation. 
Now  these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be  of  great  weight. 
The  first  of  them,  general  consent,  shows  this  system  to 
be  conformable  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  The 
second,  namely,  that  religion  was  believed  in  the  first 
ages  of  the  world,  especially  as  it  does  not  appear  that 
there  were  then  any  superstitious  or  false  additions  to  it, 
cannot  but  be  a  further  confirmation  of  its  truth.  For  it 
is  a  proof  of  this  alternative — either  that  it  came  into  the 
world  by  revelation,  or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious,  and 
forces  itself  upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these  is  the 
conclusion  of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will  consider 
how  unapt  for  speculation  rude  and  uncultivated  minds 
are,  will,  perhaps,  from  hence  alone  be  strongly  inclined 
to  believe  it  the  truth.  And  as  it  is  shown  in  the  sec- 
ond part  (chap,  ii)  of  this  Treatise,  that  there  is  nothing 
of  such  peculiar  presumption  against  a  revelation  in  the 
beginning  of  the  world  as  there  is  supposed  to  be  against 
subsequent  ones;  a  skeptic  could  not,  I  think,  give  any 
account  which  would  appear  more  probable,  even  to 
liimself,  of  the  early  pretenses  to  revelation,  than  by 
supposing  some  real  original  one  from  whence  they  were 
copied.  And  the  third  thing  above-mentioned,  that 
there  is  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  an- 
•cient  as  history,  of  the  system  of  religion  being  taught 
mankind  by  revelation ;  this  must  be  admitted  as  some 


1 66  Analogy  of  Religion  [Part  I. 

degree  of  real  proof  that  it  was  so  taught.  For  why 
should  not  the  most  ancient  tradition  be  admitted  as  some 
additional  proof  of  a  fact  against  which  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption ?  And  this  proof  is  mentioned  here,  because 
it  has  its  weight,  to  show  that  religion  came  into  the 
world  by  revelation,  prior  to  all  consideration  of  the 
proper  authority  of  any  book  supposed  to  contain  it; 
and  even  prior  to  all  consideration  whether  the  revela- 
tion itself  be  uncorruptly  handed  down  and  related,  or 
mixed  and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  historical 
account  which  we  have  of  the  origin  of  religion,  taking 
in  all  circumstances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its  truth, 
no  way  affected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity.  And  the 
external  evidence,  even  of  natural  religion,  is  by  no 
means  inconsiderable. 

9.  But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be 
recollected  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which 

Proofe  liable  to  ^.re  Only  general,  that  as  speculative  reason 
neglect.  j^^y  |^g  neglected,  prejudiced,  and  deceived, 

so  also  may  our  moral  understanding  be  impaired  and 
perverted,  and  the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended 
to.  This,  indeed,  proves  nothing  against  the  reality  of 
our  speculative  or  practical  faculties  of  perception ; 
against  their  being  intended  by  nature  to  inform  us  in 
the  theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us  how  we  are  to  be- 
have, and  what  we  are  to  expect,  in  consequence  of  our 
behavior.  Yet  our  liableness,  in  the  degree  we  are  lia- 
ble, to  prejudice  and  perversion,  is  a  most  serious  ad- 
monition to  us  to  be  upon  our  guard  with  respect  to 
what  is  of  such  consequence  as  our  determinations  con- 
cerning virtue  and  religion ;  and  particularly  not  to  take 
custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions  of  honor,  or  im- 
aginations of  present  ease,  use,  and  convenience  to 
mankind,  for  :he  only  moral  rule.  (Dissertation  ii.) 

10.  The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  na* 
ture  of  the  thing  and  the  history  of  religion,  amount, 


Chap.  VIJ  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.  167 

when  taken  together,  tc  a  real  practical  proofof  it  notto 
be  confuted ;  such  a  proof  as,  considering  the  Necessitymakea 
infinite  importance  of  the  thing,  I  apprehend  and  punSh- 
would  be  admitted  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  ™«°teai«urd. 
to  influence  the  actions  of  men  who  act  upon  thought 
and  reflection  ;  if  it  were  admitted  that  there  is  no  proof 
of  the  contrary.  But  it  may  be  said  :  "  There  are  many 
probabilities  which  cannot,  indeed,  be  confuted;  that 
is,  shown  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  over- 
balanced by  greater  probabilities  on  the  other  side; 
much  more  by  demonstration.  And  there  is  no  occa- 
sion to  object  against  particular  arguments  alleged  for 
an  opinion,  when  the  opinion  itself  may  be  clearly 
shown  to  be  false,  without  meddling  with  such  argu- 
ments at  all,  but  leaving  them  just  as  they  are.  (Pages 
33,  42.)  Now  the  method  of  government  by  rewards 
and  punishments,  and  especially  rewarding  and  punish- 
ing good  and  ill  desert,  as  such,  respectively,  must  go 
upon  supposition  that  we  are  free,  and  not  necessary 
agents.*  And  it  is  incredible,  that  the  author  of  nature 
should  govern  us  upon  a  supposition  as  true,  which  he 
knows  to  be  false;  and  therefore  absurd  to  think  he  will 
reward  or  punish  us  for  our  actions  hereafter;  especially 
that  he  will  do  it  under  the  notion  that  they  are  of  good 
or  ill  desert."  Here,  then,  the  matter  is  brought  to  a 
point.  And  the  answer  to  all  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be 
evaded :  that  the  whole  constitution  and  course  of 
things,  the  whole  analogy  of  providence  shows,  beyond 
possibility  of  doubt,  that  the  conclusion  from  this  rea- 
soning is  false,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine 
of  freedom,  indeed,  clearly  shows  where — in  supposing 
ourselves  necessary,  when  in  truth  we  are  free  agents. 
But  upon  the  supposition  of  necessity,  the  fallacy  lies  in 
taking  for  granted  that  it  is  incredible  necessary  agents 
should  be  rewarded  and  punished.  But  that,  somehow 
*  See  note  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 


[68  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

or  other,  the  conclusion  now  mentioned  is  false,  is  most 
^  ^      certain.     For  it  is  fact  that  God  does  gov- 

Thls  reasoning  ° 

erroneous— how  em  even  brute  creatures  by  the  method  of 
rewards  and  punishments,  in  the  natural 
course  of  things.  And  men  are  rewarded  and  punished 
for  their  actions ;  punished  for  actions  mischievous  to 
society  as  being  so ;  punished  for  vicious  actions  as  such, 
by  the  natural  instrumentality  of  each  other ;  under  the 
present  conduct  of  Providence.  Nay,  even  the  affection 
of  gratitude,  and  the  passion  of  resentment,  and  the  re- 
wards and  punishments  following  from  them,  which  in 
general  are  to  be  considered  as  natural,  that  is,  from  the 
author  of  nature  :  these  rewards  and  punishments,  be- 
ing naturally*  annexed  to  actions  considered  as  imply- 
ing good  intention  and  good  desert,  ill  intention  and  ill 
desert — these  natural  rewards  and  punishments,  I  say, 
are  as  much  a  contradiction  to  the  conclusion  above, 
and  show  its  falsehood,  as  a  more  exact  and  complete 
rewarding  and  punishing  of  good  and  ill  desert,  as  such. 
So  that  if  it  be  incredible  that  necessary  agents  should 
be  thus  rewarded  and  punished,  then  men  are  not  nec- 
essary, but  free ;  since  it  is  matter  of  fact  that  they  are 
thus  rewarded  and  punished.  But  if,  on  the  contrary, 
which  is  the  supposition  we  have  been  arguing  upon,  it 
be  insisted  that  men  are  necessary  agents,  then  there  is 
nothing  incredible  in  the  further  supposition  of  neces- 
sary agents  being  thus  rewarded  and  punished,  since 
we  ourselves  are  thus  dealt  with. 

II.  From  the  whole,  therefore,  it  must  follow  that  a 
necessity  supposed  possible,  and  reconcilable  with  the 
constitution  of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove  that  the 
author  of  nature  will  not,  nor  destroy  the  proof  that  he 
will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal  govern- 
ment, render  his  creatures  happy  or  miserable,  by  some 
means  or  other,  as  they  behave  well  or  ill.  Or,  to  ex- 
*  Sermon  viii  at  the  Rolls. 


Chap.  VIJ  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessiiy.  169 

press  this  conclusion  in  words  conformable  to  the  title 
of  the  chapter,  the  analogy  of  nature  shows  opinion  of  ne- 
us,  that  the  opinion  of  necessity,  considered  «^8'^'^^®- 
as  practical,  is  false.  And  if  necessity,  upon  the  sup- 
position above-mentioned,  doth  not  destroy  the  proof  of 
natural  religion,  it  evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the 
proof  of  revealed. 

From  these  things,  likewise,  we  may  learn  in  what 
sense  to  understand  that  general  assertion,  that  the 
opinion  of  necessity  is  essentially  destructive  The  sense  in 
of  all  religion.  First,  In  a  practical  sense;  ^^to^^Sl 
that  by  this  notion  atheistical  men  pretend  *°°' 
to  satisfy  and  encourage  themselves  in  vice,  and  justify 
to  others  their  disregard  to  all  religion.  And  secondly. 
In  the  strictest  sense ;  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  the 
whole  constitution  of  nature,  and  to  what  we  may  every 
moment  experience  in  ourselves,  and  so  overturns  every 
thing.  But  by  no  means  is  this  assertion  to  be  under- 
stood, as  if  necessity,  supposing  it  could  possibly  be 
reconciled  with  the  constitution  of  things,  and  with  what 
we  experience,  were  not  also  reconcilable  with  religion ; 
for  upon  this  supposition  it  demonstrably  is  so. 

[NOTE.— See  page  1 67.] 

[We  must  carefully  distinguish  between  the  religious  and  the  irre- 
ligious necessitarians.  The  question  between  the  maintainers  of  free 
will  and  the  religious  necessitarians  is  this :  When  I  blame  [or  com- 
mend] myself  for  an  action,  is  there  necessarily  involved  in  this  moral 
judgment  the  consciousness  that,  under  all  the  circumstances  preced- 
ing the  act  of  volition,  I  might  have  w///f^  otherwise  ?  The  religious 
necessitarian  holds  the  negative  •  the  maintainer  of  free  will,  the  af- 
firmative ;  and  the  irreligious  fatalists  so  far  agree  wilh  the  latter. 
They  say  that  the  sense  or  persuasion  of  liberty  is  requisi'e  to  consti- 
tute the  sense  of  responsibility  for  the  past, — requisite  as  a  ground  of 
hope  or  purpose  for  the  future ;  that,  without  it,  there  would  be  no 
room  for  remorse  for  what  we  have  done,  or  forethought  for  what  we 
should  do.  But  then  they  maintain,  also,  that  this  feeling  is  delusive ; 
that  it  may  be  demonstrated  to  be  a  mistake ;  and  that,  consequently 


170  Analogy  OF  Religion.  [Part  I. 

here  is  a  conflict  between  the  rational  and  the  moral  principles  of  our 
nature.  Such  a  scheme  is  essentially  skeptical,  representing  the  im- 
mediate judgments  of  the  mind  as  contradictory  of  each  other.  It 
represents  the  mind  as  pronouncing  certain  volitions,  when  viewed 
under  a  speculative  aspect,  to  fall  under  the  law  of  cause  and  effect; 
and  yet,  pronouncing  the  same  volitions,  when  viewed  under  a  prac- 
tical aspect,  to  be  exempt  from  it. 

Now,  upon  such  a  scheme,  as  there  is  a  direct  conflict  between  the 
independent  decisions  of  our  own  consciousness,  it  seems  clear  that 
we  have  no  more  right  to  pronounce  the  moral  judgment  delusive 
than  the  rational.  Each  would  be  brought  equally  into  doubt  if  this 
statement  were  correct.  But,  even  upon  this  statement  the  obliga- 
tions of  morality  will  remain.  I  know  not,  suppose,  which  judgment 
is  true  and  which  delusive  ;  but  still  it  is  not,  and  cannot  be  a  matter 
of  indifference  which  of  the  two  I  practically  follow ;  because,  if  I 
act  in  disregard  of  the  moral  consciousness,  I  am,  by  the  very  hy- 
pothesis, self-condemned.  The  moral  faculty  is  the  practical  faculty  ; 
and,  when  the  question  is.  What  is  to  be  done  ?  I  am  in  the  sphere  of 
action,  not  of  speculation.  Reason,  in  her  province,  may  refuse  to  reg- 
ister the  decree,  but  she  does  not,  for  she  cannot,  superinduce  a  con- 
trary practical  obligation. 

The  doctrine  of  necessity,  in  its  religious  form,  takes  this  expres- 
sion : — that  moral  acts  of  the  will  are  determined  by  their  motives 
(meaning  by  motive  all  that  is  the  result  of  temper,  organization,  ed- 
ucation, and  outward  circumstances)  as  certainly  as  physical  conse- 
quences are  by  their  antecedents ;  but  that  the  acts  which  proceed 
from  certain  classes  of  motives  are  approved  or  condemned  by  the 
moral  faculty,  as  being  the  results  of  certain  motives,  without  the  im- 
plied intervention  of  any  such  consciousness  of  freedom  as  the  main- 
tainers  of  the  liberty  of  the  will  suppose. — F.] 


Chap.  VIL]  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.  171 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  CONSIDERED  AS  A 
SCHEME  OR  CONSTITUTION,  IMPERFECTLY  COMPRE- 
HENDED. 

THOUGH  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  acknowledged, 
that  the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a  strong  credibility 
to  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  and  to     ^^  . 

°  .  .  ...  Thelnoompre- 

the  several  particular  things  contained  in  it,   hensibuityofthe 

divine    govem- 

considered  as  so  many  matters  of  fact ;  and  ment  an  answer 

...         .         ,         .       ,  ,  .  ^^■,  ■-,-  toobjecUona. 

likewise  that  it  shows  this  credibility  not  to 
be  destroyed  by  any  notions  of  necessity ;  yet  still,  ob- 
jections may  be  insisted  upon  against  the  wisdom,  equity, 
and  goodness  of  the  divine  government,  implied  in  the 
notion  of  religion,  and  against  the  method  by  which  this 
government  is  conducted,  to  which  objections  analogy 
can  be  no  direct  answer.*  For  the  credibility,  or  the 
certain  truth,  of  a  matter  of  fact,  does  not  immediately 

♦  [It  is  obvious  that  the  direct  way  of  showing  a  certain  course  of 
conduct  to  be  wise  or  good  is  to  show  the  precise  relations  which 
render  it  so ;  the  goodness  of  the  ends  and  the  suitability  of  the 
means. 

The  indirect  way  is  to  show  that  there  may  be  such  relations, 
though  we  do  not  see  them,  coupled  with  the  proof  that  such  a  course 
of  conduct  is  the  conduct  of  one  whom  we  have  good  reason,  on  othci 
grounds,  to  believe  wise  and  good. 

Indeed,  there  have  not  been  wanting  persons  who  have  chosen  to 
represent  Butler's  argument,  throughout  this  analogy,  as  tending  to 
overthrow  the  whole  proof  of  God's  attributes  of  justice,  wisdom,  and 
goodness,  by  establishing  the  matter  of  fact  of  our  being  under  a 
government  no  way  consistent  with  such  attributes.  The  object  of 
the  present  chapter  is  to  obviate  such  a  misrepresentation  Compare 
throughout,  part  ii,  chap,  viii. — F.] 


172  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I 

prove  any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom  or  goodness  of 
it;  and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediately  or  direct- 
ly, than  show  such  and  such  things  to  be  true  or  credible 
considered  only  as  matters  of  fact.  But  still,  if,  upon 
supposition  of  a  moral  constitution  of  nature  and  a  moral 
government  over  it,  analogy  suggests  and  makes  it  cred- 
ible that  this  government  must  be  a  scheme,  system,  or 
constitution  of  government,  as  distinguished  from  a  num- 
ber of  single  unconnected  acts  of  distributive  justice 
and  goodness ;  and  likewise  that  it  must  be  a  scheme  so 
imperfectly  comprehended,  and  of  such  a  sort  in  other 
respects,  as  to  afford  a  direct  general  answer  to  all  objec- 
tions against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  it ;  then  analogy 
is,  remotely,  of  great  service  in  answering  those  objec- 
tions, both  by  suggesting  the  answer  and  showing  it  to 
be  a  credible  one. 

2.  Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the  case. 
For,  firsts  Upon  supposition  that  God  exer- 
cises a  moral  government  over  the  world,  the 
analogy  of  his  natural  government  suggests,  and  makes  it 
credible,  that  his  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme 
quite  beyond  our  comprehension;  and  this  affords  a 
general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and 
goodness  of  it.  And,  secondly^  A  more  distinct  observa- 
tion of  some  particular  things  contained  in  God's 
scheme  of  natural  government,  the  like  things  being 
supposed,  by  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  gov- 
ernment, will  further  show  how  little  weight  is  to  be 
laid  upon  these  objections. 

I.  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral  gov- 
ernment over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  gov- 
Naiiirai  gov-  cmment  suggests  and  makes  it  credible  that 
c^'^reheSbS"  his  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme 
Bcheme.  quite  beyond  our  comprehension  :  and  this 

affords  a  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the 
justice  and  goodness  of  it.     It  is  most  obvious,  analogy 


Chap.  VII.]  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.  173 

renders  it  highly  credible,  that  upon  supposition  of  a 
moral  government  it  must  be  a  scheme — for  the  world, 
and  the  whole  natural  government  of  it,  appears  to  be^o — 
to  be  a  scheme,  system,  or  constitution,  whose  parts  cor- 
respond to  each  other  and  to  a  whole,  as  really  as  any 
work  of  art,  or  as  any  particular  model  of  a  civil  consti- 
tution and  government.  In  this  great  scheme  of  the 
natural  world,  individuals  have  various  peculiar  relations 
to  other  individuals  of  their  own  species.  And  whole 
species  are,  we  find,  variously  related  to  other  species 
upon  this  earth.  Nor  do  we  know  how  much  further 
these  kinds  of  relations  may  extend.  And  as  there  is 
not  any  action,  or  natural  event,  which  we  are  acquaint- 
ed with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to  have  a 
respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events;  so  possibly 
each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immediate,  may  yet 
have  a  remote,  natural  relation  to  other  actions  and 
events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this  present  world. 
There  seems,  indeed,  nothing,  from  whence  we  can  so 
much  as  make  a  conjecture,  whether  all  creatures,  ac- 
tions, and  events,  throughout  the  whole  of  nature,  have 
relations  to  each  other.  But,  as  it  is  obvious  that  all 
events  have  future  unknown  consequences,  so,  if  we 
trace  any,  as  far  as  we  can  go,  into  what  is  connected! 
with  it,  we  shall  find  that  if  such  event  were  not  con- 
nected with  somewhat  further  in  nature  unknown  to  us, 
somewhat  both  past  and  present,  such  event  could  not 
possibly  have  been  at  all.  Nor  can  we  give  the  whole 
account  of  any  one  thing  whatever ;  of  all  its  causes, 
ends,  and  necessary  adjuncts;  those  adjuncts,  I  mean, 
without  which  it  could  not  have  been.  By  this  most 
astonishing  connection — these  reciprocal  corresponden- 
cies and  mutual  relations — every  thing  which  we  see  in 
the  course  of  nature  is  actually  brought  about.  And 
things,  seemingly  the  most  insignificant  imaginable,  are 
perpetually  observed  to  be  necessary  conditions  to  other 


174  Analogy  jf  Religion.  [Part  I. 

things  of  the  greatest  importance  ;  so  that  any  one  thing 
whatever  may,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a 
necessary  condition  to  any  other. 

The  natural  world  then,  and  natural  government  of  it, 
being  such  an  incomprehensible  scheme, — so  incompre- 
hensible that  a  man  must  really  in  the  literal  sense 
know  nothing  at  all,  who  is  not  sensible  of  his  ignorance 
in  it, — this  immediately  suggests,  and  strongly  shows  the 
credibility,  that  the  moral  world  and  government  of  it 
may  be  so  too.*  Indeed,  the  natural  and  moral  consti- 
tution and  government  of  the  world  are  so  connected  as 
to  make  up  together  but  one  scheme :  and  it  is  highly 
probable  that  the  first  is  formed  and  carried  on  merely 
in  subserviency  to  the  latter,  as  the  vegetable  world  is 
for  the  animal,  and  organized  bodies  for  minds.  But 
the  thing  intended  here  is,  without  inquiring  how  far  the 
administration  of  the  natural  world  is  subordinate  to 
that  of  the  moral,  only  to  observe  the  credibility,  that 
one  should  be  analogous,  or  similar  to,  the  other :  that 
therefore  every  act  of  divine  justice  and  goodness  may 
be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond  itself  and  its  imme- 
diate object;  may  have  some  reference  to  other  parts 

ff*  [Maimonides  makes  use  of  the  following  similitude :  "  Suppose 
one  of  good  understanding,  whose  mother  had  died  soon  after  he  was 
born,  to  be  brought  up  on  an  island,  where  he  saw  no  human  being 
but  his  father,  nor  the  female  of  any  beast.  This  person  when  grown 
up  inquires  how  men  are  produced.  He  is  told  that  they  are  bred  in 
the  womb  of  one  of  the  same  species,  and  that  while  in  the  womb 
we  are  very  small  and  there  move  and  are  nourished.  The  young 
man  inquires  whether,  when  thus  in  the  womb,  we  did  not  eat  and 
drink  and  breathe,  as  we  now  do,  and  is  answered,  No.  Then  he 
denies  it  and  offers  demonstration  that  it  w  mid  noi  be  so.  For,'  says  he, 
'  If  either  of  us  cease  to  breathe  our  life  is  gone ;  and  how  could  we  have 
lived  close  shut  up  in  a  womb  for  months  ?  So  if  we  cease  to  eat  and 
drink  we  die,  and  how  could  the  child  live  so  for  months  ?'  And  thus 
he  satisfies  himself  that  it  is  impossible  that  man  should  come  into 
existence  in  such  a  manner." — Stillingfleet's  Origines  Sacrae,  p.  434. 
Ix>ndon  :  1663.     Fitzgerald's  ed.,  p.  181.] 


Chap.  VII.]  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.         175 

of  God's  moral  administration,  and  to  a  general  moral 
plan ;  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his  moral 
government  may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with  a  view  to 
the  whole  of  it.  Thus  for  example :  the  determined 
length  of  time,  and  the  degrees  and  ways  in  which  virtue 
is  to  remain  in  a  state  of  warfare  and  discipline,  and  in 
which  wickedness  is  permitted  to  have  its  progress ;  the 
times  appointed  for  the  execution  of  justice ;  the  ap- 
pointed instruments  of  it;  the  kinds  of  rewards  and 
punishments,  and  the  manners  of  their  distribution ;  all 
particular  instances  of  divine  justice  and  goodness,  and 
every  circumstance  of  them,  may  have  such  respects  to 
each  other  as  to  make  up  altogether  a  whole,  connected 
and  related  in  all  its  parts ;  a  scheme,  or  system,  which 
is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world  is,  and  of  the  like 
kind.  And  supposing  this  to  be  the  case,  it  is  most 
evident  that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of  this  scheme 
from  the  small  parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view 
in  the  present  life,  and  therefore  no  objections  against 
any  of  these  parts  can  be  insisted  upon  by  reasonable 
men.* 

3.  This  our  ignorance,  and  the  conse-  ourignorance 
quences  here  drawn  from  it,  are  universally  an  answer  to  ob- 
acknowledged  upon    other   occasions ;  and 

♦  [Let  us  imagine  a  person  to  be  taken  to  view  some  great  histor- 
ical painting,  before  which  hangs  a  thick  curtain.  The  attendant 
raises  the  curtain  a  few  inches.  Can  the  spectator  from  the  unmean- 
ing strip  of  foreground  derive  any  conrception  of  the  figures  yet  con- 
cealed? Much  less  is  he  able  to  criticise  their  proportions,  or  beauty, 
or  perspective,  or  even  the  design  of  the  artist.  The  small  fragment 
of  a  tree,  or  a  flower,  or  animal,  or  building  may  seem  quite  unmean. 
ing,  and  even  ugly,  though  the  whole  would  present  beauty,  fit- 
ness, or  grandeur.  Now  the  portion  of  God's  dominions  withir. 
our  survey  is  as  utterly  insignificant,  compared  to  the  universe  and 
its  interminable  duration,  as  an  atom  compared  to  a  planet  or  a 
man's  age  to  eternity. — Malcom.] 

[Chalmers  has  an  able  note  on  this  subject,  using  a  different  illus- 
tration taken  from  Leibnitz.] 


1/6  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

though  scarce  denied,  yet  are  universally  forgot  when 
persons  come  to  argue  against  religion.  And  it  is  not, 
perhaps,  easy  even  for  the  most  reasonable  men  always 
to  bear  in  mind  the  degree  of  our  ignorance,  and  make 
due  allowances  for  it.  Upon  these  accounts  it  may  not 
be  useless  to  go  on  a  little  further,  in  order  to  show  more 
distinctly  how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance  is  to  objec- 
tions against  the  scheme  of  providence.  Suppose,  then, 
TM   ^  X.         ^   person   boldly  to  assert   that  the   thincrs 

Illustrations.  ^      * .        .      ^    ■^  .  ..  ,  ^ 

complained  of — the  origm  and  continuance 
of  evil — might  easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated 
interpositions,  (pages  178,  179;)  interpositions  so  guard- 
ed and  circumstanced  as  would  preclude  all  mischief 
arising  from  them  ;  or,  if  this  were  impracticable,  that  a 
scheme  of  government  is  itself  an  imperfection;  since 
more  good  might  have  been  produced  without  any 
scheme,  system,  or  constitution  at  all,  by  continued 
single  unrelated  acts  of  distributive  justice  and  good- 
ness ;  because  these  would  have  occasioned  no  irregu- 
larities. And  further  than  this,  it  is  presumed,  the  ob- 
jections will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is  obvious ; 
that  were  these  assertions  true,  still  the  observations 
above,  concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  scheme  of  divine 
government,  and  the  consequence  drawn  from  it,  would 
hold  in  great  measure,  enough  to  vindicate  religion 
against  all  objections  from  the  disorders  of  the  present 
state.  Were  these  assertions  true,  yet  the  government 
of  the  world  might  be  just  and  good  notwithstanding; 
for  at  the  most  they  would  infer  nothing  more  than  that 
it  might  have  been  better.  But,  indeed,  they  are  mere 
arbitrary  assertions ;  no  man  being  sufficiently  acquaint- 
ed with  the  possibilities  of  things  to  bring  any  proof  of 
them  to  the  lowest  degree  of  probability.  For  however 
possible  what  is  asserted  may  seem,  yet  many  instances 
may  be  alleged,  in  things  much  less  out  of  our  reach,  of 
suppositions  absolutely  impossible,  and  reducible  to  the 


Chap.  VII.]  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.  177 

most  palpable  self-contradictions,  which  not  every  one 
by  any  means  would  perceive  to  be  such,  nor  perhaps 
any  one  at  first  sight  suspect. 

From  these  things  it  is  easy  to  see  distinctly  how  our 
ignorance,  as  it  is  the  common,  is  really  a  satisfactory 
answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  providence.  If  a  man  contemplating  any  one  provi- 
dential dispensation  which  had  no  relation  to  any  others, 
should  object  that  he  discerned  in  it  a  disregard  to  jus- 
tice, or  a  deficiency  of  goodness,  nothing  would  be  less 
an  answer  to  such  objection  than  our  ignorance  in  other 
parts  of  providence,  or  in  the  possibilities  of  things  no 
way  related  to  what  he  was  contemplating.  But  when 
we  know  not  but  the  parts  objected  against  may  be 
relative  to  other  parts  unknown  to  us,  and  when  we  are 
unacquainted  with  what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
practicable  in  the  case  before  us,  then  our  ignorance  is 
a  satisfactory  answer ;  because  some  unknown  relation, 
or  some  unknown  impossibility,  may  render  what  is  ob- 
jected against  just  and  good ;  nay,  good  in  the  highest 
practical  degree. 

4.  II.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such 
objections  will  further  appear,  by  a  more  distinct  obser- 
vation of  some  particular  things  contained  Argument  from 
in  the  natural  government  of  God,  the  like  sp^c'ai things. 
to  which  may  be  supposed,  from  analogy,  to  be  contained 
in  his  moral  government. 

First.  As  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world  no  end 
appears  to  be  accomplished  without  means,  so  we  find 
that  means  very  undesirable  often  conduce  Means  essential 
to  bring  about  ends  in  such  a  measure  desir-  *°®°<^- 
able,  as  greatly  to  overbalance  the  disagreeableness  of 
the  means.  And  in  cases  where  such  means  are  con- 
ducive to  such  ends,  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience, 
which  shows  us  that  they  are  thus  conducive.  Experi- 
ence also  shows  many  means  to  be  conducive  and  nec- 
12 


178  Analogy  of  Reliqion.  [Part  I, 

essary  fo  accomplish  ends,  which  means,  before  experi- 
ence, we  should  have  thought  would  have  had  even  a 
contrary  tendency.  Now  from  these  observations  relat- 
ing to  the  natural  scheme  of  the  world,  the  moral  being 
supposed  analogous  to  it,  arises  a  great  credibility  that 
the  putting  our  misery  in  each  other's  power  to  the  de- 
gree it  is,  and  making  men  liable  to  vice  to  the  degree 
we  are,  and  in  general,  that  those  things  which  are  ob- 
jected against  the  moral  scheme  of  providence  may  be, 
upon  the  whole,  friendly  and  assistant  to  virtue,  and  pro- 
ductive of  an  overbalance  of  happiness;  that  is,  the 
things  objected  against  may  be  means  by  which  an  over- 
balance of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  produced. 
And  from  the  same  observations  it  appears  to  be  no  pre- 
sumption against  this  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed  we  do 
not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  tendency,  or  that 
they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary  one.  Thus  those 
things  which  we  call  irregularities  may  not  be  so  at  all, 
because  they  may  be  means  of  accomplishing  wise  and 
good  ends  more  considerable.  And  it  may  be  added, 
as  above,  that  they  may  also  be  the  only  means  by 
which  these  wise  and  good  ends  are  capable  of  being 
accomplished. 

After  these  observations  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  in 

order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion  from 

^     ,     a-^y  of  them,  that  though  the  constitution  of 

81n  and  mis-  •'  r  ^ 

amotinthem-  our  nature,  from  whence  we  are  capable  of 
ves  beneftciaL       .  . 

Vice  and  misery,  may,  as  it  undoubtedly 
does,  contribute  to  the  perfection  and  happiness  of  the 
world;  and  though  the  actual  permission  of  evil  may 
be  beneficial  *^o  it,  (that  is,  it  would  have  been  more 
mischievous,  not  that  a  wicked  person  had  himself  ab- 
stained from  his  own  wickedness,  but  that  any  one  had 
forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that  it  was  permitted,)  yet 
notwithstanding,  it  might  have  been  much  better  for  the 
world  if  this  very  evil  had  never  been  done.     Nay,  it  is 


Chap.  VII.  I  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.    179 

most  clearly  conceivable  that  the  very  commission  of 
wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world,  and  yet  that 
it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men  to  refrain 
from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  constitution  of 
the  natural  world,  there  are  disorders  which  bring  their 
own  cures;  diseases,  which  are  themselves  remedies. 
Many  a  man  would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
gout  or  a  fever ;  yet  it  would  be  thought  madness  to 
assert,  that  sickness  is  a  better  or  more  perfect  state 
than  health;  though  the  like,  with  regard  to  the  moral 
world,  has  been  asserted.     But, 

5.  Secondly,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is 
carried  on  by  general  laws.     For  this  there  „  ^  , 

^    *^  .  Natural  govern- 

may  be  wise  and  good  reasons :  the  wisest  ment  and  gen- 
and  best,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary. 
And  that  there  are  such  reasons,  is  suggested  to  our 
thoughts  by  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  by  our  being  made 
to  experience  good  ends  to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed 
all  the  good  which  we  enjoy  is  accomplished,  by  this 
means,  that  the  laws  by  which  the  world  is  governed  are 
general.  For  we  have  scarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments 
but  what  we  are,  in  some  way  or  other,  instrumental  in 
procuring  ourselves,  by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we 
foresee  likely  to  procure  them  :  now  this  foresight  could 
not  be  at  all,  were  not  the  government  of  the  world  car- 
ried on  by  general  laws.  And  though,  for  aught  we 
know  to  the  contrary,  every  single  case  may  be  at  length 
found  to  have  been  provided  for  even  by  these ;  yet  to 
prevent  all  irregularities,  or  remedy  them  as  they  arise, 
by  the  wisest  and  best  general  laws,  may  be  impossible 
in  the  nature  of  things,  as  we  see  it  is  absolutely  impos- 
sible in  civil  government. 

But  then  we  are  ready  to  think  that  the  constitution 
of  nature  remaining  as  it  is,  and  the  course  gpedai  inter- 
of  things  being  permitted  to  go  on,  in  other  STvn7atSS 
respects,  as  it  does,  there  might  be  interpo-   ^^^  ^^^ 


i8o  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

sitions  to  prevent  irregularities,  though  they  could  not 
have  been  prevented  or  remedied  by  any  general  laws. 
And  there  would  indeed  be  reason  to  wish — which,  by 
the  way,  is  very  different  from  a  right  to  claim — that  all 
irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by  present 
interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would  have  no 
other  effect  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they  would  have 
some  visible  and  immediate  bad  effects ;  for  instance, 
they  would  encourage  idleness  and  negligence,  and  they 
would  render  doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life,  which  is 
ascertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the 
world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  further,  it  is 
certain  they  would  have  distant  effects,  and  very  great 
ones,  too,  by  means  of  the  wonderful  connections  be- 
fore-mentioned. (Page  173,  etc.)  So  that  we  cannot  so 
much  as  guess  what  would  be  the  whole  result  of  the 
interpositions  desired.  It  may  be  said,  any  bad  result 
might  be  prevented  by  further  interpositions,  whenever 
there  was  occasion  for  them ;  but  this  again  is  talking 
quite  at  random,  and  in  the  dark.  (Pages  175,  176.) 
Upon  the  whole,  then,  we  see  wise  reasons  why  the 
course  of  the  world  should  be  carried  on  by  general 
laws,  and  good  ends  accomplished  by  this  means ;  and, 
for  aught  we  know,  there  may  be  the  wisest  reasons  for 
it,  and  the  best  ends  accomplished  by  it.  We  have  no 
ground  to  believe  that  all  irregularities  could  be  rem- 
edied as  they  arise,  or  could  have  been  precluded  by 
general  laws.  We  find  that  interpositions  would  pro- 
duce evil  and  prevent  good ;  and  for  aught  we  know,  they 
would  produce  greater  evil  than  they  would  prevent,  and 
prevent  greater  good  than  they  would  produce.  And  if 
this  be  the  case,  then  the  not  interposing  is  so  far  from 
being  a  ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  instance  of 
goodness.  This  is  intelligible  and  sufficient ;  and  going 
further  seems  beyond  the  utmost  reach  of  our  faculties. 
6.  But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  after  all,  these  supposed 


Chap  VII.l  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.  i8i 

impossibilities  and  relations  are  what  we  are  unacquaint- 
ed with;  and  we  must  judge  of  religion,  as  our ignorance 
of  other  things,  by  what  we  do  know,  and  dJte^epJSJfSi 
look  upon  the  rest  as  nothing ;  or  however,  ^^^°- 
that  the  answers  here  given  to  what  is  objected  against 
religion,  may  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate  the 
proof  of  it,  since  their  stress  lies  so  very  mucl^  upon  our 
ignoiance."     But, 

7.  Firsts  Though  total  ignorance,  in  any  matter,  does 
indeed  equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all  proof 
concerning  it  and  objections  against  it,  yet  partial  ig- 
norance does  not  For  we  may  in  any  degree  be  con- 
vinced that  a  person  is  of  such  a  character,  and  conse- 
quently will  pursue  such  ends,  though  we  are  greatly 
ignorant  what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting  in  order  the 
most  effectually  to  obtain  those  ends ;  and  in  this  case, 
objections  against  his  manner  of  acting,  as  seemingly 
not  conducive  to  obtain  them,  might  be  answered  by  our 
ignorance,  though  the  proof  that  such  ends  were  intend- 
ed might  not  at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.*  Thus  the 
proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral  character  of 

*  [The  concluding  observations  of  this  chapter  are  all-important 
for  the  vindication  of  Butler's  whole  argument.  They  show  most 
satisfactorily  how  our  ignorance  may  invalidate  the  objections  against, 
and  yet  not  invalidate  the  proof  of,  the  thing.  The  essence  of  the 
reasoning  here  lies  in  the  distinction  between  our  knowledge  of  God's 
will  and  our  knowledge  of  his  ways.  We  have  positive  proof  of  his 
moral  character,  in  virtue  of  which  he  wills  both  the  righteousness 
and  the  happiness  of  his  creatures ;  and  yet  may  be  utterly  in  the 
dark  as  to  the  most  effectual  ways  or  methods  of  procedure  by  which 
these  objects  can  be  most  fully  accomplished.  We  may  know  the 
end,  and  yet  not  know  the  best  means  of  bringing  it  about.  A  total 
ignorance  would  place  both  the  objections  and  the  proof  alike  beyond 
our  reach,  but  a  partial  ignorance  may  not.  God's  wisdom  may  be 
learned  by  its  vestiges  within  the  limits  of  a  mere  handbreadth,  as  in 
the  construction  of  an  eye ;  yet,  after  having  learned  this,  we  may 
fail  in  oui  judgment  of  the  subserviency  of  things  that  go  out  and  far 
from  view,  whether  widely  in  space  or  distantly  in  time.     And  so 


1 82  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Pari-  I. 

God,  and  consequently,  that  his  government  is  moral, 
and  that  every  one  upon  the  whole  shall  receive  accord- 
ing to  his  deserts;  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed  end 
of  his  government.  But  we  are  not  competent  judges 
what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the  most  ef- 
fectually to  accomplish  this  end.  (Pages  40,  41.)  There- 
fore our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections  against  the 
conduct  of  providence  in  permitting  irregularities,  as 
seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it  is  so 
obvious  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  satisfactory  answer 
to  objections  against  a  thing,  and  yet  not  affect  the  proof 
of  it ;  till  it  can  be  shown,  it  is  frivolous  to  assert,  that 
our  ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  does 
the  objections  against  it. 

8.  Secondly^  Suppose  unknown  impossibilities  and  un- 
known relations  might  justly  be  urged  to  invalidate  the 
proof  of  religion,  as  well  as  to  answer  objections  against 
it,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  the  proof  of  it  were 
doubtful,  yet  still,  let  the  assertion  be  despised  or  let  it 
be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably  true  that  moral  obligations 
would  remain  certain,  though  it  were  not  certain  what 
would,  upon  the  whole,  be  the  consequences  of  observ- 
ing or  violating  them.  For  these  obligations  arise  im- 
mediately and  necessarily  from  the  judgment  of  our  own 
mind,  unless  perverted,  which  we  cannot  violate  with- 
out being  self-condemned.  And  they  would  be  certain, 
too,  from  considerations  of  interest.  For  though  it  were 
doubtful  what  will  be  the  future  consequences  of  virtue 
and  vice,  yet  it  is,  however,  credible  that  they  may  have 
those  consequences  which  religion  teaches  us  they  will; 
and  this  credibility  is  a  certain  *  obligation,  in  point  of 

withm  the  homestead  of  one's  own  conscience  may  we  read  the  lesson 
of  a  righteous  God,  and  yet  be  wholly  unable  to  pronounce  on  the 
tendency  or  effect  of  those  measures  which  enter  into  the  policy  of  his 
universal  government. — Chalmers.] 
♦  Page  35,  and  part  ii,  chap.  vi. 


Chap.  VII.J  A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.         183 

prudence,  to  abstain  from  all  wickedness,  and  to  live  in 
the  conscientious  practice  of  all  that  is  good.     But, 

9.  Thirdly^  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objec- 
tions against  religion  cannot  equally  be  made  use  of  to 
invalidate  the  proof  of  it.  For  upon  the  supposition 
that  God  exercises  a  moral  government  over  the  world, 
analogy  does  most  strongly  lead  us  to  conclude  that  this 
moral  government  must  be  a  scheme,  or  constitution, 
beyond  our  comprehension.  And  a  thousand  particular 
analogies  show  us,  that  parts  of  such  a  scheme,  from 
their  relation  to  other  parts,  may  conduce  to  accomplish 
ends  which  we  should  have  thought  they  had  no  ten- 
dency at  all  to  accomplish ;  nay,  ends  which,  before  ex- 
perience, we  should  have  thought  such  parts  were  contra- 
dictory to,  and  had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  And  there- 
fore all  these  analogies  show,  that  the  way  of  arguing 
made  use  of  in  objecting  against  religion  is  delusive;  be- 
cause they  show  it  is  not  at  all  incredible  that,  could  we 
comprehend  the  whole,  we  should  find  the  permission  of 
the  disorders  objected  against  to  be  consistent  with 
justice  and  goodness,  and  even  to  be  instances  of  them. 
Now  this  is  not  applicable  to  the  proof  of  religion,  as 
it  is  to  the  objections  against  it  ;*  and  therefore  cannot 
invalidate  that  proof,  as  it  does  these  objections. 

10.  Lastly^  From  the  observations  now  made,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  providence,  though  in  a  general  way  of  speaking 
they  may  be  said  to  be  taken  from  our  ignorance,  yet 
are  by  no  means  taken  merely  from  that,  but  from  some- 
what which  analogy  shows  us  concerning  it.  For  anal- 
ogy shows  us  positively  that  our  ignorance  in  the  possi- 
bilities of  things,  and  the  various  relations  in  nature,  ren- 
ders us  incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to  false  conclu- 
sions in  cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we  pretend  to  judge 
and  to  object.     So  that  the  things  above  insisted  upon 

♦  Sermons  at  the  Rolls,  page  312,  2d  edit. 


184  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

are  not  mere  suppositions  of  unknown  impossibilities  and 
relations;  but  they  are  suggested  to  our  thoughts,  and 
even  forced  upon  the  observation  of  serious  men,  and 
rendered  credible,  too,  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  And 
therefore  to  take  these  things  into  the  account  is  to 
judge  by  experience  and  what  we  do  know;  and  it  is 
not  judging  so  to  take  no  notice  of  them. 


CONCLUSION. 

THE  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to  con- 
sider this  little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we 
are  so  busily  engaged,  as  having  a  reference, 
of  some  sort  or  other,  to  a  much  larger  plan 
of  things.  Whether  we  are  any  way  related  to  the  more 
distant  parts  of  the  boundless  universe  into  which  we 
are  brought,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident 
that  the  course  of  things  which  comes  within  our  view 
is  connected  with  somewhat  past,  present,  and  future, 
beyond  it.  (Pages  172,  173.)  So  that  we  are  placed,  as 
one  may  speak,  in  the  middle  of  a  scheme,  not  a  fixed, 
but  a  progressive  one,  every  way  incomprehensible;  in- 
comprehensible, in  a  manner,  equally  with  respect  to 
what  has  been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall  be  hereafter. 
And  this  scheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it  somewhat  as 
wonderful,  and  as  much  beyond  our  thought  and  con- 
ception, (part  ii,  chap,  ii,)  as  any  thing  in  that  of  relig- 
ion. For  will  any  man  in  his  senses  say,  that  it  is  less 
difficult  to  conceive  how  the  world  came  to  be,  and  to 
continue  as  it  is,  without  than  with  an  intelligent  author 
and  governor  of  it  ?  or,  admitting  an  intelligent  govern- 
or of  it,  that  there  is  some  other  rule  of  government 
more  natural,  and  of  easier  conception,  than  that  which 
we  call  moral  ?     Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  author 


Crai'.  VI I. J  Conclusion.  185 

and  governor  of  nature  no  account  at  all  can  be  given 
how  this  universe,  or  the  part  of  it  particularly  in  which 
we  are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  course  of  it  to 
be  carried  on  as  it  is ;  nor  any  of  its  general  end  and 
design  without  a  moral  governor  of  it.  That  there  is  an 
intelligent  author  of  nature,  and  natural  governor  of  the 
world,  is  a  principle  gone  upon  in  the  foregoing  treatise, 
as  proved,  and  generally  known  and  confessed  to  be 
proved.  And  the  very  notion  of  an  intelligent  author 
of  nature,  proved  by  particular  final  causes,  implies  a 
will  and  a  character.  (Page  160.) 

Now  as  our  whole  nature,  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude  his  will  and  character  to  be 
moral,  just,  and  good ;  so  we  can  scarce  in  imagination 
conceive  what  it  can  be  otherwise.  However,  in  conse- 
quence  of  this  his  will  and  character,  whatever  it  be,  he 
formed  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on  the  course 
of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other  manner;  and 
has  assigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures,  a  part  and 
a  lot  in  it.  Irrational  creatures  act  this  their  part,  and 
enjoy  and  undergo  the  pleasures  and  the  pains  allotted 
them,  without  any  reflection.  But  one  would  think  it 
impossible  that  creatures  endued  with  reason  could 
avoid  reflecting  sometimes  upon  all  this ;  reflecting,  if 
not  from  whence  we  came,  yet  at  least  whither  we  are 
going,  and  what  the  mysterious  scheme  in  the  midst  of 
which  we  find  ourselves  will  at  length  come  out  and  pro- 
duce ;  a  scheme  in  which  it  is  certain  we  are  highly  in- 
terested, and  in  which  we  may  be  interested  even  beyond 
conception. 

For  many  things  prove  it  palpably  absurd  to  conclude 
that  we  shall  cease  to  be  at  death.  Particular  analogies 
do  most  sensibly  show  us,  that  there  is  nothing  to  be 
thought  strange  in  our  being  to  exist  in  another  state  of 
life.  And  that  we  are  now  living  beings,  affords  a  strong 
probability  that  we   shall  continue  so ;  unless  there  be 


i86  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

some  positive  ground,  and  there  is  none  from  reason  oi 
analogy,  to  think  death  will  destroy  us.  Were  a  persua- 
sion of  this  kind  ever  so  well  grounded,  there  would 
surely  be  little  reason  to  take  pleasure  in  it.  But  indeed, 
it  can  have  no  other  ground  than  some  such  imagina- 
tion, as  that  of  our  gross  bodies  being  ourselves;  which 
is  contrary  to  experience.  Experience,  too,  most  clear- 
ly shows  us  the  folly  of  concluding  from  the  body  and 
the  living  agent  affecting  each  other  mutually,  that  the 
dissolution  of  the  former  is  the  destruction  of  the  latter. 
And  there  are  remarkable  instances  of  their  not  affect- 
ing each  other,  which  lead  us  to  a  contrary  conclusion. 
The  supposition,  then,  which  in  all  reason  we  are  to  go 
upon  is,  that  our  living  nature  will  continue  after  death. 
And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable,  to  form  an  institution 
of  life,  or  to  act  upon  any  other  supposition. 

Now  all  expectation  of  immortality,  whether  more  or 
less  certain,  opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes 
and  our  fears;  since  we  see  the  constitution  of  nature 
is  such  as  to  admit  of  misery  as  well  as  to  be  productive 
of  happiness,  and  experience  ourselves  to  partake  of 
both  in  some  degree ;  and  since  we  cannot  but  know 
what  higher  degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.  And 
there  is  no  presumption  against  believing  further,  that 
our  future  interest  depends  upon  our  present  behavior; 
for  we  see  our  present  interest  doth ;  and  that  the  hap- 
piness and  misery  which  are  naturally  annexed  to  our 
actions,  very  frequently  do  not  follow  till  long  after  the 
actions  are  done  to  which  they  are  respectively  annexed. 
So  that  were  speculation  to  leave  us  uncertain,  whether 
it  were  likely  that  the  author  of  nature,  in  giving  happi- 
ness and  misery  to  his  creatures,  hath  regard  to  their 
actions  or  not ;  yet,  since  we  find  by  experience  that  he 
hath  such  regard,  the  whole  sense  of  things  which  he 
has  given  us  plainly  leads  us  at  once,  and  without  any 
elaborate  inquiries,  to  think  that   it  may,  indeed  must. 


Chap.  VII.l  Conclusion.  187 

be  to  good  actions  chiefly  that  he  hath  annexed  happi- 
ness, and  to  bad  actions  misery ;  or  that  he  will,  upon 
the  whole,  reward  those  who  do  well  and  punish  those 
who  do  evil. 

To  confirm  this  from  the  constitution  of  the  woild,  it 
has  been  observed,  that  some  sort  of  moral  government 
is  necessarily  implied  in  that  natural  government  of  God 
which  we  experience  ourselves  under ;  that  good  and 
bad  actions,  at  present,  are  naturally  rewarded  and  pun- 
ished, not  only  as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to  society, 
but  also  as  virtuous  and  vicious ;  and  that  there  is,  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  their  being 
rewarded  and  punished  in  a  much  higher  degree  than 
they  are  at  present.  And  though  this  higher  degree  of 
distributive  justice,  which  nature  thus  points  out  and 
leads  toward,  is  prevented  for  a  time  from  taking  place, 
it  is  by  obstacles  which  the  state  of  this  world  unhappi- 
ly throws  in  its  way,  and  which  therefore  are  in  their 
nature  temporary.  Now  as  these  things,  in  the  natural 
conduct  of  Providence,  are  observable  on  the  side  of 
virtue,  so  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  against  them  on  the 
side  of  vice.  A  moral  scheme  of  government,  then,  is 
visibly  established,  and  in  some  degree  carried  into  ex- 
ecution; and  this,  together  with  the  essential  tendencies 
of  virtue  and  vice  duly  considered,  naturally  raise  in  us 
an  apprehension  that  it  will  be  carried  on  further  toward 
perfection  in  a  future  state,  and  that  every  one  shall 
there  receive  according  to  his  deserts. 

And  if  this  be  so,  then  our  future  and  general  interest, 
under  the  moral  government  of  God,  is  appointed  to 
depend  upon  our  behavior,  notwithstanding  the  difficul- 
ty which  this  may  occasion  of  securing  it,  and  the  dan- 
ger of  losing  it ;  just  in  the  same  manner  as  our  temporal 
interest,  under  his  natural  government,  is  appointed  to 
depend  upon  our  behavior,  notwithstanding  the  like  dif- 
ficulty and  danger.     For,  from  our  original  constitution. 


i88  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

and  that  of  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally 
trusted  with  ourselves,  with  our  own  conduct  and  our 
own  interest.  And  from  the  same  constitution  of  nature, 
especially  joined  with  that  course  of  things  which  is  ow- 
ing to  men,  we  have  temptations  to  be  unfaithful  in  this 
trust,  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neglect  it,  and  run  our- 
selves into  misery  and  ruin.  From  these  temptations 
arise  the  difficulties  of  behaving  so  as  to  secure  our 
temporal  interest,  and  the  hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to 
miscarry  in  it.  There  is  therefore  nothing  incredible  in 
supposing  there  may  be  the  like  difficulty  and  hazard 
with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final  good  which  religion 
lays  before  us.  Indeed  the  whole  account,  how  it  came 
to  pass  that  we  were  placed  in  such  a  condition  as  this, 
must  be  beyond  our  comprehension.  But  it  is  in  part 
accounted  for  by  what  religion  teaches  us,  that  the  char- 
acter of  virtue  and  piety  must  be  a  necessary  qualifica- 
tion for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness,  under 
the  moral  government  of  God ;  in  like  manner,  as  some 
certain  qualifications  or  other  are  necessary  for  every  par- 
ticular condition  of  life,  under  his  natural  government ; 
and  that  the  present  state  was  intended  to  be  a  school 
of  discipline,  for  improving  in  ourselves  that  character. 
Now  this  intention  of  nature  is  rendered  highly  credible 
by  observing,  that  we  are  plainly  made  for  improve- 
ment of  all  kinds ;  that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of 
providence  that  we  cultivate  practical  principles,  and 
form  within  ourselves  habits  of  action,  in  order  to  be- 
come fit  for  what  we  were  wholly  unfit  for  before ;  that 
in  particular,  childhood  and  youth  is  naturally  appointed 
to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age,  and  that  the 
present  world  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  a  state  of  moral 
discipline.  And  whereas  objections  are  urged  against 
the  whole  notion  of  moral  government  and  a  probation- 
state,  from  the  opinion  of  necessity,  it  has  been  shown 
that  God  has  given  us  the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  expe- 


Chap.  VII.l  Conclusion.  189 

rience,  that  all  objections  against  religion  on  this  head 
are  vain  and  delusive.  He  has  also,  in  his  natural  gov- 
ernment, suggested  an  answer  to  all  our  short-sighted 
objections  against  the  equity  and  goodness  of  his  moral 
government,  and  in  general  he  has  exemplified  to  us  the 
latter  by  the  former. 

These  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are  mat- 
ters of  fact,  ought  in  all  common  sense  to  awaken  man- 
kind, to  induce  them  to  consider  in  earnest  their  condi- 
tion, and  what  they  have  to  do.  It  is  absurd — absurd 
to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  subject  were  not 
of  so  serious  a  kind — for  men  to  think  themselves  secure 
in  a  vicious  life,  or  even  in  that  immoral  thoughtlessness 
which  far  the  greatest  part  of  them  are  fallen  into.'  And 
the  credibility  of  religion,  arising  from  experience  and 
facts  here  considered,  is  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  en- 
gage them  to  live  in  the  general  practice  of  all  virtue 
and  piety;  under  the  serious  apprehension,  though  it 
should  be  mixed  with  some  doubt,  (part  ii,  chap,  vi,)  of 
a  righteous  administration  established  in  nature,  and  a 
future  judgment  in  consequence  of  it ;  especially  when 
we  consider  how  very  questionable  it  is  whether  any 
thing  at  all  can  be  gained  by  vice,  (page  87 ;)  how  un- 
questionably little,  as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleasures 
and  profits  of  it  are  at  the  best ;  and  how  soon  they 
must  be  parted  with  at  the  longest.  For  in  the  deliber- 
ations of  reason  concerning  what  we  are  to  pursue  and 
what  to  avoid,  as  temptations  to  any  thing  from  mere 
passion  are  supposed  out  of  the  case ;  so  inducements 
to  vice,  from  cool  expectations  of  pleasure  and  interest, 
so  small  and  uncertain  and  short,  are  really  so  insignifi- 
cant as,  in  the  view  of  reason,  to  be  almost  nothing  in 
themselves,  and  in  comparison  with  the  importance  of 
religion,  they  quite  disappear  and  are  lost.  Mere  pas- 
sion, indeed,  may  be  alleged,  though  not  as  a  reason,  yet 
as  an  excuse  for  a  vicious  course  of  life.    And  how  sorry 


190  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I. 

an  excuse  it  is  will  be  manifest  by  observing,  that  we 
are  placed  in  a  condition  in  which  we  are  unavoidably 
inured  to  govern  our  passions,  by  being  necessitated  to 
govern  them ;  and  to  lay  ourselves  under  the  same  kind 
of  restraints,  and  as  great  ones,  too,  from  temporal  re- 
gards, as  virtue  and  piety,  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
things,  require.  The  plea  of  ungovernable  passion, 
then,  on  the  side  of  vice,  is  the  poorest  of  all  things ;  for 
it  is  no  reason,  and  but  a  poor  excuse.  But  the  proper 
motives  to  religion  are  the  proper  proofs  of  it,  from  our 
moral  nature,  from  the  presages  of  conscience,  and  our 
natural  apprehension  of  God,  under  the  character  of  a 
righteous  Governor  and  Judge ;  a  nature,  and  con- 
science, and  apprehension  given  us  by  him ;  and  from 
the  confirmation  of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and 
immortality  brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel ;  and  the  wrath 
of  God  revealed  from  heaven  against  all  ungodliness  and 
unrighteousness  of  men* 


PART  11. 

OF    REVEALED    RELIGION. 


^ 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF   THE   IMPORTANCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY. 


SOME  persons,  upon  pretense  of  the  sufficiency  of 
the  light  of  nature,*  avowedly  reject  all  revelation 
as,  in  its  very  notion,  incredible,  and  what   „ 

,       -      .   .  A       1    ••,■,-     •  ■       Rejecters  of  rev- 

must  be  fictitious.     And,  indeed,  it  is  certain   elation,     why 

.      .  ,  -  ,  ,  .  ,       ,    ,        unreasonable. 

no  revelation  would  have  been  given,  had  the 
light  of  nature  been  sufficient  in  such  a  sense  as  to  ren- 
der one  not  wanting  and  useless.  But  no  man  in  serious- 
ness and  simplicity  of  mind  can  possibly  think  it  so,  who 
considers  the  state  of  religion  in  the  heathen  world  be- 
fore revelation,  and  its  present  state  in  those  places 
which  have  borrowed  no  light  from  it,  particularly  the 
doubtfulness  of  some  of  the  greatest  men  concerning 
things  of  the  utmost  importance,  as  well  as  the  natural 
inattention  and  ignorance  of  mankind  in  general.  It  is 
impossible  to  say  who  would  have  been  able  to  have 
reasoned  out  that  whole  system  which  we  call  natural 
religion,  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  clear  of  superstition  • 
but  there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm  that  the  gen 
erality  could :  if  they  could,  there  is  no  sort  of  probabil- 
ity that  they  would.  Admitting  there  were,  they  would 
highly  want  a  standing  admonition  to  remind  them  of  it, 

♦  [This  is  the  main  argument  of  Tindal's  famous  book,  "  Chris- 
tianity as  Old  as  the  Creation  ;  or,  the  Gospel  a  Republication  of  the 
Law  of  Nature,"  first  published  in  4to.,  London,  1730. — F.] 


192  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

and  inculcate  it  upon  them.*  And  further  still,  were 
they  as  much  disposed  to  attend  to  religion  as  the  bet- 
ter sort  of  men  are,  yet  even  upon  this  supposition,  there 
would  be  various  occasions  for  supernatural  instruction 
and  assistance,  and  the  greatest  advantages  naight  be 
afforded  by  them.  So  that  to  say  revelation  is  a  thing 
superfluous,  what  there  was  no  need  of,  and  what  can  be 
of  no  service,  is,  I  think,  to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at 
random. f  Nor  would  it  be  more  extravagant  to  affirm 
that  mankind  is  so  entirely  at  ease  in  the  present  state, 
and  life  so  completely  happy,  that  it  is  a  contradiction 
to  suppose  our  condition  capable  of  being  in  any  respect 
better. 

2.  There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with 

♦  [See  an  excellent  statement  of  the  argument  here  glanced  at  in 
Leland's  "Advantage  and  Necessity  of  the  Christian  Revelation 
shown  from  the  State  of  Religion  in  the  Ancient  Heathen  World,"  etc.] 

f  [It  may  be  doubted  whether  Christian  apologists  are  called  upon 
to  demonstrate  elaborately  the  .necessity  of  revelation,  prior  to  the 
consideration  of  its  truth,  as  matter  of  fact.  Paley  disposes  of  this 
whole  question  in  a  single  sentence,  by  simply  saying,  "  I  deem  it 
unnecessary  to  prove  that  mankind  stood  in  need  of  a  revelation, 
because  I  have  met  with  no  serious  person  who  thinks  that  even 
under  the  Christian  revelation,  we  have  too  much  light,  or  any  degree 
of  assurance  which  is  superfluous."  Dr.  Chalmers,  on  this  topic,  re- 
marks, "  Possessed  as  we  are,  of  such  competent  proofs  on  the  credi- 
bility of  this  said  revelation,  are  we  to  suspend  the  determination  of 
it,  till  the  previous  question  of  its  necessity  has  been  settled  and  set 
by?  Are  we  to  forego  the  consideration  of  the  evidences  which  lie 
patent  before  us  on  the  field  of  observation  till  we  take  up  a  matter, 
not  so  much,  let  it  be  noticed,  of  palpable  fact  as  of  recondite  prin- 
ciple ?  The  necessity  of  revelation  involves  in  it  topics  that  stand 
related  both  to  God  and  to  eternity — to  the  hidden  counsels  of  the 
One,  to  the  fathomless  unknown,  and  by  us,  undiscoverable,  of  the 
other.  The  truth  of  revelation  depends  on  credentials  which  lie  on 
an  open  platform,  or  certain  tangible  things  within  the  circle  of  our 
perceptions,  which  have  been  addressed  to  human  eyes,  which  have 
been  heard  by  human  ears.  It  is  not  sound  dialectics  to  suspend  the 
second  of  these  topics  on  the  first  of  them." — Dr.  Crooks.] 


Chap.  I.]    Importance  of  Christianity.  193 

these,  who  seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglecting, 
and  as  it  were  overlooking,  revelation,  as  of  Those  who  n^- 
small  importance  provided  natural  religion  toT^natiS^^'re^ 
be  kept  to.  With  little  regard  either  to  the  "^**°- 
evidence  of  the  former,  or  to  the  objections  against  it, 
and  even  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  "  the  only  design 
of  it,"  say  they,  "  must  be  to  establish  a  belief  of  the 
moral  system  of  nature,  and  to  enforce  ihe  practice  of 
natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and  practice  of 
these  things  were,  perhaps,  much  promoted  by  the  first 
publication  of  Christianity;  but  whether  they  are  be- 
lieved and  practiced,  upon  the  evidence  and  motives  of 
nature  or  of  revelation,  is  no  great  matter."*  This  way 
of  considering  revelation,  though  it  is  not  the  same  with 
the  former,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it,  and  very  much, 
at  length,  runs  up  into  it,  and  requires  to  be  particularly 
considered  with  regard  to  the  persons  who  seem  to  be 
getting  into  this  way.  The  consideration  of  it  will  like- 
wise further  show  the  extravagance  of  the  former  opin- 
ion, and  the  truth  of  the  observations  in  answer  to  it, 
just  mentioned.  And  an  inquiry  into  the  importance  of 
Christianity  cannot  be  an  improper  introduction  to  a 
treatise  concerning  the  credibility  of  it. 

*  Invenis  multos — propterea  nolle  fieri  Christianos,  quia  quasi 
sufficiunt  sibi  de  bona  vita  sua.  Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait.  Quid 
mihi  prsecepturus  est  Christus?  Ut  bene  vivam?  Jam  bene  vivo. 
Quid  mihi  necessarius  est  Christus?  Nullum  homicidium,  nullum 
furtum,  nullum  rapinam  facio,  res  alienas  non  concupisco,  nuUo  adul- 
terio  contaminor.  Nam  inveniatur  in  vita  mea  aliquid  quod  repre- 
hendatur,  et  qui  reprehenderit  faciat  Christianum. — Aug.  in  Psal., 
xxxL 

You  find  many  who  refuse  to  become  Christians  because  they  feel 
sufficient  of  themselves  to  lead  a  new  life.  We  ought  to  live  well, 
says  one.  What  will  Christ  teach  me — to  live  well  ?  I  do  live  well ; 
what  need  have  I  of  Christ  ?  I  commit  no  murder,  no  theft,  no  robbery. 
I  covet  no  man's  goods,  and  am  polluted  by  no  adultery.  Let  some 
one  find  in  me  any  thing  to  censure,  and  he  who  can  do  so  may  make 
me  a  Christian. 
18 


194  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

3.  Now  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  and 
commanded    those    things   which   are    commanded    in 

^   Christianity,  it  is  evident  at  first  sight   that 

Obedience  not    .  /'  .  '^ 

an  Indifferent     it  cannot  m  anvwise  be  an  indifferent  mat- 
matter. 

ter  whether  we  obey  or  disobey  those  com- 
mands ;  unless  we  are  certainly  assured  that  we  know 
all  the  reasons  for  them,  and  that  all  those  reasons  are 
now  ceased,  with  regard  to  mankind  in  general,  or  to 
ourselves  in  particular.  And  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
we  can  be  assured  of  this ;  for  our  ignorance  of  these 
reasons  proves  nothing  in  the  case,  since  the  whole 
analogy  of  nature  shows,  what  is  indeed  in  itself  evident, 
that  there  may  be  infinite  reasons  for  things  with  which 
we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  distinct- 
ly appear  by  considering  it  more  distinctly :  first,  as  a 
republication  and  external  institution  of  natural  or  essen- 
tial religion,  adapted  to  the  present  circumstances  of 
mankind,  and  intended  to  promote  natural  piety  and 
virtue  ;  and  secondly,  as  containing  an  account  of  a  dis- 
pensation of  things  not  discoverable  by  reason,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined 
us.  For  though  natural  religion  is  the  foundation  and 
principal  part  of  Christianity,  it  is  not  in  any  sense  the 
whole  of  it. 

4.  I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  religion. 
Christianity  im-  It  instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of 
puSStton*  ^of  the  world  :  that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinite- 
natural  religion,  jy  perfect  Being,  and  under  his  government ; 
that  virtue  is  his  law;  and  that  he  will  finally  judge 
mankind  in  righteousness,  and  render  to  all  according 
to  their  works,  in  a  future  state.  And  which  is  very 
material,  it  teaches  natural,  religion  in  its  genuine  sim- 
plicity, free  from  those  superstitions  with  which  it  was 
totally  corrupted,  and  under  which  it  was  in  a  manner 
lost. 


Chap.  I,]    Importance  of  Christianity.  195 

Revelation  is  further  an  authoritative  publication  of 
natural  religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of  testimony 
for  the   truth  of  it.     Indeed,  the   miracles     .™.  ^    .    , 

'  What  mirados 

and  prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture  were  and    prophecy 

\     ,  .       ,         , .  .  prove. 

mtended  to  prove  a  particular  dispensation 
of  providence — the  redemption  of  the  world  by  the 
Messiah ;  but  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  they  may 
also  prove  God's  general  providence  over  the  world  as 
our  moral  governor  and  judge.  And  they  evidently  do 
prove  it,  because  this  character  of  the  author  of  nature 
is  necessarily  connected  with,  and  implied  in,  that  par- 
ticular revealed  dispensation  of  things :  it  is  likewise 
continually  taught  expressly,  and  insisted  upon  by  those 
persons  who  wrought  the  miracles  and  delivered  the 
prophecies.  So  that,  indeed,  natural  religion  seems  as 
much  proved  by  the  Scripture  revelation  as  it  would 
have  been  had  the  design  of  revelation  been  nothing  else 
than  to  prove  it. 

5.  But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed  how  far  miracles 
can  prove  natural  religion ;  and  notable  objections  may 
be  urged  against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  practical  effect 
as  a  matter  of  speculation :  but  considered  mJ^r^^ThJ 
as  a  practical  thing  there  can  be  none.  For  t^^^^i-'e^c- 
suppose  a  person  to  teach  natural  religion  to  a  nation, 
who  had  lived  in  total  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  it, 
and  to  declare  he  was  commissioned  by  God  so  to  do ; 
suppose  him,  in  proof  of  his  commission,  to  foretell 
things  future,  which  no  human  foresight  could  have 
guessed  at ;  to  divide  the  sea  with  a  word ;  feed  great 
multitudes  with  bread  from  heaven  ;  cure  all  manner  of 
diseases;  and  raise  the  dead,  even  himself,  to  life; 
would  not  this  give  additional  credibility  to  his  teach- 
ing— a  credibility  beyond  what  that  of  a  common  man 
would  have,  and  be  an  authoritative  publication  of  the 
law  of  nature,  that  is,  a  new  proof  of  it  ?  It  would  be  a 
practical   one   of  the   strongest   kind,   perhaps,   which 


196  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

human  creatures  are  capable  of  having  given  them.  The 
law  of  Moses,  then,  and  the  gospel  of  Christ,  are  author- 
itative publications  of  the  religion  of  nature  :  they  afford 
a  proof  of  God's  general  providence,  as  moral  governor 
of  the  world,  as  well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations 
of  providence  toward  sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the 
law  and  the  gospel.  As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the 
latter,  so  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the  former. 
6.  To  show  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the 
greatest  and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never 
^  ^    «,   x_     heard   of  revelation,    convinced   upon   the 

Further  illustra-  .  .'  .  ^ 

tion  of  its  prac-  whole,  notwithstanding  the  disorders  of  the 

tical  effects. 

world,  that  it  was  under  the  direction  and 
moral  government  of  an  infinitely  perfect  being,  but 
ready  to  question  whether  he  were  not  got  beyond  the 
reach  of  his  faculties ;  suppose  him  brought,  by  this  sus- 
picion, into  great  danger  of  being  carried  away  by  the 
universal  bad  example  of  almost  every  one  around  him, 
who  appeared  to  have  no  sense,  no  practical  sense  at 
least,  of  these  things ;  and  this,  perhaps,  would  be  as 
advantageous  a  situation,  with  regard  to  religion,  as  na- 
ture alone  ever  placed  any  man  in.  What  a  confirma- 
tion now  must  it  be  to  such  a  person  all  at  once  to  find, 
that  this  moral  system  of  things  was  revealed  to  mankind 
in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being  whom  he  had,  from 
principles  of  reason,  believed  in;  and  that  the  publish- 
ers of  the  revelation  proved  their  commission  from  him 
by  making  it  appear  that  he  had  intrusted  them  with  a 
power  of  suspending  and  changing  the  general  laws  of 
nature. 

Nor  must  it,  by  any  means,  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a  thing 
of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  immortality  are 
eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  gospel.*     The  great 

*  [For  even  though  natural  religion  might  teach  some  efficacy  to 
be  in  repentance,  it  could  not  certainly  teach  the  efficacy  of  it  in  the 
Christian  sense,  that  is,  its  efficacy  wholly  to  cancel  the  punishment 


Chap.  I.]    Importance  of  Christianity.  197 

doctrines  of  a  future  state,  the  danger  of  a  course  of 
wickedness,  and  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  are  not  only 
-confirmed  in  the  gospel,  but  are  taught,  especially  the 
last  is,  with  a  degree  of  light  to  which  that  of  nature  is 
but  darkness. 

7.  Further:  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and 
purposes  when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  miraculous 
publication  itself;  so  it  was  intended  to  serve  the  same 
purposes  in  future  ages  by  means  of  the  set-  Design  of  the 
tlement  of  a  visible  Church;*  of  a  society  ^"e Church, 
distinguished  from  common  ones  and  from  the  rest  of 
the  world  by  peculiar  religious  institutions,  by  an  insti- 
tuted method  of  instruction,  and  an  instituted  form  of 
external  religion.  Miraculous  powers  were  given  to  the 
first  preachers  of  Christianity  in  order  to  their  introduc- 
ing it  into  the  world ;  a  visible  Church  was  established, 
in  order  to  continue  it,  and  carry  it  on  successively 
throughout  all  ages.  Had  Moses  and  the  prophets, 
Christ  and  his  apostles,  only  taught,  and  by  miracles 
proved,  religion  to  their  contemporaries,  the  benefits  of 
their  instructions  would  have  reached  but  to  a  small 
part  of  mankind.     Christianity  must   have  been,   in  a 

of  sin,  and  restore  us  absolutely  to  God's  favor.  And  though  natural 
religion  might  show  us  much  danger  in  wickedness,  it  could  not  show 
tts,  certainly,  the  great  danger  resulting  from  our  probation  being 
terminated  forever  by  death,  and  the  everlasting  punishment  which 
will  then  ensue. — F.] 

*  [In  his  sermon  before  the  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gos- 
pel Butler  says :  "  Christianity  was  left  with  Christians  to  be  trans- 
mitted, in  like  manner  as  the  religion  of  nature  had  been  left  with 
mankind  in  general.  There  was,  however,  this  difference,  that  by  an 
institution  of  external  religion  with  a  standing  ministry  for  instruc- 
tion and  discipline,  it  pleased  God  to  unite  Christians  into  visible 
Churches,  and  all  along  to  preserve  them  over  a  great  part  of  the 
world,  and  thus  perpetuate  a  general  publication  of  the  Gospel."  But- 
ler goes  on  to  show  that  however  corrupt  the  Churches  may  have  be- 
come they  were  the  repositories  of  fhe  written  oracles  of  God,  and 
along  with  their  errors  carried  their  refutation,] 


198  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II, 

great  degree,  sunk  and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages.  To 
prevent  this  appears  to  have  been  one  reason  why  a  vis- 
ible Church  was  instituted  ;  to  be  like  a  city  upon  a  hill, 
a  standing  memorial  to  the  world,  of  the  duty  which  we 
owe  our  Maker;  to  call  men  continually  both  by  ex- 
ample and  instruction  to  attend  to  it,  and  by  the  form 
of  religion  ever  before  their  eyes  remind  them  of  the 
reality ;  to  be  the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God ;  to 
hold  up  the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  nature, 
and  propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to  the  end 
of  the  world — the  light  of  revelation,  considered  here  in 
no  other  view,  than  as  designed  to  enforce  natural  re- 
ligion. And  in  proportion  as  Christianity  is  professed 
and  taught  in  the  world,  religion,  natural  or  essential 
religion,  is  thus  distinctly  and  advantageously  laid  be- 
fore mankind,  and  brought  again  and  again  to  their 
thoughts  as  a  matter  of  infinite  importance. 

A  visible  Church  has  also  a  further  tendency  to  pro- 
mote natural  religion  as  being  an  instituted 

The  Church  an  °,  .    .      °      , 

agency  for  edu-  method  of  education,  origmally  mtended  to 

cation.  ,  r  T  J  1 

be  of  more  peculiar  advantage  to  those  who 
would  conform  to  it.  For  one  end  of  the  institution 
was,  that  by  admonition  and  reproof,  as  well  as  instruc- 
tion ;  by  a  general  regular  discipline,  and  public  exer- 
cises of  religion,  fke  body  of  Christy  as  the  Scripture 
speaks,  should  be  edified^  that  is,  trained  up  in  piety  and 
virtue,  for  a  higher  and  better  state.  This  settlement, 
then,  appearing  thus  beneficial ;  tending,  in  the  nature 
of  the  thing,  to  answer,  and  in  some  degree  actually  an- 
swering, those  ends;  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
v^ery  notion  of  it  implies  positive  institutions,  for  the  vis- 
ibility of  the  Church  consists  in  them.  Take  away  every 
thing  of  this  kind,  and  you  lose  the  very  notion  itself. 
So  that  if  the  things  now  mentioned  are  advantages,  the 
reason  and  importance  of  positive  institutions  in  general 
is  most  obvious;  since,  without  ti  em,  these  advantages 


Chap.  I.j    Importance  of  Christianity.  t<^ 

could  not  be  secured  to  the  world.  And  it  is  mere  idle 
wantonness  to  insist  upon  knowing  the  reasons  why  such 
particular  ones  were  fixed  upon,  rather  than  others. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assistance 
which  Christianity  affords  to  natural  religion,  is  what 
some  persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending  :  and  yet  it 
is  a  thing  distinct  in  itself,  and  a  very  plain,  obvious 
one.  For  will  any  in  good  earnest  really  say  that  the 
bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world  were  in  as  advan- 
tageous a  situation,  with  regard  to  natural  religion,  as 
they  are  now  among  us :  that  it  was  laid  before  them, 
and  enforced  upon  them,  in  a  manner  as  distinct,  and  as 
much  tending  to  influence  their  practice } 

8.  The  objections  against  all  this,  from  the  perversion 
of  Christianity,  and  from  the  supposition  of    ^^.  ^    ^ 

■^ '  .  ^^  Objection  from 

Its   havmg   had  but   little   good   influence,  the   perversion 

?  ,        ,  ^     ,  '    ofChristlwiity. 

however  mnocently  they  may  be  proposed, 
yet  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  conclusive,  upon  any  prin- 
ciples but  such  as  lead  to  downright  atheism  ;  because 
the  manifestation  of  the  law  of  nature  by  reason,  which, 
upon  all  principles  of  theism,  must  have  been  from  God, 
has  been  perverted  and  rendered  ineffectual  in  the  same 
manner.  It  may,  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  said,  that  the 
good  eff"ects  of  Christianity  have  not  been  small ;  nor  its 
supposed  ill  effects  any  effects  at  all  of  it,  properly 
speaking.  Perhaps,  too,  the  things  themselves  done 
have  been  aggravated;  and  if  not,  Christianity  hath 
been  often  only  a  pretense ;  and  the  same  evils  in  the  main 
would  have  been  done  upon  some  other  pretense.  How- 
ever, great  and  shocking  as  the  corruptions  Natural  religion 
and  abuses  of  it  have  really  been,  they  can-  p®'^®''^- 
not  be  insisted  upon  as  arguments  against  it,  upon  prin- 
ciples of  theism.  For  one  cannot  proceed  one  step  in 
reasoning  upon  natural  religion,  any  more  than  upon 
Christianity,  without  laying  it  down  as  a  first  principle 
that  the  dispensations   of   Providence   are   not   to   be 


200  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

judged  of  by  their  perversions,  but  by  their  genuine 
tendencies ;  not  by  what  they  do  actually  seem  to  effect, 
but  by  what  they  would  effect  if  mankind  did  their  part : 
that  part  which  is  justly  put  and  left  upon  them.  It  is 
altogether  as  much  the  language  of  one  as  of  the  other : 
"  He  that  is  unjust,  let  him  be  unjust  still ;  and  he  that 
is  holy,  let  him  be  holy  still."  Rev.  xxii,  ii.  The  light 
of  reason  does  not,  any  more  than  that  of  revelation, 
force  men  to  submit  to  its  authority :  both  admonish 
them  of  what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid,  together  with 
the  consequences  of  each ;  and  after  this  leave  them  at 
full  liberty  to  act  just  as  they  please,  till  the  appointed 
time  of  judgment.  Every  moment's  experience  shows 
that  this  is  God's  general  rule  of  government.* 

9.  To  return,  then ;  Christianity  being  a  promulgation 
of  the  law  of  nature ;  being  moreover  an  authoritative 
Christian  obu-  promulgation  of  it,  with  new  light,  and  other 
fmpOTtenS^^f  circumstances  of  peculiar  advantage,  adapt- 
Christianity.  g^  ^^  ^^ie  wants  of  mankind ;  these  things 
fully  show  its  importance.  And  it  is  to  be  observed 
further,  that  as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires,  so  all 
Christians  are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their  pro- 
fession of  Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world,  and 
render  it  such  a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of  relig- 
ion. For  it  is  the  very  scheme  of  the  gospel,  that  each 
Christian  should,  in  his  degree,  contribute  toward  contin- 

*  [It  is  no  real  objection  to  this,  though  it  may  seem  so  at  first  sight, 
to  say  that  since  Christianity  is  a  remedial  system,  designed  to  obviate 
those  very  evils  which  have  been  produced  by  the  neglect  and  abuse 
of  the  light  of  nature,  it  ought  not  to  be  liable  to  the  same  perversions. 
Because,  i.  Christianity  is  not  designed  primarily  to  remedy  the  de- 
fects of  nature,  but  of  an  unnatural  state  of  ruin  into  which  man- 
kind were  brought  by  the  fall,  And,  2.  It  is  remedial  of  the  defects  of 
nature  in  a  great  degree  by  its  giving  additional  advantages.  3.  It 
might  be  impossible  that  it  should  be  remedial  in  a  greater  degree 
than  it  is,  without  destroying  man's  free  agency  ;  which  would  be  to 
destroy  its  own  end,  the  practice  of  virtue. — Fitzgerald.] 


Chap.  I.l    Importance  of  Christianity.  201 

uingand  carrying  it  on  ;  all  by  uniting  in  the  public  pro- 
fession, and  external  practice  of  Christianity ;  some  by 
instructing,  by  having  the  oversight,  and  taking  care  of 
this  religious  community — the  Church  of  God.  Now 
tills  further  shows  the  importance  of  Christianity,  and, 
\\hich  is  what  I  chiefly  intend,  its  importance  in  a  prac- 
tical sense,  or  the  high  obligations  we  are  under  to  take 
it  into  our  most  serious  consideration  ;  and  the  danger 
there  must  necessarily  be,  not  only  in  treating  it  de- 
spitefully — which  I  am  not  now  speaking  of — but  in  dis-" 
regarding  and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting  to 
do  what  is  expressly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing  those 
benefits  to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down  to 
future  times.  And  all  this  holds,  even  though  the  only 
thing  to  be  considered  in  Christianity  were  its  subservi- 
ency to  natural  religion.     But, 

10.  II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further 
view,  as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of 
things  not  at  all  discoverable  by  reason,  in 

°  /.       i  •  •      •  Important  aa 

consequence  of  which  several  distmct  pre-  presenting  new 
cepts  are  enjoined  us.  Christianity  is  not 
only  an  external  institution  of  natural  religion,  and  a 
new  promulgation  of  God's  general  providence,  as  right- 
eous governor  and  Judge  of  the  world,  but  it  contains 
also  a  revelation  of  a  particular  dispensation  of  provi- 
dence, carrying  on  by  his  Son  and  Spirit,  for  the  recov- 
ery and  salvation  of  mankind,  who  are  represented  in 
Scripture  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin.  And  in  consequence 
of  this  revelation  being  made,  we  are  commanded  to  be 
baptizedy  not  only  in  the  name  of  the  Father^  but  also  of 
the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost ;  and  other  obligations  of 
duty  unknown  before,  to  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost, 
are  revealed  Now  the  importance  of  these  duties  may 
be  judged  of  by  observing  that  they  arise,  not  from  pos- 
itive command  merely,  but  also  from  the  offices  which 
appear,  from  Scripture,  to  belong  to  those  divine  persons 


202  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

in  the  gospel  dispensation,  or  from  the  relations  which 
we  are  there  informed  they  stand  in  to  us.  By  reason  is 
revealed  the  relation  which  God  the  Father  stands  in 
to  us.  Hence  arises  the  obligation  of  duty  which  we  are 
under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the  relations 
which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  stand  in  to  us.  Hence 
arise  the  obligations  of  duty  which  we  are  under  to 
them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one  may  speak,  in  each 
of  these  three  respects  being  admitted,  that  God  is  the 
governor  of  the  world,  upon  the  evidence  of  reason ; 
that  Christ  is  the  Mediator  between  God  and  man,  and 
the  Holy  Ghost  our  Guide  and  Sanctifier,  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  revelation,  the  truth  of  the  case,  I  say,  in  each 
of  these  respects  being  admitted,  it  is  no  more  a  ques- 
tion why  it  should  be  commanded  that  we  be  baptized 
in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than  that 
we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father.  This  matter 
seems  to  require  to  be  more  fully  stated.* 

II.  Let  it  be  remembered,  then,  that  religion  comes 
under  the  twofold  consideration  of  internal 

Religion  as  in- 
ternal and  ex-   and  external ;  for  the  latter  is  as  real  a  part  of 

ternal.  .  .    .  ■,       r  -..t 

religion,  of  true  religion,  as  the  former.  Now 
when  religion  is  considered  under  the  first  notion,  as  an 
inward  principle,  to  be  exerted  in  such  and  such  inward 
acts  of  the  mind  and  heart,  the  essence  of  natural  relig- 
ion may  be  said  to  consist  in  religious  regards  to  Go^l  the 
Father  Almighty  ;  and  the  essence  of  revealed  religion  as 
distinguished  from  natural,. to  consist  in  religious  regards 
to  the  Son  and  to  the  Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligation  we 
are  under,  of  paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of 
these  Divine  persons  respectively,  arises  from  the  re- 
s])ective  relations  which  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How 
these  relations  are  made  known,  whether  by  reason  oi 
revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  case  ;  because  the 

*  See  "  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy  of  the  Christian  Sac- 
raments," etc.,  and  Colliber  on  Revealed  Religion,  as  there  quoted. 


Chap.  I.l    Importance  of  Christianity.  203 

duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  themselves,  not  out  of 
the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them.  The 
Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office  in  that  great 
dispensation  of  Providence,  the  redemption  of  the  world: 
the  one  our  Mediator,  the  other  our  Sanctifier.  Does 
not,  then,  the  duty  of  religious  regards  to  both  these  di- 
vine persons  as  immediately  arise  to  the  view  of  reason, 
out  of  the  very  nature  of  these  offices  and  relations,  as 
the  inward  good-will  and  kind  intention,  which  we  owe 
to  our  fellow-creatures,  arises  out  of  the  common  rela- 
tions between  us  and  them  ?  But  it  will  be  asked, 
"  What  are  the  inward  religious  regards,  appearing  thus 
obviously  due  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit,  as  arising  not 
merely  from  command  in  Scripture,  but  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  revealed  relations  which  they  stand  in  to 
us  ?  "  I  answer.  The  religious  regards  of  reverence, 
honor,  love,  trust,  gratitude,  fear,  hope.  In  what  ex- 
ternal manner  this  inward  worship  is  to  be  expressed  is 
a  matter  of  pure  revealed  command ;  as  perhaps  the  ex- 
ternal manner  in  which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  wor- 
shiped may  be  more  so  than  we  are  ready  to  think ; 
but  the  worship — the  internal  worship  itself — to  the  Son 
and  Holy  Ghost,  is  no  further  matter  of  pure  revealed 
command  than  as  the  relations  they  stand  in  to  us  are 
matter  of  pure  revelation  ;  for  the  relations  being  known, 
the  obligations  to  such  internal  worship  are  obligations 
of  reason,  arising  out  of  those  relations  themselves.  In 
short,  the  history  of  the  gospel  as  immediately  shows  us 
the  reason  of  these  obligations,  as  it  shows  us  the  mean 
ing  of  the  words,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 

12.  If  this  account  of  the  Christian  religion  be  just 
those  persons  wno  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  mohJ  impor 
as  of  little  consequence,  provided  natural  re-  ^uy*' ovel-'^'' 
ligion  be  kept  to,  plainly  forget  that  Chris-  ^°^^' 
tianity,  even  what  is  peculiarly  so  called  as  distinguished 
from  natural  religion,  has  yet  somewhat  very  important, 


204  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

even  of  a  moral  nature.  For  the  office  of  our  Lord  be- 
ing made  known,  and  the  relation  he  stands  in  to  us, 
the  obligation  of  religious  regards  to  him  is  plainly 
moral,  as  much  as  charity  to  mankind  is;  since  this  ob- 
ligation arises,  before  external  command,  immediately 
out  of  that  his  office  and  relation  itself.  Those  persons 
appear  to  forget  that  revelation  is  to  be  considered  as  in- 
forming us  of  somewhat  new  in  the  state  of  mankind  and 
in  the  government  of  the  world ;  as  acquainting  us  with 
some  relations  we  stand  in,  which  could  not  otherwise 
have  been  known.  And  these  relations  being  real, 
(though  before  revelation  we  could  be  under  no  obliga- 
tions from  them,  yet  upon  their  being  revealed,)  there 
is  no  reason  to  think  but  that  neglect  of  behaving  suit- 
ably to  them  will  be  attended  with  the  same  kind  of 
consequences  under  God's  government,  as  neglecting  to 
behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations  made  known  to 
us  by  reason.  And  ignorance,  whether  unavoidable  or 
voluntary,  so  far  as  we  can  possibly  see,  will  just  as 
much,  and  just  as  little,  excuse  in  one  case  as  in  the 
other :  the  ignorance  being  supposed  equally  unavoida- 
ble, or  equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 

13.  If,  therefore,  Christ  be  indeed  the  Mediator  be- 
tween God  and  man  ;  that  is,  if  Christianity  be  true ;  if 
he  be  indeed  our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and 

Peril  of  neglect.  ' 

our  God,  no  one  can  say  what  may  follow 
not  only  the  obstinate,  but  the  careless,  disregard  to 
him  in  those  high  relations.  Nay,  no  one  can  say 
what  may  follow  such  disregard,  even  in  the  way  of 
natural  consequence.  (Pages  64,  65,  etc.)  For  as  the 
natural  consequences  of  vice  in  this  life  are  doubt- 
less to  be  considered  as  judicial  punishments  inflicted 
by  God;  so  likewise,  for  aught  we  know,  the  judicial 
punishments  of  the  future  life  may  be  in  a  like  way, 
or  a  like  sense,  the  natural  consequence  of  vice, 
(chap    v;)  of  men's  violating  or  disregarding  the  rela- 


Chap.  I.]    Importance  of  Christianity.  205 

tions  which   God  has  placed  them  in  here,  and  made 
known  to  them. 

Again :  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved  in 
their  moral  character,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that  state 
which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples ;  and 
if  the  assistance  of  God's  Spirit  be  necessary  to  renew 
their  nature,  in  the  degree  requisite  to  their  being  qual 
ified  for  that  state ;  all  which  is  implied  in  the  express, 
though  figurative,  declaration^  "  Except  a  man  be  born 
of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God :" 
supposing  this,  is  it  possible  any  serious  person  can 
think  it  a  slight  matter  whether  or  not  he  makes  use  of 
the  means  expressly  commanded  by  God  for  obtaining 
this  divine  assistance  ?  especially  since  the  whole  anal- 
ogy of  nature  shows,  that  we  are  not  to  expect  any  ben- 
efits without  making  use  of  the  appointed  means  for 
obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now  reason  shows  us  noth- 
ing of  the  particular,  immediate  means,  of  obtaining 
either  temporal  or  spiritual  benefits.  This,  therefore, 
we  must  learn  either  from  experience  or  revelation. 
And  experience  the  present  case  does  not  admit  of. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that  Chris- 
tianity being  supposed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is  un- 
speakable irreverence,  and  really  the  most  presumptuous 
rashness,  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter.  It  can  never 
justly  be  esteemed  of  little  consequence  till  it  be  posi- 
tively supposed  false.  Nor  do  I  know  a  higher  and 
more  important  obligation  which  we  are  under,  than 
that  of  examining  most  seriously  into  the  evidence  of  it, 
supposing  its  credibility;  and  of  embracing  it,  upon 
supposition  of  its  truth. 

The  two  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to  be 
added,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  observations, 
and  to  prevent  their  being  mistaken. 

14.  First,  Hence  we  may  clearly  see  where  lies  the 
distinction  between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral 


2o6  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

in  religion.  M.oxdX  precepts  are  precepts  the  reasons  of 
Distinction  be-  which  we  See ;  positive  precepts  are  pre- 
M^^^tsMd^ib-  cepts  the  reasons  of  which  we  do  not  see.* 
ligations.  Moral   duties   arise    out    of  the   nature   of 

the  case  itself,  prior  to  external  command.  Positive 
duties  do  not  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case,  but 
from  external  command ;  nor  would  they  be  duties  at 
all,  were  it  not  for  such  command  received  from  him 
whose  creatures  and  subjects  we  are.  But  the  manner 
in  which  the  nature  of  the  case,  or  the  fact  of  the  rela- 
tion, is  made  known,  this  doth  not  denominate  any  duty, 
either  positive  or  moral.  That  we  be  baptized  in  the 
name  of  the  Father,  is  as  much  a  positive  duty  as  that 
we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son ;  because  both 
arise  equally  from  revealed  command ;  though  the  rela- 
tion which  we  stand  in  to  God  the  Father  is  made 
known  to  us  by  reason ;  the  relation  we  stand  in  to 
Christ,  by  revelation  only.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dis- 
pensation of  the  gospel  admitted,  gratitude  as  immedi- 
ately becomes  due  to  Christ  from  his  being  the  volun- 
tary minister  of  this  dispensation,  as  it  is  due  to  God 
the  Father  from  his  being  the  fountain  of  all  good ; 
though  the  first  is  made  known  to  us  by  revelation  only, 

*  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts,  con- 
sidered respectively  as  such.  But  yet,  since  the  latter  have  some- 
what of  a  moral  nature,  we  may  see  the  reason  of  them  considered 
in  this  view.  Moral  and  positive  precepts  are  in  some  respects  alike, 
in  others  respects  different.  So  far  as  they  are  alike,  we  discern  the 
reasons  of  both ;  so  far  as  they  are  different,  we  discern  the  reasons 
of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter.  (See  p.  195,  etc.,  and  p.  207.) 
[It  should  be  further  added,  to  prevent  misconceptions,  that  a  pre- 
cept may  be  positive,  even  though  it  have  a  ground  or  reason  visible 
to  us,  if  that  reason  do  not,  of  itself,  constitute  the  thing  required  an 
absolute  duty.  There  are,  for  instance,  visible  reasons  for  the  pro- 
priety of  such  an  initiative  rite  as  Christian  baptism,  and  yet  baptism 
is  only  a  positive  institution,  because  those  reasons  are  not  sufficient 
of  themselves  to  make  the  observance  of  such  a  rite  an  absolute 
duty.— F.] 


Chap.  I.]    Importance  of  Christianity.  207 

the  second  by  reason.  Hence,  also,  we  may  see,  and 
for  distinctness'  sake  it  may  be  worth  mentioning,  that 
positive  institutions  come  under  a  twofold  consideration : 
They  are  either  institutions  founded  on  i.atural  religion, 
as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father ;  though  this  has 
also  a  particular  reference  to  the  gospel  dispensation, 
for  it  is  in  the  name  of  God  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ ;  or  they  are  external  institutions  founded 
on  revealed  religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Son 
and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

15.  Secondly,  From  the  distinction  between  what  is 
moral  and  what  is  positive  in  religion,  ap- 

,      -    ,  ,.  -  Moral    duties 

pears  the  ground  of  that  peculiar  preference   superior  to  posi- 
which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  to  be  due  to 
the  former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general  is  very 
obvious,  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason  why  such 
particular  ones  are  pitched  upon  rather  than  others. 
Whoever,  therefore,  instead  of  caviling  at  words  will  at- 
tend to  the  thing  itself,  may  clearly  see  that  positive  in- 
stitutions in  general,  as  distinguished  from  this  or  that 
particular  one,  have  the  nature  of  moral  commands ; 
since  the  reasons  of  them  appear.  Thus,  for  instance, 
the  external  worship  of  God  is  a  moral  duty,  though  no 
particular  mode  of  it  be  so.  Care,  then,  is  to  be  taken, 
when  a  comparison  is  made  between  positive  and  moral 
duties,  that  they  be  compared  no  further  than  as  they 
are  different;  no  further  than  as  the  former  are  posi- 
tive, or  arise  out  of  mere  external  command,  the  reasons 
of  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with ;  and  as  the  latter 
are  moral,  or  arise  out  of  the  apparent  reason  of  the  case» 
without  such  external  command.  Unless  this  caution 
be  observed  we  shall  run  into  endless  confusion. 

16.  Now  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing 
precepts  enjoined  by  the  same  authority;  that  in  cer- 
tain conjunctures,  it  is  impossible  to  obey  both ;  that 


2o8  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

the  former  is  moral,  that  is,  a  precept  of  which  we  see 
If  the  two  con-  ^^^  reasons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  par- 
ftict,  the  moral   ticular  case  before  us ;  but  that  the  latter  is 

to  be  obeyed.  .   . 

positive,  that  is,  a  precept  of  which  we  do 
not  see  the  reasons :  it  is  indisputable  that  our  obliga- 
tions are  to  obey  the  former,  because  there  is  an  apparent 
reason  for  this  preference  and  none  against  it.  JFurther, 
positive  institutions,  I  suppose  all  those  which  Chris- 
tianity enjoins,  are  means  to  a  moral  end ;  and  the  end 
must  be  acknowledged  more  excellent  than  the  means. 
Nor  is  observance  of  these  institutions  any  religious 
obedience  at  all,  or  of  any  value,  otherwise  than  as  it 
proceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This  seems  to  be  the 
strict  logical  way  of  stating  and  determining  this  mat- 
ter; but  will,  perhaps,  be  found  less  applicable  to  prac 
tice  than  may  be  thought  at  first  sight. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more  lay 
way  of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words  moral  law 
and  positive  institutions  in  the  popular  sense ;  I  add,  that 
the  whole  moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  revealed  com- 
mand as  positive  institutions  are ;  for  the  Scripture  en- 
joins every  moral  virtue.  In  this  respect,  then,  they  are 
both  upon  a  level.  But  the  moral  law  is,  moreover, 
written  upon  our  hearts ;  interwoven  into  our  very  na- 
ture. And  this  is  a  plain  intimation  of  the  author  of  it, 
which  is  to  be  preferred,  when  they  interfere. 

17.  But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for 
the  determination  of  this  question  as  some  persons  seem 
The  question   to  think.     Nor  are  we  left  to  reason  alone  to 
?SoX''nTim:   determine  it.     For,  first,  Though  mankind 
portant.  have,  in  all  ages,  been  greatly  prone  to  place 

their  religion  in  peculiar  positive  rites  by  way  of  equiv- 
alent for  obedience  to  moral  precepts;  yet,  without 
making  any  comparison  at  all  between  them,  and  conse- 
quently without  determining  which  is  to  have  the  prefer- 
ence, the  nature  of  the  thing  abundantly  shows  all  notions 


Chap.  IJ    Importance  of  Christianity.  209 

of  that  kind  to  be  utterly  subversive  of  true  religion;  as 
they  are,  moreover,  contrary  to  the  whole  general  teaor 
of  Scripture,  and  likewise  to  the  most  express  particular 
declarations  of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted 
of  God  without  moral  virtue. 

Secondly^  Upon  the  occasion  of  mentioning  together 
positive  and  moral  duties,  the  Scripture  always  puts  the 
stress  of  religion  upon  the  latter  and  never  upon  the 
former;  which,  though  no  sort  of  allowance  to  neglect 
the  former  when  they  do  not  interfere  with  the  latter, 
yet  is  a  plain  intimation  that  when  they  do,  the  latter 
are  to  be  preferred.  And  further,  as  mankind  are  for 
placing  the  stress  of  their  religion  anywhere  rather  than 
upon  virtue,  lest  both  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the 
general  spirit. of  Christianity  appearing  in  the  intimation 
now  mentioned,  should  be  ineffectual  against  this  prev- 
alent folly,  our  Lord  himself,  from  whose  command 
alone  the  obligation  of  positive  institutions  arises,  has 
taken  occasion  to  make  the  comparison  between  them 
and  moral  precepts,  when  the  Pharisees  censured  him 
for  eating  with  publicans  and  sinners ;  and  also  when  they 
censured  his  disciples  iox  plucking  the  ears  of  corn  on  the 
Sabbath  day.  Upon  this  comparison  he  has  determined 
expressly,  and  in  form,  which  shall  have  the  preference 
when  they  interfere.  And  by  delivering  his  authorita- 
tive determination  in  a  proverbial  manner  of  expression, 
he  has  made  it  general,  /  will  have  mercy,  and  not  sacri- 
fice. (Matt,  ix,  13,  and  xii,  7.)  The  propriety  of  the 
word  proverbial  is  not  the  thfng  insisted  upon,  though 
I  think  the  manner  of  speaking  is  to  be  called  so.  But 
tliat  the  manner  of  speaking  very  remarkably  renders 
the  determination  general,  is  surely  indisputable.  For 
had  it,  in  the  latter  case,  been  said  only  that  God  pre- 
ferred mercy  to  the  rigid  observance  of  the  Sabbath, 
even  then,  by  parity  of  reasoning,  most  justly  might  we 

have  argued  that  he  preferred  mercy  likewise  to  the 
14 


2IO  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  TI. 

observance  of  other  ritual  institutions,  and  in  general, 
moral  duties  to  positive  ones.  And  thus  the  determina- 
tion would  have  been  general,  though  its  being  so  were 
inferred  and  not  expressed.  But  as  the  passage  really 
stands  in  the  gospel,  it  is  much  stronger ;  for  the  sense, 
and  the  very  literal  words  of  our  Lord's  answer,  are  as 
applicable  to  any  other  instance  of  a  comparison  between 
positive  and  moral  duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they 
were  spoken.  And  if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy  is 
to  be  preferred  to  positive  institutions,  it  will  scarce  be 
thought  that  justice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  re- 
markable, too,  that  as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from 
the  Old  Testament,  they  are  introduced  on  both  the  fore- 
mentioned  occasions,  with  a  declaration  that  the  Phari- 
sees did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them.  This,  I 
say,  is  very  remarkable ;  for  since  it  is  scarce  possible 
for  the  most  ignorant  person  not  to  understand  the  lit- 
eral sense  of  the  passage  in  the  prophet,  (Hosea  vi,)  and 
since  understanding  the  literal  sense  would  not  have 
prevented  their  condemning  the  guiltless,  (Matt,  xii,  7,)  it 
can  hardly  be  doubted,  that  the  thing  which  our  Lord 
really  intended  in  that  declaration  was,  that  the  Phari- 
sees had  not  learned  from  it,  as  they  might,  wherein  the 
general  spirit  of  religion  consists  ;  that  it  consists  in 
moral  piety  and  virtue  as  distinguished  from  forms  and 
ritual  observances.  However,  it  is  certain  we  may  learn 
this  from  his  divine  application  of  the  passage  in  the 
gospel. 

But  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of  human 

nature,  when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things,  one  is 

found  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the 

Both  important.         ,  .  ,         ,  .         ,  . 

Other,  to  consider  this  other  as  of  scarce  any 
importance  at  all ;  it  is  highly  necessary  that  we  remind 
ourselves  how  great  presumption  it  is  to  make  light  of 
any  institutions  of  divine  appointment ;  that  our  obliga- 
tions to  obey  all  God's  commands  whatever,  are  abso- 


Chap.  I.J    Importance  of  Christianity.  211 

lute  and  indispensable ;  and  that  commands  merely  pos- 
itive, admitted  to  be  from  him,  lay  us  under  a  moral 
obligation  to  obey  them;  an  obligation  moral  in  the 
strictest  and  most  proper  sense. 

To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the  ac- 
count now  given  of  Christianity  most  strongly  shows  and 
enforces  upon  us  the  obligation  of  searching  the  Script- 
ures, in  order  to  see  what  the  scheme  of  revelation  real- 
ly is,  instead  of  determining  beforehand  from  reason 
what  the  scheme  of  it  must  be.  (Chap,  iii.)  Indeed,  if 
in  revelation  there  be  found  any  passages,  the  seeming 
meaning  of  which  is  contrary  to  natural  religion,  we  may 
most  certainly  conclude  such  seeming  meaning  not  to 
be  the  real  one.*  But  it  is  not  any  degree  of  a  pre- 
sumption against  an  interpretation  of  Scripture,  that 
such  interpretation  contains  a  doctrine  which  the  light 
of  nature  cannot  discover,  (pages  213,  214,)  or  a  precept 
which  the  law  of  nature  does  not  oblige  to. 

*  [This  sentiment  must  be  received  with  caution  and  applied  with 
care.  It  has  often  been  used  for  evil  purposes  by  those  unfriendly  to 
religion.  Christianity  cannot  contradict  any  truths  but  the  results  of 
imperfect  investigations  in  science  or  natural  religion  must  not  hasti- 
ly be  assumed  as  true.  Hitherto  time  has  greatly  modified  or  en- 
tirely removed  what  at  first  seemed  to  be  formidable  objections. 
The  presumption  is  in  favor  of  the  received  teachings  of  Christianity, 
and  they  must  not  be  set  aside  for  every  hypothesis  that  opposers 
may  wantonly  and  presumptuously  set  forth.] 


212  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 


^ 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF    THE   SUPPOSED    PRESUMPTION    AGAINST  A  REVE- 
LATION, CONSIDERED    AS    MIRACULOUS. 

HAVING  shown  the  importance  of  the  Christian 
revelation,  and  the  obligation  which  we  are  un- 
der seriously  to  attend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth 
or  its  credibility;  the  next  thing  in  order  is,  to  consider 
the  supposed  presumptions  against  revelation  in  general ; 
which  shall  be  the  subject  of  this  chapter;  and  the  ob- 
jections against  the  Christian  in  particular,  which  shall 
be  the  subject  of  some  following  ones.  (Chapters  iii-vi.) 
For  it  seems  the  most  natural  method  to  remove  these 
prejudices  against  Christianity,  before  we  proceed  to  the 
consideration  of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and  the 
objections  against  that  evidence.  (Chap,  vii.) 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against 
the  Christian  scheme  of  things,  at  least  against  miracles ; 
so  that  stronger  evidence  is  necessary  to  prove  the  truth 
and  reality  of  them,  than  would  be  sufficient  to  con- 
vince us  of  other  events  or  matters  of  fact.  Indeed,  the 
consideration  of  this  supposed  presumption  cannot  but 
be  thought  very  insignificant  by  many  persons ;  yet  as 
it  belongs  to  the  subject  of  this  treatise,  so  it  may  tend 
to  open  the  mind,  and  remove  some  prejudices,  how- 
ever needless  the  consideration  of  it  be,  upon  its  own 
account. 

Nopresmnption  2.  I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presump- 
Si^fciemfTf  tion,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  the 
Christianity.        general   scheme   of  Christianity,  that  God 


Ch.  II.]  Presumption  against  a  Revelation.    213 

created  and  invisibly  governs  the  world  by  Jesus  Christ, 
and  by  him  also  will  hereafter  judge  it  in  righteousness, 
that  is,  render  to  every  one  according  to  his  works ;  and 
that  good  men  are  under  the  secret  influence  of  his 
Spirit.  Whether  these  things  are  or  are  not  to  be  called 
miraculous,  is  perhaps  only  a  question  about  words;  or, 
however,  is  of  no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the  analogy 
of  nature  raises  any  presumption  against  this  gener.al 
scheme  of  Christianity,  it  must  be  either  because  it  is 
not  discoverable  by  reason  or  experience,  or  else  because 
it  is  unlike  that  course  of  nature,  which  is.  But  analogy 
raises  no  presumption  against  the  truth  of  this  scheme 
upon  either  of  these  accounts. 

3.  First,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy, 
against  the  truth  of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being 
discoverable  by  reason  or  experience.     For     „ 

,  1  ,      r  .  None,  because 

suppose  one  who  never  heard  of  revelation,  not   discovered 

_     ,  .  ,  ,  , .  ,    t>y  reason. 

of  the  most  improved  understanding,  and 
acquainted  with  our  whole  system  of  natural  philosophy 
and  natural  religion,  such  a  one  could  not  but  be  sensi- 
ble that  it  was  but  a  very  small  part  of  the  natural  and 
moral  system  of  the  universe  which  he  was  acquainted 
with.  He  could  not  but  be  sensible  that  there  must  be 
innumerable  things  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
past,  in  the  invisible  government  over  the  world  at  pres- 
ent carrying  on,  and  in  what  is  to  come,  of  which  he 
was  wholly  ignorant,  (pages  174,  176,)  and  which  could 
not  be  discovered  without  revelation.  Whether  the 
scheme  of  nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite  or 
not,  it  is  evidently  vast,  even  beyond  all  possible  imag- 
ination. And  doubtless  that  part  of  it  which  is  open  to 
our  view  is  but  as  a  point  in  comparison  of  the  whole 
plan  of  Providence,  reaching  throughout  eternity  past 
and  future ;  in  comparison  of  what  is  even  now  going  on 
in  the  remote  parts  of  the  boundless  universe  :  nay,  in 
comparison  of  the  whole  scheme  of  this  world.     And 


214  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

therefore,  that  things  lie  beyond  the  natural  reach  of 
our  faculties  is  no  sort  of  presumption  against  the  truth 
and  reality  of  them ;  because  it  is  certain  there  are  in- 
numerable things,  in  the  constitution  and  government 
of  the  universe,  which  are  thus  beyond  the  natural  reach 
of  our  faculties. 

Secondly,  Analogy  raises  no  presumption  against  any 
of  the  things  contained  in  this  general  doctrine  of  Script- 
ure now  mentioned,  upon  account  of  their  being  unlike 
,  the  known  course  of  nature.     For  there  is 

None,  because 

unlike    known  no  presumption  at  all,  from  analogy,  that  the 

course  of  nature.  ^  *■  .  .    . 

wAo/e  course  of  thmgs,  or  divme  government, 
naturally  unknown  to  us,  and  every  thing  in  it,  is  like  to 
any  thing  in  that  which  is  known ;  and  therefore  no  pe- 
culiar presumption  against  any  thing  in  the  former,  upon 
account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in  the  latter. 
And  in  the  constitution  and  natural  government  of  the 
world,  as  well  as  in  the  moral  government  of  it,  we  see 
things,  in  a  great  degree  unlike  one  another,  and  there- 
fore ought  not  to  wonder  at  such  unlikeness  between 
things  visible  and  invisible.  However,  the  scheme  of 
Christianity  is  by  no  means  entirely  unlike  the  scheme 
of  nature ;  as  will  appear  in  the  following  part  of  this 
treatise. 

The  notion  of  a  miracle,*  considered  as  a  proof  of  a 
divine  mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exactness  by 
divines  ;  and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  understood  by  every 
one.  There  are  also  invisible  miracles  :t  the  incarna- 
tion of  Christ,  for  instance,  which,  being  secret,  cannot 

*  [For  a  beautiful  development  of  the  idea  of  a  miracle  the  reader 
is  referred  to  Mr.  Trench's  work  on  the  Miracles,  preliminary  essay.] 

f  [Papists  have  claimed  transubstantiation  as  an  invisible  miracle. 
But  in  the  case  of  an  invisible  miracle  the  circumstauces  exclude  ex- 
amination, while  transubstantiation  invites  and  is  favorable  to  exam- 
ination. It  is  claimed  to  be  public  and  constant,  yet  it  cannot  be 
discovered  to  be  a  miracle.  "  It  supposes  the  woiking  of  a  second 
miracle  to  make  the  first  invisible."] 


Ch.  II.]  Presumption  against  a  Revelation.    215 

be  alleged  as  a  proof  of  such  a  mission,  but  require 
themselves  to  be  proved  by  visible  miracles.  Revela- 
tion itself,  too,  is  miraculous,  and  miracles  are  the  proof 
of  it ;  and  the  supposed  presumption  against  these  shall 
presently  be  considered.  All  which  I  have  been  ob- 
serving here  is,  that,  whether  we  choose  to  call  every 
thing  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence  not  discovera- 
ble without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known  course  of 
things,  miraculous ;  and  whether  the  general  Christian 
dispensation  now  mentioned  is  to  be  called  so  or  not, 
the  foregoing  observations  seem  entirely  to  show,  that 
there  is  no  presumption  against  it,  from  the  analogy  of 
nature. 

4.  II.  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
some  operations  which  we  should  now  call  miraculous ; 
particularly,  none  against  a  revelation  at  the   „ 

t^       .       .  °  No  presumption 

begmnmg   of  the  world:  nothing  of  such  against  a  mirac- 

°  .  ...  ulous  revelation 

presumption  agamst  it  as  is  supposed  to  be  at  the  i,eginning 

'        ,.     ,  J  •       ,  1        .  ,  of  the  world. 

implied  or  expressed  in  the  word  miraculous. 
For  a  miracle,  in  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a  course 
of  nature ;  and  implies  somewhat  different  fr^m  it,  con- 
sidered as  being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no  course 
of  nature  at  the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of;  or,  if 
there  were,  we  are  not  acquainted  what  the  course  of 
nature  is  upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And  there- 
fore the  question,  whether  mankind  had  a  revelation 
made  to  them  at  that  time,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  a 
question  concerning  a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  ques- 
tion of  fact.  And  we  have  the  like  reason,  be  it  more 
or  less,  to  admit  the  report  of  tradition,  concerning  this 
question,  and  concerning  common  matters  of  fact  of  the 
same  antiquity ;  for  instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was 
first  peopled. 

Or  thus  :  When  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this  state, 
there  was  a  power  exerted  totally  different  from  the 
present  course  of  nature.     Now,  whether  this  power,  thu? 


2i6  Analogy  of  Religion.         FPart  II. 

wholly  different  from  the  present  course  of  nature,  for 
we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the  word  miraculous  j 
whether  this  power  stopped  immediately  after  it  had 
made  man,  or  went  on,  and  exerted  itself  further  in  giv- 
ing him  a  revelation,  is  a  question  of  the  same  kind  as 
whether  an  ordinary  power  exerted  itself  in  such  a  par- 
ticular degree  and  manner  or  not. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of  the 
world  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be  called 
by  that  name,  the  case  will  not  be  different ;  since  it 
must  be  acknowledged  that  such  a  power  was  exerted. 
For  supposing  it  acknowledged  that  our  Saviour  spent 
some  years  in  a  course  of  working  miracles ;  there  is  no 
more  presumption  worth  mentioning,  against  his  having 
exerted  this  miraculous  power  in  a  certain  degree  great- 
er, than  in  a  certain  degree  less ;  in  one  or  two  more 
instances,  than  in  one  or  two  fewer;  in  this,  than  in 
another,  manner.* 

*  [This  observation  applies  with  great  force  against  the  modern 
rationalistic  attempts  to  explain  away  some  of  our  Saviour's  miracles 
into  natural  events,  as  long  as  it  is  confessed  that  he  wrought  real 
miracles,  or  that  his  mission  was  really  miraculous.  Such  explana- 
tions are  really  more  improbable  than  the  common  ones  which  sup- 
pose a  miracle,  because  there  is  no  general  improbability  in  supposing 
that  a  person  endowed  with  the  power  of  working  miracles  exerted  it 
upon  a  particular  occasion  ;  whereas  there  is  an  improbability  in  sup- 
posing that  an  unusual  natural  event  occurred  ;  and  when  this  system 
of  interpretation  is  carried  on,  and  applied  to  a  great  number  of  cases, 
the  improbability  of  a  whole  series  of  strange  natural  e\  ents  taking 
place  unaccountably  one  after  the  other,  amounts,  I  think,  to  a  far 
greater  improbability  than  is  involved  in  the  admission  of  miracles ; 
because  every  thing  that  is  improbable  in  the  physical  strangeness  of 
miracles  applies  to  such  a  series  of  odd  events,  while  we  are  deprived 
of  the  means  of  accounting  for  them  by  supposing  an  extraordinary 
interposition  of  the  Deity.  A  romance  made  up  wholly  of  natural 
occurrences  which  happen  sometimes,  but  very  rarely,  is  just  as  in- 
credible as  a  romance  made  up  of  stories  about  genii  and  enchanters, 
and  things  wholly  supernatural.  The  improbability  of  both,  with 
respect  to  physical  strangeness,  is  just  the  same.     "  Some  infidels," 


Ch.  IIJ  Presumption  against  a  Revelation.    217 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar  pre- 
sumption, from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  supposing 
a  revelation  when  man  was  first  placed  upon  the  earth. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intimation 
in  history  or  tradition  that  religion  was  first  reasoned 
out ;  but  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition  makes  for 
the  other  side,  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  revelation. 
Indeed,  the  state  of  religion  in  the  first  ages,  of  which 
we  have  any  account,  seems  to  suppose  and  imply  that 
this  was  the  original  of  it  among  mankind.  And  these 
reflections  together,  without  taking  in  the  peculiar  au- 
thority of  Scripture,  amount  to  real  and  a  very  material 
degree  of  evidence  that  there  was  a  revelation  at  the 
beginning  of  the  world.  Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirma- 
tion of  natural  religion,  and  therefore  mentioned  in  the 
former  part  of  this  treatise,  (page  164,  etc.,)  so  likewise, 
it  has  a  tendency  to  remove  any  prejudices  against  a 
subsequent  revelation. 

5.  III.  But  still  it  maybe  objected,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
miracles;    particularly    agamst    revelation,  course  of  nature 
after  the  settlement  and  during  the  contin- 
uance of  a  course  of  nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption,  it  is 
to  be  observed  in  general,  that  before  we  can  have 
ground  for  raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be 
called  an  argument  from  analogy,  for  or  against  revela- 
tion considered  as  somewhat  miraculous,  we  must  be 

says  the  Archbishop  of  Dublin,  "  have  labored  to  prove,  concerning 
tofne  OTu  of  our  Lord's  miracles,  that  it  might  have  been  the  result  ot 
an  accidental  conjuncture  of  natural  circumstances ;  next  they  en- 
deavor to  prove  the  same  concerning  another,  and  so  on  ;  and  thence 
infer  that  all  of  them,  occurring  as  a  series,  might  have  been  so. 
They  might  argue,  in  like  manner,  that  because  it  is  not  very  im- 
probable one  may  throw  sixes  in  any  one  out  of  a  hundred  throws, 
therefore  it  is  no  more  improbable  that  one  may  throw  sixes  a  hun- 
dred times  running." — Logic,  l>ook  iii,  §  11. — F.] 


2i8  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

acquainted  with  a  similar  or  parallel  case.  But  the 
history  of  some  other  world,  seemingly  in  like  circum- 
stances with  our  own,  is  no  more  than  a  parallel  case ; 
and  therefore  nothing  short  of  this  can  be  so.  Yet 
could  we  come  at  a  presumptive  proof,  for  or  against  a 
revelation,  from  being  informed  whether  such  world  had 
one,  or  not ;  such  a  proof,  being  drawn  from  one  single 
instance  only,  must  be  infinitely  precarious.  More 
particularly : 

6.  First  of  all,  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption 
^         ^      against    common     speculative    truths,    and 

Presumption       °    .  ^  . 

against  common   agamst  the  most  Ordinary  facts,  before  the 

facts— Cesar.  ^       .      ^     ,  ,.,"'.' 

proof  of  them ;  which  yet  is  overcome  by 
almost  any  proof.*     There  is  a  presumption  of  millions 

*  [Mr.  Mill  (Logic,  chap,  xxiv,  §  5)  has  pointed  out  a  mistake  into 
which  writers  against  Hume's  Essay  on  Miracles  have  fallen,  in  con- 
founding the  improbability  that  an  event  will  occur,  with  the  improb- 
ability it  has  occurred — improbability  before  the  fact  and  improba- 
bility after  it.  La  Place,  differing  widely  from  these  writers  on 
religious  subjects,  has  sanctioned  the  same  error  in  his  Essay  on 
Probabilities. 

The  presumption  against  a  miracle  cannot  be  estimated  by  com- 
paring with  the  presumption  of  a  previously  conceived  story,  but  with 
the  presumption  against  the  truth  of  a  story  already  refuted,  which 
relates  to  events  not  miraculous. 

"Many  events  are  altogether  improbable  to  us  befoie  we  are  in- 
formed of  their  happening,  which  are  not  in  the  least  incredible  when 
we  are  informed  of  them,  because  not  contrary  to  any,  even  approxi- 
mate, induction." 

Suppose  a  thousand  numbers  to  be  put  in  a  box,  and  that  it  is  pro 
posed  to  draw  out  the  number  87.  Now  there  are  nine  hundred 
and  ninety-nine  chances  to  one  against  drawing  that  or  any  other 
given  number.  But  if  any  person  of  common  veracity  tells  you  he 
drew  out  a  number  which  proved  to  be  87,  you  at  once  believe  him, 
for  as  some  number  was  drawn,  it  was  as  likely  to  be  this  as  any  other. 

Butler  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  fallen  into  the  error  noticed  by 
Mr.  Mill.  He  says,  "  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption  against  com- 
mon speculative  truths,  and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts,  before 
the  proof  ,  which  yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any  proof." 

In  the  view  of  improbability  above  taken,  "  the  proof  of  Christian- 


Ch.  II.]  Presumption  against  a  Revelation.    219 

to  one  against  the  story  of  Cesar,  or  of  any  other  man. 
For  suppose  a  number  of  common  facts  so  and  so  cir- 
cumstanced, of  which  one  had  no  kind  of  proof,  should 
happen  to  come  into  one's  thoughts ;  every  one  would, 
without  any  possible  doubt,  conclude  them  to  be  false. 
And  the  like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact.  And 
from  hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  importance 
as  to  the  matter  before  us  is,  concerning  the  degree  of 
the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles ; 
not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all 
against  them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of  mill- 
ions to  one  against  the  most  common  facts,  what  can  a 
small  presumption,  additional  to  this,  amount  to,  though 
it  be  peculiar.'  It  cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as  noth- 
ing.*    The  only  material  question  is,  whether  there  be 

ity  from  prophecy  becomes  amazingly  strong.  There  are  many  pre- 
dictions, for  instance,  that  Christ  should  be  bom  at  a  certain  time  and 
place,  and  under  very  particular  circumstances.  The  probabilities 
against  such  a  conjuncture  of  events  are  almost  infinite,  yet  they  hap- 
pened exactly  as  foretold."] 

*  [Butler  supposes,  in  the  first  instance,  a  series  of  events  to  have 
come  gratuitously  into  one's  mind  ;  and,  after  stating  the  almost  in- 
finite number  of  chances  against  its  being  true,  supposes,  in  the  second 
instance,  these  very  events  to  be  deponed  to  by  a  credible  witness. 
Now,  that  both  the  first  and  the  second  of  these  things  should  happen 
in  coincidence  together  were  the  strongest  possible  unlikelihood  ;  and 
Butler  says  truly,  that  the  presumption  against  a  miracle  is  a  small 
presumption  additional  to  this ;  for,  in  fact,  this  were  itself  a  miracle. 
The  proper  way  of  estimating  the  strength  of  the  presumption 
against,  or  of  the  proof  that  would  be  necessary  for  the  establishment 
of  a  miracle,  is  to  bring  it  into  comparison,  not  with  the  presumption 
against  the  truth  of  a  previously  conceived  story,  but  with  the  pre- 
sumption against  the  truth  of  an  already  reported  story  that  related 
to  events  which  were  not  miraculous.  There  will  be  found  in  this 
case  a  difference  very  much  greater  than  the  small  additional  pre- 
sumption which  Butler  speaks  of;  and  so,  however  striking  or  orig 
inal  his  observation  may  be,  there  seems  nothing  in  it  which  can 
guide  us  into  a  right  track  for  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  that  since 
his  time  has  so  exercised  the  skill  of  controversialists. — Chalmers.] 


220  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

any  such  presumption  against  miracles  as  to  render  them 
in  any  sort  incredible  ? 

7.  Secondly^  If  we  leave  out  the  consideration  of  relig- 
ion, we  are  in  such  total  darkness  upon  what  causes, 
Aside  from  re-  occasions,    reasons,    or    circumstances    the 
SSSof^lSi  present  course  of  nature  depends,  that  there 
**"'  does  not  appear  any  improbability  for   or 

against  supposing,  that  five  or  six  thousand  years  may 
have  given  scope  for  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  cir- 
cumstances from  whence  miraculous  interpositions  may 
have  arisen.  And  from  this,  joined  with  the  foregoing 
observation,  it  will  follow,  that  there  must  be  a  presump- 
tion, beyond  all  comparison  greater,  against  \}^^  particu- 
lar common  facts  just  now  instanced  in,  than  against 
miracles  in  general ;  before  any  evidence  of  either. 

8.  But,  thirdly^  Take  in  the  consideration  of  religion, ' 
or  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see  dis- 
T>  «^     ^  ^     tinct  particular  reasons  for  miracles ;  to  af- 

ReUgion  affords  ^  .  .  .  ,  ' 

reasons  for  mir-   ford  mankind  instruction  additional  to  that 

acles. 

of  nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it.  And 
this  gives  a  real  credibility  to  the  supposition,  that  it 
might  be  part  of  the  original  plan  of  things  that  there 
should  be  miraculous  interpositions. 

9.  Then,  lastly^  Miracles  must  not  be  compared  to 
common   natural  events ;  or   to  events   which,   though 

Miracles  not  uncommon,  are  similar  to  what  we  daily  ex- 
with^  common^  pcriencc  ;  but  to  the  extraordinary  phenom- 
events.  enaof  nature.    And  then  the  comparison  will 

be  between  the  presumption  against  miracles,  and  the 
presumption  against  such  uncommon  appearances,  sup- 
pose, as  comets,  and  against  there  being  any  such  powers 
in  nature  as  magnetism  and  electricity,  so  contrary  to 
the  properties  of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  these 
powers.  And  before  any  one  can  determine,  whether 
there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  against  miracles  more 
than  against  other  extraordinary  things,  he  must  consider 


Ch.  II.]  Presumption  against  a  Revelation.    221 

what,  upon  first  hearing,  would  be  the  presumption 
against  the  last-mentioned  appearances  and  powers  to  a 
person  acquainted  only  with  the  daily,  monthly,  and  an- 
nual course  of  nature  respecting  this  earth,  and  with 
those  common  powers  of  matter  which  we  every  day  see. 
10.  Upon  all  this  I  conclude,  that  there  certainly  is 
no  such  presumption  against  miracles  as  to  render  them 
in  anywise  incredible ;  that  on  the  contrary,  our  being 
able  to  discern  reasons  for  them,  gives  a  positive  credi- 
bility to  the  history  of  them,  in  cases  where  those  rea- 
sons hold  ;  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  there 
is  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all,  from  analogy,  even 
in  the  lowest  degree,  against  miracles,  as  distinguished- 
from  other  extraordinary  phenomena;  though  it  is  not 
worth  while  to  perplex  the  reader  with  inquiries  into  the 
abstract  nature  of  evidence  in  order  to  determine  a 
question  which  without  such  inquiries  we  see  (page 
217,  etc.)  is  of  no  importance. 


222  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF  OUR  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING  WHAT  WERE  TO  BE 
EXPECTED  IN  A  REVELATION  ;  AND  THE  CREDIBIL- 
ITY. FROM  ANALOGY,  THAT  IT  MUST  CONTAIN  THINGS 
APPEARING  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS.* 

BESIDES  the  objections  against  the   evidence  for 
Christianity,  many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme 
Obections  t     ^^  ^^  5  against  the  whole  manner  in  which  it 
Christianity  it-  is   put  and  left  with  the  world,  as  well  as 

Belt  \  .  ,     ' 

agamst  several  particular  relations  in  Script- 
ure :  objections  drawn  from  the  deficiencies  of  revela- 
tion ;  from  things  in  it  appearing  to  men  foolishness^ 
(i  Cor.  i,  28;)  from  its  containing  matters  of  oifense 
which  have  led,  and  it  must  have  been  foreseen  would 

*  [The  object  of  this  chapter  is  to  prove  the  likelihood,  in  the  gen- 
eral, of  a  revelation  being  liable  to  objections,  or  at  least  that  its  be- 
ing so  forms  no  proper  ground  for  the  rejection  of  it.  This  reduces 
us  to  the  consideration  of  its  proofs,  as  the  only  relevant  inquiry  that 
we  have  to  do  with.  Doubtless  every  objection  against  these  proofs 
must  be  entertained,  and  satisfactorily  disposed  of.  But  this  is  differ- 
ent from  objections  against  the  subject-matter  of  a  revelation.  These 
form  what  are  here  called  its  internal  improbabilities,  much  insisted 
on  by  Deists  ;  but  all  proceeding  on  the  competency  of  the  human 
understanding  to  decide  upon  a  topic  which  is  here  shown  to  be  much 
t(to  high  for  it,  we  being  no  more  judges  beforehand  of  what  a  reve- 
lation ought  to  be,  either  in  the  way  it  ought  to  be  conducted  or  what 
it  should  contain,  than  we  are  judges  anterior  to  experience  of  what 
ought  to  be  the  course  of  nature.  The  alleged  imperfections  and 
anomalies  in  the  methods  by  which  Christianity  distributed  and  gave 
forth  her  lessons,  are  most  effectually  met  by  the  analogous  imperfec- 
tions and  anomalies,  if  such  they  must  be  called,  as  contrary  to  all 
the  likelihoods  of  previous  expectation,  that  might  be  observed  in  the 
pfts  and  teaching  of  nature. — Chalmers.] 


Chap.  III.]  Of  Credibility  of  Revelation.       223 

lead,  into  strange  enthusiasm  and  superstition,  and  be 
made  to  serve  the  purposes  of  tyranny  and  wickedness ; 
from  its  not  being  universal ;  and,  which  is  a  thing  of 
the  same  kind,  from  its  evidence  not  being  so  convinc- 
ing and  satisfactory  as  it  might  have  been ;  for  this  last 
is  sometimes  turned  into  a  positive  argument  against 
its  truth.  (Chap,  vi.) 

It  would  be  tedious,  indeed  impossible,  to  enumerate 
the  several  particulars  comprehended  under  the  objec- 
tions here  referred  to,  they  being  so  various  according 
to  the  different  fancies  of  men.  There  are  persons  who 
think  it  a  strong  objection  against  the  authority  of 
Scripture  that  it  is  not  composed  by  rul^^  of  art,  agreed 
upon  by  critics,  for  polite  and  correct  writing.  And  the 
scorn  is  inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the  prophetic 
parts  of  Scripture  are  treated ;  partly  through  the  rash- 
ness of  interpreters,  but  very  much  also  on  account  of 
the  hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language  in  which  they 
are  left  us. 

2.  Some  of  the  principal  things  of  this  sort  shall  be 
particularly  considered  in  the  following  chapters.  But 
my  design  at  present  is,  to  observe  in  general,  with  re- 
spect to  this  whole  way  of  arguing,  that  such  objections 
upon  supposition  of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  ^''^^^^^ 
credible,  beforehand,  we  should  be  incompetent  judges 
of  it  to  a  great  degree ;  and  that  it  would  contain  many 
things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  great  objections,  in  case 
we  judge  of  it  otherwise  than  by  the  analogy  of  nature. 
And,  therefore,  though  objections  against  the  evidence  of 
Christianity  are  most  seriously  to  be  considered,  yet  ob- 
jections against  Christianity  itself  are,  in  a  great  measure, 
frivolous;  almost  all  objections  against  it,  excepting 
those  which  are  alleged  against  the  particular  proofs  of 
its  coming  from  God.  I  express  myself  with  caution, 
lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to  vilify  reason,  which  is,  in- 
deed, the  only  faculty  we  have  wherewith  to  judge  con- 


224  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

cerning  any  thing,  even  revelation  itself;  or  be  misun- 
derstood to  assert,  that  a  supposed  revelation  cannot  be 
proved  false  from  internal  characters.  For  it  may  contain 
clear  immoralities  or  contradictions ;  and  either  of  these 
would  prove  it  false.  Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to  affirm, 
that  nothing  else  can  possibly  render  any  supposed  rev- 
elation incredible.  Yet  still  the  observation  above  is,  1 
think,  true  beyond  doubt,  that  objections  against  Chris- 
tianity, as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evi- 
dence, are  frivolous.  To  make  out  this  is  the  general 
design  of  the  present  chapter.  And  with  regard  to  the 
ivhole  of  it,  I  cannot  but  particularly  wish  that  the  proofs 
might  be  attentled  to,  rather  than  the  assertions  caviled 
at  upon  account  of  any  unacceptable  consequences, 
whether  real  or  supposed,  which  may  be  drawn  from 
them.  For  after  all,  that  which  is  true  must  be  admit- 
ted ;  though  it  should  show  us  the  shortness  of  our  fac- 
ulties, and  that  we  are  in  nowise  judges  of  many  things 
of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves  very  competent 
ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection  with  reasonable 
men ;  at  least  upon  second  thought  it  will  not  be  any 
objection  with  such,  against  the  justness  of  the  following 
observations : — 

3.  As  God  governs  the  world,  and  instructs  his  crea- 
tures, according  to  certain  laws  or  rules  in  the  known 
course  of  nature,  known  by  reason  together  with  expe- 
Being  incom  rience ;  so  the  Scripture  informs  us  of  a 
fh?SaS'di8!  scheme  of  divine  providence  additional  to 
more^Bro?the  ^his.  It  relates  that  God  has,  by  revelation, 
revealed,  instructed  men  in  things  concerning  his  gov- 

ernment which  they  could  not  otherwise  have  known, 
and  reminded  them  of  things  which  they  might  other- 
wise know ;  and  attested  the  truth  of  the  whole  by  mir- 
acles. Now  if  the  natural  and  the  revealed  dispensation 
of  things  are  both  from  God — if  they  coincide  with  each 
other,  and  together  make  up  one  scheme  of  providence 


Chap.  III.]  Of  Credibility  of  Revelation.       225 

—our  being  incompetent  judges  of  one  must  render  it 
credible  tha<-  we  may  be  incompetent  judges  also  of  the 
other.  Since,  upon  experience,  the  acknowledged  con- 
stitution and  course  of  nature  is  found  to  be  greatly  dif- 
ferent from  what,  before  experience,  would  have  been 
expected ;  and  such  as,  men  fancy,  there  lie  great  ob- 
jections against :  this  renders  it  beforehand  highly  cred- 
ible that  they  may  find  the  revealed  dispensation,  like- 
wise, if  they  judge  of  it  as  they  do  of  the  constitution  of 
nature,  very  different  from  expectations  formed  before- 
hand; and  liable,  in  appearance,  to  great  objections: 
objections  against  the  scheme  itself,  and  against  the  de- 
grees and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpositions  by 
which  it  was  attested  and  carried  on.  Thus  suppose  a 
prince  to  govern  his  dominions  in  the  wisest  luustration— 
manner  possible,  by  common  known  laws ;  SSSm^kwsf 
and  that  upon  some  exigencies  he  should  ^^• 
suspend  these  laws,  and  govern,  in  several  instances,  in 
a  different  manner:  if  one  of  his  subjects  were  not  a 
competent  judge  beforehand  by  what  common  rules  the 
government  should  or  would  be  carried  on,  it  could  not 
be  expected  that  the  same  person  would  be  a  competent 
judge  in  what  exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what 
degree,  those  laws  commonly  observed  would  be  sus- 
pended or  deviated  from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge  of  the 
wisdom  of  the  ordinary  administration,  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  think  he  would  be  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the 
extraordinary.  If  he  thought  he  had  objections  against 
the  former,  doubtless  it  is  highly  supposable  he  might 
think,  also,  that  he  had  objections  against  the  latter. 
And  tRus,  as  we  fall  into  infinite  follies  and  mistakes 
whenever  we  pretend,  otherwise  than  from  experience 
and  analogy,  to  judge  of  the  constitution  and  course  of 
nature,  it  is  evidently  supposable  beforehand  that  we 
should  fall  into  as  great  in  pretending  to  judge,  in  like 
manner,  concerning  revelation.  Nor  is  there  any  more 
15 


226  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

ground  to  expect  that  this  latter  should  appear  to  us 
clear  of  objections  than  that  the  former  should. 

4.  These  observations  relating  to  the  whole  of  Chris- 
tianity, are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular.     As 
we  are  in  no  sort  judges  beforehand  by  what 

This   analogy    ,  ,  •  ,  ,  1  , 

applied  to  in-  laws  or  rulcs,  in  what  degree  or  by  what 
'^     **"'  means,  it  were  to  have  been  expected  that 

God  would  naturally  instruct  us;  so  upon  supposition 
of  his  affording  us  light  and  instruction  by  revelation, 
additional  to  what  he  has  afforded  us  by  reason  and  ex- 
perience, we  are  in  no  sort  judges  by  what  methods, 
and  in  what  proportion,  it  were  to  be  expected  that  this 
supernatural  light  and  instruction  would  be  afforded  us. 
We  know  not  beforehand  what  degree  or  kind  of  natu- 
ral information  it  were  to  be  expected  God  would  afford 
men,  each  by  his  own  reason  and  experience ;  nor  how 
far  he  would  enable  and  effectually  dispose  them  to 
communicate  it,  whatever  it  should  be,  to  each  other; 
nor  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  highly 
probable,  or  doubtful ;  nor  whether  it  would  be  given 
with  equal  clearness  and  conviction  to  all.  Nor  could 
we  guess,  upon  any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natu- 
ral knowledge,  or  even  the  faculty  itself  by  which  we 
are  capable  of  attaining  it,  reason,  would  be  given  us  at 
once,  or  gradually. 

In  like  manner,  we  are  wholly  ignorant  what  degree 
of  new  knowledge  it  were  to  be  expected  God  would 
give  mankind  by  revelation,  upon  supposition  of  his  af- 
fording one ;  or  how  far,  or  in  what  way,  he  would  in- 
terpose miraculously  to  qualify  them  to  whom  he  should 
originally  make  the  revelation,  for  communicating  the 
knowledge  given  by  it ;  and  to  secure  their  doing  it  to 
the  age  in  which  they  should  live ;  and  to  secure  its  be- 
ing transmitted  to  posterity.  We  are  equally  ignorant, 
whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  or  highly 
probable,  or  doubtful,  (see  chap,  vi;)  or  whether  all 


Chap.  III.J  Of  Credibility  of  Revelation.       227 

who  should  have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it,  and 
any  degree  of  evidence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the 
same :  or  whether  the  scheme  would  be  revealed  at 
once,  or  unfolded  gradually.  Nay,  we  are  not  in  any 
sort  able  to  judge  whether  it  were  to  have  been  expected 
that  the  revelation  should  have  been  committed  to  writ- 
ing, or  left  to  be  handed  down,  and  consequently  cor- 
rupted, by  verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk  under  it,  if 
mankind  so  pleased,  and  during  such  time  as  they  are  per- 
mitted, in  the  degree  they  evidently  are,  to  act  as  they  will. 

5.  But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  a  revelation  in  some  of 
the  above-mentioned  circumstances,  one,  for  instance, 
which  was  not  committed  to  writing,  and     ^^.    . 

°     .  Objection  to  an 

thus  secured  agamst  danger  of  corruption,  unwritten  reve- 
would  not  have  answered  its  purpose."  I 
ask,  what  purpose  7  It  would  not  have  answered  all  the 
purposes  which  it  has  now  answered,  and  in  the  same 
degree  ;  but  it  would  have  answered  others,  or  the  same 
in  different  degrees.  And  which  of  these  were  the  pur- 
poses of  God,  and  best  fell  in  with  his  general  govern- 
ment, we  could  not  at  all  have  determined  beforehand. 
Now  since  it  has  been  shown  that  we  have  no  princi- 
ples of  reason  upon  which  to  judge,  beforehand,  how  it 
were  to  be  expected  revelation  should  have  been  left,  or 
what  was  most  suitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  government, 
in  any  of  the  fore-mentioned  respects;  it  must  be  quite 
frivolous  to  object  afterward,  as  to  any  of  them,  against 
its  being  left  in  one  way  rather  than  another;  for  this 
would  be  to  object  against  things  upon  account  of  their 
being  different  from  expectations,  which  have  been 
shown  to  be  without  reason. 

6.  And  thus  we  see  that  the  only  question  concern- 
ing the  truth  of  Christianity  is,  whether  The  only  qncs- 
it  be  a  real  revelation ;  not  whether  it  be  gSslLtliy'  'a 
attended  with  every  circumstance  which  we  "^^  reveiationf 
should  have  looked  for :  and  concerning  the  authoritv 


228  Analogy  of  Religion.         [P.art  II 

of  Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to  be; 
not  whether  it  be  a  book  of  such  sort,  and  so  pro- 
mulgated, as  weak  men  are  apt  to  fancy  a  book  coil- 
taining  a  divine  revelation  should.  And,  therefore, 
neither  obscurity  nor  seeming  inaccuracy  of  style,  nor 
various  readings,  nor  early  disputes  about  the  authors 
of  particular  parts,  nor  any  other  things  of  the  like  kind, 
though  they  had  been  much  more  considerable  in  de- 
gree than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority  of  the 
Scripture ;  unless  the  prophets,  apostles,  or  our  Lord, 
had  promised,  that  the  book,  containing  the  divine  rev- 
elation, should  be  secure  from  those  things.  Nor,  in- 
deed, can  any  objections  overthrow  such  a  kind  of 
revelation  as  the  Christian  claims  to  be,  since  there  are 
no  objections  against  the  morality  of  it,  (page  217,  etc.,) 
but  such  as  can  show  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles 
wrought  originally  in  attestation  of  it ;  no  appearance  of 
any  thing  miraculous  in  its  obtaining  in  the  world;  nor 
any  of  prophecy,  that  is,  of  events  foretold,  which  human 
sagacity  could  not  foresee.  If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the 
proof  alleged  for  all  these  is  absolutely  none  at  all,  then 
is  revelation  overturned.  But  were  it  allowed  that  the 
proof  of  any  one,  or  all  of  them,  is  lower  than  is  allowed ; 
yet  while  any  proof  of  them  remains,  revelation  will  stand 
upon  much  the  same  footing  it  does  at  present,  as  to  all 
the  purposes  of  life  and  practice,  and  ought  to  have  the 
like  influence  upon  our  behavior. 

7.  From  the  foregoing  observations,  too,  it  will  follow, 
and  those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation 
Modes  of  ar-  will  find  it  worth  remarking,  that  there  are 
laT  to&p":   several  ways  of  arguing,  which,  though  just 
^^'  with  regard  to  other  writings,  are  not  appli- 

cable to  Scripture ;  at  least  not  to  the  prophetic  parts 
of  it.  We  cannot  argue,  for  instance,  that  this  cannot 
be  the  sense  or  intent  of  such  a  passage  of  Scripture,  for 
if  it  had  it  would  have  been  expressed  more  plainly,  or 


Chai*.  III.l  Or  Credibility  of  Revelation.       229 

have  been  represented  under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hiero- 
glyphic; yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus  with  respect  to 
common  books.  And  the  reason  of  this  difference  is 
very  evident ;  that  in  Scripture  we  are  not  competent 
judges,  as  we  are  in  common  books,  how  plainly  it  were 
to  have  been  expected,  what  is  the  true  sense  should 
have  been  expressed,  or  under  how  apt  an  image  figured. 
'I'he  only  question  is,  what  appearance  there  is  that  this 
is  the  sense?  and  scarce  at  all,  how  much  more  de- 
terminately  or  accurately  it  might  have  been  expressed 
or  figured  ? 

8.  "  But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  improba- 
bilities of  all  kinds  weaken  external  proba-  objection,  in- 
ble  proof.?  "  Doubtless.  But  to  what  prac-  griXntx' 
tical  purpose  can  this  be  alleged  here,  when  *^''"*^  ^^^''^• 
it  has  been  proved  before,  (page  217,  etc.,)  that  real  in- 
ternal improbabilities,  which  rise  even  to  moral  certain- 
ty, are  overcome  by  the  most  ordinary  testimony  ?  and 
when  it  now  has  been  made  appear,  that  we  scarce  know 
what  are  improbabilities,  as  to  the  matter  we  are  here 
considering.?  as  will  further  appear  from  what  follows. 

For  though  from  the  observations  above  made  it  is 
manifest  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent  judges 
what  supernatural  instruction  were  to  have  been  ex- 
pected ;  and  though  it  is  self-evident  that  the  objections 
of  an  incompetent  judgment  must  be  frivolous ;  yet  it 
may  be  proper  to  go  one  step  further,  and  observe  that 
if  men  will  be  regardless  of  these  things,  and  pretend  to 
judge  of  the  Scriptures  by  preconceived  expectations, 
the  analogy  of  nature  shows  beforehand,  not  only  that  it 
ib'  highly  credible  they  may,  but  also  probable  that  they 
will,  imagine  they  have  strong  objections  against  it,  how- 
ever really  unexceptionable  ;  for  so,  prior  to  experience, 
they  would  think  they  had,  against  the  cir-  similar  objec 
cumstances,  and  degrees,  and  the  whole  scripture  Hn.i 
manner  of  that  instruction,  which  is  afforded   im^mre*! 


230  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II. 

by  tlie  ordinary  course  of  nature.  Were  the  instruction 
which  God  affords  to  brute  creatures  by  instincts  and 
mere  propensions,  and  to  mankind  by  these  together 
with  reason,  matter  of  probable  proof,  and  not  of  certain 
observation,  it  would  be  rejected  as  incredible,  in  many 
iastances  of  it,  only  upon  account  of  the  means  by  which 
this  instruction  is  given,  the  seeming  disproportions, 
the  limitations,  necessary  conditions,  and  circumstances 
of  It.  For  instance :  would  it  not  have  been  thought 
highly  improbable  that  men  should  have  been  so  much 
more  capable  of  discovering,  even  to  certainty,  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths,  and  rev- 
olutions of  the  heavenly  bodies ;  than  the  occasions  and 
cures  of  distempers,  and  many  other  things  in  which 
human  life  seems  so  much  more  nearly  concerned  than 
in  astronomy  ?  How  capricious  and  irregular  a  way  of 
information,  would  it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention^  by 
means  of  which  nature  instructs  us  in  matters  of  science, 
and  in  many  things  upon  which  the  affairs  of  the  world 
greatly  depend ;  that  a  man  should  by  this  faculty  be 
made  acquainted  with  a  thing  in  an  instant,  when  per- 
haps he  is  thinking  of  somewhat  else,  which  he  has  in 
vain  been  searching  after,  it  may  be,  for  years. 

So,  likewise,  the  imperfections  attending  the  only 
method  by  which  nature  enables  and  directs  us  to  com- 
municate our  thoughts  to  each  other  are  innumerable. 
Language  is,  in  its  very  nature,  inadequate,  ambiguous, 
liable  to  infinite  abuse,  even  from  negligence ;  and  so 
liable  to  it  from  design,  that  every  man  can  deceive  and 
betray  by  it.  And  to  mention  but  one  instance  more, 
that  brutes  without  reason  should  act,  in  many  respects, 
with  a  sagacity  and  foresight  vastly  greater  than  what 
men  have  in  those  respects,  would  be  thought  impossible. 
Yet  it  is  certain  they  do  act  with  such  superior  fore- 
sight ;  whether  it  be  their  own,  indeed,  is  another  ques- 
tion.    From  these  things  it  is  highly  credible  before- 


Chap.  IIIJ  Of  Credibility  of  Revelation.      231 

hand,  that  upon  supposition  God  should  afford  men 
some  additional  instruction  by  revelation,  it  would  be 
with  circumstances,  in  manners,  degrees,  and  respects 
which  we  should  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had  great  objections 
against  the  credibility  of.  Nor  are  the  objections  against 
the  Scripture,  nor  against  Christianity  in  general,  at  all 
more  or  greater  than  the  analogy  of  nature  would  be- 
forehand,— not  perhaps  give  ground  to  expect,  for  this 
analogy  may  not  be  sufficient,  in  some  cases,  to  ground 
an  expectation  upon, — but  no  more  nor  greater  than 
analogy  would  show  it,  beforehand,  to  be  supposable 
and  credible,  that  there  might  seem  to  lie  against  reve- 
lation. 

9.  By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  partic- 
ular objection,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen  how  they 
are  applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind ;  and,  indeed, 
to  almost  all  objections  against  Christianity  as  distin- 
guished from  objections  against  its  evidence.  It  appears 
from  Scripture,  that  as  it  was  not  unusual  objection  to 
in  the  apostolic  age  for  persons,  upon  their  SSS*"tS^£ 
conversion  to  Christianity,  to  be  endued  o«i«''iy"8e. 
with  miraculous  gifts ;  so,  some  of  those  persons  exer- 
cised these  gifts  in  a  strangely  irregular  and  disorderly 
manner;  and  this  is  made  an  objection  against  their  be- 
ing really  miraculous.  Now  the  foregoing  observations 
quite  remove  this  objection,  how  considerable  soever  it 
may  appear  at  first  sight.  For,  consider  a  person  en- 
dued with  any  of  these  gifts,  for  instance,  that  of  tongues ; 
it  is  to  be  supposed  that  he  had  the  same  power  over  this 
miraculous  gift  as  he  would  have  had  over  it  had  it  been 
the  effect  of  habit,  of  study,  and  use,  as  it  ordinarily  is;  or 
the  same  power  over  it,  as  he  had  over  any  other  natural 
endowment.  Consequently,  he  would  use  it  in  the  same 
manner  he  did  any  other ;  either  regularly  and  upon  prop- 
er occasions  only,  or  irregularly  and  upon  improper  ones ; 
according  to  his  sense  of  decency,  and  his  character  of 


232  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II 

prudence.*  Where,  then,  is  the  objection  -*  Why  if 
this  miraculous  power  was  indeed  given  to  tl  e  world  to 
propagate  Christianity,  and  attest  the  truth  of  it,  we 
might,  it  seems,  have  expected  that  other  sort  of  persons 
should  have  been  chosen  to  be  invested  with  it;  or  that 
these  should,  at  the  same  time,  have  been  endued  with 
prudence ;  or  that  they  should  have  been  continually 
restrained  and  directed  in  the  exercise  of  it ;  that  is, 
that  God  should  have  miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all, 
in  a  different  manner  or  higher  degree.  But,  from  the 
observations  made  above,  it  is  undeniably  evident  that 
we  are  not  judges  in  what  degrees  and  manner  it  were 
to  have  been  expected  he  should  miraculously  inter- 
pose ;  upon  supposition  of  his  doing  it  in  some  degree 
and  manner.  Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  providence, 
are  superior  gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and 
other  talents  of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on  per- 
sons of  prudence  and  decency,  or  such  as  are  disposed 
to  make  the  properest  use  of  them.  Nor  is  the  instruc- 
tion and  admonition  naturally  afforded  us  for  the  con- 
duct of  life,  particularly  in  our  education,  commonly 
given  in  a  manner  the  most  suited  to  recommend  it ;  but 

*  [Warburton,  as  quoted  by  Fitzgerald,  points  out  the  distinction 
between  such  supernatural  endowments  as  the  gift  of  tongues  and  oth- 
ers. "  The  power  of  healing  or  working  miracles  is,  during  the  whole 
course  of  its  operation,  one  continual  arrest  or  diversion  of  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  matter  and  motion.  It  was  therefore  fitting  that  this 
power  should  be  given  occasionally.  But  the  speaking  7vith  tongues, 
when  once  the  gift  was  conferred,  became  thenceforth  a  natural 
power  ;  just  as  the  free  and  perfect  use  of  the  members  of  the  body, 
after  they  have  been  restored  by  miracles  to  the  exercise  of  their  nat- 
ural functions.  Indeed,  to  have  lost  the  gift  of  tongues  after  this 
temporary  use  of  it  would  imply  another  miracle ;  for  it  must  have 
been  by  actual  deprivation,  unless  we  suppose  the  apostles  were  ir- 
rational organs  through  which  divine  sounds  were  conveyed.  ...  In 
healing,  the  apostles  are  to  be  considered  as  the  workers  of  a  miracle  ; 
and  in  speaking  strange  tongues,  as  the  persons  on  whom  the  miracle 
is  performed."] 


Chap.  III.]  Of  CREDiBiLfXY  of  Revelation.       233 

often  with   circumstances  apt  to  prejudice  us  against 
such  instruction. 

10.  One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  re- 
semblance between  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation 
in  several  other  respects.*  Practical  Chris-  other  analogies 
tianity,  or  that  faith  and  behavior  which  ren-  SSr^"an?5t 
ders  a  man  a  Christian,  is  a  plain  and  obvi-  *°"' 
ous  thing;  like  the  common  rules  of  conduct,  with 
respect  to  our  ordinary  temporal  affairs.  The  more 
distinct  and  particular  knowledge  of  those  things,  the 
study  of  which  the  apostle  calls  ''^ going  on  unto  perfec- 
tion,^' and  of  the  prophetic  parts  of  revelation,  like  many 
parts  of  natural  and  even  civil  knowledge,  may  require 
very  exact  thought  and  careful  consideration.  The 
hinderances  too,  of  natural  and  of  supernatural  light  and 
knowledge,  have  been  of  the  same  kind.  And  as  it  is 
owned  the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet  under- 
stood, so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood  before  the 
^''restitution  of  all  things,''  and  without  miraculous  inter- 
positions, it  must  be  in  the  same  way  as  natural  knowl- 
edge is  come  at,  by  the  continuance  and  progress  of 
learning  and  of  liberty,  and  by  particular  persons  at- 
tending to,  comparing,  and  pursuing,  intimations  scat- 
tered up  and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and  disre- 
garded by  the  generality  of  the  world.  For  this  is  the 
way  in  which  all  improvements  are  made;  by  thought- 

*  [This  passage  marks  the  essential  difference  between  the  Protest- 
ant and  Roman  notions  of  developments.  The  Protestant  are :  i.  Not 
developments  of  the  faith,  but  of  the  wisdom,  of  the  gospel ;  whereas 
the  Roman  are  developments  of  mere  necessary  articles  of  faith 
2.  The  Protestant  developments  are  arrived  at  by  the  free  examina- 
tion of  Scripture  with  all  the  helps  of  learning  and  reason  ;  whereas 
the  Roman  are  principally  drawn  from  tradition,  and  were  elaborated 
in  ages  when  the  study  of  the  original  languages  having  been  gener- 
ally abandoned,  and  sound  principles  of  criticism  but  little  known, 
the  Church  was  destitute  of  adequate  means  for  developing  the  sense 
of  the  sacred  writings.  — Fi tzokkalo.] 


234  Analog V  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

ful  men's  tracing  on  obscure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped 
us  by  nature  accidentally,  or  which  seem  to  come  into 
our  minds  by  chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a 
book  which  has  been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  man- 
kind should  contain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered. 
For  all  the  same  phenomena,  and  the  same  faculties  of 
investigation,  from  which  such  great  discoveries  in  nat- 
ural knowledge  have  been  made  in  the  present  and  last 
age,  were  equally  in  the  possession  of  mankind  several 
tliousand  years  before.  And  possibly  it  might  be  in- 
tended, that  events,  as  they  come  to  pass,  should  open 
and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  several  parts  of  Scripture. 

11.  It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a 
objttction.  Nat-  material  rcspcct ;  for  that  natural  knowledge 
oMittie  tap^o^r-  is  of  little  or  no  consequence.  But  I  have 
^'*""'-  been  speaking  of  the  general  instruction 
which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us.  And  besides, 
some  parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in  the  more  common, 
restrained  sense  of  the  words,  are  of  the  greatest  conse- 
quence to  the  ease  and  convenience  of  life.  But  sup- 
pose the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this  respect, 
yet  it  might  be  abundantly  supplied  from  the  whole 
constitution  and  course  of  nature;  which  shows  that 
God  does  not  dispense  his  gifts  according  to  our  notions 
of  the  advantage  and  consequence  they  would  be  of  to 
us.  And  this  in  general,  with  his  method  of  dispensing 
knowledge  in  particular,  would  together  make  out  an 
analogy  full  to  the  point  before  us. 

12.  But  it  may  be  objected  still  further,  and  more 
Objection  from  generally— "  The  Scripture  represents  the 
%^oI  V^'  world  as  in  a  state  of  ruin,  and  Christianity 
Christianity.  ^^  g^^  expedient  to  recover  it,  to  help  in 
these  respects  where  nature  fails ;  in  particular,  to  sup- 
ply the  deficiencies  of  natural  light.  Is  it  credible,  then, 
that  so  many  ages  should  have  been  let  pass  before  a 
matter  of  such  a  sort,  of  so  great  and  so  general  impor 


Chap.  III. J  Of  Credibility-  of  Revelation.       235 

tance,  was  made  known  to  mankind  ?  and  then  thai  it 
should  be  made  known  to  so  small  a  part  of  them  ?  Is 
it  conceivable,  that  this  supply  should  be  so  very  defi- 
cient, should  have  the  like  obscurity  and  doubtfulness, 
be  liable  to  the  like  perversions  ;  in  short,  lie  open  to  all 
the  like  objections,  a?  the  light  of  nature  itself  .i*' 
(Chap,  vi.) 

Without  determining  how  far  this  in  fact  is  so,  I  an- 
swer ;  it  is  by  no  means  incredible  that  it  might  be  so, 
if  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation  be  from  the  same 
hand.  Men  are  naturally  liable  to  diseases;  for  which 
God,  in  his  good  providence,  has  provided  natural  rem- 
edies, (Chap.  V.)  But  remedies  existing  in  nature  have 
been  unknown  to  mankind  for  many  ages ;  are  known 
but  to  few  now  ;  probably  many  valuable  ones  are  not 
known  yet.  Great  has  been,  and  is,  the  obscurity  and 
difficulty,  in  the  nature  and  application  of  them.  Cir- 
cumstances seem  often  to  make  them  very  improper 
where  they  are  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  after  long 
labor  and  study,  and  many  unsuccessful  endeavors,  that 
they  are  brought  to  be  as  useful  as  they  are ;  after  high 
contempt  and  absolute  rejection  of  the  most  useful  we 
have ;  and  after  disputes  and  doubts,  which  have  seemed 
to  be  endless.  The  best  remedies,  too,  when  unskillful- 
ly,  much  more  if  dishonestly,  applied,  may  produce  new 
diseases ;  and  with  the  rightest  application,  the  success 
of  them  is  often  doubtful.  In  many  cases  they  are  not 
at  all  effectual ;  where  they  are,  it  is  often  very  slowly : 
and  the  application  of  them,  and  the  necessary  regimen 
accompanying  it,  is,  not  uncommonly,  so  disagreeable, 
that  some  will  not  submit  to  them ;  and  satisfy  them- 
selves with  the  excuse  that  if  they  would,  it  is  not  cer- 
tain  whether  it  would  be  successful.  And  many  per- 
sons, who  labor  under  diseases,  for  which  there  are 
known  natural  remedies,  are  not  so  happy  as  to  be  al- 
ways, if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them.     In  a  word,  the  reme- 


236  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

dies  which  nature  has  provided  for  diseases  are  neither 
certain,  perfect,  nor  universal.  And  indeed  the  same 
principles  of  arguing,  which  would  lead  us  to  conclude 
that  they  must  be  so,  would  lead  us  likewise  to  conclude 
that  there  could  be  no  occasion  for  them ;  that  is,  that 
there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all.  And  therefore  our 
experience  that  there  are  diseases,  shows  that  it  is 
credible  beforehand,  upon  supposition  nature  has  pro- 
vided remedies  for  them,  that  these  remedies  may  be, 
as  by  experience  we  find  they  are,  not  certain,  nor 
perfect,  nor  universal ;  because  it  shows,  that  the  prin- 
ciples upon  which  we  should  expect  the  contrary  are 
fallacious. 

13.  And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all 
these  things?  Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what  is 
The  province  offered  to  US  as  being  of  divine  revelation, 
of  reason.  Yov  this  would  be  to  infer  that  we  are  una- 

ble to  judge  of  any  thing  because  we  are  unable  to  judge 
of  all  things.  Reason  can,  and  it  ought,  to  judge  not 
only  of  the  meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality  and  the  evi- 
dence, of  revelation. 

First.  It  is  the  province  of  reason  to  judge  of  the 
morality  of  the  Scripture ;  that  is,  not  whether  it  con- 
tains things  different  from  what  we  should  have  expect- 
ed from  a  wise,  just,  and  good  Being;  for  objections 
from  hence  have  been  now  obviated,  but  whether  it  con- 
tains things  plainly  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or 
goodness ;  to  what  the  light  of  nature  teaches  us  of  God. 
And  I  know  nothing  of  this  sort  objected  against  Script- 
ure, excepting  such  objections  as  are  formed  upon  sup- 
positions which  would  equally  conclude  that  the  consti- 
tution of  nature  is  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or 
goodness  ;  which  most  certainly  it  is  not.  Indeed,  there 
are  some  particular  precepts  in  Scripture,  given  to  par- 
ticular persons,  requiring  actions  which  would  be  im- 
moral and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  such  precepts.     But 


Chap.  III.]  Of  Credibility  of  Revelation.       237 

it  is  easy  to  see  that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind  as  that 
the  precept  changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of 
the  action ;  and  both  constitutes  and  shows  that  not  to 
be  unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept,  must 
have  appeared  and  really  have  been,  so :  which  may 
well  be,  since  none  of  these  precepts  are  contrary  to  im-- 
mutable  morality.  If  it  were  commanded  to  cultivate 
the  principles,  and  act  from  the  spirit  of  treachery,  in- 
gratitude, cruelty;  the  command  would  not  alter  the 
nature  of  the  case,  or  of  the  action,  in  any  of  these  in- 
stances. But  it  is  quite  otherwise  in  precepts,  which  re- 
quire only  the  doing  an  external  action;  for  instance, 
taking  away  the  property  or  life  of  any.  For  men  have  no 
right  to  either  life  or  property,  but  what  arises  solely  from 
the  grant  of  God  :  when  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease 
to, have  any  right  at  all  in  either;  and  when  this  revoca- 
tion is  made  known,  as  surely  it  is  possible  it  may  be,  it 
must  cease  to  be  unjust  to  deprive  them  of  either.  And 
though  a  course  of  external  acts,  which  without  com- 
mand would  be  immoraf,  must  make  an  immoral  habit, 
yet  a  few  detached  commands  have  no  such  natural 
tendency.  I  thought  proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the 
few  Scripture  precepts,  which  require  not  vicious  ac- 
tions, but  actions  which  would  have  been  vicious  had  it 
not  been  for  such  precepts  ;  because  they  are  sometimes 
weakly  urged  as  immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon 
objections  drawn  from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems 
no  difficulty  at  all  in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises 
from  their  being  offenses;  that  is,  from  their  being 
liable  to  be  perverted,  as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked 
designing  men,  to  serve  the  most  horrid  purposes, 
and,  perhaps,  to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthusiastic. 
And  objections  from  this  head  are  not  objections 
against  revelation,  but  against  the  whole  notion  of  re- 
ligion as  a  trial :  and  against  the  general  constitution 
of  nature. 


238  Analogy  of  Religion.^        [Part  II, 

Secondly.  Reason  is  able  to  judge,  and  must,  of  the 
evidence  of  revelation,  and  of  the  objections  urged 
against  that  evidence ;  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  a 
following  chapter.  (Chap,  vii.) 

14.  But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observations 
is,  that  the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christian- 
Weneedcon-  ity  depends,  is  scarce  at  all,  what  objections 
lions "agatost*'  there  are  against  its  scheme,  since  there  are 
proof.  none  against  the  morality  of  it ;  but  what  ob- 

jections there  are  against  its  evidence :  or,  what  proof  there 
remains  of  it,  after  due  allowa?ices  made  for  the  objections 
against  that  proof :  because  it  has  been  shown,  that  the 
objections  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objec- 
tions against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous.  For  surely  very 
little  weight,  if  any  at  all,  is  to  be  laid  upon  a  way  of 
arguing  and  objecting,  which,  when  applied  to  the  gen- 
eral constitution  of  nature,  experience  shows  not  to  be 
conclusive  :  and  such,  I  think,  is  the  whole  way  of  ob- 
jecting treated  of  throughout  this  chapter.  It  is  resolv- 
able into  principles,  and  goes  upon  suppositions,  which 
mislead  us  to  think  that  the  Author  of  nature  would 
not  act  as  we  experience  he  does ;  or  would  act,  in  such 
and  such  cases,  as  we  experience  he  does  not  in  like 
cases.  But  the  unreasonableness  of  this  way  of  object- 
ing will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from  hence,  that  the 
chief  things  thus  objected  against  are  justified,  as  shall 
be  further  shown,*  by  distinct,  particular,  and  full  anal- 
ogies, in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  as  frivolous  as  objec- 
tions of  the  foregoing  sort  against  revelation  are,  yet, 
when  a  supposed  revelation  is  more  consistent  with  it- 
self, and  has  a  more  general  and  uniform  tendency  to 
promote  virtue,  than,  all  circumstances  considered,  could 
have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political  views ; 
this  is  a  presumptive  proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from 
*  Chap,  iv,  latter  part ;  and  v,  vi. 


Chap.  III.]  Of  Credibility  of  Revelation.       239 

them,  and  so  of  its  truth ;  because  we  are  competent 
judges  what  might  have  been  expected- from  enthusiasm 
and  political  views.* 

*  [In  aiding  that  a  revelation  cannot  have  come  from  perfect 
wisdom,  because  there  are  in  it  things  which  seem  to  us  foolishness 
we  are  arguing  in  the  dark.  But  in  arguing  that  it  cannot  have  come 
from  human  fraud  or  enthusiasm  we  are  dealing  with  matters  which 
we  may  perfectly  understand,  because  coming  within  the  sphere  of 
our  daily  experience.  See  the  latter  argument  admirably  pressed  in 
the  Archbishop  of  Dublin's  Essay  on  the  Peculiarities  of  the  Chris- 
tian Religion,  and  on  the  Omissions  of  Scripture. — F.l 


240  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  CHRISTIANITY,  CONSIDERED  AS  A  SCHEME  OR  CON- 
STITUTION,  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED. 


I 


T  hath  been  now  shown*  that  the  analogy  of  nature 
renders  it  highly  credible,  beforehand,  that  suppos- 
^u.  -^     .  u    i^g  3.  revelation  to  be  made,  it  must  contain 

Objections  to  be         °  ,  ' 

expected.  How   many  things  very  different  from   what  we 

answered.  i  i   i  ,  -,  , 

should  have  expected,  and  such  as  appear 
open  to  great  objections ;  and  that  this  observation,  in 
good  measure,  takes  off  the  force  of  those  objections,  or 
rather,  precludes  them.  But  it  may  be  alleged  that  this 
is  a  very  partial  answer  to  such  objections,  or  a  very  un- 
satisfactory way  of  obviating  them ;  because  it  doth  not 
show  at  all,  that  the  things  objected  against  can  be  wise, 
just,  and  good ;  much  less  that  it  is  credible  they  are  so. 
It  will,  therefore,  be  proper  to  show  this  distinctly,  by 
applying  to  these  objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice, 
and  goodness  of  Christianity,  the  answer  above  f  given 
to  the  like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature  ; 
before  we  consider  the  particular  analogies  in  the  latter 
to  the  particular  things  objected  against  in  the  former. 
Now  that  which  affords  a  sufificient  answer  to  objections 
against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the  consti- 
tution of  nature,  is  its  being  a  constitution,  a  system,  or 
scheme,  imperfectly  comprehended  ;  a  scheme,  in  which 
means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and  which 
is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  For  from  these  things  it 
has  been  proved,  not  only  to  be  possible,  but  also  to  be 

•*  In  the  foregoing  chapter. 

f  Part  i,  chap,  vii,  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 


Chap.  IV.]  Of  Christianity  as  a  Scheme.         241 

credible,  that  those  things  which  are  objected  against 
may  be  consistent  with  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness ; 
nay,  may  be  instances  of  them  :  and  even  that  the  con- 
stitution and  government  of  nature  may  be  perfect  in 
the  highest  possible  degree.  If  Christianity,  then,  be  a 
scheme,  and  of  the  like  kind,  it  is  evident  the  like  ob- 
jections against  it  must  admit  of  the  like  answer.  And, 
2.  I.  Christianity  is  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our  compre- 
hension.    The  moral  government  of  God  is    ^^^  ^   ..  ^, 

°  .  .  Christianity  be 

exercised   by  gradually  conductmg   thmgs  yond  our  com 

_    ,  .  .  ,     °  ,  prehension. 

SO,  in  the  course  of  his  providence,  that 
every  one,  at  length,  and  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive 
according  to  his  deserts ;  and  neither  fraud  nor  violence, 
but  truth  and  right,  shall  finally  prevail.  Christianity  is 
a  particular  scheme  under  this  general  plan  of  provi- 
dence, and  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to  its  completion  with 
regard  to  mankind :  consisting  itself  also  of  various 
parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy,  which  has  been  car- 
rying on  from  the  time  the  world  came  into  its  present 
wretched  state,  and  is  still  carrying  on,  for  its  recovery, 
by  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah ;  who  is  "  to  gather  to- 
gether in  one  the  children  of  God  that  are  scattered 
abroad,"  (John  xi,  52,)  and  establish  "an  everlasting 
kingdom,  wherein  dwelleth  righteousness."  2  Pet.  iii,  13. 
And  in  order  to  it,  after  various  manifestations  of  things 
relating  to  this  great  and  general  scheme  of  Providence, 
through  a  succession  of  many  ages ; — (for  "  the  Spirit  of 
Christ,  which  was  in  the  prophets,  testified  beforehand 
his  sufferings,  and  the  glory  that  should  follow:  unto 
whom  it  was  revealed,  that  not  unto  themselves,  but 
unto  us,  they  did  minister  the  things  which  are  now 
reported  unto  us  by  them  which  have  preached  the 
gospel;  which  things  the  angels  desire  to  look  into," 
(i  Pet.  i,  II,  12:) — after  various  dispensations,  looking 
forward  and  preparatory  to  this  final  salvation,  "  in  the 
fullness  of  time,"  when  Infinite  Wisdom  thought  fit,  He, 
16 


242  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II. 

"  being  in  the  form  of  God,  made  himself  of  no  reputa- 
tion, and  took  upon  him  the  form  of"  a  servant,  and  was 
made  in  the  likeness  of  men ;  and  being  found  in  fash- 
ion as  a  man,  he  humbled  himself,  and  became  obedient 
to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross :  wherefore  God 
also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name  which 
is  above  every  name :  that  at  the  name  of  Jesus  every 
knee  should  bow,  of  things  in  heaven,  and  things  in 
earth,  and  things  under  the  earth ;  and  that  every  tongue 
should  confess,  that  Jesus  Christ  is  Lord,  to  the  glory 
of  God  the  Father."  Phil,  ii,  6-11.  Parts,  likewise,  of 
this  economy  are  the  miraculous  mission  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  and  his  ordinary  assistances  given  to  good  men ; 
the  invisible  government  which  Christ  at  present  exer- 
cises over  his  Church ;  that  which  he  himself  refers 
to  in  these  words,  "  In  my  Father's  house  are  many 
mansions — I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you,"  (John  xiv, 
2  ;)  and  his  future  return  to  "judge  the  world  in  right- 
eousness," and  completely  re-establish  the  kingdom  of 
God.  "  For  the  Father  judgeth  no  man  ;  but  hath  com- 
mitted all  judgment  unto  the  Son  ;  that  all  men  should 
honor  the  Son,  even  as  they  honor  the  Father."  John 
V,  22,  23.  "All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  heaven  and 
in  earth."  Matt,  xxviii,  18.  "And  he  must  reign,  till  he 
hath  put  all  enemies  under  his  feet.  Then  cometh  the 
end,  when  he  shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to 
God,  even  the  Father;  when  he  shall  have  put  down  all 
rule,  and  all  authority,  and  power.  And  when  all  things 
shall  be  subdued  unto  him,  then  shall  the  Son  also  him- 
self be  subject  unto  him,  that  put  all  things  under  him, 
that  God  may  be  all  in  all."  i  Cor.  xv,  25-28.  Now 
little,  surely,  need  be  said  to  show,  that  this  system  or 
scheme  of  things  is  but  imperfectly  comprehended  by 
us.  The  Scripture  expressly  asserts  it  to  be  so.  And 
indeed  one  cannot  read  a  passage  relating  to  this  "  great 
mystery  of  godliness,"  (i  Tim.  iii,  16,)  but  what  imme 


Chap.  IV.]  Of  Christianity  as  a  Scheme.         243 

diately  runs  up  into  something  which  shows  us  our  ig- 
norance in  it,  as  every  thing  in  nature  shows  us  our 
ignorance  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  And  whoever 
will  seriously  consider  that  part  of  the  Christian  scheme 
which  is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  so  much  more 
unrevealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  pur 
poses  of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know^  as  little  of  it  as 
of  the  constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore, 
is  as  much  an  answer  to  our  objections  against  the  per- 
fection of  one  as  against  the  perfection  of  the  other. 
(Page  172,  etc.) 

3.  II.  It  is  obvious,  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispen- 
sation, as  much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things,  means 
are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends.  And  Means  used  to 
the  observation  of  this  furnishes  us  with  the  *«««'"P"«^^«nd«- 
same  answer  to  objections  against  the  perfection  of 
Christianity,  as  to  objections  of  the  like  kind  against  the 
constitution  of  nature.  It  shows  the  credibility,  that 
the  things  objected  against,  how  foolish  (i  Cor.  i)  soever 
they  appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very  best  means  of  ac- 
complishing the  very  best  ends.  And  their  appearing 
foolishness  is  no  presumption  against  this,  in  a  scheme 
so  greatly  beyond  our  comprehension.  (Page  178.) 

4.  III.  The  credibility  that  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general 
laws,  (pages  179,  180,)  no  less  than  the  A8ton&tnre,»o 
course  of  nature,  may  require  to  be  more  SriSd'^S^  by 
distinctly  made  out.  Consider,  then,  upon  ^*'°*™'  '*'^'- 
what  ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole  common  course 
of  nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general  foreordained 
laws.  We  know,  indeed,  several  of  the  general  laws  of 
matter;  and  a  great  part  of  the  natural  behavior  of  liv- 
ing agents  is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we  know  in  a 
manner  nothing,  by  what  laws  storms  and  tempests, 
earthquakes,  famine,  pestiknce,  become  the  instruments 
of  destruction   to  mankind.     And    the  laws,  by  which 


244  Analogy  of  Religion.         'Part  II.. 

persons  born  into  the  world  at  such  a  time  and  place, 
are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  tempers;  the  laws,  by 
which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in  a  multitude  of 
cases;  and  by  which  innumerable  things  happen,  of  the 
greatest  influence  upon  the  affairs  and  state  of  the 
world ;  these  laws  are  so  wholly  unknown  to  us,  that  we 
call  the  events  which  come  to  pass  by  them,  accidental; 
though  all  reasonable  men  know  certainly,  that  there 
cannot,  in  reality,  be  any  such  thing  as  chance;  and 
conclude  that  the  things  which  have  this  appearance 
are  the  result  of  general  laws  and  may  be  reduced 
into  them.  It  is,  then,  but  an  exceeding  little  way, 
and  in  but  a  very  few  respects,  that  we  can  trace 
up  the  natural  course  of  things  before  us  to  gen- 
eral laws.  And  it  is  only  from  analogy  that  we  con- 
clude the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  being  reduced 
into  them ;  only  from  our  seeing  that  part  is  so.  It  is 
from  our  finding  that  the  course  of  nature,  in  some  re- 
spects and  so  far,  goes  on  by  general  laws,  that  we  con- 
clude this  of  the  rest.  And  if  that  be  a  just  ground  for 
such  a  conclusion,  it  is  a  just  ground  also,  if  not  to  con- 
clude yet  to  apprehend,  to  render  it  supposable  and  cred- 
ible, which  is  sufficient  for  answering  objections,  that 
God's  miraculous  interpositions  may  have  been  all  along, 
in  like  manner,  hy  general  Xd^v^^s,  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that 
miraculous  powers  should  be  exerted  at  such  times, 
upon  such  occasions,  in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and 
with  regard  to  such  persons  rather  than  others  ;  that  the 
affairs  of  the  world-  being  permitted  to  go  on  in  their 
natural  course  so  far,  should  just  at  such  a  point  have  a 
new  direction  given  them  by  miraculous  interpositions ; 
that  these  interpositions  should  be  exactly  in  such  de- 
grees and  respects  only  :  all  this  may  have  been  by  gen- 
eral laws.  These  laws  are  unknown,  indeed,  to  us  ;  but 
no  more  unknown  than  the  Uws  from  whence  it  is  that 
some  die  as  soon  as  they  are  born  and  others  live  to  ex- 


Chap.  IV.]  Of  Christianity  as  a  Scheme.         245 

treme  old  age ;  that  one  man  is  so  superior  to  anothei 
in  understanding ;  with  innumerable  more  things,  which, 
as  was  before  observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any  laws 
or  rules  at  all ;  though  it  is  taken  for  granted  they  are 
as  much  reducible  to  general  ones  as  gravitation.  Now, 
if  the  revealed  dispensations  of  Providence  and  mirac- 
ulous interpositions  be  by  general  laws,  as  well  as  God's 
ordinary  government  in  the  course  of  nature,  made 
known  by  reason  and  experience ;  there  is  no  more  rea- 
son to  expect  that  every  exigence,  as  it  arises,  should  be 
provided  for  by  these  general  laws  of  miraculous  inter- 
positions than  that  every  exigence  in  nature  should, 
by  the  general  laws  of  nature ;  yet  there  might  be 
wise  and  good  reasons,  that  miraculous  interpositions 
should  be  by  general  laws ;  and  that  these  laws  should  not 
be  broken  in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by  other  miracles. 
5.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  the  appearance  of  deficien- 
cies and  irregularities  in  nature  is  owing  to  its  being  a 
scheme  but  in  part  made  known,  and  of  such  The  scheme 
a  certain  particular  kind  in  other  respects,  chn" tianfty  ?m- 
Now  we  see  no  more  reason  why  the  frame  rtoo(T%he*^ki- 
and  course  of  nature  should  be  such  a  ^'^'■^"<^«- 
scheme,  than  why  Christianity  should.  And  that  the 
former  is  such  a  scheme,  renders  it  credible  that  the  lat- 
ter, upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  may  be  so  too.  And 
as  it  is  manifest  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  revealed 
but  in  part,  and  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use 
of  to  accomplish  ends,  like  to  that  of  nature;  so  the 
credibility  that  it  may  have  been  all  along  carried  on 
by  general  laws,  no  less  than  the  course  of  nature,  has 
been  distinctly  proved.  And  from  all  this  it  is  before- 
hand credible  that  there  might,  I  think  probable  that 
there  would,  be  the  like  appearance  of  deficiencies  and 
irregularities  in  Christianity  as  in  nature ;  that  is,  that 
Christianity  would  be  liable  to  the  like  objections,  as 
the  frame  of  nature.     And  these  objections  are  answered 


246  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

by  these  observations  concerning  Christianity ;  as  the 
like  objections  against  the  frame  of  nature  are  answered 
by  the  like  observations  concerning  the  frame  of  nature. 


6.  The  objections  against  Christianity,  considered  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  (page  222,  etc.,)  having  in  general  been 
obviated  in  the  preceding  chapter;  and  the  same  con- 
sidered as  made  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it 
having  been  obviated  in  this ;  the  next  thing,  according  to 
the  method  proposed,  is  to  show  that  the  principal  objec- 
tions, in  particular  against  Christianity,  may  be  answered 
by  particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature.  And  as  one 
of  them  is  made  against  the  whole  scheme  of  it  togeth- 
er, as  just  now  described,  I  choose  to  consider  it  here, 
rather  than  in  a  distinct  chapter  by  itself. 

The  thing  objected  against  this  scheme  of  the  gospel 
is,  "  that  it  seems  to  suppose  God  was  reduced  to  the 
Objection,  God  necessity  of  a  long  series  of  intricate  means 
Sompeiiedtouse  ^^  Order  to  accomplish  his  ends,  the  recov- 
to8?A?htepr  ery  and  salvation  of  the  world ;  in  like  sort 
P®^-  as  men,  for  want  of  understanding  or  power, 

not  being  able  to  come  at  their  ends  directly,  are  forced  to 
go  round-about  ways,  and  make  use  of  many  perplexed 
contrivances  to  arrive  at  them."  Now  every  thing  which 
we  see  shows  the  folly  of  this,  considered  as  an  objec- 
tion against  the  truth  of  Christianity.  For  according  to 
our  manner  of  conception,  God  makes  use  of  variety  of 
means,  what  we  often  think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural 
course  of  providence,  for  the  accomplishment  of  all 
his  ends.  Indeed,  it  is  certain  there  is  somewhat  in 
this  matter  quite  beyond  our  comprehension ;  but  the 
mystery  is  as  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity.  We 
know  what  we  ourselves  aim  at  as  final  ends,  and  what 
courses  we  take  merely  as  means  conducing  to  those 
ends.     But  we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are 


Chap.  IV.J  Of  Christianity  as  a  Scheme.  247 

considered  by  the  Author  of  nature,  under  the  single 
notion  of  means  and  ends ;  so  as  that  it  may  be  said, 
this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  his  re- 
gard. And  whether  there  be  not  some  peculiar  absurd- 
ity in  our  very  manner  of  conception  concerning  this 
matter,  somewhat  contradictory,  arising  from  our  ex- 
tremely imperfect  views  of  things,  it  is  impossible  to  say. 
However,  thus  much  is  manifest,  that  the  whole  natu- 
ral world,  and  government  of  it,  is  a  scheme  or  system ; 
not  a  fixed,  but  a  progressive  one ;  a  scheme  in  which 
the  operation  of  various  means  takes  up  a  great  length 
of  time  before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can  be  attained. 
The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits  of  the 
earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  is  an  instance  of  this ; 
and  so  is  human  life.  Thus  vegetable  bodies,  and  those 
of  animals,  though  possibly  formed  at  once,  yet  grow  up 
by  degrees  to  a  mature  state.  And  thus  rational  agents, 
who  animate  these  latter  bodies,  are  naturally  directed 
to  form  each  his  own  manners  and  character  by  the 
gradual  gaining  of  knowledge  and  experience,  and  by  a 
long  course  of  action.  Our  existence  is  not  only  suc- 
cessive, as  it  must  be  of  necessity,  but  one  state  of  our 
life  and  being  is  appointed  by  God  to  be  a  preparation 
for  another ;  and  that  to  be  the  means  of  attaining  to 
another  succeeding  one :  infancy  to  childhood ;  child- 
hood to  youth ;  youth  to  mature  age.  Men  are  impa- 
tient, and  for  precipitating  things;  but  the  Author  of 
nature  appears  deliberate  throughout  his  operations ; 
accomplishing  his  natural  ends  by  slow,  successive  steps.* 

*  [*•  We  shall  find  that  all  the  great  developments  of  the  moral  be- 
ing have  resulted  in  the  advantage  of  society,  and  that  all  the  great 
developments  of  the  social  condition  have  raised  the  character  of 
humanity.  The  movement  takes  its  peculiar  character  from  which- 
ever of  the  two  facts  predominates  and  lends  its  luster. 

"  Sometimes,  long  intervals  of  time,  a  thousand  transformations  and 
obstacles,  occur  before  the  second  fact  is  developed,  and  comes  as  it 
were  to  complete  the  civilization  which  the  first  had  commenced 


248  Analogy  of  Religion         [Part  II. 

And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid  out,  which 
from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various  systems  of  means, 
as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order  to  the  carrying  on  its 
several  parts  into  execution.  Thus  in  the  daily  course  of 
natural  providence,  God  operates  in  the  very  same  man- 
ner as  in  the  dispensation  of  Christianity,  making  one 
thing  subservient  to  another ;  this  to  somewhat  further ; 
and  so  on,  through  a  progressive  series  of  means  which 
extend  both  backward  and  forward,  beyond  our  utmost 
view.  Of  this  manner  of  operation,  every  thing  we  see 
in  the  course  of  nature  is  as  much  an  instance  as  any 
part  of  the  Christian  dispensation. 

But  close  observation  convinces  us  of  the  bond  which  unites  them. 
The  ways  of  Providence  are  not  confined  within  narrow  limits  ;  he 
hurries  not  himself  to  display  to-day  the  consequence  of  the  principle 
that  he  yesterday  laid  down  ;  he  will  draw  it  out  in  the  lapse  of  ages, 
when  the  hour  is  come  ;  and  even  according  to  our  reasoning,  logic 
is  not  the  less  sure  because  it  is  slow.  Providence  is  unconcerned  as 
to  time  ;  his  march  (if  I  may  be  allowed  the  simile)  is  like  that  of  the 
fabulous  deities  of  Homer  through  space ;  he  takes  a  step,  and  ages 
have  elapsed.  How  long  a  time,  how  many  events,  before  the  regen- 
eration of  the  moral  man  by  Christianity  exercised  its  great  and  le- 
gitimate influence  upon  the  regeneration  of  the  social  state  !  It  has 
succeeded,  however ;  who  can  at  this  day  gai:nisay  it  ? " — Guizot's 
Lectures  on  Civilization  in  Europe^  Lecture  I.] 


Chap.  VJ  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  249 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  THE  PARTICULAR  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY  ,*  THE 
APPOINTMENT  OF  A  MEDIATOR,  AND  THE  REDEMP- 
TION  OF   THE  WORLD  BY  HIM. 

THERE  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  Chris- 
tianity which  has  been  more  objected  against  than 
the  mediation  of  Christ,  in  some  or  other  of  its  parts. 
Yet,  upon  thorough  consideration,  there  seems  nothing 
less  justly  liable  to  it.*     For, 

I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  imagined 
presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  The  analogy  of 
'' a  Mediator  behveen  God  and  manr  (i  Tim.  ff^wSrS 
ii,  5.)  For  we  find  all  living  creatures  are  *^^***o'"- 
brought  into  the  world,  and  their  life  in  infancy  is  pre- 
served, by  the  instrumentality  of  others ;  and  every  sat- 
isfaction of  it,  some  way  or  other,  is  bestowed  by  the 
like  means.  So  that  the  visible  government  which  God 
exercises  over  the  world,  is  by  the  instrumentality  and 
mediation  of  others.     And  how  far  his  invisible  govern- 

*  [Philosophers  make  shameful  and  dangerous  mistakes  when  they 
judge  of  the  divine  economy.  He  cannot,  they  tell  us,  act  thus  ;  it 
would  be  contrary  to  his  wisdom  or  his  justice,  etc.  But  while  they 
make  these  peremptory  assertions,  they  show  themselves  to  be  unac- 
quainted with  the  fundamental  rules  of  their  own  science  and  with 
the  origin  of  all  late  improvements.  True  philosophy  would  begin 
the  other  way,  with  observing  the  constitution  of  the  world,  how  God 
has  made  us,  and  in  what  circumstances  he  has  placed  us,  and  then, 
from  what  he  has  done,  form  a  sure  judgment  what  he  would  do. 
Thus  might  they  learn  "  the  invisible  things  of  God  from  those  which 
are  clearly  seen,"  the  things  which  are  not  accomplished  from  those 
which  are. — Powell's  Use  and  Abuse  of  Philosophy,  quoted  by 
Nfalcom.] 


250  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

ment  be,  or  be  not  so,  it  is  impossible  to  determine  at 
all  by  reason.  And  the  supposition  that  part  of  it  is  so, 
appears,  to  say  the  least,  altogether  as  credible  as  the 
contrary.  There  is,  then,  no  sort  of  objection,  from 
the  light  of  nature,  against  the  general  notion  of  a  me 
diator  between  God  and  man,  considered  as  a  doctrine 
of  Christianity,  or  as  an  appointment  in  this  dispensa- 
tion; since  we  find  by  experience  that  God  does  appoint 
mediators,  to  be  the  instruments  of  good  and  evil  to  us, 
the  instruments  of  his  justice  and  his  mercy.  And  the 
objection  here  referred  to  is  urged,  not  against  media- 
tion in  that  high,  eminent,  and  peculiar  sense  in  which 
Christ  is  our  mediator;  but  absolutely  against  the  whole 
notion  itself  of  a  mediator  at  all. 

2.  II.  As  we  must  suppose  that  the  world  is  under  the 
proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state  of  relig- 
Punishmentwiu  iou,  before  wc  Can  enter  into  consideration 
naturai^^coEfse*  of  the  revealed  doctrine  concerning  the  re- 
quence.  dcmption  of  it  by  Christ ;  so  that  supposi- 

tion is  here  to  be  distinctly  taken  notice  of.  Now  the 
divine  moral  government  which  religion  teaches  us,  im- 
plies, that  the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery,  in 
some  future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God. 
That  such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effect  by  his 
appointment,  is  necessarily  implied.  But  as  it  is  not  in 
any  sort  to  be  supposed  that  we  are  made  acquainted  with 
all  the  ends  or  reasons  for  which  it  is  fit  future  punish- 
ments should  be  inflicted,  or  why  God  has  appointed 
such  and  such  consequent  misery  should  follow  vice ; 
and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the  dark  how  or  in  what 
manner  it  shall  follow,  by  what  immediate  occasions,  or 
by  the  instrumentality  of  what  means ;  there  is  no  ab- 
surdity in  supposing,  it  may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to 
that,  in  which  many  miseries  follow  such  and  such  courses 
of  action  at  present ;  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  untime- 
ly death  by  diseases,  death  from  the  hands  of  civil  jus- 


Chap.  V.l  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  251 

tice.  There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  future  punish- 
ment may  follow  wickedness  of  course,  as  we  speak,  or 
in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  from  God's  original 
constitution  of  the  world ;  from  the  nature  he  has  given 
us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which  he  places  us ;  or  in 
a  like  manner,  as  a  person  rashly  trifling  upon  a  preci- 
pice, in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  falls  down ;  in 
the  way  of  natural  consequence,  breaks  his  limbs,  sup- 
pose ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  of  this,  with- 
out help,  perishes.* 

3.  Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended  with 
hearing  it  spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing,  that  the  fu- 
ture punishments  of  wickedness  may  be  in  the  way  of 

*  There  is  a  clear  distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  and  inno- 
cence and  guilt.  Right  and  wrong  depend  on  unchangeable  rela- 
tions, and  consequent  obligations  :  while  innocence  and  guilt  depend 
on  conscious  and  avoidable  violations  of  God's  law.  Obedience  to 
God's  laws,  whether  intentional  or  not,  whether  rendered  by  a  Chris- 
tian or  an  infidel,  brings  naturally  a  degree  of  favor  and  benefit,  just 
as  cases  of  disobedience  cause  evil  and  suffering.  Whether  rashly  and 
foolishly  or  ignorantly  a  man  approaches  a  precipice  and  falls  over, 
he  will  suffer  and  perhaps  lose  his  life.  If  he  takes  poison  intention- 
ally or  ignorantly  he  will  suffer  and  die. 

This  natural  relation  between  obedience  or  disobedience  of  law 
and  consequences,  good  or  evil,  is  readily  perceived  in  ordinary  life  ; 
but  the  same  natural  connection  exists  between  willful  sin  and  pun- 
ishment, present  and  future.  In  no  sense  is  this  punishment  merely 
arbitrary,  which  in  any  individual  case  the  Divine  will  might  suspend 
or  remove.  The  principles  of  the  Divine  government  that  connect 
happiness  with  virtue  and  misery  with  vice  were  established  before 
the  existence  of  the  sinner,  and  are  as  unchangeable  as  the  character 
of  Jehovah.  God  could  as  readily  send  a  sinless  archangel  to  perdition 
as  free  an  unrepenting  sinner  from  the  consequences  of  sin  and  raise 
him  to  heaven.  Both  are  impossible.  In  this  view  we  can  see  how 
God  consistently,  with  tenderness  and  earnestness,  entreats  man  to 
turn  from  his  evil  way,  and  yet  when  he  refuses  leaves  him  to  the 
consequences  of  guilt. 

In  Christ  the  law  is  satisfied  and  made  honorable,  and  in  the  ap- 
pointed way  man  may  be  saved,  but  God  cannot  save  him  otherwise, 


252  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

natural  consequence ;  as  if  this  were  taking  the  execu- 
.    ,     mv      tion  of  justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God  and 

Objection.  Then       .    .  ■', 

nature,  not  God,  giving   it  to  nature.     But  they  should   re- 

oxecutes  justice.  ,  ,  ,  . 

member  that  when  thmgs  come  to  pass  ac- 
cording to  the  course  of  nature,  this  does  not  hindei 
them  from  being  his  doing  who  is  the  God  of  nature  ; 
and  that  the  Scripture  ascribes  those  punishments  to 
divine  justice  which  are  known  to  be  natural;  and 
which  must  be  called  so,  when  distinguished  from  such 
as  are  miraculous.  But  after  all,  this  supposition,  or 
rather  this  way  of  speaking,  is  here  made  use  of  only  by 
way  of  illustration  of  the  subject  before  us.  For  since 
it  must  be  admitted  that  the  future  punishment  of  wick- 
edness is  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of 
reason,  equity,  and  justice;  it  comes,  for  aught  I  see,  to 
the  same  thing,  whether  it  is  supposed  to  be  inflicted  in 
a  way  analogous  to  that  in  which  the  temporal  punish- 
ments of  vice  and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way. 
And  though  there  were  a  diff"erence,  it  is  allowable  in 
the  present  case  to  make  this  supposition,  plainly  not 
an  incredible  one,  that  future  punishment  may  follow 
wickedness  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  or  ac- 
cording to  some  general  laws  of  government  already 
established  in  the  universe. 

4.  III.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we 
may  observe  somewhat,  much  to  the  present  purpose,  in 
Naturaiescape   the  constitution  of  nature,  or  appointments 
pShiSr^of  of  Providence :  the  provision  which  is  made 
^°®-  that  all  the   bad  natural  consequences  of 

men's  actions  should  not  always  actually  follow ;  or  that 
such  bad  consequences  as,  according  to  the  settled 
course  of  things,  would  inevitably  have  followed  if  not 
prevented,  should  in  certain  degrees  be  prevented.  We 
are  apt  presumptuously  to  imagine  that  the  world  might 
have  been  so  constituted  as  that  there  would  not  have 
been  any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.    On  the  contrary, 


Chap.  V.]    Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  253 

we  find  the  Author  of  nature  permits  it.  Bui  then  he 
has  provided  reliefs,  and,  in  many  cases,  perfect  reme- 
dies for  it,  after  some  pains  and  difficulties ;  reliefs  and 
remedies  even  for  that  evil  which  is  the  fruit  of  our  own 
misconduct,  and  which,  in  the  course  of  nature,  would 
have  continued,  and  ended  in  our  destruction,  but  for 
such  remedies.  And  this  is  an  instance  both  of  severity 
and  of  indulgence,  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus 
all  the  bad  consequences,  now  mentioned,  of  a  man's 
trifling  upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented.  And 
though  all  were  not,  yet  some  of  them  might,  by  proper 
interposition,  if  not  rejected;  by  another's  coming  to 
the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying  hold  on  that 
relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  required.  Persons  may 
do  a  great  deal  themselves  toward  preventing  the  bad 
consequences  of  their  follies ;  and  more  may  be  done  by 
themselves,  together  with  the  assistance  of  others,  their 
fellow-creatures;  which  assistance  nature  requires  and 
prompts  us  to.  This  is  the  general  constitution  of  the 
world. 

Now  suppose  it  had  been  so  constituted,  that  after 
such  actions  were  done,  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to 
draw  after  them  misery  to  the  doer,  it  should  tws  naturally 
have  been  no  more  in  human  power  to  have  Sve^to^thelS- 
prevented  that  naturally  consequent  misery,  *'*"* 
in  any  instance,  than  it  is  in  all ;  no  one  can  say  wheth- 
er such  a  more  severe  constitution  of  things  might  not 
yet  have  been  really  good.  But  that,  on  the  contrary, 
provision  is  made  by  nature,  that  we  may  and  do,  to  so 
great  degree,  prevent  the  bad  natural  effects  of  our  fol- 
lies; this  may  be  called  mercy,  or  compassion,  in  the 
original  constitution  of  the  world ;  compassion  as  dis- 
tinguished from  goodness  in  general.  And  the  whole 
known  constitution  and  course  of  things  affording  us  in- 
stances of  such  compassion,  it  would  be  according  to 
the  analogy  of  nature  to  hope,  that,  however  ruinous  the 


254     '  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

natural  consequences  of  vice  might  be,  from  the  general 
laws  of  God's  government  over  the  universe,  yet  provis- 
ion might  be  made,  possibly  might  have  been  originally 
made,  for  preventing  those  ruinous  consequences  from 
inevitably  following ;  at  least  from  following  universally 
and  in  all  cases. 

5.  Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this 
made  a  question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubt- 

Presumption  ful.  The  generality  of  mankind  are  so  far 
rap^yet^imd  ^^om  having  that  awful  sense  of  things, 
forhopa  which  the  present  state  of  vice  and  misery 

and  darkness  seems  to  make  but  reasonable,  that  they 
have  scarce  any  apprehension,  or  thought  at  all,  about 
this  matter,  any  way;  and  some  serious  persons  may 
have  spoken  unadvisedly  concerning  it.  But  let  us  ob- 
serve, what  we  experience  to  be,  and  what,  from  the 
very  constitution  of  nature,  cannot  but  be,  the  conse- 
quences of  irregular  and  disorderly  behavior ;  even  of 
such  rashness,  willfulness,  neglects,  as  we  scarce  call 
vicious.  Now  it  is  natural  to  apprehend  that  the  bad 
consequences  of  irregularity  will  be  greater,  in  propor- 
tion as  the  irregularity  is  so.  And  there  is  no  compari- 
son between  these  irregularities  and  the  greater  instances 
of  vice,  or  a  dissolute  profligate  disregard  to  all  religion  ; 
if  there  be  any  thing  at  all  in  religion.  For  consider 
what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral  agents,  presumptuously  to 
introduce  that  confusion  and  misery  into  the  kingdom 
of  God  which  mankind  have  in  fact  introduced ;  to 
blaspheme  the  sovereign  Lord  of  all ;  to  contemn  his 
authority ;  to  be  injurious,  to  the  degree  they  are,  to 
their  fellow-creatures,  the  creatures  of  God.  Add  that 
the  effects  of  vice,  in  the  present  world,  are  often  ex- 
treme misery,  irretrievable  ruin,  and  even  death :  and 
upon  putting  all  this  together  it  will  appear,  that  as  no 
one  can  say  in  what  degree  fatal  the  unprevented  con- 
sequences of  vice  may  be,  according  to  the  general  rule 


Chap.  VJ  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  255 

of  Divine  government ;  so  it  is  by  no  means  intuitively 
certain  how  far  these  consequences  could  possibly,  in 
the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  prevented,  consistently  with 
the  eternal  rule  of  right,  or  with  what  is,  in  fact,  the 
moral  constitution  of  nature.  However,  there  would  be 
large  ground  to  hope,  that  the  universal  government 
was  not  so  severely  strict,  but  that  there  was  room  for 
pardon,  or  for  having  those  penal  consequences  pre- 
vented.    Yet, 

6.  IV.  There  seems  no  probability  that  any  thing  we 
could  do,  would  alone,  and  of  itself,  prevent  we  can  in  no 
them  ;  prevent  their  following,  or  being  inflict-  JeL  ^SS- 
ed.  But  one  would  think,  at  least,  it  were  im-  q'^«°<**- 
possible  that  the  contrary  should  be  thought  certain.  For 
we  are  not  acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the  case.  We 
are  not  informed  of  all  the  reasons  which  render  it  fit  that 
future  punishments  should  be  inflicted;  and  therefore 
cannot  know  whether  any  thing  we  could  do  would  make 
such  an  alteration  as  to  render  it  fit  that  they  should 
be  remitted.  We  do  not  know  what  the  whole  natural 
or  appointed  consequences  of  vice  are,  nor  in  what  way 
they  would  follow,  if  not  prevented ;  and  therefore  can 
in  no  sort  say  whether  we  could  do  any  thing  which 
would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  them.  Our  ignorance 
being  thus  manifest,  let  us  recollect  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture, or  providence.  For  though  this  may  be  but  a 
slight  ground  to  raise  a  positive  opinion  upon  in  this 
matter,  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  answer  a  mere  arbitrary  as- 
sertion, without  any  kind  of  evidence  urged  by  way  of 
objection  against  a  doctrine  the  proof  of  which  is  not 
reason,  but  revelation.  Consider  then:  people  rum 
their  fortunes  by  extravagance ;  they  bring  diseases  up- 
on themselves  by  excess;  they  incur  the  penalties  ot 
civil  laws,  and  surely  civil  government  is  natural ;  will 
sorrow  for  these  follies  past,  and  behaving  well  for  the 
future,  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  the  natural  conse- 


256  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

quences  of  them  ?  On  the  contrary,  men's  natural  abil- 
ities of  helping  themselves  are  often  impaired ;  or  if  not, 
yet  they  are  forced  to  be  beholden  to  the  assistance  of 
others,  upon  several  accounts  and  in  different  ways: 
assistance  which  they  would  have  had  no  occasion  for 
had  it  not  been  for  their  misconduct;  but  which,  in  the 
disadvantageous  condition  they  have  reduced  them- 
selves to,  is  absolutely  necessary  to  their  recovery  and 
retrieving  their  affairs.  Now  since  this  is  our  case,  con- 
siderirg  ourselves  merely  as  inhabitants  of  this  world, 
and  as  having  a  temporal  interest  here,  under  the' natu- 
ral government  of  God,  which,  however,  has  a  great  deal 
moral  in  it ;  why  is  it  not  supposable  that  this  may  be 
our  case  also,  in  our  more  important  capacity,  as  under 
his  perfect  moral  government,  and  having  a  more  general 
and  future  interest  depending  ?  If  we  have  misbehaved 
in  this  higher  capacity,  and  rendered  ourselves  obnox- 
ious to  the  future  punishment  which  God  has  annexed 
to  vice,  it  is  plainly  credible,  that  behaving  well  for 
the  time  to  come,  may  be — not  useless,  God  forbid — 
but  wholly  insufficient,  alone  and  of  itself,  to  prevent 
that  punishment,  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition  which  we 
should  have  been  in  had  we  preserved  our  innocence.* 

And  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence, 
whenever  we  reason  concerning  the  divine  conduct,  yet 

*  [Mr.  Newman  notices  a  distinction  between  the  facts  of  revela- 
tion and  its  principles,  and  considers  the  argument  from  analogy 
more  concerned  with  the  latter  than  the  former.  "  The  revealed 
facts  are  special  and  singular  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  the  re. 
vealed  principles  are  common  to  all  the  works  of  God ;  and  if  the 
Author  of  nature  be  the  author  of  grace,  it  may  be  expected  that  the 
principles  discussed  in  them  will  be  the  same,  and  form  a  connecting 
link  between  them.  In  this  identity  of  principle  lies  the  analogy  of 
natural  and  revealed  religion  in  Butler's  sense  of  the  word.  The  incar- 
nation is  a  fact,  and  cannot  be  paralleled  by  any  thing  in  nature ;  the 
doctrine  of  mediation  is  a  principle,  and  is  abundantly  exemplified  in 
nature." — Essay  on  Developments,  quoted  by  Malcom.] 


Chap.  V.]  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  257 

it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our 
notions  of  government,  as  well  as  to  what 

°  '         ,        .  Reformation 

is,  in  fact,  the  general  constitution  of  nature,  gives  no  hope  of 
to  suppose  that  doing  well  for  the  future 
should,  in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the  judicial  bad  conse- 
quences of  having  done  evil,  or  all  the  punishment  an- 
nexed to  disobedience.  And  we  have  manifestly  nothing 
from  whence  to  determine  in  what  degree,  and  in  what 
cases,  reformation  would  prevent  this  punishment,  even 
supposing  that  it  would  in  some.  And  though  the  effi- 
cacy of  repentance  itself  alone,  to  prevent  what  man- 
kind had  rendered  themselves  obnoxious  to,  and  recov- 
er what  they  had  forfeited,  is  now  insisted  upon  in  oppo- 
sition to  Christianity ;  yet,  by  the  general  prevalence  of 
propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  no- 
tion of  repentance  alone  being  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt, 
appears  to  be  contrary  to  the  general  sense  of  mankind. 

Upon  the  whole,  then;  had  the  laws,  the  general 
laws,  of  God's  government  been  permitted  to  operate 
without  any  interposition  in  our  behalf,  the  future  pun- 
ishment, for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  or  have 
any  reason  to  think,  must  inevitably  have  followed,  not- 
withstanding any  thing  we  could  have  done  to  prevent 
it.     Now, 

7.  V.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it 
which  you  please,  revelation  comes  in ;  confirms  every 
doubting  fear  which  could  enter  into  the  pardontaught 
heart  of  man  concerning  the  future  unpre-  ^y™^eJ**^on. 
vented  consequence  of  wickedness  ;  supposes  the  world 
to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin ;  (a  supposition  which  seems  the 
very  ground  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  which,  if 
not  provable  by  reason,  yet  it  is  in  nowise  contrary  to 
it;)  teaches  us,  too,  that  the  rules  of  divine  govemment 
are  such  as  not  to  admit  of  pardon  immediately  and  di- 
rectly upon  repentance,  or  by  the  sole  efficacy  of  it : 

but  then  teaches  at  the  same  time,  what  nature  might 
17 


258  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

justly  have  hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of  the  uni- 
verse was  not  so  rigid,  but  that  there  was  room  for  an  in- 
terposition to  avert  the  fatal  consequence  of  vice  ;  which, 
therefore,  by  this  means,  does  admit  of  pardon.  Reve- 
lation teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  laws  of  God's  more 
general  government,  no  less  than  the  particular  laws  by 
which  we  experience  he  governs  us  at  present,  are  com- 
passionate, (page  252,  etc.,)  as  well  as  good,  in  the  more 
general  notion  of  goodness  ;  and  that  he  hath  mercifully 
provided  that  there  should  be  an  interposition  to  pre- 
vent the  destruction  of  human  kind,  whatever  that  de- 
struction unprevented  would  have  been.  "  God  so  loved 
the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that  who- 
soever believeth,"  not,  to  be  sure,  in  a  speculative,  but 
in  a  practical  sense,  "  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him 
should  not  perish,"  (John  iii,  16;)  gave  his  Son  in  the 
same  way  of  goodness  to  the  world  as  he  affords  particu- 
lar persons  the  friendly  assistance  of  their  fellow- crea- 
tures, when,  without  it,  their  temporal  ruin  would  be 
the  certain  consequence  of  their  follies ;  in  the  same 
way  of  goodness,  I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and 
infinitely  higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  "  loved 
us,  and  gave  himself  for  us,"  with  a  love  which  he  him 
self  compares  to  that  of  human  friendship ;  though,  in 
this  case,  all  comparisons  must  fall  infinitely  short  of 
the  thing  intended  to  be  illustrated  by  them.  He  inter- 
posed in  such  a  manner  as  was  necessary  and  effectual 
to  prevent  that  execution  of  justice  upon  sinners  which 
God  had  appointed  should  otherwise  have  been  execut- 
ed upon  them  :  or  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  prevent  thai 
punishment  from  actually  following,  which,  according 
to  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  must  have 
followed  the  sins  of  the  world,  had  t  not  been  for  such 
interposition.* 

*  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cursory  read- 
er, that  it  is,  in  any  sort,  affirmed,  or  implied,  in  any  thing  said  in 


Chap.  VJ  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  259 

If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first 
thought,  inconsistent  with  divine  goodness,  a  second,  I 
atn  persuaded,  will  entirely  remove  that  ap-  objection,  is 
pearance.  For  were  we  to  suppose  the  J^  Kfb^S 
constitution  of  things  to  be  such  as  that  the  ^^*®^ 
whole  creation  must  have  perished,  had  it  not  been  for 
somewhat  which  God  had  appointed  should  be  in  order 
to  prevent  that  ruin ;  even  this  supposition  would  not  be 
inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with  the  most  absolutely 
perfect  goodness.  But  still  it  may  be  thought  that  this 
whole  manner  of  treating  the  subject  before  us  supposes 
mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a  very  strange  state.  And  truly 
so  it  does.  But  it  is  not  Christianity  which  has  put  us 
into  this  state.  Whoever  will  consider  the  manifold 
miseries  and  the  extreme  wickedness  of  the  world  ;  that 
the  best  have  great  wrongnesses  within  themselves, 
which  they  complain  of,  and  endeavor  to  amend ;  but 
that  the  generality  grow  more  profligate  and   corrupi 

this  chapter,  that  none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the  general  redemp- 
tion, but  such  as  have  the  advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  witl 
it  in  the  present  life.  But  it  may  be  needful  to  mention,  that  several 
questions,  which  have  been  brought  into  the  subject  before  us,  and 
determined,  are  not  in  the  least  entered  into  here  ;  questions  which 
have  been,  I  fear,  rashly  determined,  and  perhaps  with  equal  rash- 
ness, contrary  ways.  For  instance  :  Whether  God  could  have  saved 
the  world  by  other  means  than  the  death  of  Christ,  consistently  with 
the  general  laws  of  his  government  ?  And,  had  not  Christ  come  into 
the  world,  what  would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the  better 
sort  of  men  ;  those  just  persons  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  for  whom 
Manasses,  in  his  prayer,*  asserts  repentance  was  not  appointed  ?  The 
meaning  of  the  first  of  these  questions  is  greatly  ambiguous  •  and 
neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answered  without  going  upon  that 
infinitely  ausurd  supposition,  that  we  know  the  whole  of  the  case. 
And  perhaps,  the  very  inquiry,  What  7vould  have  followed  if  God 
had  not  done  as  he  has  ?  may  have  in  it  some  very  great  impropriety  ; 
and  ought  not  to  be  carried  on  any  further  than  is  necessary  to  help 
our  partial  and  inadequate  conception  of  things. 

•  The  Pny«r  of  Mknasses  Ib  one  of  the  spocryphal  books  of  the  Old  Testament 
M  hich  next  precedes  "  Maoosbees.'' 


26o  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II. 

with  age :  that  heathen  moralists  thought  the  present 
state  to  be  a  state  of  punishment ;  and  what  might  be 
added,  that  the  earth,  our  habitation,  has  the  appear- 
ance of  being  a  ruin ;  whoever,  I  say,  will  consider  all 
these,  and  some  other  obvious  things,  will  think  he  has 
little  reason  to  object  against  the  Scripture  account,  that 
mankind  is  in  a  state  of  degradation  ;  against  this  being 
the  fact;  how  difficult  soever  he  may  think  it  to  account 
for,  or  even  to  form  a  distinct  conception  of,  the  occa- 
sions and  circumstances  of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of 
our  first  parents  was  the  occasion  of  our  being  placed  in 
a  more  disadvantageous  condition,  is  a  thing  throughout, 
and  particularly  analogous  to  what  we  see,  in  the  daily 
course  of  natural  providence  ;  as  the  recovery  of  the 
world,  by  the  interposition  of  Christ,  has  been  shown  to 
be  so  in  general. 

8.  VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  inter- 
posed in  the   redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  as 
.T     ^^  . ..      Mediator,  in  the  largest  sense,  behueen  God 

llowChnstin-  ,  °  '  . 

tciposes  as  a  and  man^  is  thus  represented  to  us  in  the 
Scripture  :  "  He  is  the  light  of  the  world  ;"  * 
the  revealer  of  the  will  of  God  in  the  most  eminent 
sense :  he  is  a  propitiatory  sacrifice  ;t  the  "  Lamb  of 
God;"t  and  as  he  voluntarily  offered  himself  up,  he  is 
styled  our  High-priest. §  And,  which  seems  of  peculiar 
weight,  he  is  described  beforehand,  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, under  the  same  characters  of  a  priest,  and  an  ex- 
piatory victim. II  And  whereas  it  is  objected,  that  all 
this  is  merely  by  way  of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of  the 
Mosaic  law,  the  apostle,  on  the  contrary,  affirms,  that 

*  John  i,  and  viii,  12. 

f  Rom.  iii,  25,  and  v,  II  ;  I  Cor.  v,  7  ;  Eph.  v,  2 ;  i  John  ii,  2 
Matt,  xxvi,  28. 
X  John  i,  29,  36,  and  throughout  the  Book  of  Revelation. 
§  Throughout  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 
I  Isa  liii ;  Dan.  ix,  24  ;  Psa.  ex,  4- 


Chap.  V.J  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  261 

"  the  law  was  a  shadow  of  good  things  to  come,  and  not 
the  very  image  of  the  things,"  (Heb.  x,  i ;)  and  that  the 
"  priests  that  offer  gifts  according  to  the  ^aw — serve  un- 
to the  example  and  shadow  of  heavenly  things  as  Moses 
WIS  admonished  of  God  when  he  was  about  to  make 
the  tabernacle.  For  see,"  saith  he,  "  that  thou  make  all 
things  according  to  the  pattern  showed  to  thee  in  the 
mount,"  (Heb.  viii,  4,  5  ;)  that  is,  the  Levitical  priest- 
hood was  a  shadow  of  the  priesthood  of  Cfiiist,  in  like 
manner  as  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses  was  accord- 
ing to  that  showed  him  in  the  mount.  The  priesthood 
of  Christ,  and  the  tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were  the  orig- 
inals :  of  the  former  of  which,  the  Levitical  priesthood 
was  a  type ;  and  of  the  latter,  the  tabernacle  made  by 
Moses  was  a  copy.  The  doctrine  of  this  epistle  then 
plainly  is,  that  the  legal  sacrifices  were  allusions  to  the 
great  and  final  atonement  to  be  made  by.  the  blood  of 
Christ ;  and  not  that  this  was  an  allusion  to  those.  Nor 
can  any  thing  be  more  express  and  determinate  than  the 
following  passage :  *'  It  is  not  possible  that  the  blood  of 
bulls  and  of  goats  should  take  away  sin.  Wherefore, 
when  he  cometh  into  the  world,  he  saith,  Sacrifice  and 
offering  " — that  is,  of  bulls  and  of  goats — "  thou  wouldst 
not,  but  a  body  hast  thou  prepared  me — Lo,  I  come  to 
do  thy  will,  O  God.  By  which  will  we  are  sanctified, 
through  the  offering  of  the  body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for 
all."  Heb.  x,  4,  5,  7,  9,  10.  And  to  add  one  passage 
more  of  the  like  kind :  '*  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear 
the  sins  of  many  ;  and  unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall 
he  appear  the  second  time,  without  sin;"  that  is,  with- 
out bearing  sin,  as  he  did  at  his  first  coming,  by  being 
an  offering  for  it ;  without  having  our  iniquities  again 
laid  upon  him,  without  being  any  more  a  ^in-offering  : — 
*  Unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the  sec- 
ond time,  without  sin  unto  salvation."  Heb.  ix,  28.  Noi 
do  the  inspired  writers  at  all  confine  themselves  to  this 


262  Analogy  of  Religion.        LPart  II. 

manner  of  speaking  concerning  the  satisfaction  of  Christ, 
but  declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 
us  additional  to,  and  beyond  mere  instruction^  example, 
and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expression  :  "  That 
Jesus  should  die  for  that  nation,"  the  Jews,  "  and  not 
for  that  nation  only,  but  that  also,"  plainly  by  the  effi- 
cacy of  his  death,  "  he  should  gathei  together  in  one  the 
children  of  God  that  were  scattered  abroad:"*  that 
"  he  suffered  for  sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust :"  f  that 
"he  gave  his  life — himself — a  ransom:" J  that  "we  are 
bought — bought  with  a  price  :"§  that  "he  redeemed  us 
with  his  blood :  redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the 
law,  being  made  a  curse  for  us:"  ||  that  "he  is  our  ad- 
vocate, intercessor,  and  propitiation:"!^  that  "he  was 
made  perfect  (or  consummate)  through  sufferings ;  and 
being  thus  made  perfect,  he  became  the  author  of  salva- 
tion :"**  that  "  God  was  in  Christ,  reconciling  the  world 
to  himself,  by  the  death  of  his  Son  by  the  cross ;  not 
imputing  their  trespasses  unto  them:"  ft  and,  lastly, 
that  "  through  death  he  destroyed  him  that  had  the 
power  of  death."  H  Christ,  then,  having  thus  "  humbled 
himself,  and  become  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death 
of  the  cross,  God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  giv- 
en him  a  name  which  is  above  every  name ;  hath  given 
all  things  into  his  hands;  hath  committed  all  judgment 
unto  him ;  that  all  men  should  honor  the  Son,  even  as 
they  honor  the  Father." §§  For,  "worthy  is  the  Lamb 
that  was  slain,  to  receive  power,  and  riches,  and  wisdom, 

*  John  xi,  51,  52.  f  I  Pet.  iii,  18. 

X  Matt.  XX,  28  ;  Mark  x,  45  ;  I  Tim.  ii,  6. 
§  2  Pet.  ii,  I  ;  Rev.  xiv,  4  ;  i  Cor.  vi,  20. 
I  I  Pet.  i,  19  ;  Rev.  v,  g  ;  Gal.  iii,  13. 

•|  Heb.  vii,  25  ;  i  John  ii,  I,  2.  **  I[eb.  ii,  10  ;  v,  9. 

ff  2  Cor.  V,  19  ;  Rom.  v,  lo ;  Eph.  ii,  16. 

Xt  Heb.  ii,  14.     See  also  a  remarkable  passage  In  the  book  of  Job, 
xxxiii,  24. 

§§  Phil,  ii,  8,  9  ;  John  iii,  35,  and  v.  22,  23. 


Chap.  VJ  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  263 

and  strength,  and  honor,  and  glory,  and  blessing!  And 
every  creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and  on  the  earth,  heard 
I  saying,  Blessing,  and  honor,  and  glory,  and  power,  be 
unto  him  that  sitteth  upon  the  throne,  and  unto  the 
Lamb,  for  ever  and  ever."  Rev.  v,  12,  13. 

9  These  passages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend 
and  express  the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as  mediator 
between  God  and  man,  so  far,  I  mean.,  as  the  nature  of 
this  his  office  is  revealed  ;  and  it  is  usually  treated  of  by 
divines  under  three  heads. 

First.  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet : 
"that  Prophet  that  should  come  into  the  Christ aa  a 
world,"  (John  vi,  14,)  to  declare  the  divine  ^^p'^®^ 
will.  He  published  anew  the  law  of  nature  which  men- 
had  corrupted ;  and  the  very  knowledge  of  which,  to 
some  degree,  was  lost  among  them.  He  taught  man- 
kind— taught  us  authoritatively — to  "  live  soberly,  right- 
eously, and  godly,  in  this  present  world,"  in  expectation 
of  the  future  judgment  of  God.  He  confirmed  the  truth 
of  this  moral  system  of  nature,  and  gave  us  additional 
evidence  of  it,  the  evidence  of  testimony.  (Page  195.) 
He  distinctly  revealed  the  manner  in  which  God  would 
be  worshiped,  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  and  the  re- 
wards and  punishments  of  a  future  life.  Thus  he  was  a 
prophet,  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other  ever  was.  To 
which  is  to  be  added,  that  he  set  us  a  perfect  '*  example, 
that  we  should  follow  his  steps." 

10.  Secondly.  He  has  a  "kingdom,  which  is  not  of  this 
world."  He  founded  a  Church,  to  be  to  Christ  as  a 
mankind  a  standing  memorial  of  religion  ^^^* 
and  invitation  to  it;  which  he  promised  to  be  with  al- 
ways, even  to  the  end.  He  exercises  an  invisible  gov- 
ernment over  it,  himself,  and  by  his  Spint ;  over  that 
part  of  it  which  is  militant  here  on  eartii,  a  government 
of  discipline,  "  for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints,  for  the 
edifying  of  his  brxlv  ;  till  we  all  come  in  the  unity  of  the 


264  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,  unto  a 
perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the  full- 
ness of  Christ."  (Eph.  iv,  12,  13.)  Of  this  Church,  all 
persons  scattered  over  the  world,  who  live  in  obedience 
to  his  laws,  are  members.  For  these  he  is  gone  to  pre- 
pare a  place y  and  will  come  again  to  receive  them  unto  him- 
self ^  that  where  he  is^  there  they  may  be  also  ;  and  reign 
with  him  for  ever  and  ever,  (John  xiv,  2,  3 ;  Rev.  iii, 
21,  and  xi,  15;)  and  likewise  "to  take  vengeance  on 
them  that  know  not  God  and  obey  not  his  gospel." 
2  Thess.  i,  8. 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office  I  find  no  objec- 
tions but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter. 

11.  Lastly.  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sacri- 
christ  a&  a  ficc,  and  made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the 

^^'^^  world;  which  is  mentioned  last,  in  regard 

to  what  is  objected  against  it.  Sacrifices  of  expiation 
were  commanded  the  Jews,  and  obtained  among  most 
other  nations,  from  tradition,  whose  original  probably 
was  revelation.  And  they  were  continually  repeated 
both  occasionally  and  at  the  returns  of  stated  times, 
and  made  up  great  part  of  the  external  religion  of  man- 
kind. "  But  now  once  in  the  end  of  the  world  Christ 
appeared  to  put  away  sin  by  the  sacrifice  of  himself." 
Heb.  ix,  26.  And  this  sacrifice  was  in  the  highest  de- 
gree, and  with  the  most  extensive  influence,  of  that  effi- 
cacy for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin  which  the  heathens 
may  be  supposed  to  have  thought  their  sacrifices  to 
have  been,  and  which  the  Jewish  sacrifices  really  were 
in  some  degree,  and  with  regard  to  some  persons. 

12.  How,  and  in  what  particular  way,  it  had  this  effi- 
How  Christ's  cacy,  there    are  not  wanting   persons  who 

Sf  te  nSfSl  have  endeavored  to  explain ;  but  I  do  not 
plained.  ^^^  ^\^^^  tj^g    Scripture   has   explained    it. 

We  seem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark  concerning  the 


Chap.  V.]  Appointmevt  of  a  Mediator.  265 

manner  in  which  the  ancients  understood  atonement  to 
be  made,  that  is,  pardon  to  be  obtained  by  sacrinces. 
And  if  the  Scripture  has,  as  surely  it  has,  left  this  mat- 
ter of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  mysterious,  left  some- 
what in  it  unrevealed,  all  conjectures  about  it  must  be. 
if  not  evidently  absurd,  yet  at  least  uncertain.  Nor  has 
any  one  reason  to  complain  for  want  of  further  informa- 
tion, unless  he  can  show  his  claim  to  it. 

Some  have  endeavored  to  explain  the  efficacy  of  what 
Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond  what  the 
Scripture  has  authorized  ;  others,  probably  because  they 
could  not  explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away,  and 
confining  his  office  as  Redeemer  of  the  world  to  his  in- 
struction, example,  and  government  of  the  Church. 
Whereas,  the  doctrine  of  the  gospel  appears  to  be,  not 
only  that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  ren- 
dered it  of  the  efficacy  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did  and 
suffered  for  us :  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of 
having  our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  lifej  not 
only  that  he  revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a 
capacity  of  salvation,  and  how  they  might  obtain  it ;  but 
moreover,  that  he  put  them  into  this  capacity  of  salva- 
tion by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  them ;  put  us  into 
a  capacity  of  escaping  future  punishment,  and  obtaining 
future  happiness.  And  it  is  our  wisdom  thankfully  to 
accept  the  benefit,  by  performing  the  conditions  upon 
which  it  is  offered  on  our  part,  without  disputing  how  it 
was  procured  on  his.     For, 

13,  VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  pun- 
ishment in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wicked- 
ness in  this ;  nor  in  what  manner  it  would  objections 
have  been  inflicted,  had  it  not  been  pre-  gSSaSlb- 
vented;  nor  all  the  reasons  why  its  inflic-  *°^- 
tion  would  have  been  needful ;  nor  the  particular  na- 
ture of  that  state  of  happiness  which  Christ  is  gone  to 
prepare  for  his  disciples;  and  since   we   are  ignorant 


266  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  1 1. 

how  far  any  thing  which  we  could  do  would,  alone  and  of 
Itself,  have  been  effectual  to  prevent  that  punishment  to 
which  we  were  obnoxious,  and  recover  that  happiness 
which  we  had  forfeited ;  it  is  most  evident  we  are  not 
judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  whether  a  mediator 
was  or  was  not  necessary  to  obtain  those  ends ;  to  pre- 
vent that  future  punishment,  and  bring  mankind  to  the 
final  happiness  of  their  nature.  And  for  the  very  same 
reasons,  upon  supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  mediator, 
we  are  no  more  judges,  antecedently  to  revelation,  of 
the  whole  nature  of  his  office,  or  the  several  parts  of 
which  it  consists :  of  what  was  fit  and  requisite  to  be 
assigned  him,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  ends  of  divine 
Providence  in  the  appointment.  And  from  hence  it 
follows,  that  to  object  against  the  expediency  or  useful- 
ness of  particular  things  revealed  to  have  been  done  or 
suffered  by  him,  because  we  do  not  see  how  they  were 
conducive  to  those  ends,  is  highly  absurd.  Yet  nothing 
is  more  common  to  be  met  with  than  this  absurdity. 
But  if  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand  that  we  are  not 
judges  in  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  objection  can, 
with  any  shadow  of  reason,  be  urged  against  any  partic- 
ular part  of  Christ's  mediatorial  office  revealed  in  Script- 
ure till  it  can  be  shown  positively  not  to  be  requisite  or 
conducive  to  the  ends  proposed  to  be  accomplished ;  or 
that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 

14.  And  there  is  one  objection  made  against  the  sat- 
isfaction of  Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive 
r.^.  ^     r.  .   kind  :  that  the  doctrine  of  his  being  appoint 

Objection.  God  ,  o     rtr 

represented   as   ed  to  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world  repre- 

causing  the  in-  y^      ^  i      •  •      itc 

Qocent  to  sutFer  sents  God  as  bemg  mdmerent  whether  he 

with  the  guilty.  .   ,       ,     ,        .  , 

punished  the  mnocent  or  the  guilty.  Now 
from  the  foregoing  observations  we  may  see  the  extreme 
slightness  of  all  such  objections,  and  (though  it  is  most 
certain  all  who  make  them  do  not  see  the  consequence) 
that  they  conclude  altogether  as   much  against  God's 


Chap.  V  ■  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  267 

M  hole  original  constitution  of  nature,  and  the  whole  daily 
course  of  divine  Providence,  in  the  government  of  the 
world,  that  is,  against  the  whole  scheme  of  theism  and 
the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as  against  Christianity. 
For  the  world  is  a  constitution,  or  system,  whose  parts 
have  a  mutual  reference  to  each  other ;  and  there  is  a 
scheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on,  called  the 
course  of  nature,  to  the  carrying  on  of  which  God  has 
appointed  us  in  various  ways  to  contribute.  And  when, 
in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  it  is  appointed 
that  innocent  people  should  suffer  for  the  faults  of  the 
guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the  very  same  abjection  as  the 
instance  we  are  now  considering.  The  infinitely  great- 
er importance  of  that  appointment  of  Christianity  which 
is  objected  against,  does  not  hinder,  but  it  may  be,  as  it 
plainly  is,  an  appointment  of  the  very  same  kind  with 
what  the  world  affords  us  daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if 
there  were  any  force  at  all  in  the  objection,  it  would  be 
stronger,  in  one  respect,  against  natural  providence  than 
against  Christianity ;  because  under  the  former  we  are 
in  many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated, 
whether  we  will  or  not,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others ; 
whereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  voluntary. 

The  world's  being  under  the  righteous  government  of 
God  does  indeed  imply  that  finally,  and  upon  the  whole, 
every  one  shall  receive  according  to  his  personal  de- 
serts: and  the  general  doctrine  of  the  whole  Scripture 
is,  that  this  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  divine  gov- 
ernment. But  during  the  progress,  and  for  aught  we 
know,  even  in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral 
scheme,  vicarious  punishments  may  be  fit,  and  absolute- 
ly necessary  Men,  by  their  follies,  run  themselves  into 
extreme  distress ;  into  difficulties  which  would  be  abso- 
lutely fatal  to  them,  were  it  not  for  the  interposition  and 
assistance  of  others.  God  commands  by  the  law  of  na- 
ture that  we  afford  them  this  assistance,  in  many  cases 


268  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II, 

where  we  cannot  do  it  without  very  great  pains,  and 
labor,  and  sufferings  to  ourselves.  And  we  see  in  what 
variety  of  ways  one  person's  sufferings  contribute  to  the 
relief  of  another ;  and  how,  or  by  what  particular  means, 
this  comes  to  pass,  or  follows,  from  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  nature,  which  come  under  our  notice :  and  be- 
ing familiarized  to  it,  men  are  not  shocked  with  it.  So 
tnat  the  reason  of  their  insisting  upon  objections  of  tne 
foregoing  kind  against  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  is  either 
that  they  do  not  consider  God's  settled  and  uniform  ap- 
pointments as  his  appointments  at  all,  or  else  they  for- 
get that  vicarious  punishment  is  a  providential  appoint- 
ment of  every  day's  experience :  and  then,  from  their 
being  unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of  nature, 
or  divine  government  over  the  world,  and  not  seeing 
how  the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contribute  to  the 
redemption  of  it,  unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  will, 
they  conclude  his  sufferings  could  not  contribute  to  it 
any  other  way.  And  yet,  what  has  been  often  alleged 
in  justification  of  this  doctrine,  even  from  the  apparent 
natural  tendency  of  this  method  of  our  redemption — its 
tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  laws,  and 
deter  his  creatures  from  sin ;  this  has  never  yet  been 
answered,  and  is,  I  think,  plainly  unanswerable  :  though 
I  am  far  from  thinking  it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the 
case.  But  without  taking  this  into  consideration,  it 
abundantly  appears,  from  the  observations  above  made, 
that  this  objection  is  not  an  objection  against  Christian- 
ity, but  against  the  whole  general  constitution  of  nature 
And  if  it  were  to  be  considered  as  an  objection  against 
Christianity,  or,  considering  it  as  it  is,  an  objection 
against  the  constitution  of  nature,  it  amounts  to  no  more 
in  conclusion  than  this,  that  a  divine  appointment  can- 
not be  necessary  or  expedient,  because  the  objector 
does  not  discern  it  to  be  so  ;  though  he  must  own  that 
the  nature  of  the  case  is  such  as  renders  him  incapable 


Chap.  V.]  Appointment  of  a  Mediator.  269 

of  judging  whether  it  be  so  or  not;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be 
necessary  though  it  were  so. 

15.  It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reason- 
able men  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner,  object- 
ing against  the  credibility  of  such  particular      objectionB 
things  revealed   in  Scripture,  that   they  do  ^Sra^cea°nS 
not  see  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  them.   *o"*^^®- 

For  though  it  is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exer- 
cise of  our  understanding,  to  inquire  with  due  reverence 
into  the  ends  and  reasons  of  God's  dispensations;  yet 
when  those  reasons  are  concealed,  to  argue,  from  our 
ignorance,  that  such  dispensations  cannot  be  from  God, 
is  infinitely  absurd.  The  presumption  of  this  kind  of 
objections  seems  almost  lost  in  the  folly  of  them.  And 
the  folly  of  them  is  yet  greater  when  they  are  urged,  as 
usually  they  are,  against  things  in  Christianity  analogous, 
or  like,  to  those  natural  dispensations  of  Providence  which 
are  matter  of  experience.  Let  reason  be  kept  to ;  and  if 
any  part  of  the  Scripture  account  of  the  redemption  of 
the  world  by  Christ  can  be  shown  to  be  really  contrary 
to  it,  let  the  Scripfture,  in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up ; 
but  let  not  such  poor  creatures  as  we  go  on  objecting 
against  an  infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see  the  neces- 
sity or  usefulness  of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  reason- 
ing ;  and,  which  still  further  heightens  the  absurdity  in 
the  present  case,  parts  which  we  are  not  actively  con- 
cerned in.     For  it  may  be  worth  mentioning, 

16.  'Lastly.  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but 
the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us  not  to  ex- 
pect to  have  the  like  information  concern-  Equal  infoma 
ing  the  Divine  conduct  as  concerning  our  the" DTvtae^ con- 
own  duty.  God  instructs  us  by  experi-  Jjf^  no't'^u>''be 
ence,  (for  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience,  «*p®«^*^ 
which  instructs  us,)  what  good  or  bad  consequences 
will  follow  from  our  acting  in  such  and  such  manners ; 
and    by   this   he    directs    us    how    we    are    to    behave 


270  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

ourselves.  But,  though  we  are  sufficiently  instructed 
for  the  common  purposes  of  life,  yet  it  is  but  an  almost 
infinitely  small  part  of  natural  providence  which  we  are 
at  all  let  into.  The  case  is  the  same  with  regard  to  rev- 
elation. The  doctrine  of  a  Mediator  between  God  and 
man,  against  which  it  is  objected  that  the  expediency 
of  some  things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to 
what  was  done  on  God's  part  in  the  appointment,  and 
on  the  Mediator's  in  the  execution  of  it.  For  what  is 
required  of  us,  in  consequence  of  this  gracious  dispen- 
sation, is  another  subject,  in  which  none  can  complain 
for  want  of  information.  The  constitution  of  the  world 
and  God's  natural  government  over  it  is  all  mystery, 
as  much  as  the  Christian  dispensation.  Yet  under  the 
first,  he  has  given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  life ;  and 
under  the  other,  all  things  pertaining  unto  godliness. 
And  it  may  be  added,  that  there  is  nothing  hard  to  be 
accounted  for  in  any  of  the  common  precepts  of  Chris- 
tianity ;  though  if  there  were,  surely  a  Divine  command 
is  abundantly  sufficient  to  lay  us  under  the  strongest 
obligations  to  obedience.  But  the  fafct  is,  that  the  rea- 
sons of  all  the  Christian  precepts  are  evident.  Positive 
institutions  are  manifestly  necessary  to  keep  up  and 
propagate  religion  among  mankind.  And  our  duty  to 
Christ,  the  internal  and  external  worship  of  him,  this 
part  of  the  religion  of  the  gospel  manifestly  arises  out 
of  what  he  has  done  and  suffered,  his  authority  and 
dominion,  and  the  relation  which  he  is  revealed  to  stand 
in  to  us.  (Page  201,  etc.) 


Chap.  VI. J  Revelation  not  Universal.  271 


K 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF  THE  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  IN  REVELATION  ; 
AND  OF  THE  SUPPOSED  DEFICIENCY  IN  THE  PROOF 
OF    IT. 

IT  has  been  thought  by  some  persons,  that  if  the  evi- 
dence of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself 
turns  into  a  positive  argument  against  it; 
because  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if  it 
were  true,  it  would  be  left  to  subsist  upon  doubtful  evi- 
dence. And  the  objection  against  revelation,  from  its 
not  being  universal,  is  often  insisted  upon  as  of  great 
weight. 

Now  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be  shown,  by 
observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they  are  founded, 
which  are  really  such  as  these : — that  it  cannot  be 
thought  God  would  have  bestowed  any  favor  at  all  upon 
us,  unless  in  the  degree  which  we  think  he  might,  and 
which,  we  imagine,  would  be  most  to  our  particular  ad- 
vantage ;  and  also,  that  it  cannot  be  thought  he  would 
bestow  a  favor  upon  any,  unless  he  bestowed  the  same 
upon  all :  suppositions  which  we  find  contradicted, 
not  by  a  few  instances  in  God's  natural  government 
of  the  world,  but  by  the  general  analogy  of  mature 
together. 

2.  Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as 
doubtful,  and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a  positive 
argument  against  it,  should  be  put  upon  -vf©  act  on 
considering  what  that  evidence,  indeed,  is,  den^^' inljjr. 
which  they  act  upon  with  regard  to  their  t*nt matters, 
temporal  interests.     For  it  is  not  only  extremely  diffi- 


272  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II, 

cult,  but  in  many  cases  absolutely  impossible,  to  balance 
pleasure  and  pain,  satisfaction  and  uneasiness,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  say  on  which  side  the  overplus  is.  There  are 
the  like  difficulties  and  impossibilities  in  making  the 
due  allowances  for  a  change  of  temper  and  taste,  for 
satiety,  disgusts,  ill  health  ;  any  of  which  render  men 
incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they  have  obtained,  what 
they  most  eagerly  desired.  Numberless,  too,  are  the 
accidents,  besides  that  one  of  untimely  death,  which  may 
even  probably  disappoint  the  best  concerted  schemes ; 
and  strong  objections  are  often  seen  to  lie  against  them, 
not  to  be  removed  or  answered,  but  which  seem  over- 
balanced by  reasons  on  the  other  side ;  so  as  that  the 
certain  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the  pursuit  are,  by 
every  one,  thought  justly  disregarded,  upon  account  of 
the  appearing  greater  advantages  in  case  of  success, 
though  there  be  but  little  probability  of  it.  Lastly. 
Every  one  observes  our  liableness,  if  we  be  not  upon 
our  guard,  to  be  deceived  by  the  falsehood  of  men,  and 
the  false  appearance  of  things ;  and  this  danger  must  be 
greatly  increased  if  there  be  a  strong  bias  within,  sup- 
pose from  indulged  passion,  to  favor  the  deceit.  Hence 
arises  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubtfulness  of  proof, 
wherein  our  temporal  interest  really  consists ;  what  are 
the  most  probable  means  of  attaining  it ;  and  whether  those 
means  will  eventually  be  successful.  And  numberless 
instances  there  are,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  in  which 
all  men  think  it  reasonable  to  engage  in  pursuits,  though 
the  probability  is  greatly  against  succeeding ;  and  to 
make  such  provision  for  themselves  as  it  is  supposable 
they  may  have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain,  acknowl- 
edged probability  is,  that  they  never  shall. 

3.  Then  those  who  think  the  objection  against  reve- 
AnaiogyBhows  lation,  from  its  light  not  being  universal,  to 
veSty  fs'^^i  be  of  weight,  should  observe  that  the  Author 
objection.  Qf  nature,  in  numberless  instances,  bestows 


Chap,  vr.f  Revelation  not  Universal.  273 

that  upon  some  which  he  does  not  upon  others^  who 
seem  equally  to  stand  in  need  of  it.  Indeed,  he  appears 
to  bestow  all  his  gifts,  with  the  most  promiscuous  varie- 
t-y,  among  creatures  of  the  same  species :  health  and 
strength,  capacities  of  prudence  and  of  knowledge, 
means  of  improvement,  riches,  and  all  external  advan- 
tages. And  as  there  are  not  any  two  men  found  of  ex- 
actly like  shape  and  features,  so,  it  is  probable,  there  are 
not  any  two  of  an  exactly  like  constitution,  temper,  and 
situation,  with  regard  to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life. 
Yet,  notwithstanding  these  uncertainties  and  varieties, 
God  does  exercise  a  natural  government  over  the  world  ; 
and  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  prudent  and  imprudent 
institution  of  life,  with  regard  to  our  health  and  our 
affairs,  under  that  his  natural  government. 

As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation  have 
been  universal,  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a 
greater  or  less  part  of  the  world,  at  different  times,  so 
likewise,  at  different  times,  both  revelations  have  had 
different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who  lived  dur- 
ing the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  from  Moses  till 
after  the  captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  the  truth 
of  their  religion  than  those  had,  who  lived  in  the  interval 
between  the  last-mentioned  period  and  the  coming  of 
Christ.  And  the  first  Christians  had  higher  evidence 
of  the  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity 
than  what  we  have  now.  They  had  also  a  strong  pre- 
sumptive proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  perhaps  of  much 
greater  force  in  way  of  argument  than  many  think,  of 
which  we  have  very  little  remaining ;  I  mean,  the  pre- 
sumptive proof  of  its  truth,  from  the  influence  which  it 
had  upon  the  lives  of  the  generality  of  its  professors. 
And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  possibly  have  a  proof  of  it 
which  they  could  not  have,  from  the  conformity  between 
the  prophetic  history  and  the  state  of  the  world,  and  of 
("Ihristianity. 
18 


2/4  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II. 

And  further :  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  evidence 
which  some  have  of  religion  to  amount  to  little  more 
than  seeing  that  it  may  be  true,  but  that  they  remain  in 
great  doubts  and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence 
and  its  nature,  and  great  perplexities  concerning  the 
rule  of  life ;  others,  to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the 
truth  of  religion,  with  a  distinct  knowledge  of  their  duty 
and  others  severally,  to  have  all  the  intermediate  de- 
grees of  religious  light  and  evidence  which  lie  between 
these  two — if  we  put  the  case,  that  for  the  present  it 
was  intended  revelation  should  be  no  more  than  a  small 
light  in  the  midst  of  a  world  greatly  overspread,  notwith- 
standing it,  with  ignorance  and  darkness ;  that  certain 
glimmerings  of  this  light  should  extend,  and  be  directed, 
to  remote  distances,  in  such  a  manner  as  that  those  who 
really  partook  of  it  should  not  discern  from  whence  it 
originally  came ;  that  some,  in  a  nearer  situation  to  it, 
should  have  its  light  obscured,  and,  in  different  ways 
and  degrees,  intercepted;  and  that  others  should  be 
placed  within  its  clearer  influence,  and  be  much  more 
enlivened,  cheered,  and  directed  by  it;  but  yet,  that 
even  to  these  it  should  be  no  more  than  a  light  shining 
in  a  dark  place :  all  this  would  be  perfectly  uniform,  and 
of  a  piece  with  the  conduct  of  providence  in  the  distri- 
bution of  its  other  blessings.  If  the  fact  of  the  case 
really  were,  that  some  have  received  no  light  at  all  from 
the  Scripture  ;  as  many  ages  and  countries  in  the  hea- 
then world  :  that  others,  though  they  have,  by  means  of 
it,  had  essential  or  natural  religion  enforced  upon  their 
consciences,  yet  have  never  had  the  genuine  Scripture 
revelation,  with  its  real  evidence,  proposed  to  their  con- 
sideration ;  and  the  ancient  Persians  and  modern  Mo- 
hammedans may  possibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a  situ- 
ation somewhat  like  to  this  :  that  others,  though  they 
have  had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of  divine 
revelation,  yet  have  had  it  with  the  system  and  evidence 


Chap.  VI.]  Revelation  not  Universal.  275 

of  Christianity  so  interpolated,  the  system  so  corrupted, 
the  evidence  so  blended  with  false  miracles,  as  to  leave 
the  mind  in  the  utmost  doubtfulness  and  uncertainty 
about  the  whole;  which  may  be  the  state  of  some 
thoughtful  men  in  most  of  those  nations  who  call  them- 
selves Christian  ;  and  lastly^  that  others  have  had  Chris- 
tianity offered  to  them  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  and 
with  its  proper  evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and 
Churches  of  civil  and  of  Christian  liberty ;  but,  however, 
that  even  these  persons  are  left  in  great  ignorance  in 
many  respects,  and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded 
them  enough  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regu- 
late their  life,  to  teach  them  their  duty,  and  encourage 
them  in  the  careful  discharge  of  it ;  I  say,  if  we  were  to 
suppose  this  somewhat  of  a  general  true  account  of  the 
degrees  of  moral  and  religious  light  and  evidence,  which 
were  intended  to  be  afforded  mankind,  and  of  what  has 
actually  been  and  is  their  situation  in  their  moral  and 
religious  capacity,  there  would  be  nothing  in  all  this 
ignorance,  doubtfulness,  and  uncertainty — in  all  these 
varieties  and  supposed  disadvantages  of  some  in  com- 
parison of  others,  respecting  religion — but  may  be  par- 
alleled by  manifest  analogies  in  the  natural  dispensa- 
tions of  providence  at  present,  and  considering  ourselves 
merely  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

4.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which 
would  seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  administration 
in  nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in  mind  au  to  be  judged 
that  every  one  shall  be  dealt  equitably  with  ;  SXtfwie'dffe 
instead  of  forgetting  this,  or  explaining  it  *°^»^"'*y- 
away,  after  it  is  acknowledged  in  words.  All  shadow  of 
injustice,  and  indeed  all  harsh  appearances,  in  this  vari- 
ous economy  of  providence,  would  be  lost,  if  we  would 
keep  in  mind  that  every  merciful  allowance  shall  be 
made,  and  no  more  be  required  of  any  one  than  what 
might  have  been  equitably  expected  of  him,  from  the 


zj^  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed;  and  not  what 
might  have  been  expected,  had  he  been  placed  in  other 
circumstances  :  that  is,  in  Scripture  language,  that  every 
man  shall  be  accepted  "according  to  what  he  had,  not 
according  to  what  he  had  not."  2  Cor.  viii,  12.  This, 
however,  doth  not  by  any  means  imply  that  all  persons 
condition  here  is  equally  advantageous  with  respect  to 
futurity.  And  Providence's  designing  to  place  some  in 
greater  darkness  with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  is 
no  more  a  reason  why  they  should  not  endeavor  to  get 
out  of  that  darkness,  and  others  to  bring  them  out  of  it, 
than  why  ignorant  and  slow  people,  in  matters  of  othei 
knowledge,  should  not  endeavor  to  learn,  or  should  not 
be  instructed. 

5.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same 
wise  and  good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  dis- 

,     posed  the  Author  of  nature  to  make  differ- 

Divereity    in    ^ 

knowledge  not   ent  kmds  and  orders  of  creatures,  disposed 

more  unreason-    ,  .  ,  .,.,,., 

able  than  in  ca-  him  also  to  placc   crcatures  of  like  kinds 

pacitiea.  .        ,.„  .  .  -      ,  , 

in  different  situations;  and  that  the  same 
principle  which  disposed  him  to  make  creatures  of  dif- 
ferent moral  capacities,  disposed  him  also  to  place  crea- 
tures of  like  moral  capacities  in  different  religious  situ- 
ations :  and  even  the  same  creatures,  in  different  periods 
of  their  being.  And  the  account  or  reason  of  this,  is 
also  most  probably  the  account  why  the  constitution  of 
things  is  such  as  that  creatures  of  moral  natures  or  ca- 
pacities, for  a  considerable  part  of  that  duration  in 
which  they  are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all  subjects  of 
morality  and  religion ;  but  grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow 
up  to  be  so  more  and  more,  gradually  from  childhood 
to  mature  age. 

6.  What,  in  particular,  is   the   account  or  reason  of 
The  reason  of  th-csc  things,  wc  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark 

these  things   is  -^         i      ^i.    ^  i  t^^i 

that  of  oar  ig-  wcrc  it  Only  that  we  know  so  very  little  even 
foThem""^"*'''*  of  our  own  case.     Our  present   state  may 


Chap.  VI. ]  Revelation  not  Universal.  277 

possibly  be  the  consequence  of  somewhat  past,  which 
we  are  wholly  ignorant  of;  as  it  has  a  reference  to  some- 
what to  come,  of  which  we  know  scarce  any  more  than 
is  necessary  for  practice.  A  system  or  constitution,  in 
its  notion,  implies  variety :  and  so  complicated  a  one 
as  this  world,  very  great  variety.  So  that  were  revela- 
tion universal,  yet  from  men's  different  capacities  of  un- 
derstanding, from  the  different  lengths  of  their  lives, 
their  different  educations,  and  other  external  circum- 
stances, and  from  their  difference  of  temper  and  bodily 
constitution ;  their  religious  situations  would  be  widely 
different,  and  the  disadvantage  of  some  in  comparison  of 
others,  perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  present.  And 
the  true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  such 
a  part  of  mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of  igno- 
rance, must  be  supposed  also  the  true  account  of  our 
further  ignorance  in  not  knowing  the  reasons  why,  or 
whence  it  is,  that  they  are  placed  in  this  condition.  But 
the  following  practical  reflections  may  deserve  the  seri- 
ous consideration  of  those  persons  who  think  the  cir- 
cumstances of  mankind,  or  their  own,  in  the  fore-men- 
tioned respects,  a  ground  of  complaint. 

First.  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious, 
may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men's  trial  in 
the  religious  sense :  as  it  gives  scope  for  a 

°  ,  .    .      °  ^  This  want  of 

virtuous  exercise,  or  vicious  neglect,  of  their  %ht  a  part  of 

,.  .  .    .  to  »  our  trial. 

understanding,  m  examining  or  not  examin- 
ing into  that  evidence.  There  seems  no  possible  reason 
to  be  given  why  we  may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral  pro- 
bation with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  understanding 
upon  the  subject  of  religion,  as  we  are  with  regard  to 
our  behavior  in  common  affairs.  The  former  is  as  much 
a  thing  within  our  power  and  choice  as  the  latter.  And 
I  suppose  it  is  to  be  laid  down  for  certain,  that  the  same 
character,  the  same  inward  principle,  which,  after  a  man 
is  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him  obe- 


2/8  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

dient  to  the  precepts  of  it,  would,  were  he  not  thus  con- 
vinced, set  him  about  an  examination  of  it,  upon  its 
system  and  evidence  being  offered  to  his  thoughts; 
and  that  in  the  latter  state,  his  examination  would  be 
with  an  impartiality,  seriousness,  and  solicitude,  propor- 
tionable to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former.  And  as 
inattention,  negligence,  want  of  all  serious  concern,  about 
a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and  such  importance,  when  of- 
fered to  men's  consideration,  is,  before  a  distinct  con- 
viction of  its  truth,  as  real  immoral  depravity  and  disso- 
luteness as  neglect  of  religious  practice  after  such  con- 
viction ;  so  active  solicitude  about  it,  and  fair  impartial 
consideration  of  its  evidence  before  such  conviction,  is  as 
really  an  exercise  of  a  morally  right  temper  as  is  religious 
practice  after.  Thus,  that  religion  is  not  intuitively  true, 
but  a  matter  of  deduction  and  inference ;  that  a  convic- 
tion of  its  truth  is  not  forced  upon  every  one,  but  left 
to  be,  by  some,  collected  with  heedful  attention  to 
premises  :  this  as  much  constitutes  religious  probation — 
as  much  affords  sphere,  scope,  opportunity,  for  right  and 
wrong  behavior — as  any  thing  whatever  does.  And  their 
manner  of  treating  this  subject,  when  laid  before  them, 
shows  what  is  in  their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 

8.  Secondly.  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though 
it  is  not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if,  upon  considera- 
Doubtftii  evi-   tion  of  religion,  the  evidence  of  it  should 
ilra'^^inmS  pro"   sccm  to  any  persons  doubtful,  in  the  highest 
bation.  supposable  degree ;  even  this  doubtful  evi- 

dence will,  however,  put  them  into  a  general  state  of  proba- 
tion^ in  the  moral  and  religious  sense.  For,  suppose  a  man 
to  be  really  in  doubt  whether  such  a  person  had  not  done 
nim  the  greatest  favor;  or,  whether  his  whole  temporal 
interest  did  not  depend  upon  that  person ;  no  one  who 
had  any  sense  of  gratitude  and  of  prudence  could  possi- 
bly consider  himself  in  the  same  situation,  with  regard 
to  such  persons,  as  if  he  had  no  such  doubt.     In  truth, 


Chap.  VI.]  Revelation  not  Universal.  279 

it  is  as  just  to  say  that  certainty  and  doubt  are  the  same 
as  to  say  the  situations  now  mentioned  would  leave  a 
man  as  entirely  at  liberty,  in  point  of  gratitude  or  pru- 
dence, as  he  would  be  were  he  certain  he  had  received 
no  favor  from  such  person,  or  that  he  no  way  depended 
upon  him  And  thus,  though  the  evidence  of  religion 
which  is  afforded  to  some  men  should  be  little  more 
than  that  they  are  given  to  see  the  system  of  Christian- 
ity, or  religion  in  general,  to  be  supposable  and  credible, 
this  ought  in  all  reason  to  beget  a  serious  practical  ap- 
prehension that  it  may  be  true.  And  even  this  will 
afford  matter  of  exercise,  for  religious  suspense  and  de- 
liberation, for  moral  resolution  and  self-government; 
because  the  apprehension  that  religion  may  be  true, 
does  as  really  lay  men  under  obligations  as  a  full  con- 
viction that  it  is  true.  It  gives  occasion  and  motives  to 
consider  further  the  important  subject ;  to  preserve  at- 
tentively upon  their  minds  a  general  implicit  sense  that 
they  may  be  under  divine  moral  government,  an  awful 
solicitude  about  religion,  whether  natural  or  revealed. 
Such  apprehension  ought  to  turn  men's  eyes  to  every 
degree  of  new  light  which  may  be  had,  from  whatever 
side  it  comes,  and  induce  them  to  refrain,  in  the  mean 
time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live  in  the  conscientious 
practice  of  every  common  virtue.  Especially  are  they 
bound  to  keep  at  the  greatest  distance  from  all  dissolute 
profaneness,  for  this  the  very  nature  of  the  case  for- 
bids; and  to  treat  with  highest  reverence  a  matter  upon 
which  their  own  whole  interest  and  being,  and  the  fate 
of  nature,  depends.  This  behavior,  and  an  active  en- 
deavor to  maintain  within  themselves  this  temper,  is  the 
business,  the  duty,  and  the  wisdom  of  those  persons 
who  complain  of  the  doubtfulness  of  religion ;  is  what 
they  are  under  the  most  proper  obligations  to;  and  such 
behavior  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  im- 
prove in  them,  that  character  which  the  practice  of  all 


28o  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II 

the  several  duties  of  religion,  from  a  full  conviction  of 
its  truth,  is  an  exertion  of  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve 
in  others ;  others,  I  say,  to  whom  God  has  afforded  such 
conviction.  Nay,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of 
religion,  revealed  as  well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may  be 
said  in  general  that  whoever  will  weigh  the  matter  thor- 
oughly, may  see  there  is  not  near  so  much  difference  as 
is  commonly  imagined  between  what  ought  in  reason  to 
be  the  rule  of  life  to  those  persons  who  are  fully  con- 
vinced of  its  truth,  and  to  those  who  have  only  a  serious 
doubting  apprehension  that  it  may  be  true.  Their  hopes, 
and  fears,  and  obligations  will  be  in  various  degrees;  but, 
as  the  subject-matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the  same, 
so  the  subject-matter  of  their  obligations,  what  they  are 
bound  to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 

9.  It  is  to  be  observed,  further,  that  from  a  character 
of  understanding,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the  world, 
„  ,  -.      .V    some  persons  have  it  in   their  power  to  do 

ReUgious  doubt    .     _    ,  *^,  ,    ,  *^ 

doea  not  lessen   mfinitely  more  harm  or  good  by  settmg  an 

responsibiUty.  /  a  A    ^^ 

example  of  profaneness  and  avowed  disre- 
gard to  all  religion,  or,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious, 
though  perhaps  doubting,  apprehension  of  its  truth,  and 
of  a  reverend  regard  to  it  under  this  doubtfulness,  than 
they  can  do  by  acting  well  or  ill  in  all  the  common  in- 
tercourses among  mankind ;  and  consequently  they  are 
most  highly  accountable  for  a  behavior  which  they 
may  easily  foresee  is  of  such  importance,  and  in  which 
there  is  most  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong ;  even  admit- 
ting the  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as  doubtful  as  is 
pretended. 

10.  The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which 
renders  them  just  and  true,  is  that  doubting  necessarily 

Doubtimpiies  implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for  that  of 
evidence.  which  we  doubt.     For  no  person  would  be 

in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts 
so  and  so  circumstanced  which  should  accidentally  come 


Chap.  VI.]  Revelation  not  Universal.  281 

into  his  thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at  all. 
And  though,  in  the  case  of  an  even  chance,  and  where 
consequently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  should  in  common 
language  say  that  we  had  no  evidence  at  all  for  either 
side ;  yet  that  situation  of  things  which  renders  it  an 
even  chance  and  no  more,  that  such  an  event  will  hap- 
pen, renders  this  case  equivalent  to  all  others,  where 
there  is  such  evidence  on  both  sides  of  a  question  (In- 
troduction) as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  concerning  the 
truth.  Indeed,  in  all  these  cases  there  is  no  more  evi- 
dence on  the  one  side  than  on  the  other;  but  there  is 
(what  is  equivalent  to)  much  more  for  either  than  for 
the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  which  come  into  one's 
thoughts  at  random.  And  thus,  in  all  these  cases,  doubt 
as  much  presupposes  evidence,  lower  degrees  of  evi- 
dence, as  belief  presupposes  higher,  and  certainty  high- 
er still.  Any  one  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  nature 
of  evidence,  will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and 
see  that  between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of 
it  which  affords  ground  of  doubt,  there  are  as  many  in- 
termediate degrees  as  there  are  between  that  degree 
which  is  the  ground  of  doubt,  and  demonstration.  And 
though  we  have  not  faculties  to  distinguish  these  de- 
grees of  evidence  with  any  sort  of  exactness,  yet  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  discerned,  they  ought  to  influence 
our  practice.  For  it  is  as  real  an  imperfection  in  the 
moral  character  not  to  be  influenced  in  practice  by  a 
lowei  degree  of  evidence  when  discerned,  as  it  is  in  the 
understanding  not  to  discern  it.  And  as,  in  all  subjects 
which  men  consider,  they  discern  the  lower  as  well  as 
:he  higher  degrees  of  evidence,  proportionably  to  their 
capacity  of  understanding ;  so,  in  practical  subjects,  they 
are  influenced  in  practice  by  the  lower  as  well  as  higher 
degrees  of  it,  proportionably  to  their  fairness  and  hon- 
esty. And  as  in  proportion  to  defects  in  the  under- 
standing, men  are  unapt  to  see  lower  degrees  of  evi- 


282  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

dence,  are  in  danger  of  overlooking  evidence  when  it  is 
not  glaring,  and  are  easily  imposed  upon  in  such  cases ; 
so,  in  proportion  to  the  corruption  of  the  heart,  they 
seem  capable  of  satisfying  themselves  with  having  no 
regard  in  practice  to  evidence  acknowledged  real,  if  it 
be  not  overbearing.  From  these  things  it  must  follow, 
♦  that  doubting  concerning  religion  implies  such  a  degree 
of  evidence  for  it  as,  joined  with  the  consideration  of  its 
importance,  unquestionably  lays  men  under  the  obliga- 
tions before-mentioned,  to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to  it  in 
all  their  behavior. 

II.   Thirdly.  The   difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 

of  religion  is  involved,  which   some  complain  of,  is  no 

more  a  just  ground  of  complaint  than  the 

Difficulties  "^     .      °  .  . 

In  evidence  no   external  circumstauccs  of  temptation  which 

more  a  cause  of  ,.„,.. 

complaint  than   Others  are  placed  in,  or  than  difficulties  in 

in  practice.  .  -    .         _  _   .,  .      .  - 

the  practice  of  it  after  a  full  conviction  of 
its  truth.     Temptations  render  our  state  a  more  improv- 
ing state  of  discipline  (part  i,  chap,  v)  than  it  would  be 
otherwise ;  as  they  give  occasion  for  a  more  attentive 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  which  confirms  and 
strengthens  it  more  than  an  easier  or  less  attentive  ex- 
ercise of  it  could.     Now  speculative  difficulties  are,  in 
this  respect,  of  the  very  same  nature  with  these  external 
temptations.     For  the  evidence  of  religion  not  appear- 
ing obvious,  is  to  some  persons  a  temptation  to  reject  it, 
without  any  consideration  at  all ;  and  therefore  requires 
such  an  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  seri- 
ously to  consider  that  evidence,  as  there  would  be  no 
occasion  for  but  for  such  temptation.     And  the  sip- 
posed  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence,  after  it  has  been  in 
some  sort  considered,  affords  opportunity  to  an  unfair 
mind  of  explaining  away,  and  deceitfully  hiding  from 
itself,  that  evidence  which  it  might  see  :  and  also  for 
men's  encouraging  themselves  in  vice,  from  hopes  of 
impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  see  thus  much  at  least, 


Chap.  VIJ  Revelation  not  Universal.  283 

that  these  hopes  are  uncertain :  in  like  manner  as  the 
common  temptation  tc  many  instances  of  folly,  which 
end  in  temporal  infamy  and  ruin,  is  the  ground  for  hope 
of  not  being  detected,  and  of  escaping  with  impunity ; 
that  is  the  doubtfulness  of  the  proof  beforehand,  that 
such  foolish  behavior  will  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruir, 
On  the  contrary,  supposed  doubtfulness  in  the  evidence 
of  religion  calls  for  a  more  careful  and  attentive  exercise 
of  the  virtuous  principle  in  fairly  yielding  themselves  up 
to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though 
doubtful ;  and  in  practicing  conscientiously  all  virtue, 
though  under  some  uncertainty  whether  the  govern- 
ment in  the  universe  may  not  possibly  be  such  as  that 
vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And  in  general,  temp- 
tation, meaning  by  this  word  the  lesser  allurements  to 
wrong,  and  difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty,  as 
well  as  the  greater  ones ;  temptation,  I  say,  as  such,  and 
of  every  kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls  forth  some  virtuous 
efforts,  additional  to  what  would  otherwise  have  been 
wanting,  cannot  but  be  an  additional  discipline  and  im- 
provement of  virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it,  in  the 
other  senses  of  that  word.  (Part  i,  chap,  iv,  and  page  150.) 
So  that  the  very  same  account  is  to  be  given  why  the 
evidence  of  religion  should  be  left  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  require,  in  some,  an  attentive,  solicitous,  perhaps  pain- 
ful exercise  of  their  understanding  about  it;  as  why 
others  should  be  placed  in  such  circumstances  as  that 
the  practice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full  conviction 
of  the  truth  of  it,  should  require  attention,  solicitude, 
and  pains;  or  why  appearing  doubtfulness  should  be 
permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to  some;  as 
why  external  difficulties  and  allurements  should  be  per- 
mitted to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to  others.  The 
same  account  also  is  to  be  given,  why  some  should  be 
exercised  with  temptations  of  both  these  kinds,  as  why 
others  should  be  exercised  with  the  latter  in  such  very 


284  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Pari  II 

high   degrees  as   some   have   been,  particularly  as  the 
primitive  Christians  were. 

12.  Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing 
that  the  speculative  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
Speculative  dif-  ^^  religion  is  involved  may  make  even  the 
ficuitiesto  some  principal  part  of  some  persons'  trial.     For 

the  chief  trial.  ,  ,  •  . 

as  the  chief  temptations  of  the  generality  of 
the  world  are  the  ordinary  motives  to  injustice  or  unre- 
strained pleasure ;  or  to  live  in  the  neglect  of  religion, 
from  that  frame  of  mind,  which  renders  many  persons 
almost  without  feeling  as  to  any  thing  distant,  or  which 
is  not  the  object  of  their  senses ;  so  there  are  other  per- 
sons without  this  shallowness  of  temper,  persons  of  a 
deeper  sense  as  to  what  is  invisible  and  future,  who  not 
only  see,  but  have  a  general  practical  feeling  that  what 
is  to  come  will  be  present,  and  that  things  are  not  less 
real  for  their  not  being  the  objects  of  sense ;  and  who, 
from  their  natural  constitution  of  body  and  of  temper, 
and  from  their  external  condition,  may  have  small  temp- 
tations to  behave  ill,  small  difficulty  in  behaving  well,  in 
the  common  course  of  life.  Now  when  these  latter  per- 
sons have  a  distinct,  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  relig- 
ion, without  any  possible  doubts  or  difficulties,  the  prac- 
tice of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable,  unless  they  will  do  a 
constant  violence  to  their  own  minds ;  and  religion  is 
scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them,  than  it  is  to  crea- 
tures in  a  state  of  perfection.  Yet  these  persons  may 
possibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  discipline  and  exercise 
in  a  higher  degree  than  they  would  have  by  such  an 
easy  practice  of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requisite,  for 
reasons  unknown  to  us,  that  they  should  give  some  fur- 
ther manifestation  (page  151)  what  is  their  moral  char- 
acter, to  the  creation  of  God,  than  such  a  practice  of  it 
would  be.  Thus  in  the  great  variety  of  religious  situa- 
tions in  which  men  are  placed,  what  constitutes — what 
chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes— the  probation,  in  all 


Chap.  VI.]  Revelation  not  Universal.  285 

senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in  which 
the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved  ;  and  their  principal 
and  distinguished  trial  may  be,  how  they  will  behave 
under  and  with  respect  to  these  difficulties.  Circum- 
stances in  men's  situation  in  their  temporal  capacity, 
analogous  in  good  measure  to  this  respecting  religion, 
are  to  be  observed.  We  find  some  persons  are  placed 
in  such  a  situation  in  the  world,  as  that  their  chief  diffi- 
culty, with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the  doing  what  is 
prudent  when  it  is  known,  for  this,  in  numberless  cases, 
is  as  easy  as  the  contrary,  but  to  some  the  principal  ex- 
ercise is  recollection,  and  being  upon  their  guard  against 
deceits — the  deceits,  suppose,  of  those  about  them — 
against  false  appearances  of  reason  and  prudence.  To 
persons  in  some  situations,  the  principal  exercise  with 
respect  to  conduct  is  attention,  in  order  to  inform  them- 
selves what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the  reasonable  and 
prudent  part  to  act. 

13.  But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition  that 
men's  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not 
owing  to   their   neglects   or   prejudices ;  it     ^.     . ,    , 

°  °  ^     ^  .     '  Dissatiafaction 

must  be  added,  on  the  other  hand,  m  all  the  feuit  of  the 

1  11  ^        f    objector. 

common  reason,  and  as  what  the  truth  of 
the  case  plainly  requires  should  be  added,  that  such  dis- 
satisfaction possibly  may  be  owing  to  those — possibly 
may  be  men's  own  fault.     For, 

If  there  are  any  persons  who  never  set  themselves 
heartily,  and  in  earnest,  to  be  informed  in  religion ;  if 
there  are  any  who  secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove  true, 
and  are  less  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties, 
and  more  to  objections  than  to  what  is  said  in  answer  to 
them ;  these  persons  will  scarce  be  thought  in  a  likely 
way  of  seeing  the  evidence  of  religion,  though  it  were 
most  certainly  true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  so  fully 
proved.  If  any  accustom  themselves  to  consider  thi? 
subject  usually  in  the  way  of  mirth  and  sport ;  if  they 


286  Analogy  of  Religion.         LP  art  II. 

attend  to  forms  and  representations,  and  inadequate 
manners  of  expression,  instead  of  the  real  things  intend- 
ed by  them,  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more  than  inad- 
equately expressive  of  the  things  signified,)  or  if  they 
substitute  human  errors  in  the  room  of  divine  truth, 
why  may  not  all,  or  any  of  these  things,  hinder  some 
men  from  seeking  that  evidence  which  really  is  seen  by 
others ;  as  a  like  turn  of  mind,  with  respect  to  matters 
of  common  speculation  and  practice,  does,  we  find  by 
experience,  hinder  them  from  attaining  that  knowledge 
and  right  understanding  in  matters  of  common  specula- 
tion and  practice  which  more  fair  and  attentive  minds 
attain  to  ?  And  the  effect  will  be  the  same,  whether 
their  neglect  of  seriously  considering  the  evidence  of 
religion,  and  their  indirect  behavior  with  regard  to  it, 
proceed  from  mere  carelessness  or  from  the  grosser 
vices ;  or  whether  it  be  owing  to  this,  that  forms,  and 
figurative  manners  of  expression,  as  well  as  errors,  ad- 
minister occasions  of  ridicule,  when  the  things  intended, 
and  the  truth  itself,  would  not.  Men  may  indulge  a 
ludicrous  turn  so  far  as  to  lose  all  sense  of  conduct  and 
prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and  even,  as  it  seems,  to  im- 
pair their  faculty  of  reason.  And  in  general,  levity,  care- 
lessness, passion,  and  prejudice,  do  hinder  us  from  being 
rightly  informed  with  respect  to  common  things ;  and  they 
may^  in  like  manner,  and  perhaps  in  some  further  provi- 
dential manner,  with  respect  to  moral  and  religious  sub- 
jects ;  may  hinder  evidence  from  being  laid  before  us, 
and  from  being  seen  when  it  is.    The  Scripture*  does  de 

*  Dan.  xii,  lo.  See  also  Isa.  xxix,  13,  14  ;  Matt,  vi,  23,  and  xi 
25,  and  xiii,  II,  12  ;  John  iii,  19,  and  v,  44  ;  I  Cor.  ii,  14,  and  ?  Cor 
iv,  4 ;  2  Tim.  iii,  13  ;  and  that  affectionate,  as  well  as  authoritative 
admonition,  so  very  many  times  inculcated,  "He  that  hath  ears  to 
hear,  let  him  hear."  Grotius  saw  so  strongly  the  thing  intended  in 
these,  and  other  passages  of  Scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say,  that 
the  proof  given  us  of  Christianity  was  less  than  it  might  have  been, 
for  this  very  purpose :    Ut  ita  sermo  Evangelii  tanquam  lapis  essct 


Chap.  VI.]  Revelation  not  Universal.  287 

clare,  that  every  one  shall  not  understand.  And  it  makes 
no  difference  by  what  providential  conduct  this  comes 
to  pass;  whether  the  evidence  of  Christianity  was,  orig- 
inally and  with  design,  put  and  left  so,  as  that  those  who 
are  desirous  of  evading  moral  obligations  should  not  see 
it,  and  that  honest-minded  persons  should,  or  whether 
it  comes  to  pass  by  any  other  means. 

14.  Further :  the  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and 
of  Christianity  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  p^of  levei  to 
common  men:  even  those  the  greatest  part  «>™"on™e"- 
of  whose  time,  from  childhood  to  old  age,  is  taken  up 
with  providing,  for  themselves  and  their  families,  the 
common  conveniences,  perhaps  necessaries,  of  life ; 
those,  I  mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  ask- 
ing after  proof  or  attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were 
they  as  much  in  earnest  about  religion  as  about  their 
temporal  affairs,  are  capable  of  being  convinced,  upon 
real  evidence,  that  there  is  a  God  who  governs  the 
world ;  and  they  feel  themselves  to  be  of  a  moral  na- 
ture, and  accountable  creatures.     And  as  Christianity 

Lydius  ad  quern  ingenia  sanabilia  explorarentur .  De  Ver,,  R.  C,  lib. 
2,  toward  the  end.  [We  give  the  passage  from  <irotius  in  full :  "  If 
there  be  any  one  who  is  not  satisfied  with  the  arguments  hitherto  al- 
leged for  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion,  but  desires  more  power- 
ful ones,  he  ought  to  know  that  different  things  must  have  different 
kinds  of  proof ;  one  sort  in  mathematics,  another  in  the  properties  of 
bodies,  another  in  doubtful  matters,  and  another  in  matters  of  fact. 
And  we  are  to  abide  by  that  whose  testimonies  are  void  of  all  suspi- 
cion ;  if  this  be  not  admitted,  not  only  all  history  is  of  no  further  use, 
and  a  great  part  of  physic  ;  but  all  that  natural  affection,  which  is  be- 
tween parents  and  children,  is  lost,  who  can  be  known  no  other  way. 
And  it  is  the  will  of  God,  that  those  things  which  he  would  have  us 
believe,  so  as  that  faith  should  be  accepted  from  us  as  obedience, 
should  not  be  so  very  plain,  as  tho>e  things  we  perceive  by  our  senses, 
and  by  demonstration  ;  but  only  so  far  as  is  sufficient  to  procure  the 
belief,  and  persuade  a  man  of  the  thing,  who  is  not  obstinately  bent 
against  it :  So  that  the  gospel  is,  as  it  were,  a  touchstone,  to  try  men's 
honest  dispositions  by." — Dr.  Crooks.] 


288  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

entirely  falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense  of  things 
so  they  are  capable,  not  only  of  being  persuaded,  but  of 
being  made  to  see  that  there  is  evidence  of  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and  many  appearing  com- 
pletions of  prophecy.  But  though  this  proof  is  real  and 
conclusive,  yet  it  is  liable  to  objections, and  maybe  run 
up  into  difficulties;  which,  however,  persons  who  aie 
capable,  not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are 
capable  also  of  seeing  through ;  that  is,  not  of  clearing 
up  and  answering  them,  so  as  to  satisfy  their  curiosity, 
for  of  such  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  with  respect 
to  any  one  thing  in  nature ;  but  capable  of  seeing  that 
the  proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  destroyed  by 
these  objections.  But  then  a  thorough  examination 
into  religion  with  regard  to  these  objections,  which 
cannot  be  the  business  .of  every  man,  is  a  matter  of 
pretty  large  compass,  and  from  the  nature  of  it  re- 
quires some  knowledge  as  well  as  time  and  attention 
to  see  how  the  evidence  comes  out  upon  balancing 
one  thing  with  another,  and  what,  upon  the  whole,  is 
the  amount  of  it.  Now  if  persons  who  have  picked 
up  these  objections  from  others,  and  take  for  grant- 
ed they  are  of  weight,  upon  the  word  of  those  from 
whom  they  received  them,  or  by  often  retailing  of 
them  come  to  see,  or  fancy  they  see,  them  to  be  of 
weight,  will  not  prepare  themselves  for  such  an  exami- 
nation, with  a  competent  degree  of  knowledge,  or  will 
not  give  that  time  and  attention  to  the  subject  which, 
from  the  nature  of  it,  is  necessary  for  attaining  such  infor- 
mation ;  in  this  case  they  must  remain  in  doubtfulness, 
ignorance,  or  error ;  in  the  same  way  as  they  must  with 
regard  to  common  sciences,  and  matters  of  common  life, 
if  they  neglect  the  necessary  means  of  being  informed 
in  them. 

15.  But  still,  perhaps,  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a 
prince  or  common  master  were  to  send  directions  to  a 


Chap.  VIJ  Revelation  not  Universal.  289 

servant,  he  would  take  care  that  they  should  always 
bear  the  certain  marks  who  they  came  from,      ob.  The  ev<- 
and  that  their  sense  should  be  always  plain,   J^^aL'^as  the 
so  as  that  there  should  be  no  possible  doubt,   master^^toaMrv* 
if  he  could  help  it,  concerning  the  author-   *°'' 
ity  or  meaning  of  them.     Now  the  proper  answer  to 
all  this  kind  of  objections  is,  that  wherever  the  fallacy 
lies,  it  is  even  certain  we  cannot  argue  thus  with  respect 
to  Him  who  is  the  governor  of  the  world;  and  particu- 
larly, that  he  does  not  afford  us  such  information,  with 
respect  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  interests,  as  experi- 
ence abundantly  shows.     However,  there   is  a  full  an- 
swer to  this  objection,  from  the  very  nature  of  religion. 
For  the  reason  why  a  prince  would  give  his  directions 
in  this  plain  manner  is,  that  he  absolutely  desires  such 
an  external  action  should  be  done,  without  concerning 
himself  with  the  motive  or  principle  upon  which  it  is 
done ;  that  is, he  regards  only  the  external  ev;nt,  or  the 
thing's  being  done,  and  not  at  all,  properly  speaking,  the 
doing  of  it,  or  the  action.     Whereas  the  whole  of  moral- 
ity and  religion,  consisting  merely  in  action  itself,  there 
is  no  sort  of  parallel  between  the  cases.     But  if  the 
prince  be  supposed  to  regard  only  the  action ;  that  is, 
only  to  desire  to  exercise,  or  in  any  sense  prove,  the 
understanding  or  loyalty  of  a  servant,  he  would  not  al- 
ways give  his  orders  in  such  a  plain  manner.     It  may  be 
proper  to  add,  that  the  will  of  God,  respecting  morality 
and  religion,  may  be  considered  either  as  absolute,  or  as 
only  conditional.     If  it  be  absolute,  it  can  only  be  thus 
that  we  should   act  virtuously  in  such  given   circum- 
stances ;  not  that  we  should  be  brought  to  act  so  by  his 
changing  of  our  circumstances.     And  if  God's  will  be 
thus  absolute,  then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the  highest  and 
strictest  sense,  to  do  or  to  contradict  his  will ;  which  is 
a  most  weighty  consideration.     Or  his  will  may  be  con- 
sidered only  as  conditional — that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we 
19 


290  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  TI. 

shall  be  rewarded ;  if  otherwise,  punished ;  of  which 
conditional  will  of  the  Author  of  nature,  the  whole  con- 
stitution of  it  aifords  most  certain  instances. 

16.  Upon  the  whole  :  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion 
necessarily  implies  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation : 
Probation  im-  and  the  Credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in 
K  ttS^'tttags  s"^^  ^  state  being  admitted,  there  seems  no 
objected  to.  peculiar  difficulty  in  supposing  our  proba- 
tion to  be,  just  as  it  is,  in  those  respects  which  are  above 
objected  against.  There  seems  no  pretense,  from  the 
reason  of  the  things  to  say  that  the  trial  cannot  equitably 
be  any  thing,  but  whether  persons  will  act  suitably  to 
certain  information,  or  such  as  admits  no  room  for 
doubt ;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no  danger  of  miscar- 
riage, but  either  from  their  not  attending  to  what  they 
certainly  know,  or  from  overbearing  passion  hurrying 
them  on  to  act  contrary  to  it.  For  since  ignorance  and 
doubt  afford  scope  for  probation  in  all  senses,  as  really 
as  intuitive  conviction  or  certainty ;  and  since  the  two 
former  are  to  be  put  to  the  same  account  as  difficulties 
in  practice  ;  men's  moral  probation  may  also  be,  whether 
they  will  take  due  care  to  inform  themselves  by  impar- 
tial consideration,  and  afterward  whether  they  will  act 
as  the  case  requires,  upon  the  evidence  which  they  have, 
however  doubtful.  And  this,  we  find  by  experience^  is 
frequently  our  probation,  (pages  77,  282,  etc.,)  in  our 
temporal  capacity.  For  the  information  which  we  want, 
with  regard  to  our  worldly  interests,  is  by  no  means  al- 
ways given  us  of  course,  without  any  care  of  our  own 
And  we  are  greatly  liable  to  self-deceit  from  inward 
secret  prejudici^s ;  and  also  to  the  deceit  of  others.  So 
that  to  be  able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often 
requires  much  and  difficult  consideration.  Then  after 
we  have  judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evidence  upon 
which  we  must  act,  if  we  will  live  and  act  at  all,  is  perpetu- 
ally doubtful  to  a  very  high  degree.    And  the  constitution 


Chap.  VI.]  Revelation  not  Universal.  291 

and  course  of  the  world  in  fact  is  such,  as  that  want  of 
impartial  consideration  what  we  have  to  do,  and  ventur- 
ing upon  extravagant  courses,  because  it  is  doubtful 
what  will  be  the  consequences,  are  often  naturally,  that 
is,  providentially,  altogether  as  fatal,  as  misconduct  oc- 
casioned by  heedless  inattention  to  what  we  certainly 
know,  or  disregarding  it  from  overbearing  passion. 

17.  Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  well 
seem  strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  mpny  good  men. 
But  if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are      ^     ^      _, 

'■  ^  We  acton  evi- 

made  think  so  ;  persons  who  object  as  above,   denceiowerthan 

,     ,  «.      ,1  1  1-    •  1         probable. 

and  throw  off  all  regard  to  religion  under 
pretense  of  want  of  evidence  ;  I  desire  them  to  consider 
again,  whether  their  thinking  so  be  owing  to  any  thing 
unintelligible  in  these  observations,  or  to  their  own  not 
having  such  a  sense  of  religion,  and  serious  solicitude 
about  it,  as  even  their  state  of  skepticism  does  in  all 
reason  require  }  It  ought  to  be  forced  upon  the  reflec- 
tion of  these  persons  that  our  nature  and  condition  nec- 
essarily require  us,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  to  act 
upon  evidence  much  lower  than  what  is  commonly 
called  probable ;  to  guard  not  only  against  what  we  ful- 
ly believe  will,  but  also  against  what  we  think  it  sup- 
posable  may,  happen ;  and  to  engage  in  pursuits  when 
the  probability  is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  be  credibie 
that  possibly  we  may  succeed  in  them. 


292  Analogy  of  Religion.         LPart  II 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCE  FOR  CHRISTIANITY.* 

''  I  ^HE  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objections 
^  J.      against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and 

Proof  aside  Particular  things  relating  to  it,  being  re- 
and"  r™hec^^*  moved,  there  remains  to  be  considered,  what 
positive  evidence  we  have  for  the  truth  of 
it :  chiefly  in  order  to  see  what  the  analogy  of  nature 
suggests  with  regard  to  that  evidence,  and  the  objections 
against  it ;  or  to  see  what  is,  and  is  allowed  to  be,  the 
plain,  natural  rule  of  judgment  and  of  action  in  our 
temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we  have  the  same 
kind  of  evidence,  and  the  same  kind  of  objections 
against  it,  that  we  have  in  the  case  before  us. 

Now,  in  the  evidence  of  Christianity,  there  seem  to 
be  several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the 

*  [At  the  place  where  we  now  find  ourselves,  Butler  makes  a  transi- 
tion in  his  argument :  he  passes  from  the  subject-matter  of  Christian- 
ity to  its  evidence.  He  has  hitherto  been  employed  in  removing  the 
objections  against  Christianity  itself  by  the  argument  of  analogy,  and 
by  the  same  engine  he  now  proceeds  to  remove  the  objections  that 
may  be  leveled  against  the  proof  of  it.  The  two  objects  are  altogeth- 
er distinct.  ...  In  the  discharge  of  this  second  service,  he  is  not 
called  upon  to  propound  very  fully,  or  in  the  way  of  positive  vindi- 
cation, the  evid(  nces  of  Christianity.  He  adverts  to  them  ;  he  states 
what  they  are  ;  he  even  renders  a  passing  homage  to  their  authority 
and  force  ;  but  his  proper  task  is  to  do  by  them  what  he  had  before 
done  by  the  subject-matter  of  revelation,  that  is,  clear  away  the  ob- 
jections, not  now  against  the  doctrine  of  Christianity,  but  against  the 
proof  of  it,  and  that  by  showing  that  the  similar  or  analogous  objec- 
tions in  other  cases  are  not  admitted  to  have  the  validity  which,  in 
the  case  of  the  evangelical  story,  the  opj  onents  of  the  gospel  would 
fain  allow  to  them. — Chalmers.] 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  293 

head  either  of  miracles  or  the  completion  of  prophecy, 
in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  words.  But  these 
two  are  its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs ;  and  those 
other  things,  however  considerable  they  are,  yet  ought 
never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  direct  proofs,  but  al- 
ways to  be  joined  with  them.  Thus  the  evidence  of 
Christianity  will  be  a  long  series  of  things  reaching,  as 
it  seems,  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to  the  present 
time,  of  great  variety  and  compass,  taking  in  both  the 
direct  and  also  the  collateral  proofs,  and  making  up,  all 
of  them  together,  one  argument;  the  conviction  arising 
from  which  kind  of  proof  may  be  compared  to  what  they 
call  the  effect  in  architecture  or  other  works  of  art — a  re- 
sult from  a  great  number  of  things  so  and  so  disposed, 
and  taken  into  one  view.  I  shall,  therefore,  yfrj/,  make 
some  observations  relating  to  miracles,  and  the  appear- 
ing completion  of  prophecy,  and  consider  what  anal- 
ogy suggests  in  answer  to  the  objections  brought  against 
this  evidence.  And  secondly^  I  shall  endeavor  to  give 
5ome  account  of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned, 
consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence, 
considered  as  making  up  one  argument :  this  being  the 
kind  of  proof  upon  which  we  determine  most  questions 
of  difficulty  concerning  common  facts  alleged  to  have 
happened,  or  seeming  likely  to  happen  ;  especially  ques- 
tions relating  to  conduct. 

2.  Firsts  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the  di- 
rect proof  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and 
prophecy,  and  upon   the  objections  alleged        ^**^**'' 
against  it. 

I.  Now  the  following  observations,  relating  to  the  his 
torical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of 
Christianity,  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

I.  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  historical 
evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  prophets 
as  of  the  common  civil  history  of  Moses  and  the  kings 


294  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II 

of  Israel ;  or,  as  of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewish  nation 
And  the  Gospels  and  the  Acts  afford  us  the  same  histor- 
ical evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  and  the  apostles 
as  of  the  common  matters  related  in  them.*  This  in- 
deed could  not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  reasonable 
man,  if  the  authors  of  these  books,  like  many  other  his 
torians,  had  appeared  to  make  an  entertaining  manner 
of  writing  their  aim  ;  though  they  had  interspersed  mir- 
acles in  their  works,  at  proper  distances,  and  upon  prop- 
er occasions.  These  might  have  animated  a  dull  rela- 
tion, amused  the  reader,  and  engaged  his  attention. 
And  the  same  account  would  naturally  have  been  given 
of  them,  as  of  the  speeches  and  descriptions  of  such 
authors;  the  same  account,  in  a  manner,  as  is  to  be 
given  why  the  poets  make  use  of  wonders  and  prodigies. 
But  the  facts,  both  miraculous  and  natural,  in  Scripture, 
are  related  in  plain,  unadorned  narratives;  and  both  of 
them  appear,  in  all  respects,  to  stand  upon  the  same 
footing  of  historical  evidence. 

Further:  some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  ac 
count  of  miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove 

Scripture  quot-  ... 

jd  from  age  to   the  truth  of  Christianity,  are  quoted  as  gen- 
uine, from  the  age  in  which    they  are  said 
to  be  written  down  to  the  present:  and  no  other  parts 

*  [This  was  clearly  observed  and  distinctly  stated  by  Lord  Boling- 
broke:  "The  miracles  in  the  Bible  are  not  like  those  in  Livy,  de- 
tached pieces  that  do  not  disturb  the  civil  history,  which  goes  on  very 
well  without  them.  But  the  miracles  of  the  Jewish  historian  are  in- 
timately connected  with  all  the  civil  affairs,  and  make  a  necessary 
and  inseparable  part.  The  whole  history  is  founded  in  them  ;  it  con- 
sists of  little  else  ;  and  if  it  were  not  a  history  of  them,  it  would  be  a 
history  of  nothing." — Bolingbroke's  Posthumous  Works,  vol.  iii,  p.  279. 
The  state  of  the  case  seems  to  be,  that  the  gravity,  distinctness,  and 
good  sense  of  the  Scripture  histories,  in  relating  civil  affairs,  prove 
those  narratives  not  to  be  mythical,  that  is,  not  to  be  the  product  of 
imagination.  And  the  intimate  connection  of  the  miraculous  with 
the  natural  facts,  proves  that  the  former  are  not  merely  introduced 
for  the  sake  of  ornament. — F.] 


Chap.  VIIJ  Evidence  for  Christianity.  295 

of  them,  material  in  the  present  question,  are  omitted  to 
be  quoted  in  such  manner  as  to  afford  any  sort  of  proof 
of  their  not  being  genuine.  And  as  common  history, 
when  called  in  question  in  any  instance,  may  often  be 
greatly  confirmed  by  contemporary  or  subsequent  events 
more  known  and  acknowledged ;  and  as  fhe  common 
Scripture  history,  like  many  others,  is  thus  confirmed ; 
30  likewise  is  the  miraculous  history  of  it,  not  only  in 
particular  instances,  but  in  general.  For  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Jewish  and  Christian  religions,  which  were 
events  contemporary  with  the  miracles  related  to  be 
wrought  in  attestation  of  both,  or  subsequent  to  them, 
these  events  are  just  what  we  should  have  expected, 
upon  supposition  such  miracles  were  really  wrought  to 
attest  the  truth  of  these  religions.  These  miracles  are 
a  satisfactory  account  of  those  events,  of  which  no  other 
satisfactory  account  can  be  given,  nor  any  account  at 
all  but  what  is  imaginary  merely  and  invented.  It  is  to 
be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,  the  most  easy  and  di- 
rect account  of  this  history,  how  it  came  to  be  written, 
and  to  be  received  in  the  world  as  a  true  history,  is,  that 
't  really  is  so;  nor  can  any  other  account  of  it  be  easy 
and  direct.  Now  though  an  account  not  at  all  obvious, 
but  very  far-fetched  and  indirect,  may  indeed  be  and 
often  is,  the  true  account  of  a  matter ;  yet  it  cannot  be 
admitted  on  the  authority  of  its  being  asserted.  Mere 
guess,  supposition,  and  possibility,  when  opposed  to  his- 
torical evidence,  prove  nothing  but  that  historical  evi- 
dence is  not  demonstrative. 

3.  Now  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think,  is, 
that  the  Scripture  history,  in  general,  is  to  be  admitted 
as  an  authentic  genuine  history  till  some-  scripture  nis- 
what  positive  be  alleged  sufficient  to  invali-  Jniuediiutav^- 
date  it.  But  no  man  will  deny  the  conse-  '***^' 
quence  to  be,  that  it  cannot  be  rejected,  or  thrown  by 
as  of  no  authority,  till  it  can  be  proved  to  be  of  none ; 


296  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

even  though  the  evidence  now  mentioned  for  its  author- 
ity were  doubtful.  This  evidence  may  be  confronted 
by  historical  evidence  on  the  other  side,  if  there  be  any; 
or  general  incredibility  in  the  things  related,  or  incon- 
sistence in  the  general  turn  of  the  history,  would  prove 
it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But  since,  upon  the  face  of  the 
matter,  upon  a  first  and  general  view,  the  appearance  is 
that  it  is  an  authentic  history,  it  cannot  be  determined 
to  be  fictitious  without  some  proof  that  it  is  so.  And 
the  following  observations,  in  support  of  these,  and  co- 
incident with  them,  will  greatly  confirm  the  historical 
evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity. 

4.  2.  The  epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of  epis- 
tolary writing,  and  moreover  from  several  of  them  being 
Evidence  from   written,   not  to  particular  persons,  but  to 
inSendentand   Churches,  Carry  in  them  evidences  of  their 
peculiar.  being  genuine  beyond  what  can   be,  in  a 

mere  historical  narrative,  left  to  the  world  at  large.* 
This  evidence,  joined  with  that  which  they  have  in 
common  with  the  rest  of  the  New  Testament,  seems  not 
to  leave  so  much  as  any  particular  pretence  for  denying 
their  genuineness,  considered  as  an  ordinary  matter  of 
fact  or  of  criticism.  I  szy^  particular  pretence  for  deny- 
ing it  J  because  any  single  fact  of  such  a  kind  and  such 
antiquity  may  have  general  doubts  raised  concerning  it, 
from  the  very  nature  of  human  affairs  and  human  testi- 
mony. There  is  also  to  be  mentioned  a  distinct  and 
particular  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  the  epistle 
chiefly  referred  to  here,  the  first  to  the  Corinthians, 
from  the  manner  in  which  it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Ro- 
manus,  in  an  epistle  of  his  own  to  that  Church.f  Now 
these  epistles  afford  a  proof  of  Christianity,  detached 

*  [The  argument  here  hinted  at  is  forcibly  presented  in  Paley's 
admirable  work,  "  Horae  Paulinse."  See  also  Blunt's  "  Undesigned 
Coincidences  both  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments."] 

f  Clem.  Rom.,  Ep.  I,  ch.  xlvii. 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  297 

from  all  others,  which  is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight ; 
and  also  a  proof  of  a  nature  and  kind  peculiar  to  itself. 
For, 

In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the 
Gospel  in  general,  and  the  institution  of  the  communion 
in  particular,  not  from  the  rest  of  the  apostles,  or  jointly 
togetlier  with  them,  but  alone  from  Christ  himself;  whom 
he  declares,  likewise,  conformably  to  the  history  in  the 
Acts,  that  he  saw  after  his  ascension.*  So  that  the  tes- 
timony of  St.  Paul  is  to  be  considered  as  detached  from 
that  of  the  rest  of  the  apostles. 

And  he  declares  turther  that  he  was  endued  with  a 
power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publicly  known 
to  this  very  people  ;  speaks  of  frequent  and  great  varie- 
ty of  miraculous  gifts  as  then  subsisting  in  those  very 
Churches  to  which  he  was  writing;  which  he  was  reprov- 
ing for  several  irregularities,  and  where  he  had  personal 
opposers :  he  mentions  these  gifts  incidentally,  in  the 
most  easy  manner,  and  without  effort;  by  way  of  re- 
proof to  those  who  had  them,  for  their  indecent  use  of 
them ;  and  by  way  of  depreciating  them,  in  comparison 
of  moral  virtues.  In  short,  he  speaks  to  these  Churches 
of  these  miraculous  powers  in  the  manner  any  one  would 
speak  to  another  of  a  thing  which  was  as  familiar,  and 
as  much  known  in  common  to  them  both,  as  any  thing 
in  the  world. f  And  this,  as  hath  been  observed  by 
several  persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 

5.  3  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact  that  Chris- 
tianity offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded  to  be  re- 
ceived, upon  the  allegation,  that  is,  as  un-      _ 

'      *  ^  ^  ,  "  '  '  Christianity 

believers  would  speak,  upon  the  pretense  of  avowedly found- 

,  ,  1  •    1  1  1  ,      ed  on  mlroclea, 

miracles,  publicly  wrought  to  attest  the  truth 

of  it  in  such  an  age ;  and  that  it  was  actually  received  by 

♦  Gal.  i ;  i  Cor.  xi,  23,  etc.  ;  i  Cor.  xv,  8. 

f  Rom.  XV,  19  ;  I  Cor.  xii,  8-28,  etc.,  and  chap,  xiii,  i,  2,  8,  and 
the  whole  xivth  chap. ;  2  Cor.  xii,  12,  13  :  Gal.  iii,  2,  5. 


298  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

great  numbers  in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  professed 
belief  of  the  reality  of  these  miracles.  And  Christianity, 
including  the  dispensation  of  the  Old  Testament,  seems 
distinguished  by  this  from  all  other  religions.  I  mean 
that  this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case  with  regard  to 
any  other.  For  surely  it  will  not  be  supposed  to  lie 
upon  any  person  to  prove,  by  positive  historical  evidence, 
that  it  was  not.  It  does  in  no  sort  appear  that  Moham- 
medanism was  first  received  in  the  world  upon  the  foot- 
ing of  supposed  miracles,*  that  is,  public  ones;  for,  as 
revelation  is  itself  miraculous,  all  pretense  to  it  must 
necessarily  imply  some  pretense  of  miracles.  And  it  is 
a  known  fact,  that  it  was  immediately,  at  the  very  first, 
propagated  by  other  means.  And  as  particular  institu- 
tions, whether  in  paganism  or  popery,  said  to  be  con- 
firmed by  miracles,  after  those  institutions  had  obtained 
are  not  to  the  purpose ;  so,  were  there  what  might  be 
called  historical  proof,  that  any  of  them  were  introduced 
by  a  supposed  divine  command,  believed  to  be  attested 
by  miracles,  these  would  not  be  in  any  wise  parallel. 
For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to  be  accounted 
for,  after  parties  are  formed,  and  have  power  in  their 
hands ;  and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration  with 
the  multitude  ;  and  political  interests  are  blended  with 
religious  claims  and  religious  distinctions.  But  before 
any  thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few  persons,  and  those  of 
the  lowest  rank,  all  at  once,  to  bring  over  such  great 
numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and  get  it  to  be  received 
upon  the  particular  evidence  of  miracles — this  is  quite 
another  thing. 

And  I  think  it  will  be  allowed  by  any  fair  adveisary 

*  See  the  Koran,  chap,  xiii  and  xvii.  [The  infidel  says,  unless 
a  sign  be  sent  down  unto  him  from  his  Lord,  we  will  not  believe  ; 
thou  art  a  preacher  only. — Sale's  Ti-ans.,  p.  20X,  ed.  4to.  "  Nothing 
hindered  us  from  sending  thee  with  miracles,  except  that  the  former 
nations  have  charged  them  with  imposture."] 


Chap.  VII.J  Ev.dence  for  Christianity.  299 

that  the  fact  now  mentioned,  taking  in  all  the  circum- 
stances of  it,  is  peculiar  to  the  Christian  religion.  How- 
ever, the  fact  itself  is  allowed,  that  Chris- 

,       .        ,      ,         .  -  -        ,        In  this  peculiar. 

tianity  obtamed,  that  is,  was  professed  to  be 
received,  in  the  world,  upon  the  belief  of  miracles,  im- 
mediately in  the  age  in  which  it  is  said  those  miracles 
were  wrought :  or  that  this  is  what  its  first  converts 
would  have  alleged  as  the  reason  for  their  embracing  It 
Now  certainly  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  such  num- 
bers of  men,  in  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  world, 
should  forsake  the  religion  of  their  country,  in  which 
they  had  been  educated ;  separate  themselves  from  their 
friends,  particularly  in  their  festival  shows  and  solemni- 
ties, to  which  the  common  people  are  so  greatly  addicted, 
and  which  were  of  a  nature  to  engage  them  much  more 
than  any  thing  of  that  sort  among  us ;  and  embrace 
a  religion,  which  could  not  but  expose  them  to  many  in- 
conveniences, and  indeed  must  have  been  a  giving  up 
the  world  in  a  great  degree,  even  from  the  very  first, 
and  before  'the  empire  engaged  in  form  against  them  : 
it  cannot  be  supposed  that  such  numbers  should  make 
so  great,  and,  to  say  the  least,  so  inconvenient  a  change 
in  their  whole  institution  of  life,  unless  they  were 
really  convinced  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles  upon 
the  knowledge  or  belief  of  which  they  professed  to 
make  it. 

And  it  will,  I  suppose,  readily  be  acknowledged,  that 
the  generality  of  the  first  converts  to  Christianity  must 
have  believed  them ;  that  as,  by  becoming 

^,     .     .  ,  ,      ,  ,  ,  ,  ,      ,  Firetoonverte 

Christians,  they  declared  to  the  world  they  beUeved  mira 
were  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles, 
so  this  declaration  was  to  be  credited.  And  this  their 
testimony  is  the  same  kind  of  evidence  for  those  mira- 
cles as  if  they  had  put  it  in  writing,  and  these  writings 
had  come  down  to  us.  And  it  is  real  evidence,  because 
it  is  of  facts  which  they  had  capacity  and  full  opportu- 


300  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

uity  to  inform  themselves  of.  It  is  also  distinct  from  the 
direct  or  express  historical  evidence,  though  it  is  of  the 
same  kind ;  and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  distinct  in  all 
cases.  For  were  a  fact  expressly  related  by  one  or  more 
ancient  historians,  and  disputed  in  after  ages :  that  this 
fact  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  believed,  by  great 
numbers  of  tlie  age  in  which  the  historian  says  it  was 
done,  would  be  allowed  an  additional  proof  of  such  fact, 
quite  distinct  from  the  express  testimony  of  the  histo- 
rian. The  credulity  of  mankind  is  acknowledged,  and 
the  suspicions  of  mankind  ought  to  be  acknowledged 
too;  and  their  backwardness  even  to  believe,  and  great- 
er still  to  practice,  what  makes  against  their  interest. 
And  it  must  particularly  be  remembered,  that  education, 
and  prejudice,  and  authority  were  against  Christianity 
in  the  age  I  am  speaking  of.  So  that  the  immediate 
conversion  of  such  numbers  is  a  real  presumption  of 
somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter :  *  I  sa) 
presumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as  a  proof,  alone 
and  by  itself.  Nor  need  any  one  of  the  things  men- 
tioned in  this  chapter  be  considered  as  a  proof  by  it- 
self; and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be  one  of  the 
strongest. 

6.  Upon  the  whole :  as  there  is  large  historical  evi- 
dence,   both    direct    and    circumstantial,   of   miracles 

*  [Arnobius,  one  of  the  earliest  Christian  writers,  says  :  "  Shall  we 
say  that  the  men  of  those  times  were  inconsiderate,  deceitful,  and 
brutish  enough  to  feign  having  seen  what  they  never  saw?  And  that 
when  they  might  have  lived  in  peace  and  comfort  they  chose  gratui 
tous  hatred  and  obloquy  ?  " 

■  The  rejection  of  Christianity  by  so  many  in  the  first  ages  was  the 
result  of  the  continual  action  of  personal  hereditary  prejudice  and 
depravity  capable  of  resisting  any  supposable  evidence.  But  the 
reception  of  Christianity  by  multitudes,  under  the  same  evidences,  and 
to  their  immediate  personal  damage,  shows  strongly  that  there  was 
enough  evidence  to  produce  those  effects.  Thus  the  rejection  by 
some  does  not  countervail  the  acceptance  by  others. — Malcom.] 


Chap.  VII.l  Rvidknce  for  Christianity.  301 

wrought  in  attestation  of  Chri'stianity,  collected  by  those 
who  have  writ  upon  the  subject,  it  lies  upon  unbeliev- 
ers to  show  why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be 

,.       -        ^,  .  '  .  .         •       T  ,1  •    1       Burden  of  proof 

credited.  This  way  of  speaking  is,  I  think,  with  onbeiiev- 
just,  and  what  persons  who  write  in  de- 
fense of  religion  naturally  fall  into.  Yet  in  a  matter  of 
such  unspeakable  importance,  the  proper  question  is,  nol 
whom  it  lies  upon,  according  to  the  rules  of  argument, 
to  maintain  or  confute  objections;  but  whether  there 
really  are  any,  against  this  evidence,  sufficient  in  reason 
to  destroy  the  credit  of  it  ?  However,  unbelievers  seem 
to  take  upon  them  the  part  of  showing  that  there  are. 

They  allege  that  numberless  enthusiastic  people,  in 
different  ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to  the 
same  difficulties  which  the  primitive  Chris-      ^,.  ^ 

,  .  ,     .  Objections 

tians  did,  and  are  ready  to  give  up  their  founded  on  en- 
lives  for  the  most  idle  follies  imaginable. 
But  it  is  not  very  clear  to  what  purpose  this  objection  is 
brought.  For  every  one,  surely,  in  every  case,  must 
distinguish  between  opinions  and  facts.  And  though 
testimony  is  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions,  or  of  any 
opinions  at  all ;  yet  it  is  allowed,  in  all  other  cases,  to  be 
a  proof  of  facts.  And  a  person's  laying  down  his  life  in 
attestation  of  facts,  or  of  opinions,  is  the  strongest  proof 
of  his  believing  them.  And  if  the  apostles  and  their 
contemporaries  did  believe  the  facts  in  attestation  of 
which  they  exposed  themselves  to  sufferings  and  death, 
this  their  belief,  or  rather  knowledge,  must  be  a  proof 
of  those  facts ;  for  they  were  such  as  came  under  the 
observation  of  their  senses.  And  though  it  is  not  (;f 
equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of  weight,  that  the  martyrs  of  the 
next  age,  notwithstanding  they  were  not  eye-witnesses 
of  those  facts,  as  were  the  apostles  and  their  contempo- 
raries, had,  however,  full  opportunity  to  inform  them- 
selves whether  they  were  true  or  not,  and  gave  equal 
proof  of  their  believing  them  to  be  true. 


302  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II 

7.  But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony,  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating  to 

Enthmiasm  ^^^^S^^^  5  some  secm  to  think  it  totally  and 
wreakens    evi-    absolutely  destroys  the  evidence   of  testi- 

dence.  -^         ....  .       ,     •     -,        •■      , 

mony  upon  this  subject.  And,  mdeed,  the 
po\yers  of  enthusiasm,  and  of  diseases  too,  which  operate 
in  a  like  manner,  are  very  wonderful  in  particular  in- 
stances. But  if  great  numbers  of  men,  not  appearing  in 
any  peculiar  degree  weak,  nor  under  any  peculiar  sus- 
picion of  negligence,  affirm  that  they  saw  and  heard 
such  things  plainly  with  their  eyes  and  their  ears,  and 
are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest ;  such  testimony  is  evi- 
dence of  the  strongest  kind  we  can  have  for  any  matter 
of  fact.  Yet  possibly  it  may  be  overcome,  strong  as  it 
is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things  thus  attested,  or  by  con- 
trary testimony.  And  in  an  instance  where  one  thought 
it  was  so  overcome,  it  might  be  just  to  consider  how  far 
such  evidence  could  be  accounted  for  by  enthusiasm  : 
for  it  seems  as  if  no  other  imaginable  account  were  to 
be  given  of  it.  But  till  such  incredibility  be  shown,  or 
contrary  testimony  produced,  it  cannot  surely  be  ex- 
pected that  so  far-fetched,  so  indirect  and  wonderful  an 
account  of  such  testimony,  as  that  of  enthusiasm  must 
be ;  an  account  so  strange,  that  the  generality  of  man- 
kind can  scarce  be  made  to  understand  what  is  meant 
by  it ;  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  expected,  that  such  account 
will  be  admitted  of  such  evidence,  when  there  is  this 
direct,  easy,  and  obvious  account  of  it,  that  people  real- 
ly saw  and  heard  a  thing  not  incredible,  which  they 
affirm  sincerely,  and  with  full  assurance,  that  they  did 
see  and  hear. 

Granting,  then,  that  enthusiasm  is  not  (strictly  speak- 
The  objection   ing)  an  absurd,  but  a  possible  account  of 

suppoaos     the  *=•;  .  .      .  -r     ^  ^i     ^  ^i. 

things  attested   such  testimony.  It  is  manifest  that  the  very 

incredible,  hence  .  _  .  , 

of  no  force.         mention  of  it  goes  upon  the  previous  suppo- 
sition that  the  things  so  attested  are   incredible,  and 


CiiAr.VIIJ  Evidence  FOR  Christianity.  303 

therefore  need  not  be  considered  till  they  are  shown  to 
be  so.  Much  less  need  it  be  considered  after  the  con- 
trary has  been  proved.  And  I  think  it  has  been  proved, 
to  full  satisfaction,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  a  rev- 
elation in  general,  or  in  such  a  one  as  the  Christian  in 
particular.  However,  as  religion  is  supposed  peculiarl} 
liable  to  enthusiasm,  it  may  just  be  observed,  that  prej- 
udices almost  without  number,  and  without  name,  ro- 
mance, affectation,  humor,  a  desire  to  engage  attention 
or  to  surprise,  the  party  spirit,  custom,  little  competi- 
tions, unaccountable  likings  and  dislikings ;  these  influ- 
ence men  strongly  in  common  matters.  And  as  these 
prejudices  are  often  scarce  known  or  reflected  upon  by 
the  persons  themselves  who  are  influenced  by  them, 
they  are  to  be  considered  as  influences  of  a  like  kind  to 
enthusiasm.  Yet  human  testimony  in  common  matters 
is  naturally  and  justly  believed  notwithstanding. 

8.  It  is  intimated  further,  in  a  more  refined  way  of 
observation,  that  though  it  should  be  proved  seiMeoeption 
that  the  apostles  and  first  Christians  could  S^birSTSe 
not,  in  some  respects,  be  deceived  them-  *po**i®*' 
selves,  and  in  other  respects  cannot  be  thought  to  have 
intended  to  impose  upon  the  world,  yet  it  will  not  follow 
that  their  general  testimony  is  to  be  believed,  though 
truly  handed  down  to  us ;  because  they  might  still  in 
part,  that  is,  in  other  respects,  be  deceived  themselves, 
and  in  part  also  designedly  impose  upon  others ;  which, 
it  is  added,  is  a  thing  very  credible,  from  that  mixture 
of  real  enthusiasm  and  real  knavery,  to  be  met  with  in 
the  same  characters. 

And  I  must  confess,  I  think  the  matter  of  fact  con- 
tained in  this  observation  upon  mankind  is  not  to  be 
denied ;  and  that  somewhat  very  much  akin  to  it,  is 
often  supposed  in  Scripture,  as  a  very  common  case,  and 
most  severely  reproved.  But  it  were  to  have  been  ex- 
pected, that  persons  capable  of  applying  this  observa- 


304  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

tion,  as  applied  in  the  objection,  might  also  frequently 
have  met  with  the  like  mixed  character  in  instances 
where  religion  was  quite  out  of  the  case.  The  thing 
plainly  is,  that  mankind  are  naturally  endowed  with  rea- 
son, or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing  between  truth  and 
falsehood ;  and  as  naturally  they  are  endued  with  verac- 
ity, or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  say :  but  from 
many  occasions,  they  are  liable  to  be  prejudiced,  and 
biased,  and  deceived  themselves,  and  capable  of  intend- 
ing to  deceive  others,  in  every  different  degree ;  inso- 
much that,  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  deceived  by  preju- 
dice, so  likewise  it  seems  to  be  not  an  uncommon  thing 
for  persons  who,  from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not 
invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any  foundation  at  all,  to 
propagate  it  with  heightening  circumstances,  after  it  is 
once  invented  and  set  agoing.  And  others,  though  they 
would  not  propagate  a  lie,  yet,  which  is  a  lower  degree 
of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass  without  contradiction.  But 
notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testimony  remains  still 
a  natural  ground  of  assent ;  and  this  assent,  a  natural 
principle  of  action. 

9.  It  is  objected  further,  that,  however  it  has  hap- 
pened, the  fact  is,  that  mankind  have  in  different  ages 
Delusions  from  been  Strangely  deluded  with  pretenses  to 
auegedmiracies.  j^iracles  and  woudcrs.  But  it  is  by  no 
means  to  be  admitted,  that  they  have  been  oftener,  or 
are  at  all  more  liable  to  be,  deceived  by  these  pretenses 
than  by  others. 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  degree 
of  historical  evidence  for  miracles  which  are  on  all 
hands  acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But  suppose  that 
there  were  even  the  like  historical  evidence  for  these  to 
what  there  is  for  those  alleged  in  proof  of  Christianity, 
which  yet  is  in  nowise  allowed,  but  suppose  this ;  the 
consequence  would  not  be,  that  the  evidence  of  the  lat- 
ter is  not  to  be  admitted.     Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the 


Chap.  VIIJ  Evidence  for  Christianity.  305 

world  who,  in  common  cases,  would  conclude  thus. 
For  what  would  such  a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but 
this,  that  evidence  confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or 
any  way  overbalanced,  destroys  the  credibility  of  other 
evidence  neither  confuted  nor  overbalanced  ?  To  argue 
that  because  there  is,  if  there  were,  like  evidence  from 
testimony  for  miracles  acknowledged  false,  as  for  those 
in  attestation  of  Christianity,  therefore  the  evidence  in 
the  latter  case  is  not  to  be  credited ;  this  is  the  same  as 
to  argue,  that  if  two  men  of  equally  good  reputation  had 
given  evidence  in  different  cases  no  way  connected,  and 
one  of  them  had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  this  confuted 
the  testimony  of  the  other. 

10.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  the  general  observation 
that  human  creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from 
enthusiasm  in  religion,  and  principles  equiv- 
alent  to  enthusiasm  in  common  matters,  and  be  weakened  vet 

.  1,1  not  destroyed. 

in  both  from  negligence ;  and  that  they  are 
so  capable  of  dishonestly  endeavoring  to  deceive  others ; 
this  does,  indeed,  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in 
all  cases,  but  does  not  destroy  it  in  any.  And  these 
things  will  appear  to  different  men  to  weaken  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony  in  different  degrees ;  in  degrees  pro- 
portionable to  the  observations  they  have  made,  or  the 
notions  they  have  any  way  taken  up,  concerning  the 
weakness,  and  negligence,  and  dishonesty  of  mankind ; 
or  concerning  the  powers  of  enthusiasm,  and  prejudices 
equivalent  to  it.  But  it  seems  to  me,  that  people  do  not 
know  what  they  say,  who  affirm  these  things  to  destroy 
the  evidence  from  testimony  which  we  have  of  the  truth 
of  Christianity.  Nothing  can  destroy  the  evidence  of 
testimony  in  any  case  but  a  proof,  or  probability,  that 
persons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  facts  to  which 
they  give  testimony;  or  that  they  are  actually  under 
some  indirect  influence  in  giving  it,  in  such  particular 
rase.  Till  this  be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human 
20 


306  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

actions  require  that  testimony  be  admitted.  It  can 
never  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct  historical  evi- 
dence, indolently  to  say,  that  there  are  so  many  princi- 
ples from  whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  them- 
selyes,  and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  especially  in 
matters  of  religion,  that  one  knows  not  what  to  believe 
And  it  is  surprising  persons  can  help  reflecting,  that  this 
very  manner  of  speaking  supposes,  they  are  not  satisfied 
that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence  of  which  they  speak 
thus;  or  that  they  can  avoid  observing,  if  they  do  make 
this  reflection,  that  it  is,  on  such  a  subject,  a  very 
material  one.* 

II.  And  over  against  all  these  objections,  is  to  be  set 
the  importance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have  en- 
The  importance  gaged  the  attention  of  its  first  converts,  so 
pLvSS?^^  as  to  have  rendered  them  less  liable  to  be 
aeiusions.  deceived  from  carelessness  than  they  would 

in  common  matters;  and,  likewise,  the  strong  obliga- 
tions to  veracity  which  their  religion  laid  them  under : 
so  that  the  first  and  most  obvious  presumption  is,  that 
they  could  not  be  deceived  themselves,  nor  would  de- 
ceive others.  And  this  presumption,  in  this  degree,  is 
peculiar  to  the  testimony  we  have  been  considering. 

In  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in  themselves,  and 
have  an  air  of  positiveness  which  sometimes  is  not  very 
WhatunbeUev-  easy ;  yet  they  are  necessary,  and  necessary 
ore  must  admit  ^^  ^^  repeated,  in  order  to  connect  a  dis- 
course, and  distinctly  to  lay  before  the  view  of  the  read- 
er what  is  proposed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is  left  as 
proved.  Now  the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  obser- 
vations is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt  this :  that  unbe- 
lievers must  be  forced  to  admit  the  external  evidence 
for  Christianity,  that  is,  the  proof  of  miracles  wrought  to 
attest  it.  to  be  of  real  weight  and  very  considerable ; 
though  tney  cannot  allow  it  to  be  sufficient  to  convince 
•  See  the  foregoing  chapter. 


Chap.  VI I. J  Evidence  for  Christianity.  307 

them  of  the  reality  of  those  miracles.  And  as  they  must, 
in  all  reason,  admit  this,  so  it  seems  to  me,  that  upon 
consideration  they  would  in  fact  admit  it ;  those  of  them, 
I  mean,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of  the  matter :  in 
like  manner  as  persons,  in  many  cases,  own  they  see 
strong  evidence  from  testimony  for  the  truth  of  things, 
which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced  are  true ;  cases, 
suppose,  where  there  is  contrary  testimony,  or  things 
which  they  think,  whether  with  or  without  reason,  to  be 
incredible.  But  there  is  no  testimony  contrary  to  that 
which  we  have  been  considering ;  and  it  has  been  fully 
proved  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  Christianity  in 
general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 

12.  II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from 
prophecy  I  shall  only  make  some  few  gen-  prophocy-ob- 
eral  observations,  which  are  suggested  by  the  SvaiSate^^us* 
analogy  of  nature  ;  that  is,  by  the  acknowl-  ^"^^^ 
edged  natural  rules  of  judging  in  common  matters  con- 
cerning evidence  of  a  like  kind  to  this  from  prophecy. 

I.  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one  part  of  a 
prophecy  does  not  in  any  degree  invalidate  the  proof 
of  foresight,  arising  from  the  appearing  completion  of 
those  other  parts  which  are  understood.  For  the  case 
is  evidently  the  same  as  if  those  parts  which  are  not  un- 
derstood were  lost,  or  not  written  at  all,  or  written  in  an 
unknown  tongue.  Whether  this  observation  be  com- 
monly attended  to  or  not,  it  is  so  evident  that  one  can 
scarce  bring  one's  self  to  set  down  an  instance  in  com- 
mon matters  to  exemplify  it.  However,  suppose  a  writ- 
ing, partly  in  cypher,  and  partly  in  plain  words  at  length, 
and  that  in  th  '^  part  one  understood,  there  appeared 
mention  of  several  known  facts;  it  would  never  come 
into  any  man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he  under- 
stood the  whole,  perhaps  he  might  find  that  those  facts 
were  not  in  reality  known  by  the  latter.  Indeed,  both 
in  this  example,  and  the  thing  intended  to  be  exempli 


3o8  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

fied  by  it,  our  not  understanding  the  whole  (the  whole, 
suppose,  of  a  sentence  or  a  paragraph)  might  sometimes 
occasion  a  doubt  whether  one  understood  .the  literal 
meaning  of  such  a  part ;  but  this  comes  under  another 
consideration. 

For  the  same  reason,  though  a  man  should  be  incapa- 
ble, for  want  of  learning,  or  opportunities  of  inquiry,  or 
from  not  having  turned  his  studies  this  way,  even  so 
much  as  to  judge,  whether  particular  prophecies  have 
been  throughout  completely  fulfilled ;  yet  he  may  see, 
in  general,  that  they  have  been  fulfilled  to  such  a  degree, 
as,  upon  very  good  ground,  to  be  convinced  of  foresight 
more  than  human  in  such  prophecies,  and  of  such  events 
being  intended  by  them.  For  the  same  reason,  also, 
though  by  means  of  the  deficiencies  in  civil  history,  and 
the  different  accounts  of  historians,  the  most  learned 
should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to  satisfaction  that  such 
parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been  minutely  and 
throughout  fulfilled  ;  yet  a  very  strong  proof  of  foresight 
may  arise  from  that  general  completion  of  them  which 
is  made  out :  as  much  proof  of  foresight,  perhaps,  as  the 
Giver  of  prophecy  intended  should  ever  be  afforded  by 
such  parts  of  prophecy. 

13.  2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to 
such  and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof  that  it  was  intend- 
™.       »  v«    ed  of  them;  as  the  rules  by  which  we  natu- 

The  applicabll-  '  .         •'. 

ity  of  a  series   rally  judge  and  determine,  in  common  cases 

of  prophecies  Is  ,;    ,  1  •  •,,  rr>,  . 

proof  of  intend-   parallel  to   this,  Will  show.     This  observa- 

ed  application.         .  ^  ,         .  ,  , 

tion  I  make  m  answer  to  the  common  ob- 
jection against  the  application  of  the  prophecies,  that 
considering  each  of  them  distinctly  by  itself,  it  does  not 
at  all  appear  that  they  were  intended  of  those  particular 
events  to  which  they  are  applied  by  Christians ;  and 
therefore  it  is  to  be  supposed,  that,  if  they  meant  any 
thing,  they  were  intended  of  other  events  unknown  to 
us,  and  not  of  these  at  all. 


Chap.  VII. J  Evidence  for  Christianity  309 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing  which  bear  a  great 
resemblance  tc  prophecy,  with  respect  to  the  matter 
before  us;  the  mythological  and  the  satirical, where  the 
satire  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  concealed.  And  a  man 
might  be  assured  that  he  understood  what  an  author  in- 
tended by  a  fable  or  parable,  related  without  any  appli- 
cation or  moral,  merely  from  seeing  it  to  be  easily  capa- 
ble  of  such  application,  and  that  such  a  moral  might 
naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And  he  might  be  fully 
assured  that  such  persons  and  events  were  intended  in 
a  satirical  writing,  merely  from  its  being  applicable  to 
them.  And  agreeably  to  the  last  observation,  he  might 
be  in  a  good  measure  satisfied  of  it,  though  he  were  not 
enough  informed  in  affairs  or  in  the  story  of  such  per- 
sons, to  understand  half  the  satire.  For,  his  satisfaction 
that  he  understood  the  meaning,  the  intended  meaning, 
of  these  writings,  would  be  greater  or  less,  in  proportion  as 
he  saw  the  general  turn  of  them  to  be  capable  of  such 
application,  and  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  partic- 
ular things  capable  of  it.  And  thus  if  a  long  series  of 
prophecy  is  applicable  to  the  present  state  of  the  Church 
and  to  the  political  situations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the 
world,  some  thousand  years  after  these  prophecies  were 
delivered,  and  a  long  series  of  prophecy  delivered  before 
the  coming  of  Christ  is  applicable  to  him ;  these  things 
are  in  themselves  a  proof  that  the  prophetic  history  was 
intended  of  him,  and  of  those  events :  in  proportion  as 
the  general  turn  of  it  is  capable  of  such  application,  and 
to  the  number  and  variety  of  particular  prophecies  ca- 
pable of  it.  And  though  in  all  just  way  of  considera- 
tion, the  appearing  completion  of  prophecies  is  to  be 
allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory  of,  and  to  determine 
their  meaning;  yet  it  is  to  be  remembered  further,  that 
the  anciert  Jews  applied  the  prophecies  to  a  Messiah 
before  his  coming,  in  much  the  same  manner  as  Chris- 
tians do  row;  and  that  the  primitive  Christians  inter- 


3IO  Analogy  of  Religion.        IPartIL 

preted  the  prophecies  respecting  the  state  of  the  Church 
and  of  the  world  in  the  last  ages,  in  the  sense  which  the 
event  seems  to  confirm  and  verify.  And  from  these 
things  it  may  be  made  to  appear, 

14.  3.  That  the  showing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if 

that  could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some  other 

events,  in   such  and  such  predictions,  and 

Mistakes    as  '  .  :     . 

to  the  meaning  not  thosc  at  all  which  Christians  allege  to 

cf  prophecy  do  .  ^  t      •  1 

rot  weaken  Its  be  completions  01  those  predictions ;  or  that 
such  and  such  prophecies  are  capable  of  be- 
ing applied  to  other  events  than  those  to  which  Christians 
apply  them — that  this  would  not  confute  or  destroy  the 
force  of  the  argument  from  prophecy,  even  with  regard 
to  those  very  instances.  For,  observe  how  this  matter 
really  is.  If  one  knew  such  a  person  to  be  the  sole  author 
of  such  a  book,  and  was  certainly  assured,  or  satisfied 
to  any  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  of  what  he  in- 
tended in  it,  one  should  be  assured  or  satisfied  to  such 
a  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  that  book; 
for  the  meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but  the  meaning 
of  the  author.  But  if  one  knew  a  person  to  have  com- 
piled a  book  of  memoirs  which  he  received  from  anoth- 
er of  vastly  superior  knowledge  in  the  subject  of  it, 
especially  if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great  intricacies  and 
difficulties,  it  would  in  nowise  follow,  that  one  knew  the 
whole  meaning  of  the  book  from  knowing  the  whole 
meaning  of  the  compiler;  for  the  original  memoirs, 
that  is,  the  author  of  them,  might  have,  and  there  would 
be  no  degree  of  presumption,  in  many  cases,  against 
supposing  him  to  have,  some  further  meaning  than  the 
compiler  saw.  To  say,  then,  that  the  Scriptures  and  the 
things  contained  in  them  can  have  no  other  or  further 
meaning  than  those  persons  thought  or  had  who  first 
recited  or  wrote  them,  is  evidently  saying  that  those 
persons  were  the  original,  proper,  and  sole  authors  of 
those  books,  that  is,  that  they  are  not  inspired;  which 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  311 

is  absurd,  while  the  authority  of  these  books  is  under 
examination,  that  is,  till  you  have  determined  they  are 
of  no  divine  authority  at  all.  Till  this  be  determined, 
it  must  in  all  reason  be  supposed,  not  indeed  that  they 
have,  for  this  is  taking  for  granted  that  they  are  inspired, 
but  that  they  may  have  some  further  meaning  than  what 
the  compilers  saw  or  understood.  And  upon  this  sup- 
position, it  is  supposable  also  that  this  further  meaning 
may  be  fulfilled. 

Now  events  corresponding  to  prophecies,  interpreted 
in  a  different  meaning  from  that  in  which  the  prophets 
are  supposed  to  have  understood  them ;  this  affords,  in 
a  manner,  the  same  proof  that  this  different  sense  was 
originally  intended,  as  it  would  have  afforded,  if  the 
prophets  had  not  understood  their  predictions  in  the 
sense  it  is  supposed  they  did ;  because  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption of  their  sense  of  them  being  the  whole  sense 
of  them.  And  it  has  been  already  shown,  that  the  ap- 
parent completions  of  prophecy  must  be  allowed  to  be 
explanatory  of  its  meaning.  So  that  the  question  is, 
whether  a  series  of  prophecy  has  been  fulfilled,  in  a 
natural  or  proper,  that  is,  in  any  real  sense  of  the  words 
of  it.  For  such  completion  is  equally  a  proof  of  foresight 
more  than  human,  whether  the  prophets  are,  or  are  not, 
supposed  to  have  understood  it  in  a  different  sense.  I 
say,  supposed;  for  though  I  think  it  clear  that  the 
prophets  did  not  understand  the  full  meaning  of  their 
predictions,  it  is  another  question,  how  far  they  thought 
they  did,  and  in  what  sense  they  understood  them. 

15.  Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those 
persons  busy  themselves  who  endeavor  to  prove  that 
the  prophetic  history  is  applicable  to  events  Fumiiment 
of  the  age  in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  JJXStoVwt 
ages  before  it.  Indeed,  to  have  proved  this  ***"' 
before  there  was  any  appearance  of  a  further  completion 
of  it,  might  have  answered  some  purpose;  for  it  might 


312  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

have  prevented  the  expectation  of  any  such  further  com- 
pletion. Thus,  could  Porphyry  have  shown  that  some 
principal  parts  of  the  Book  of  Daniel,  for  instance,  the 
seventh  verse  of  the  seventh  chapter,  which  the  Chris- 
tians interpreted  of  the  latter  ages,  was  applicable  to 
events  which  happened  before  or  about  the  age  of  An- 
tiochus  Epiphanes ;  this  might  have  prevented  them 
from  expecting  any  further  completion  of  it.  And  un- 
less there  was  then,  as  I  think  there  must  have  been, 
external  evidence  concerning  that  book  more  than  is 
come  down  to  us,  such  a  discovery  might  have  been  a 
stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  Christianity  itself;  con- 
sidering the  authority  which  our  Saviour  has  given  to 
the  Book  of  Daniel,  and  how  much  the  general  scheme 
of  Christianity  presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even 
this  discovery,  had  there  been  any  such,*  would  be  of 
very  little  weight  with  reasonable  men  now ;  if  this  pas- 
sage, thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of  Por- 
phyry, appears  to  be  applicable  also  to  events  which 
succeeded  the  dissolution  of  the  Roman  empire.  I 
mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending  to  insinuate  that  the 
division  of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it  plainly  was 
divided  into  about  that  number,  were  alone  and  by  it- 
self of  any  moment  in  verifying  the  prophetic  history  ; 
but  only  as  an  example  of  the  thing  I  am  speaking  of. 
And  thus,  upon  the  whole,  the  matter  of  inquiry  evi- 
dently must  be,  as  above  put,  Whether  the  prophecies 
are  applicable  to  Christ,  and  to  the  present  state  of  the 
world  and  of  the  Church;  applicable  in  such  a  degree 

*  It  appears  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in  this 
way.  For  Jerome  on  the  place  says :  "  Duas  posteriores  bestias — in 
uno  Macedonum  regno  ponit."  And  as  to  the  ten  kings :  "  Decern 
reges  enumerat,  qui,  fuerunt  scevissimi ;  ipsosque  rages  non  unius 
ponit  regni,  verbi  gratia,  Macedonise,  Syrise,  Asiae,  et  ^gypti ;  sed  de 
diversis  regnis  unum  efficit  regum  ordinem."  And  in  this  way  of  in- 
terpretation, any  thing  may  be  made  of  any  thing. 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  313 

as  to  imply  foresight :  not  whether  they  are  capable 
of  any  other  application ;  though  I  know  no  pretense 
for  saying  the  general  turn  of  them  is  capable  of  any 
other. 

16.  These  observations  are,  I  think,  just,  and  the  evi- 
dence referred  to  in  them  real ;  though  there  may  be 

people  who  will  not  accept    of  such   imper-      Defects  in  char 

feet  information  from  Scripture.  Some,  too,  ^ower **Jr  e*5i- 
have  not  integrity  and  regard  enough  to  truth  °®°^- 
to  attend  to  evidence  which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  per- 
haps perplexity,  and  which  is  much  of  a  different  sort 
from  what  they  expected.  And  it  plainly  requires  a  de- 
gree of  modesty  and  fairness  beyond  what  every  one 
has,  for  a  man  to  say,  not  to  the  world,  but  to  himself, 
that  there  is  a  real  appearance  of  somewhat  of  great 
weight  in  this  matter,  though  he  is  not  able  thoroughly 
to  satisfy  himself  about  it ;  but  it  shall  have  its  influence 
upon  him,  in  proportion  to  its  appearing  reality  and 
weight.  It  is  much  more  easy,  and  more  falls  in  with 
the  negligence,  presumption,  and  willfulness  of  the  gen- 
erality, to  determine  at  once,  with  a  decisive  air,  there 
is  nothing  in  it.  The  prejudices  arising  from  that  abso- 
lute contempt  and  scorn  with  which  this  evidence  is 
treated  in  the  world  I  do  not  mention.  For  what,  in- 
deed, can  be  said  to  persons  who  are  weak  enough  in 
their  understandings  to  think  this  any  presumption 
against  it ;  or,  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in 
their  temper  to  be  influenced  by  such  prejudices,  upon 
such  a  subject.? 

17.  I  shall  now.  Secondly^  Endeavor  to  give  some  ac- 
count of  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christian 
ity,  consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  cii- 

'  .    ,        .  ,  .  ,         ,  ,  .  General  arsru- 

cumstantial  evidence,  considered  as  making  ment   Reasons 

,'   ,        ,  ^        ^    for  stating  It 

up  one  argument.     Indeed,  to  state  and  ex- 
amine  this  argument  fully   would  be  a  work  much  be- 
yond the  compass  of  this  whole  treatise ;  nor  is  so  much 


314  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

as  a  proper  abridgment  of  it  to  be  expected  here.  Yet 
the  present  subject  requires  to  have  some  brief  account 
of  it  given.  For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence  upon  which 
most  questions  of  difficulty,  in  common  practice,  are 
determined ;  evidence  arising  from  various  coincidences, 
which  support  and  confirm  each  other,  and  in  this  man- 
ner prove,  with  more  or  less  certainty,  the  point  under 
consideration.  And  I  choose  to  do  it  also :  firsts  be- 
cause it  seems  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  not 
duly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of  revela- 
tion is,  not  some  direct  and  express  things  only,  but  a 
great  variety  of  circumstantial  things  also ;  and  that 
though  each  of  these  direct  and  circumstantial  things  is 
indeed  to  be  considered  separately,  yet  they  are  after- 
ward to  be  joined  together ;  for  that  the  proper  force 
of  the  evidence  consists  in  the  result  of  those  several 
things,  considered  in  their  respects  to  each  other,  and 
united  into  one  view ;  and,  in  the  next  place,  because  it 
seems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of  fact  here  set  down, 
which  are  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  must  be  ac- 
knowledged by  them  also  to  contain  together  a  degree 
of  evidence  of  great  weight,  if  they  could  be  brought  to 
lay  these  several  things  before  themselves  distinctly, 
and  then  with  attention  consider  them  together;  in- 
stead of  that  cursory  thought  of  them  to  which  we  are 
familiarized.  For  being  familiarized  to  the  cursory 
thought  of  things,  as  really  hinders  the  weight  of  them 
from  being  seen,  as  from  having  its  due  influence  upon 
practice. 

i8.  The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to 
be  inquired  into,  is  this  :  that  over  and  above  our  rea- 
Tiio  point  to   son  and  affections,  which  God  has  given  us 
be  proved.  ^^^  ^^  information  of  our  judgment  and  the 

conduct  of  our  lives,  he  has  also,  by  external  revelation, 
given  us  an  account  of  himself  and  his  moral  govern- 
ment over  the  world,  implying  a  future  state  of  rewards 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  315 

and  punishments;  that  is,  hath  revealed  the  system  of 
natural  religion ;  for  natural  religion  may  be  externally 
(page  194,  etc.)  revealed  by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may 
be  taught  it  by  mankind,  their  fellow-creatures — that 
God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evidence  of  revelation,  as 
well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain  this  moral 
system;  together  with  an  account  of  a  particular  dis- 
pensation of  providence,  which  reason  could  no  way 
have  discovered,  and  a  particular  institution  of  religion 
founded  on  it,  for  the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their 
present  wretched  condition,  and  raising  them  to  the  per- 
fection and  final  happiness  of  their  nature. 

19.  This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be 
considered  as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is  noth- 
ing but  the  history  of  events  before  they  The  revelation 
come  to  pass  ;  doctrines,  also,  are  matters  '*^'^*®'^*'  • 
of  fact;  and  precepts  come  under  the  same  notion. 
And  the  general  design  of  Scripture,  which  contains  in 
it  this  revelation,  thus  considered  as  historical,  may  be 
said  to  be,  to  give  us  an  account  of  the  world  in  this 
one  single  view — as  God's  world;  by  which  it  appears 
essentially  distinguished  from  all  other  books,  so  far  as 
I  have  found,  except  such  as  are  copied  from  it.  It  be- 
gins with  an  account  of  God's  creation  of  the  world,  in 
order  to  ascertain  and  distinguish  from  all  others  who 
is  the  object  of  our  worship  by  what  he  has  done;  in 
order  to  ascertain  who  he  is  concerning  whose  provi 
dence,  commands,  promises,  and  threatenings,  this  sa- 
cred book  all  along  treats;  the  Maker  and  Proprietoi 
of  the  world,  he  whose  creatures  we  are,  the  God  of 
nature:  in  order  likewise  to  distinguish  him  from  the 
idols  of  the  nations,  which  are  either  imaginary  beings, 
that  is,  no  beings  at  all ;  or  else  part  of  that  creation, 
the  historical  relation  of  which  is  here  given.  And  St. 
John,  not  improbably  with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account 
of  the  creation,  begins  his  gospel  with  an  account  of  our 


ii6  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

Saviour's  pre  existence,  and  that  "  all  things  were  made 
by  him,  and  without  him  was  not  any  thing  made  that 
was  made,"  (John  i,  3  ;)  agreeably  to  the  doctrine  of  St. 
Paul,  that  "God  created  all  things  by  Jesus  Christ." 
Eph.  iii,  9.  This  being  premised,  the  Scripture,  taker 
together,  seems  to  profess  to  contain  a  kind  of  at 
abridgment  of  the  history  of  the  world  in  the  view  just 
now  mentioned:  that  is,  a  general  account  of  the  con- 
dition of  religion  and  its  professors  during  the  continu- 
ance of  that  apostasy  from  God,  and  state  of  wickedness 
which  it  every-where  supposes  the  world  to  lie  in. 
And  this  account  of  the  state  of  religion  carries  with  it 
some  brief  account  of  the  political  state  of  things,  as 
religion  is  affected  by  it.  Revelation,  indeed,  considers 
the  common  affairs  of  this  world,  and  what  is  going  on 
in  it,  as  a  mere  scene  of  distraction,  and  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  concern  itself  with  foretelling  at  what  time 
Rome,  or  Babylon,  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place, 
should  be  the  most  conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and 
dissoluteness  which  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be;  can- 
not, I  say,  be  supposed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild 
scene  for  its  own  sake.  But  it  seems  to  contain  some 
very  general  account  of  the  chief  governments  of  the 
world,  as  the  general  state  of  religion  has  been,  is,  or 
shall  be  affected  by  them,  from  the  first  transgression, 
and  during  the  whole  interval  of  the  world's  continuing 
in  its  present  state,  to  a  certain  future  period,  spoken  of 
both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testament,  very  distinctly^ 
and  in  great  variety  of  expression;  "The  times  of  tne 
restitution  of  all  things,"  (Acts  iii,  21 ;)  when  "  the  mys- 
tery of  God  shall  be  finished,  as  he  hath  declared  to  his 
servants  the  prophets,"  (Rev.  x,  7 ;)  when  "  the  God  of 
heaven  shall  set  up  a  kingdom  which  shall  never  be  de- 
stroyed :  and  the  kingdom  shall  not  be  left  to  other  peo- 
ple," (Dan.  ii,  44,)  as  it  is  represented  to  be  during  this 
apostasy,  but  "judgment  shall  be  given  to  the  saints," 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  ^         317 

(Dan.  vii,  22,)  and  "they  shall  reign,"  (RSv.  xxii,  5  ;") 
"  and  the  kingdom  and  dominion,  and  the  greatness  of 
the  kingdom  under  the  whoje  heaven,  shall  be  given  to 
the  people  of  the  saints  of  the  Most  High."  Dan.  vii,  27. 
20.  Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would 
remark,  how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation 
lakes  up,  near  six  thousand  years  of  which  The  length  oi 
aie  past :  and  how  great  a  variety  of  things  it  Sf  tSpkaSi^ 
treats  of;  the  natural  and  moral  system  or  ***• 
history  of  the  world,  including  the  time  when  it  was 
formed,  all  contained  in  the  very  first  book,  and  evi- 
dently written  in  a  rude  and  unlearned  age ;  and  in 
subsequent  books,  the  various  common  and  prophetic 
history,  and  the  particular  dispensation  of  Christianity. 
Now  all  this  together  gives  the  largest  scope  for  criti- 
cism ;  and  for  confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being 
confuted,  either  from  reason,  or  from  common  history, 
or  from  any  inconsistence  in  its  several  parts.  And  it 
is  a  thing  which  deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that 
whereas  some  imagine  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the 
evidence  for  revelation  implies  a  positive  argument  that 
it  is  not  true ;  it  appears,  on  the  contrary,  to  imply  a 
positive  argument  that  it  is  true.  For  could  any  com- 
mon relation,  of  such  antiquity,  extent,  and  variety,  (for 
in  these  things  the  stress  of  what  I  am  now  observing 
lies,)  be  proposed  to  the  examination  of  the  world ;  that 
it  could  not,  in  an  age  of  knowledge  and  liberty,  be 
confuted,  or  shown  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  reasonable  men  ;  this  would  be  thought  a  strong 
presumptive  proof  of  its  truth.  And,  indeed,  it  must 
be  a  proof  of  it,  just  in  proportion  to  the  probability^ 
that  if  it  were  false  it  might  be  shown  to  be  so ;  and 
this,  I  think,  is  scarce  pretended  to  be  shown,  but  upon 
principles  and  in  ways  of  arguing  which  have  been 
clearly  obviated.  (Chap,  ii,  iii,  etc.)  Nor  does  it  at  all 
appear  that  any  set  of  men  who  believe  natural  religion 


3i8  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

are  of  th^  opinion  that  Christianity  has  been  thus  con- 
futed.    But  to  proceed  : — 

21.  Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the 
Old  Testament  contains  a  clironological  account  of  the 
Its  contents  begimiingof  it,  and  from  thence,  an  unbroken 
genealogy  of  mankind  for  many  ages  before 
common  history  begins ;  and  carried  on  as  much  further 
as  to  make  up  a  continued  thread  of  history  of  the 
length  of  between  three  and  four  thousand  years.  It 
contains  an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant  with  a 
particular  nation,  that  they  should  be  his  people,  and 
he  would  be  their  God,  in  a  peculiar  sense  ;  of  his  often 
interposing  miraculously  in  their  affairs;  giving  them 
the  promise,  and,  long  after,  the  possession,  of  a  partic- 
ular country;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest  national 
prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would  worship  him,  in  bpposi- 
tion  to  the  idols  which  the  rest  of  the  world  worshiped, 
and  obey  his  commands,  and  threatening  them  with  un- 
exampled punishments  if  they  disobeyed  him,  and  fell 
into  the  general  idolatry  ;  insomuch,  that  this  one  nation 
should  continue  to  be  the  observation  and  the  wonder 
of  all  the  world.  It  declares  particularly,  that  "  God 
would  scatter  them  among  all  people,  from  one  end 
of  the  earth  unto  the  other;"  but  that  "when  they 
should  return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would  have 
compassion  upon  them,  and  gather  them,  from  all  the 
nations  whither  he  had  scattered  them ;  that  Israel 
should  be  saved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  everlasting  salva- 
tion, and  not  be  ashamed  or  confounded,  world  without 
end."  And  as  some  of  those  promises  are  conditional, 
others  are  as  absolute  as  any  thing  can  be  expressed,  that 
the  time  should  come  when  "  the  people  should  be  all 
righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  forever;  that  though 
God  would  make  a  full  end  of  all  nations  whither  he 
had  scattered  them,  yet  would  he  not  make  a  full  end 
of  them :  that  he  would  bring  again  the  captivity  of  his 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  319 

people  Israel,  and  plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they 
should  be  no  more  pulled  up  out  of  their  land ;  that  the 
seed  of  Israel  should  not  cease  from  being  a  nation  for- 
ever."*    It  foretells  that  God  would  raise  them  up  a 
particular  person,  in  whom  all  his  promises  should  final- 
ly be  fulfilled ;  the  Messiah,  who  should  be,  in  a  high 
and  eminent  sense,  their  anointed  Prince  and  Saviour. 
This  was  foretold  in  such  a  manner  as  raised  a  general 
expectation  of  such  a  person  in  the  nation,  as  appears 
from  the  New  Testament,  and  is  an  acknowledged  fact ; 
an  expectation  of  his  coming  at  such  a  particular  time, 
before  any  one  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  person,  and 
when  there  was  no  ground  for  such  an  expectation  but 
from  the  prophecies;  which  expectation,  therefore,  must 
in  all  reason  be  presumed  to  be   explanatory  of  those 
prophecies,  if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their  mean- 
ing.    It  seems,  moreover,  to  foretell   that  this  person 
should  be  rejected  by  that  nation  to  whom  he  had  been 
so  long  promised,  and  though  he  was  so  much  desired 
by  them.f     And  it  expressly  foretells,  that  he  should  be 
the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles ;  and  even  that  the  comple- 
tion of  the  scheme  contained  in  this  book,  and  then  be- 
gun and  in  its  progress,  should  be   somewhat  so  great, 
that,  in  comparison  with  it,  the  restoration  of  the  Jews 
alone  would  be  but  of  small  account :  "  It  is  a  light 
thing  that  thou  shouldst  be  my  servant  to  raise  up  the 
tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  restore  the  preserved  of  Israel : 
I  will  also  give  thee  for  a  light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou 
mayest  be  for  salvation  unto  the   end  of  the  earth.  ' 
And,  "In   the  last  days,   the  mountain   of  the  Lord's 
house  shall  be  established  in  the  top  of  the  mountains, 
and  shall  be  exalted  above  the  hills;  and  all  nations 
shall  flow  into  it — for  out  of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  law, 

♦  Deut.  xxviii,  64 ;  xxx,  2,  3 ;  Isa.  xlv,  17  ;  Ix,  21  ;  Jer.  xxx,  11 ; 
xlvi,  28  ;  Amos  ix,  15  ;  Jer.  xxxi,  36. 
t  Isa.  viii,  14,  15 ;  xlix,  5  ;  liii ;  Mai.  i,  10,  ii,  and  iii. 


320  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  I.I. 

and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem.  And  he 
shall  judge  among  the  nations — and  the  Lord  alone 
shall  be  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the  idols  he  shall  lit 
terly  abolish."*  The  Scripture  further  contains  an 
account,  that  at  the  time  the  Messiah  was  expected  a 
person  rose  up  in  this  nation  claiming  to  be  that  Mes- 
siah, to  be  the  person  whom  all  the  prophets  referred  to, 
and  in  whom  they  should  center ;  that  he  spent  some 
years  in  a  continued  course  of  miraculous  works,  and 
endued  his  immediate  disciples  and  followers  with  a 
power  of  doing  the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  that 
religion  which  he  commissioned  them  to  publish ,  that, 
invested  with  this  authority  and  power,  they  made 
numerous  converts  in  the  remotest  countries,  and  set- 
tled and  established  his  religion  in  the  world ;  to  the 
end  of  which  the  Scripture  professes  to  give  a  prophetic 
account  of  the  state  of  this  religion  among  mankind. 

22.  Let  us  now  suppose  a  person,  utterly  ignorant  of 
history,  to  have  all  this  related  to  him  out  of  the  Script- 
ure.    Or,  suppose,  such  a  one,  having  the 
ted  to  a  candid   Scripture  put  into  his  hands,  to  remark  these 

inquirer.  ....  ,  .         ,  ,  ,  .      , 

thmgs  m  It,  not  knowmg  but  that  the  whole, 
even  its  civil  history,  as  well  as  the  other  parts  bf  it, 
might  be,  from  beginning  to  end,  an  entire  invention  ; 
and  to  ask,  What  truth  was  in  it,  and  whether  the  reve- 
lation here  related  was  real  or  a  fiction  ?  And  instead 
of  a  direct  answer,  suppose  him,  all  at  once,  to  be  told 
the  following  confessed  facts,  and  then  to  unite  them 
into  one  view. 

Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the  pro- 
fession and  establishment  of  natural  religion,  the  belief 
that  there  is  one  God  to  be  worshiped,  that  virtue  is  his 

*  I«a.  xljx,  6  ;  ii ;  xi ;  Ivi,  7  ;  Mai.  i,  ii.  To  which  must  be  add- 
ed the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  several  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, and  very  many  in  the  Old,  which  describe  what  shall  he  the 
completion  of  the  revealed  plan  of  Providence. 


Chap.  VTT.I  Evidence  for  Christianity.  321 

law,  and  that  mankind  shall  be  rewarded  and  punished 
hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  disobey  it  here  ;      Truths  origi- 

^  J  J  J  nated  by  revela- 

ih  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say,  the  pro-  tion.  itsimpor- 

^       .  .  ,  ,.  ,  '         .  ,  tanoe    and    au- 

fession  and  establishment  of  this  moral  sys-  thority. 
tem  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the  revelation,  whether 
real  or  supposed,  contained  in  this  book ;  the  establish 
ment  of  this  moral  system,  even  in  those  countries 
which  do  not  acknowledge  the  proper  authority  of  the 
Scripture.  (Page  274.)  Let  him  be  told  also  what  num- 
ber of  nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper  authority. 
Let  him  then  take  in  the  consideration,  of  what  impor- 
tance religion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon  these  things 
he  might,  I  think,  truly  observe,  that  this  supposed  rev- 
elation's obtaining  and  being  received  in  the  world,  with 
all  the  circumstances  and  effects  of  it,  considered  to- 
gether as  one  event,  is  the  most  conspicuous  and  im- 
portant event  in  the  story  of  mankind :  that  a  book  of 
this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and  recommended  to 
our  consideration,  demands,  as  if  by  a  voice  from  heaven, 
to  have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into  ;  and 
that  before  such  examination,  to  treat  it  with  any  kind 
of  scoffing  and  ridicule  is  an  offense  against  natural  piety. 
But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the 
establishment  of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  owing 
to  the  Scripture  revelation,  this  does  not  destroy  the 
proof  of  religion  from  reason ;  any  more  than  the  proof 
of  Euclid's  Elements  is  destroyed  by  a  man's  knowing,  01 
thinking,  that  he  should  never  have  seen  the  truth  of 
the  several  propositions  contained  in  it,  nor  had  those 
propositions  come  into  his  thoughts  but  for  that  math- 
ematician. 

25.  Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of  be,  in 
the  next  place,  informed  of  the  acknowl-  itg  antiquity, 
edged  antiquity  of  the  first  parts  of  this  JSnSSc^ 
book ;  and  that  its  chronology,  its  account  '**'*• 
of  the  time  when  the  earth  and  the  several  parts  of  it 
21 


322  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

were  fir  t  peopled  with  human  creatures  is  no  way  con- 
tradicted, but  is  really  confirmed,  by  the  natural  and 
civil  history  of  the  world,  collected  from  common  his- 
torians, from  the  state  of  the  earth,  and  from  the  late  in- 
vention of  arts  and  sciences.  And  as  the  Scripture  con 
tains  an  unbroken  thread  of  common  and  civil  history, 
from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for  between  three  and 
four  thousand  years ;  let  the  person  we  are  speaking  of 
be  told,  in  the  next  place,  that  this  general  history,  as  it 
is  not  contradicted,  but  is  confirmed,  by  profane  his- 
tory, as  much  as  there  would  be  reason  to  expect  upon 
supposition  of  its  truth  ;  so  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole 
history  itself  to  give  any  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion 
of  its  not  being,  in  the  general,  a  faithful  and  literally 
true  genealogy  of  men,  and  series  of  things.  I  speak 
here  only  of  the  common  Scripture  history,  or  of  the 
course  of  ordinary  events  related  in  it,  as  distinguished 
from  miracles,  and  from  the  prophetic  history.  In  all  the 
Scripture  narrations  of  this  kind,  following  events  arise 
out  of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all  other  histories.  There 
appears  nothing  related  as  done  in  any  age,  not  con- 
formable to  the  manners  of  that  age  ;  nothing  in  the 
account  of  a  succeeding  age,  which  one  would  say  could 
not  be  true,  or  was  improbable,  from  the  account  of 
things  in  the  preceding  one.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
characters  which  would  raise  a  thought  of  their  being 
feigned ;  but  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable  of  their 
being  real.  It  is  to  be  added,  also,  that  mere  genealo- 
gies, bare  narratives  of  the  number  of  years  which  per- 
sons called  by  such  and  such  names  lived,  do  not  carry 
the  face  of  fiction;  perhaps  do  carry  some  presump- 
tion of  veracity :  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which 
have  nothing  to  surprise,  may  be  thought  to  carry  some- 
what of  the  like  presumption  too.  And  the  domestic 
and  the  political  history  is  plainly  credible.  There  may 
be    incidents  in   Scripture,  which,  taken  alone  in  the 


Chap.  VII.J  Evidence  for  Christianity.  323 

naked  way  they  are  told,  may  appear  strange,xespecially 
to  persons  of  other  manners,  temper,  education;  but 
there  are  also  incidents  of  undoubted  truth,  in  many  or 
most  persons'  lives,  which,  in  the  same  circumstances, 
would  appear  to  the  full  as  strange.*  There  may  be 
mistakes  of  transcribers,  there  may  be  other  real  or 
seeming  mistakes,  not  easy  to  be  particularly  accounted 
for;  but  there  are  certainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind 
in  the  Scripture  than  what  were  to  have  been  expected 
in  books  of  such  antiquity ;  and  nothing,  in  any  wise, 
sufficient  to  discredit  the  general  narrative.  Now,  that 
a  history  claiming  to  commence  from  the  creation,  and 
extending  in  one  continued  series  through  so  great  a 
length  of  time,  and  variety  of  events,  should  have  such 
appearances  of  reality  and  truth  in  its  whole  contexture, 
is  surely  a  very  remarkable  circumstance  in  its  favor. 
And  as  all  this  is  applicable  to  the  common  history  of 
the  New  Testament,  so  there  is  a  further  credibility,  and 
a  very  high  one,  given  to  it  by  profane  authors ;  many 

*  [See  this  thought  presented  in  a  most  agreeable  and  lively  form 
in  the  Archbishop  of  Dublin's  '*  Historic  Doubts  "  concerning  Napo- 
leon Bonaparte.  Compare  the  following  conversation  given  in  Bos- 
well's  Life  of  Johnson,  (ann.  1763 :)  *'  Talking  of  those  who  deny  the 
truth  of  Christianity,  he  said,  '  It  is  always  easy  to  be  on  the  negative 
side.  ...  I  deny  that  Canada  is  taken,  and  I  can  support  my  denial  by 
pretty  good  arguments.  The  French  are  a  much  more  numerous 
people  than  we,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  they  would  allow  us  to  take 
it.*  '  But  the  ministry  have  assured  us,  in  all  the  formality  of  a  Ga- 
zette, that  it  is  taken.'  'Very  true.  But  the  ministry  have  put  us  to 
an  enormous  expense  by  the  war  in  America,  and  it  is  their  interest 
to  persuade  us  that  we  have  got  something  for  our  money.'  '  But  the 
fact  is  confirmed  by  thousands  of  men  who  were  at  the  taking  of 
it.'  'Aye,  but  these  men  have  still  more  interest  in  deceiving  us. 
They  don't  want  that  you  should  think  the  French  have  beat  them, 
but  that  they  have  beat  the  French,  Now,  suppose  you  should  go 
over  and  find  that  it  really  is  taken  ;  that  would  only  satisfy  yourself? 
for  when  you  come  back  we  will  not  believe  you.  We  will  say  yox^ 
have  been  bribed.'" — F.] 


324  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

of  these  writing  of  the  same  times,  and  confirming  the 
^riith  of  customs  and  events  which  are  incidentally,  as 
well  as  more  purposely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this  cred- 
ibility of  the  common  Scripture  history  gives  some  cred- 
ibility to  its  miraculous  history :  especially  as  this  is 
interwoven  with  the  common,  so  as  that  they  imply  each 
other,  and  both  together  make  up  one  relation. 

24.  Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this 

,  ^     person,  that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter 

Antiquity  of  the    ^  '  ...  .  .     ,  ?      ,        . 

Jews  whose  re-  of  fact,  which  IS  mdced  implied  in  the  fore- 

ligion  preserved  .  .  , 

their    national  goiHg  oDservation,  that  there  was  such  a  na- 

6X18  t6n  CC 

tion  as  the  Jews,  of  the  greatest  antiquity, 
whose  government  and  general  polity  was  founded  on 
the  law  here  related  to  be  given  them  by  Moses  as  from 
heaven :  that  natural  religion,  though  with  rites  addi- 
tional, yet  no  way  contrary  to  it,  was  their  established 
religion,  which  cannot  be  said  of  the  Gentile  world ; 
and  that  their  very  being,  as  a  nation,  depended  upon 
their  acknowledgment  of  one  God,  the  God  of  the  uni- 
verse. For  suppose,  in  their  captivity  in  Babylon,  they 
had  gone  over  to  the  religion  of  their  conquerors,  there 
would  have  remained  no  bond  of  union  to  keep  them  a 
distinct  people.  And  while  they  were  under  their  own 
kings  in  their  own  country,  a  total  apostasy  from  God 
would  have  been  the  dissolution  of  their  whole  govern- 
ment. They,  in  such  a  sense,  nationally  acknowledged 
and  worshiped  the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when 
the  rest  of  the  world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered 
them,  in  fact,  the  peculiar  people  of  God.  And  this,  so 
remarkable  an  establishment  and  preservation  of  natural 
religion  among  them,  seems  to  add  some  peculiar  credi 
bility  to  the  historical  evidence  for  the  miracles  of  Moses 
and  the  prophets;  because  these  miracles  are  a  full,  sat- 
isfactory account  of  this  event,  which  plainly  wants  to 
be  accounted  for,  and  cannot  otherwise. 

25.  Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  his- 


Chap.  VIIJ  Evidence  for  Christianitv.  325 

tory,  be  acquainted  further,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the 
Messiah,  of  Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the  time  when 
this  nation,  from  the  prophecies  above-men-     ^,    , , 

'  *       ^  Messiah  came, 

tioned,  expected  the  Messiah :  that  he  was  and.    ^cording 

'         ^  /■  1  J     to  proph<>«y,8uf- 

rejected,  as  it  seemed  to  have  been  foretold  fered  and  tri- 

umphed. 

he  should,  by  the  body  of  the  people,  under 
the  direction  of  their  rulers  :  that  in  the  course  of  a  very 
few  years  he  was  believed  on,  and  acknowledged  as  the 
promised  Messiah,  by  great  numbers  among  the  Gentiles, 
agreeably  to  the  prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet  not  upon 
the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles,  (page  297,  etc.,) 
of  which  miracles  we  also  have  strong  historical  evi- 
dence ;  (by  which  I  mean  here  no  more  than  must  be 
acknowledged  by  unbelievers ;  for  let  pious  frauds  and 
follies  be  admitted  to  weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say  they 
destroy,  our  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  proof  of 
Christianity,  (page  305,  etc. ;)  that  this  religion  approv- 
ing itself  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  and  carrying  its  own 
evidence  with  it,  so  far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of  its  sys- 
tem, and  being  no  way  contrary  to  reason  in  those  parts 
of  it  which  require  to  be  believed  upon  the  mere  au- 
thority of  its  Author ;  that  this  religion,  I  say,  gradually 
spread  and  supported  itself  for  some  hundred  years,  not 
only  without  any  assistance  from  temporal  power,  but 
under  constant  discouragements,  and  often  the  bitterest 
persecutions  from  it,  and  then  became  the  religion  of 
the  world :  that  in  the  mean  time,  the  Jewish  nation 
and  government  were  destroyed  in  a  very  remarkable 
manner,  and  the  people  carried  away  captive  and  dis- 
persed through  the  most  distant  countries,  in  which 
state  of  dispersion  they  have  remained  fifteen  hundred 
years :  and  that  they  remain  a  numerous  people,  united 
among  themselves,  and  distinguished  from  the  rest  of 
the  world,  as  they  were  in  the  days  of  Moses,  by  the 
profession  of  his  law ;  and  every-where  looked  upon  in 
a  manner,  which  one   scarce  knows  how  distinctly  to 


326  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

express,  but  in  the  words  of  tht  prophetic  account  of  it, 
given  so  many  ages  before  it  came  to  pass  :  "  Thou  shalt 
become  an  astonishment,  a  proverb  and  a  by-word, 
among  all  nations  whither  the  Lord  shall  lead  thee." 
Deut.  xxviii,  37. 

26.  The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews 
remaining  a  distinct  people  in  their  dispersion,  and  the 

The  Jews  pre-  Confirmation  which  this  event  appears  to 
KT^p^Jie^  give  to  the  truth  of  revelation,  may  be 
This  a  miracle,  thought  to  be  answered  by  their  religion's 
forbidding  them  intermarriages  with  those  of  any  other, 
and  prescribing  them  a  great  many  peculiarities  in  their 
food,  by  which  they  are  debarred  from  the  means  of  in- 
corporating with  the  people  in  whose  countries  they 
live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  satisfactory  account  of  that 
which  it  pretends  to  account  for.  But  what  does  it  pre- 
tend to  account  for  ?  The  correspondence  between  this 
event  and  the  prophecies ;  or  the  coincidence  of  both, 
with  a  long  dispensation  of  providence  of  a  peculiar  na- 
ture toward  that  people  formerly  ?  No.  It  is  only  the 
event  itself  which  is  offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for ; 
which  single  event,  taken  alone,  abstracted  from  all  such 
correspondence  and  coincidence,  perhaps  would  not 
have  appeared  miraculous;  but  that  correspondence 
and  coincidence  may  be  so,  though  the  event  itself  be 
supposed  not.  Thus,  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's 
being  born  at  Bethlehem  with  a  long  foregoing  series  of 
prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  is  doubtless  miracu- 
lous— the  series  of  prophecy,  and  other  coincidences, 
and  the  event,  being  admitted :  though  the  event  itself, 
his  birth  at  that  place,  appears  to  have  been  brought 
about  in  a  natural  way ;  of  which,  however,  no  one  can 
be  certain. 

27.  And  at  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some  degree, 
expressly  tc  have  verified  the  prophetic  history  already ; 
so  likewise,  they  may  be  considered  further,  as  having  a 


Chap.  VIIJ  Evidence  for  Christianitv.  327 

peculiar  aspect  toward  the  full  completion  of  it ;  as  af- 
fording some  presumption  that  the  whole  of  The  past  fuimi- 
it  shall,  one  time  or  other,  be  fulfilled.  Sy°iendera^the 
Thus,  that  the  Jews  have  been  so  wonder-  ^^t"-*  P«>i*We. 
fully  preserved  in  their  long  and  wide  dispersion  ;  which 
is  indeed  the  direct  fulfilling  of  some  prophecies,  but  is 
now  mentioned  only  as  looking  forward  to  somewhat  yet 
to  come;  that  natural  religion  came  forth  from  Judea, 
and  spread  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the  world,  be- 
fore lost  in  idolatry ;  which,  together  with  some  other 
things,  have  distinguished  that  very  place,  in  like  man- 
ner as  the  people  of  it  are  distinguished  :  that  this  great 
change  of  religion  over  the  earth  was  brought  about  un- 
der the  profession  and  acknowledgment  that  Jesus  was 
the  promised  Messiah  :  things  of  this  kind  naturally  turn 
the  thoughts  of  serious  men  toward  the  full  completion 
of  the  prophetic  history,  concerning  the  final  restoration 
of  that  people;  concerning  the  establishment  of  the 
everlasting  kingdom  among  them,  the  kingdom  of  the 
Messiah ;  and  the  future  state  of  the  world  under  this 
sacred  government.  Such  circumstances  and  events, 
compared  with  these  prophecies,  though  no  completions 
of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think,  be  spoken  of  as  nothing 
in  the  argument  by  a  person  upon  his  first  being  in- 
formed of  them.  They  fall  in  with  the  prophetic  history 
of  things  still  future,  give  it  some  additional  credibility, 
have  the  appearance  of  being  somewhat  in  order  to  the 
full  completion  of  it. 

Indeed,  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and 
great  calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to  judge 
thoroughly  of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity 
from  that  part  of  the  prophetic  history  which  relates  to 
the  situation  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  and  to  the 
state  of  the  Church  from  the  establishment  of  Christian- 
ity to  the  present  time.  But  it  appears,  from  a  general 
view  of  it,  to  be  very  material.     And  those  persons  who 


328  Analogy  of  Religicn.        [Part  II. 

have  thoroughly  examined  it,  and  some  of  them  were 
men  of  the  coolest  tempers,  greatest  capacities,  and  least 
liable  to  imputations  of  prejudice,  insist  upon  it  as  de- 
terminately  conclusive. 

28.  Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history, 
first  to  recollect  the  passages  above-mentioned  out  of 
Eecapitniation.  Scripture  without  knowing  but  that  the 
whole  was  a  late  fiction,  then  to  be  informed 
of  the  correspondent  facts  now  mentioned,  and  to  unite 
them  all  into  one  view :  that  the  profession  and  estab- 
lishment of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  greatly  ow- 
ing, in  different  ways,  to  this  book,  and  the  supposed 
revelation  which  it  contains  ;  that  it  is  acknowledged  to 
be  of  the  earliest  antiquity;  that  its  chronology  and 
common  history  are  entirely  credible;  that  this  ancient 
nation,  the  Jews,  of  whom  it  chiefly  treats,  appear  to 
have  been,  in  fact,  the  people  of  God  in  a  distinguished 
sense;  that,  as  there  was  a  national  expectation  among 
them,  raised  from  the  prophecies,  of  a  Messiah  to  ap- 
pear at  such  a  time,  so  one  at  this  time  appeared  claim- 
ing to  be  that  Messiah ;  that  he  was  rejected  by  this 
nation  but  received  by  the  Gentiles,  not  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles ;  that  the  religion  he 
taught  supported  itself  under  the  greatest  difficulties, 
gained  ground,  and  at  length  became  the  religion  of  the 
world ;  that  in  the  meantime  the  Jewish  polity  was  ut- 
terly destroyed,  and  the  nation  dispersed  over  the  face 
of  the  earth ;  that,  notwithstanding  this,  they  have  re- 
mained a  distinct  and  numerous  people  for  so  many 
centuries,  even  to  this  day ;  which  not  only  appears  to 
be  the  express  completion  of  several  prophecies  concern- 
ing them,  but  also  renders  it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible 
and  easy  possibility  that  the  promises  made  to  them  as 
a  nation  may  yet  be  fulfilled.  And  to  these  acknowl- 
edged truths,  let  the  person  we  have  been  supposing 
idd,  as  I  think  he  ought,  whether  every  one  will  allow 


Chap.  VII.l  Evidence  for  Christianity.  329 

it  or  not,  the  obvious  appearances  which  there  are  of 
the  state  of  the  world,  in  other  respects  besides  what  re- 
lates to  the  Jews,  and  of  the  Christian  Church,  having 
so  long  answered,  and  still  answering  to  the  prophetic 
history.  Suppose,  I  say,  these  facts  set  over  against  the 
things  before-mentioned  out  of  the  Scripture,  and  sen 
ously  compared  with  them ;  the  joint  view  of  both  to- 
gether must,  I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight  to  a 
considerate,  reasonable  person ;  of  much  greater,  indeed, 
upon  having  them  first  laid  before  him  than  is  easy  for 
us,  who  are  so  familiarized  to  them,  to  conceive,  without 
some  particular  attention  for  that  purpose. 

29.  All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  con- 
tained under  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  These  pointa 
and  most  thoroughly  examined  into;  that  dS^^consideK 
the  weight  of  each  may  be  judged  of,  upon  ^^°' 
such  examination,  and  such  conclusion  drawn  as  re- 
sults from  their  united  force.  But  this  has  not  been  at- 
tempted here.  I  have  gone  no  further  than  to  show, 
that  the  general  imperfect  view  of  them  now  given,  the 
confessed  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  and  the  many 
obvious  appearing  completions  of  prophecy,  together 
with  the  collateral  things  *  here  mentioned,  and  there 
are  several-  others  of  the  like  sort ;  that  all  this  together, 
which,  being  fact,  must  be  acknowledged  by 

...  ,  .  ,  \-     Necessary  oi>n- 

unbelievers,   amounts   to   real    evidence   of  cessions  of  un- 
believers, 
somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter; 

evidence  much  more  important  than  careless  men,  who 
have  been  accustomed  only  to  transient  and  partial 
views  of  it,  can  imagine  ;  and,  indeed,  abur.dantly  suffi- 
cient to  act  upon.  And  these  things,  I  appiehend,  must 
be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers.  For  though  they  may 
say  that  the  historical  evidence  of  miracles,  wrought  in 

♦  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  not  reducible 
to  the  head  of  certain  miracles,  or  determinate  completions  of  proph- 
ecy    See  pages  292,  293. 


330  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Pai^t  II. 

attestation  of  Christianity,  is  not  sufficient  to  convince 
them  that  such  miracles  were  really  wrought,  they  can- 
not deny  that  there  is  such  historical  evidence,  it  being 
a  known  matter  of  fact  that  there  is.  They  may  say,  the 
conformity  between  the  prophecies  and  events  is  by  ac- 
cident :  but  there  are  many  instances  in  which  such 
conformity  itself  cannot  be  denied.  They  may  say,  with 
regard  to  such  kind  of  collateral  things  as  those  above- 
mentioned,  that  any  odd  accidental  events,  without 
meaning,  will  have  a  meaning  found  in  them  by  fanciful 
people ;  and  that  such  as  are  fanciful  in  any  one  certain 
way,  will  make  out  a  thousand  coincidences  which  seem 
to  favor  their  peculiar  follies.  Men,  I  say,  may  talk 
thus ;  but  no  one  who  is  serious  can  possibly  think  these 
things  to  be  nothing,  if  he  considers  the  importance  of 
collateral  things,  and  even  of  lesser  circumstances,  in 
the  evidence  of  probability,  as  distinguished  in  nature 
from  the  evidence  of  demonstration.  In  many  cases, 
indeed,  it  seems  to  require  the  truest  judgment  to  de- 
termine with  exactness  the  weight  of  circumstantial  evi- 
dence ;  but  it  is  very  often  altogether  as  convincing  as 
that  which  is  the  most  express  and  direct. 

30.  This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christianity, 

considered  as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve  to 

recommend  to  serious  persons  to  set  down 

Force  of  the  ,.,,,•,  ,  r 

proof  from  the  every  thmg  which  they  thmk  may  be  of  any 

combination    of  ,.,  „.  ^      ^    .  .  . 

these  considera-  real  weight  at  all  in  proof  of  It,  and  partic- 
ularly the  many  seeming  completions  of 
prophecy  :  and  they  will  find,  that,  judging  by  the  nat 
ural  rules  by  which  we  judge  of  probable  evidence  in 
common  matters,  they  amount  to  a  much  higher  degree 
of  proof,  upon  such  a  joint  review,  than  could  be  sup- 
posed upon  considering  them  separately,  at  different 
times,  how  strong  soever  the  proof  might  before  appear 
to  them  upon  such  separate  views  of  it.  For  probable 
proofs,  by  being  added,  not  only  increase  the  evidence, 


Chap.  VII.]  Evidence  for  Christianity.  331 

Dut  multiply  it,*  Nor  should  I  dissuade  any  one  from 
setting  down  what  he  thought  made  for  the  contrary 
side.  But,  then,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  not  in  order  to 
influence  his  judgment  but  his  practice,  that  a  mistake 
on  one  side  may  be,  in  its  consequences,  much  more 
dangerous  than  a  mistake  on  the  other.  And  what 
course  is  most  safe,  and  what  most  dangerous,  is  a  con  • 
.^deration  thought  very  material,  when  we  deliberate 
not  concerning  events,  but  concerning  conduct  in  oui 
temporal  affairs.  To  be  influenced  by  this  considera- 
tion in  our  judgment,  to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is 
indeed  as  much  prejudice  as  any  thing  whatever.  And 
like  other  prejudices,  it  operates  contrary  ways  in  diff"er- 
ent  men.  For  some  are  inclined  to  believe  what  they 
hope,  and  others  what  they  fear.  And  it  is  manifest 
unreasonableness  to  apply  to  men's  passions  in  order  to 
gain  theii  assent.  But  in  deliberations  concerning 
conduct,  there  is  nothing  which  reason  niore  requires 
to  be  taken  into  the  account,  than  the  importance  of  it. 
For  suppose  it  doubtful  what  would  be  the  consequence 
of  acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary  manner;  still,  that 
taking  one  side  could  be  attended  with  little  or  no  bad 
consequcuces,  and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended 
with  the  cp"eatest,  must  appear  to  unprejudiced  reason 
of  the  highest  moment  toward  determining  how  we  are 
to  act.     But  the  truth  of  our  religion,  like  the  truth  of 

*  [If  the  thing  to  be  proved  have  in  it  an  apparent  character  of 
truth,  this  constitutes  an  improbability  of  its  falsehood.  If  it  have 
another  character  of  truth,  this  constitutes  another  improbability  of 
its  falsehood.  If  this  were  a  complete  statement  of  the  argument  to 
be  drawn  from  the  coexistence  of  the  two  characters  of  truth,  the 
second  improbability  would  only  require  to  be  added  to  the  first  to 
give  the  value  of  the  whole.  But  in  reality  the  argument  is  much 
stronger.  For  the  improbability  that  they  should  simultaneously 
exist  in  the  thing  under  examination,  and  yet  that  thing  be  false,  is 
evidently  different  from  the  sum  of  the  improbabilities  that  each 
separately  should  exist  in  it  if  false. — F.] 


332  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

common  matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence 
taken  together.  And  unless  the  whole  series  of  things 
which  may  be  alleged  in  this  argument,  and  every  particu- 
lar thing  in  it,  can  reasonably  be  supposed  to  have  been 
by  accident,  (for  here  the  stress  of  the  argument  for  Chris- 
tianity lies,)  then  is  the  truth  of  it  proved ;  in  like  man 
ner  as  if,  in  any  common  case,  numerous  events  ac- 
knowledged were  to  be  alleged  in  proof  of  any  other 
event  disputed ;  the  truth  of  the  disputed  event  would 
be  proved,  not  only  if  any  one  of  the  acknowledged 
ones  did  of  itself  clearly  imply  it,  but  though  no  one  of 
them  singly  did  so,  if  the  whole  of  the  acknowledged 
events  taken  together,  could  not  in  reason  be  supposed 
to  have  happened  unless  the  disputed  one  were  true. 

It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage  the  nature  of  this 
evidence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack  Christian- 
ity, especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is  easy  to  show, 
in  a  short  and  lively  manner,  that  such  and  such  things 
are  liable  to  objection,  that  this  and  another  thing  is  of 
little  weight  in  itself;  but  impossible  to  show,  in  like 
manner,  the  united  force  of  the  whole  argument  in  one 
view. 

31.  However,  lastly^  as  it  has  been  made  appear  that 
there  is  no  presumption  against  a  revelation  as  miracu- 
lous; that  the  general  scheme  of  Christian- 
Christian  evi-    .        '  ... 
dence  cannot  be   ity,  and  the  prmcipal  parts  of  It,  are  con- 
destroyed            .          ,  ,           ,  ^  .  ^  .       . 

formable  to  the  experienced  constitution  of 

things,  and  the  whole  perfectly  credible ;  so  the  account 
now  given  of  the  positive  evidence  for  it  shows  that  this 
evidence  is  such  as,  from  the  nature  of  it,  cannot  be 
destroyed,  though  it  should  be  lessened. 


Chap.  VIII.J  Objections  against  Analogy.       333 


^ 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OF  THE  OBJECTIONS  WHICH  MAY  BE  MADE  AGAINST 
ARGUING  FROM  THE  ANALOGY  OF  NATURE  TO  RE- 
LIGION. 

IF  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention  as 
they  are  bound,  even  in  point  of  morality,  to  consider, 
what  they  judge  and  give  characters  of,  the  occasion  of 
this  chapter  would  be,  in  some  good  measure  at  least 
superseded.  But  since  this  is  not  to  be  expected ;  for 
some  we  find  do  not  concern  themselves  to  understand 
even  what  they  write  against ;  since  this  treatise,  in 
common  with  most  others,  lies  open  to  objections  which 
may  appear  very  material  to  thoughtful  men  at  first 
sight ;  and,  besides  that,  seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the 
objections  of  such  as  can  judge  without  thinking,  and 
of  such  as  can  censure  without  judging;  it  may  not  be 
amiss  to  set  down  the  chief  of  these  objections  which 
occur  to  me,  and  consider  them  to  their  hands.  And 
they  are  such  as  these  : — 

2.  "  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in  rev- 
elation by  saying  that  there  are  the  same  in  natural  re- 
ligion ;  when  what  is  wanting  is   to  clear 

.       ,       '        ,  ^      ,  ,      .  Five  objections. 

both  of  them,  of  these  their  common,  as 
well  as  other  their  respective  difficulties :  but  that  it  is  a 
strange  way  indeed  of  convincing  men  of  the  obligations 
of  religion,  to  show  them  that  they  have  as  little  reason 
for  their  worldly  pursuits ;  and  a  strange  way  of  vindi- 
cating the  justice  and  goodness  of  the  Author  of  nature, 
and  of  removing  the  objections  against  both,  to  which 
the  system  of  religion  lies  open,  to  show  that  the  like 


334  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

objections  lie  against  natural  providence ;  a  way  of  an- 
swering objections  against  religion,  without  so  much  as 
pretending  to  make  out  that  the  system  of  it,  or  the 
particular  things  in  it  objecfted  against,  are  reasonable — 
especially,  perhaps,  some  may  be  inattentive  enough  to 
add,  must  this  be  thought  strange,  when  it  is  confessed 
that  analogy  is  no  answer  to  such  objections;  that  when 
this  sort  of  reasoning  is  carried  to  the  utmost  length  it 
tan  be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet  leave  the  mind  in 
a  very  unsatisfied  state  :  and  that  it  must  be  unaccounta- 
ble ignorance  of  mankind,  to  imagine  they  will  be  pre- 
vailed with  to  forego  their  present  interests  and  pleas- 
ures, from  regard  to  religion,  upon  doubtful  evidence." 

Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  appear, 
that  appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  measure  owing 
to  half  views,  which  show  but  part  of  an  object,  yet 
show  that  indistinctly;  and  to  undeterminate  language. 
By  these  means  weak  men  are  often  deceived  by  others, 
and  ludicrous  men  by  themselves.  And  even  those  who 
are  serious  and  considerate  cannot  always  readily  dis- 
entangle, and  at  once  clearly  see  through,  the  perplexities 
in  which  subjects  themselves  are  involved  :  and  which 
are  heightened  by  the  deficiencies  and  the  abuse  of 
words.  To  this  latter  sort  of  persons  the  following  re- 
ply to  each  part  of  this  objection  severally  may  be  of 
some  assistance,  as  it  may  also  tend  a  little  to  stop 
and  silence  others. 

3.  First.  The  thing  wanted,  that  is,  what  men  require, 
is  to  have  all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or  at  least 
Answer  to  the  foJ*  any  thing  we  know  to  the  contrary,  it 
S'th^tteTf  may  be,  the  same  as  requiring  to  compre- 
S^Vff^'is  hend  the  Divine  nature,  and  the  whole  plan 
wanted.  q{  Providence  from  everlasting  to  everlast- 

ing. But  it  hath  always  been  allowed  to  argue,  from 
what  is  acknowledged  to  what  is  disputed.  And  it  is  in 
no  other  sense  a  poor  thing  to  argue  from  natural  relig- 


Chap.  VIIIJ  Objections  against  Analogy.       335 

ion  to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with,  than  it 
is  to  argue  in  numberless  other  ways  of  probable  deduc- 
tion and  inference  in  matters  of  conduct,  which  we  are 
continually  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  doing.  Indeed 
the  epithet  poor  may  be  applied,  I  fear,  as  properly  to 
great  part,  or  the  whole,  of  human  life,  as  it  is  to  the 
things  mentioned  in  the  objection.  Is  it  not  a  poor 
thing  for  a  physician  to  have  so  little  knowledge  in  the 
cure  of  diseases  as  even  the  most  eminent  have .''  to  act 
upon  conjecture  and  guess  where  the  life  of  man  is 
concerned  }  Undoubtedly  it  is  :  but  not  in  comparison 
of  having  no  skill  at  all  in  that  useful  art,  and  being 
obliged  to  act  wholly  in  the  dark. 

4.  Further :  since  it  is  as  unreasonable  as  it  is  com- 
mon to  urge  objections  against  revelation  which  are  of 
equal  weight  against   natural  religion  ;  and 
those  who  do  this,  if  they  are  not  confuted   against   reveia- 

-   .   ,  .  ,  ,        tlon    as    strong 

themselves,    deal    unfairly    with    others    in   against  natural 

...  ,  ,  .  ,       religion. 

making  it  seem  that  they  are  arguing  only 
against  revelation,  or  particular  doctrines  of  it,  when  in 
reality  they  are  arguing  against  moral  providence ;  it  is 
a  thing  of  consequence  to  show,  that  such  objections  are 
as  much  leveled  against  natural  religion  as  against  re- 
vealed. And  objections  which  are  equally  applicable 
to  both,  are,  properly  speaking,  answered  by  its  being 
shown  that  they  are  so,  provided  the  former  be  admit- 
ted to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in  the  considera- 
tion how  distinctly  this  is  admitted,  it  is  plainly  very 
material  to  observe,  that  as  the  things  objected  against 
in  natural  religion  are  of  the  same  kind  with  what  is 
certain  matter  of  experience  in  the  course  of  providence, 
and  in  the  information  which  God  affords  us  concerning 
our  temporal  interest  under  his  government;  so  the  ob- 
jections against  the  system  of  Christianity  and  the  evi- 
dence of  it  are  of  the  very  same  kind  with  those  which 
are  made  against  the  system  and  evidence  of  natural 


336  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

religion.  However,  the  reader,  upon  review,  may  see 
that  most  of  the  analogies  insisted  upon,  even  in  the 
latter  part  of  this  treatise,  do  not  necessarily  require  to 
have  more  taken  for  granted  than  is  in  the  former ;  that 
there  is  an  Author  of  nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the 
world  :  and  Christianity  is  vindicated,  not  from  its  anal- 
ogy to  natural  religion,  but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to 
the  experienced  constitution  of  nature. 
<  5.  Secondly.  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  consists 
in  such  a  determinate  course  of  life,  as  being  what,  there 
is  reason   to  think,  is   commanded  by  the 

Answer  to  sec-  .  ■' 

ond  objection  as   Author  of  nature,  and  will,  upon  the  whole, 

to  men's  having  ,  1  1  • 

as  little  reason  be   our   happmcss   Under   his   government. 

for  worldly  pur-    _  _         . .  .  •  -i     1  1  1 

suits  as  reug-  Now  if  men  can  be  convinced  that  they  have 
the  like  reason  to  believe  this,  as  to  believe 
that  taking  care  of  their  temporal  affairs  will  be  to  theii 
advantage ;  such  conviction  cannot  but  be  an  argument 
to  them  for  the  practice  of  religion.  And  if  there  be 
really  any  reason  for  believing  one  of  these,  and  endeav- 
oring to  preserve  life,  and  secure  ourselves  the  necessa- 
ries and  conveniences  of  it ;  then  there  is  reason  also  for 
believing  the  other,  and  endeavoring  to  secure  the  inter- 
est it  proposes  to  us.  And  if  the  interest  which  religion 
proposes  to  us  be  infinitely  greater  than  our  whole  tem- 
poral interest,  then  there  must  be  proportionably  great- 
er reason  for  endeavoring  to  secure  one  than  the  other : 
since,  by  the  supposition  the  probability  of  our  secur- 
ing one  is  equal  to  the  probability  of  our  securing  the 
other.  This  seems  plainly  unanswerable ;  and  has  a 
tendency  to  influence  fair  minds,  who  consider  what 
our  condition  really  is,  or  upon  what  evidence  we  are 
naturally  appointed  to  act;  and  who  are  disposed  to 
acquiesce  in  the  terms  upon  which  we  live,  and  attend 
to  and  follow  that  practical  instruction,  whatever  it  be, 
which  is  afforded  us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  re- 


Chap.  VIIIJ  Objections  against  Analogy.       337 

ferred  to  in  the  objection,  lies  in  another  place.  For  it 
is  said  that  the  proof  of  religion  is  involved  in  such  in- 
extricable difficulties  as  to  render  it  doubt-      „        ,  ,^ 

Force  of  the 

ful;  and  that  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if  objection,    aod 

,  ,   ,        ,    r  1       ,     r   1    would  not  give 

It  were  true,  it  would  be  left  upon  doubtful  doubtful  evi 
evidence.  Here  then,  over  and  above  the 
force  of  each  particular  difficulty  or  objection,  these  dif- 
ficulties and  objections  taken  together,  are  turned  into 
a  positive  argument  against  the  truth  of  religion  ;  which 
argument  would  stand  thus:  If  religion  were  true,  it 
would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and  open  to  objections  to  the 
degree  in  which  it  is :  therefore,  that  it  is  thus  left,  not 
only  renders  the  evidence  of  it  weak,  and  lessens  its 
force  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  such  objections ;  but 
also  shows  it  to  be  false,  or  is  a  general  presumption  of 
its  being  so.  Now  the  observation  that  from  the  natural 
constitution  and  course  of  things  we  must,  in  our  tem- 
poral concerns,  almost  continually,  and  in  matters  of 
great  consequence,  act  upon  evidence  of  alike  kind  and 
degree  to  the  evidence  of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this 
argument ;  because  it  shows,  that  it  is  according  to  the 
conduct  and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature  to  ap- 
point we  should  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that,  which 
this  argument  presumes  he  cannot  be  supposed  to  ap- 
point we  should  act  upon :  it  is  an  instance,  a  general 
one  made  up  of  numerous  particular  ones,  of  somewhat 
in  his  dealing  with  us  similar  to  what  is  said  to  be  in- 
credible. And  as  the  force  of  this  answer  lies  merely 
in  the  parallel  which  there  is  between  the  evidence 
for  religion  and  for  our  temporal  conduct,  the  an- 
swer is  equally  just  and  conclusive  ;  whether  the  parallel 
be  made  out  by  showing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to 
be  higher,  or  the  evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

6.   Thirdly.  The  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to  vindi- 
cate the  character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  obligations 
of  men ;  it  is  not  to  justify  his  providence,  but  to  show 
22 


338  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II 

what  belongs  tc  us  to  do.  These  are  two  subjects,  and 
ought  not  to  be  confounded.  And  though  they  may  al 
Answer  to  third  length  run  Up  into  each  other,  yet  observa- 
She^deofviS  tions  may  immediately  tend  to  make  out  the 
j^Sfndg^-  latter,  which  do  not  appear,  by  any  imme- 
Ss'SnTuM^  diate  connection,  to  the  purpose  of  the 
®^-  former ;    which   is    less   our   concern   than 

many  seem  to  think. 

For,  first,  It  is  not  necessary  we  should  justify  the  dis- 
pensations of  Providence  against  objections  any  further 
than  to  show  that  the  things  objected  against  may,  for 
aught  we  know,  be  consistent  with  justice  and  goodness. 
Suppose,  then,  that  there  are  things  in  the  system  of  this 
world,  and  plan  of  Providence  relating  to  it,  which,  tak- 
en alone,  would  be  unjust;  yet  it  has  been  shown  unan- 
swerably, that  if  we  could  take  in  the  reference  which 
these  things  may  have  to  other  things  present,  past,  and 
to  come ;  to  the  whole  scheme,  which  the  things  object- 
ed against  are  parts  of;  these  very  things  might,  for 
aught  we  know,  be  found  to  be  not  only  consistent  with 
justice,  but  instances  of  it.  Indeed,  it  has  been  shown, 
by  the  analogy  of  what  we  see,  not  only  possible  that 
this  may  be  the  case,  but  credible  that  it  is.  And  thus 
objections  drawn  from  such  things  are  answered,  and 
Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far  as  religion  makes  its 
vindication  necessary. 

Hence  it  appears,  secondly.  That  objections  against 
the  divine  justice  and  goodness  are  not  endeavored  to 
be  removed  by  showing  that  the  like  objections,  allowed 
to  be  really  conclusive,  lie  against  natural  providence; 
but  those  objections  being  supposed,  and  shown  not  to 
be  conclusive,  the  things  objected  against,  considered  as 
matters  of  fact,  are  further  shown  to  be  credible  from 
their  conformity  to  the  constitution  of  nature;  for  in- 
stance, that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their 
actions  hereafter,  from  the  observation  that  he  does  re- 


Chap.  VIII.]  Objections  against  Analogy.       339 

ward  and  punish  them  for  their  actions  here.     And  this, 
I  apprehend,  is  of  weight. 

And  I  add,  thirdly,  It  would  be  of  weight,  even  though 
those  objections  were  not  answered.  For,  there  being 
the  proof  of  religion  above  set  down,  and  religion  imply- 
ing several  facts ;  for  instance  again,  the  fact  last  men 
tioned,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their 
actions  hereafter ;  the  observation  that  his  present  meth- 
od of  government  is  by  rewards  and  punishments,  shows 
that  future  fact  not  to  be  incredible :  whatever  objec- 
tions men  may  think  they  have  against  it,  as  unjust  or 
unmerciful,  according  to  their  notions  of  justice  and 
mercy ;  or  as  improbable  from  their  belief  of  necessity. 
I  say,  as  itnprobable,  for  it  is  evident  no  objection  against 
it,  as  unjust^  can  be  urged  from  necessity ;  since  this  no- 
tion as  much  destroys  injustice  as  it  does  justice. 

Then,  fourthly.  Though  objections  against  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  system  of  religion  cannot,  indeed,  be 
answered  without  entering  into  consideration  of  its  rea- 
sonableness, yet  objections  against  the  credibility  or 
truth  of  it  may :  Because  the  system  of  it  is  reducible 
into  what  is  properly  matter  of  fact;  and  the  truth,  the 
probable  truth,  of  facts,  may  be  shown  without  considera- 
tion of  their  reasonableness.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  though 
in  some  cases  and  respects  it  is  highly  useful  and  proper, 
yet  it  is  not  necessary,  to  give  proof  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  every  precept  enjoined  us,  and  of  every  particu- 
lar dispensation  of  Providence  which  comes  into  the 
system  of  religion.  Indeed,  the  more  thoroughly  a  per- 
son of  a  right  disposition  is  convinced  of  the  perfection 
of  the  Divine  nature  and  conduct,  the  further  he  will 
advance  toward  that  perfection  of  religion  which  St. 
John  (i  John  iv,  18)  speaks  of.  But  the  general  obliga- 
tions of  religion  are  fully  made  out,  by  proving  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  practice  of  it.  And  that  the  practice 
of  religion  is  reasonable,  maybe  shown,  though  no  more 


340  Analogy  of  Religion.         lPart  II. 

could  be  proved  than  that  the  system  of  it  may  be  so, 
for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary;  and  even  without 
entering  into  the  distinct  consideration  of  this.  And 
from  hence,  fifthly,  It  is  easy  to  see  that  though  the 
analogy  of  nature  is  not  an  immediate  answer  to  objec- 
tions against  the  wisdom,  the  justice,  or  goodness,  of  any 
doctrine  or  precept  of  religion,  yet  it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an 
immediate  and  direct  answer  to  what  is  really  intended 
by  such  objections ;  which  is  to  show,  that  the  things 
objected  against  are  incredible. 

7.  Fourthly.  It  is  most  readily  acknowledged,  that  the 

foregoing  treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory ;  very  far, 

indeed,  from  it :  but  so  would  any  natural 

Answer    to 

fourth  objection   institution  of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a 

that   the   argu-  .  ,      •  •  -,  t 

ment  is  unsatis-   systcm,  together  With  Its  evidence.     Leav- 

factory.    Thisis     .  ...  .    ,  ,.    .  ,     , 

true  in  ordinarjr  ing  religion  out  of  the  casc,  men  are  divided 
in  their  opinions,  whether  our  pleasures 
overbalance  our  pains;  and  whether  it  be,  or  be  not, 
eligible  to  live  in  this  world.  And  were  all  such  con- 
troversies settled,  which  perhaps  in  speculation  would 
be  found  involved  in  great  difficulties ;  and  were  it  de- 
termined, upon  the  evidence  of  reason,  as  nature  has  de- 
termined it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preserved ; 
yet  still,  the  rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to  afford 
us  for  escaping  the  miseries  of  it,  and  obtaining  its  sat- 
isfactions, the  rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving  health, 
and  recovering  it  when  lost,  are  not  only  fallible  and 
precarious,  but  very  far  from  being  exact.  Nor  are  we 
informed  by  nature,  in  future  contingencies  and  acci- 
dents, so  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain  what  is  the  best 
method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What  will  be  the  suc- 
cess of  our  temporal  pursuits,  in  the  common  sense  of 
the  word  success,  is  highly  doubtful.  And  what  will  be 
the  success  of  them  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word ; 
that  is,  what  happiness  or  enjoyment  we  shall  obtain  by 
them,  is  doubtful  in  a  muchhiglier  degree.     Indeed,  the 


Chap.  VIIIJ  Objections  against  Analogy        341 

unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  evidence  with  which  we 
are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  is 
scarce  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men  do  not  throw  away 
life,  or  disregard  the  interest  of  it,  upon  account  of  this 
doubtfulness. 

The  evidence  of  religion,  then,  being  admitted  real, 
those  who  object  against  it  as  not  satisfactory,  that  is,  as 
not  being  what  they  wish  it,  plainly  forget  ^he  objection 
the  very  condition  of  our  being :  for  satis-   overlooks  the  na- 

■'  .  .  °  ture  of  our  be- 

faction,  in  this  sense,  does  not  belong  to  ing,  also  of  re- 
such  a  creature  as  man.  And,  which  is  more 
material,  they  forget  also  the  very  nature  of  religion.  For 
religion  presupposes,  in  all  those  who  will  embrace  it,  a 
certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honesty ;  which  it  was 
intended  to  try  whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exer- 
cise, in  such  as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement. 
Religion  presupposes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  same 
sense,  as  speaking  to  a  man  presupposes  he  understands 
the  language  in  which  you  speak ;  or  as  warning  a  man 
of  any  danger,  presupposes  that  he  hath  such  a  regard 
to  himself  as  that  he  will  endeavor  to  avoid  it.  And, 
therefore,  the  question  is  not  at  all,  Whether  the  evi- 
dence of  religion  be  satisfactory :  but,  whether  it  be,  in 
reason,  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline  that  virtue 
which  it  presupposes  ?  Now  the  evidence  of  it  is  fully 
sufficient  for  all  those  purposes  of  probation ;  how  far 
soever  it  is  from  being  satisfactory  as  to  the  purposes  of 
curiosity,  or  any  other;  and,  indeed,  it  answers  the  pur- 
poses of  the  former  in  several  respects,  which  it  would 
not  do,  if  it  were  as  overbearing  as  is  required.  One 
might  add  further,  that  whether  the  motives  or  the  evi- 
dence for  any  course  of  action  be  satisfactory,  meaning 
here  by  that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man  that  such  a 
course  of  action  will  in  event  be  for  his  good  ;  this  need 
never  be,  and  I  think,  strictly  speaking,  never  is,  the 
practical  question  in  common  matters.     But  the  practi- 


342  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

cal  question  in  all  cases  is,  Whether  the  evidence  for  a 
course  of  action  be  such  as,  taking  in  all  circumstances, 
makes  the  faculty  within  us  which  is  the  guide  and  judge 
of  conduct,  (see  Dissertati  .;n  ii,)  determine  that  course 
of  action  to  be  prudent?  Indeed,  satisfaction  that  it 
will  be  for  our  interest  or  happiness,  abundantly  deter- 
mines an  action  to  be  prudent ;  but  evidence,  almost  infi- 
nitely lower  than  this,  determines  actions  to  be  so  too, 
even  in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 

8.  Fifthly.  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influ 
ence  which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may  or  may 
.  nj^^   iiot  be  expected  to  have  upon  men,  I  ob- 

Answer  to  fifth  ^  ... 

objection    that  serve,  as  above,  that  religion  being  intended 

such     evidence  ...  .  . 

will  not  Influ-  for  a  trial  and  exercise  of  the  morality  of 

ence  practice.  ,       ,  .       .  ,  .  /. 

every  person  s  character  who  is  a  subject  of 
it ;  and  there  being,  as  I  have  shown,  such  evidence  for 
it  as  is  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  men  to  embrace 
it ;  to  object  that  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  mankind  will 
be  influenced  by  such  evidence,  is  nothing  to  the  pur- 
pose of  the  foregoing  treatise.  For  the  purpose  of  it  is 
not  to  inquire,  what  sort  of  creatures  mankind  are ;  but, 
what  the  light  and  knowledge,  which  is  afforded  them, 
requires  they  should  be:  to  show  how,  in  reason,  they 
ought  to  behave ;  not  how,  in  fact,  they  will  behave. 
This  depends  upon  themselves,  and  is  their  own  con- 
cern ;  the  personal  concern  of  each  man  in  particular. 
And  how  little  regard  the  generality  have  to  it,  experi- 
ence indeed  does  too  fully  show.  But  religion,  consid- 
ered as  a  probation,  has  had  its  ends  upon  all  persons  to 
whom  it  has  been  proposed,  with  evidence  sufficient  in 
reason  to  influence  their  practice ;  for  by  this  means 
they  have  been  put  into  a  state  of  probation,  let  them 
behave  as  they  will  in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  revelation, 
but  reason  also,  teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence  of  re- 
ligion being  laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  Providence 
ire  carrying  on,  not  only  with  regard  to  those  who  will, 


Chap.  VII  IJ  Objections  against  Analogy.       343 

but  likewise  with  regard  to  those  who  will  not,  be  influ- 
enced by  it.  However,  lastly^  the  objection  here  re- 
ferred to  allows  the  things  insisted  upon  in  this  treatise 
to  be  of  some  weight;  and  if  so,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will 
have  some  influence.  And  if  there  be  a  probability  that 
it  will  have  any  at  all,  there  is  the  same  reason  in  kind, 
though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  before  men,  as  there 
would  be  if  it  were  likely  to  have  a  greater  influence. 

9.  And  further,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with 
respect  to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in 
this  treatise  I  have  argued  upon  the  princi-  Theauthorhaa 
pies  of  others,*  not  my  own ;  and  have  JKjieJSfoS* 
omitted  what  I  think  true,  and  of  the  utmost  ®^ 
importance,  because  by  others  thought  unintelligible  or 
not  true.  Thus  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of 
the  Fatalists,  which  I  do  not  believe ;  and  have  omitted 
a  thing  of  the  utmost  importance,  which  I  do  believe — 
the  moral  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions,  prior  to  all 
will  whatever :  which  I  apprehend  as  certainly  to  deter- 
mine the  Divine  conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and  false- 
hood necessarily  determine  the  Divine  judgment.  In- 
deed, the  principle  of  liberty,  and  that  of  moral  fitness, 
so  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  moralists,  the 
ancients  as  well  as  moderns,  have  formed  their  language 
upon  it.  And  probably  it  may  appear  in  mine,  though 
I  have  endeavored  to  avoid  it ;  and,  in  order  to  avoid  it 
have  sometimes  been  obliged  to  express  myself  in  a  man- 
ner which  will  appear  strange  to  such  as  do  not  observe 
the  reason  for  it;  but  the  general  argument  here  pursued 
does  not  at  all  suppose,  or  proceed  upon,  these  principles 

Now,  these  two   abstract   principles  of  liberty  and 

*  By  arguing  upon  tht  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  observe 
is  meant,  not  proving  any  thing  from  those  principles,  but  notwith- 
standing them.  Thus  religion  is  proved,  not  from  the  opinion  of 
necessity,  which  is  absurd,  but  notwithstanding,  or  even  though,  that 
opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true. 


344  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

moral  fitness  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  considered 
in  no  other  view  than  merely  as  a  question  of  fact ;  and 
in  this  view  it  is  here  considered.  It  is  obvious  that 
Christianity,  and  the  proof  of  it,  are  both  historical. 
And  even  natural  religion  is  properly  a  matter  of  fact 
For,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Governor  of  the  world,  is 
so ;  and  this  proposition  contains  the  general  system  of 
natural  religion.  But  then,  several  abstract  truths,  and 
in  particular  those  two  principles,  are  usually  taken  into 
consideration  in  the  proof  of  it ;  whereas  it  is  here  treat- 
ed of  only  as  a  matter  of  fact.  To  explain  this  :  that  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  is 
an  abstract  truth ;  but  that  they  appear  so  to  our  mind 
is  only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  this  last  must  have  been 
admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient  skeptics, 
who  would  not  have  admitted  the  former ;  but  pretend- 
ed to  doubt,  whether  there  were  any  such  thing  as  truth ; 
or  whether  we  could  certainly  depend  upon  our  faculties 
of  understanding  for  the  knowledge  of  it  in  any  case. 

So,  likewise,  that  there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  an 
original  standard  of  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  independ- 
ent upon  all  will,  but  which  unalterably  determines  the 
will  of  God,  to  exercise  that  moral  government  over  the 
world  which  religion  teaches,  that  is,  finally  and  upon 
the  whole  to  reward  and  punish  men  respectively  as  they 
act  right  or  wrong ;  this  assertion  contains  an  abstract 
truth,  as  well  as  matter  of  fact.  But  suppose,  in  the 
present  state,  every  man,  without  exception,  was  reward- 
ed and  punished,  in  exact  proportion  as  he  followed  or 
transgressed  that  sense  of  right  and  wrong  which  God 
has  implanted  in  the  nature  of  every  man ;  this  would 
not  be  at  all  an  abstract  truth,  but  only  a  matter  of  fact. 
And  though  this  fact  were  acknowledged  by  every  one, 
yet  the  very  same  difficulties  might  be  raised  as  are  now 
concerning  the  abstract  questions  of  liberty  and  moral 
fitness  :  and  we  should  have  a  proof,  even  the  certahi 


Chap.  VIIIJ  Objections  against  Analogy.       345 

one  of  experience,  that  the  government  of  the  world  was 
perfectly  moral,  without  taking  in  the  consideration  of 
those  questions :  and  this  proof  would  remain,  in  what 
way  soever  they  were  determined. 

And  thus  God,  having  given  mankind  a  moral  faculty, 
the  object  of  which  is  actions,  and  which  naturally  ap- 
proves some  actions  as  right  and  of  good  desert,  and 
condemns  others  as  wrong  and  of  ill  desert ;  that  he  will, 
finally  and  upon  the  whole,  reward  the  former,  and  pun- 
ish the  latter,  is  not  an  assertion  of  an  abstract  truth, 
but  of  what  is  as  mere  a  fact  as  his  doing  so  at  present 
would  be.  This  future  fact  I  have  not  indeed  proved 
with  the  force  with  which  it  might  be  proved,  from  the 
principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness  ;  but  without  them, 
have  given  a  really  conclusive  practical  proof  of  it, 
which  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the  general  analogy  of 
nature ;  a  proof  easily  caviled  at,  easily  shown  not  to  be 
demonstrative,  for  it  is  not  offered  as  such ;  but  impos- 
sible, I  think,  to  be  evaded  or  answered.  And  thus  the 
obligations  of  religion  are  made  out,  exclusively  of  the 
questions  concerning  liberty  and  moral  fitness ;  which 
have  been  perplexed  with  difficulties  and  abstruse  rea- 
sonings as  every  thing  may. 

10.  Hence,  therefore,  may  be  observed  distinctly  what 
is  the  force  of  this  treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such  as  are 
convinced  of  religion,  upon  the  proof  arising  Force  of  tiua 
out  of  the  two  last-mentioned  principles,  an  *'^®*"^®- 
additional  proof  and  a  confirmation  of  it :  to  such  as  do 
not  admit  those  principles  an  original  proof  of  it,  (pages 
161,  etc.,)  and  a  confirmation  of  that  proof.  Those  who 
believe  will  here  find  the  scheme  of  Christianity  cleared 
of  objections,  and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a  peculiar  man- 
ner strengthened :  those  who  do  not  believe,  will  at  least 
be  shown  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts  to  prove  Christian- 
ity false ;  the  plain,  undoubted  credibility  of  it ;  and,  I 
liope,  a  good  deal  more. 


346  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

And  thus,  though  some,  perhaps,  may  seriously  think 
that  analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great  stress  laid 
upon  it;  and  ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule,  may  be 
applied  to  show  the  argument  from  it  in  a  disadvantage- 
ous light ;  yet  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  it  is  a 
real  one.  For  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed,  im 
plying  in  it  numerous  facts ;  analogy,  being  a  confirma- 
tion of  all  facts  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is  the 
only  proof  of  most,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every  one 
to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the  side 
of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed ;  and  it  ought  to 
be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profess  to  follow 
nature,  and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract  reasonings. 


Part  IIJ  Conclusion.  347 


CONCLUSION. 

WHATEVER  account  may  be  given  of  the  strange 
inattention  and    disregard,   in   some   ages   and 
countries,  to  a  matter  of  such  importance  as     ^  . 

,    .  /  ...  The  Incredible 

religion,  it  would,  before  experience,  be  in-  disregard  of  re- 

UgioD. 

credible  that  there  should  be  the  like  disre- 
gard in  those  who  have  had  the  moral  system  of  the 
world  laid  before  them,  as  it  is  by  Christianity,  and  often 
inculcated  upon  them ;  because  this  moral  system  car- 
ries in  it  a  good  degree  of  evidence  for  its  truth,  upon 
its  being  barely  proposed  to  our  thoughts.  There  is  no 
need  of  abstruse  reasonings  and  distinctions  to  convince 
an  unprejudiced  understanding  that  there  is  a  God  who 
made  and  governs  the  world,  and  will  judge  it  in  right- 
eousness ;  though  they  may  be  necessary  to  answer  ab- 
struse difficulties  when  once  such  are  raised;  when  the 
very  meaning  of  those  words  which  express  most  intelli- 
gibly the  general  doctrine  of  religion  is  pretended  to  be 
uncertain,  and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  ob- 
scured by  the  intricacies  of  speculation.  But  to  an  un- 
prejudiced mind,  ten  thousand  thousand  instances  of 
design  cannot  but  prove  a  designer.  And  it  is  intuitive- 
ly manifest,  that  creatures  ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful 
sense  of  their  Maker;  and  that  justice  and  charity  must 
be  his  laws  to  creatures  whom  he  has  made  social,  and 
placed  in  society. 

2.  Indeed,  the  truth  of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  so 
called,  is  not  self-evident,  but  requires  ex- 

...  Immoral  tem- 

ternal  proof  in  order  to  its  being  received,   per  of  mind  im- 
Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  revealed  relig- 
ion, will  be  found  to  imply  the  same  dissolute  immoral 


34^  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Part  II. 

temper  of  mind  as  inattention  to  natural  religion ;  be- 
cause, when  both  are  laid  before  us,  in  the  manner  they 
are  in  Christian  countries  of  liberty,  our  obligations  to 
inquire  into  both,  and  to  embrace  both  upon  supposition 
of  their  truth,  are  obligations  of  the  same  nature  For 
revelation  claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God ;  and  our  obli 
gation  to  attend  to  his  voice  is  surely  moral  in  all  cases. 
And  as  it  is  insisted  that  its  evidence  is  conclusive, 
upon  thorough  consideration  of  it ;  so  it  offers  itself  to 
us  with  manifest  obvious  appearances  of  having  some- 
thing more  than  human  in  it,  and,  therefore,  in  all  rea- 
son, requires  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined 
into. 

3.  It  is  to  be  added,  that  though  light  and  knowledge, 
in  what  manner  soever  afforded  us,  is  equally  from  God  ; 
«  ,._.    V,    ^^     y^t   a  miraculous  revelation  has  a  peculiar 

Eeli^onhasthe    •'  .  ^ 

highest    claims  tendency,  from  the  first  principles  of  our  na- 

to  attention.  ''  ,  •     ,  . 

ture,  to  awaken  mankind,  and  inspire  them 
with  reverence  and  awe :  and  this  is  a  peculiar  obliga- 
tion, to  attend  to  what  claims  to  be  so  with  such  appear- 
ances of  truth.  It  is,  therefore,  most  certain,  that  our 
obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the  evidence  of 
Christianity,  and,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  to  em- 
brace it,  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  moral  in  the 
highest  and  most  proper  sense.  Let  us,  then,  suppose, 
that  the  evidence  of  religion  in  general,  and  of  Chris- 
tianity, has  been  seriously  inquired  into  by  all  reasona- 
ble men  among  us.  Yet  we  find  many  professedly  to 
reject  both,  upon  speculative  principles  of  infidelity 
And  all  of  them  do  not  content  themselves  with  a  bare 
neglect  of  religion,  and  enjoying  their  imaginary  free- 
dom from  its  restraints.  Some  go  much  beyond  this. 
They  deride  God's  moral  government  over  the  world  • 
they  renounce  his  protection,  and  defy  his  justice :  they 
ridicule  and  vilify  Christianity,  and  blaspheme  the  Au- 
thor of  it ;  and  take  all  occasions  to  manifest  a  scorn 


Part  11.1  Conclusion.  349 

and  contempt  of  revelation.  This  amounts  to  an  active 
setting  themselves  against  religion;  to  what  may  be 
considered  as  a  positive  principle  of  irreligion;  which 
they  cultivate  within  themselves,  and,  whether  they  in- 
tend this  effect  or  not,  render  habitual,  as  a  good  man 
does  the  contrary  principle.  And  others,  who  are 
not  chargeable  with  all  this  profligateness,  yet  are  in 
avowed  opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered  to  be 
groundless. 

4.  Now  admitting,  which  is  the  supposition  we  go 
upon,  that  these  persons  act  upon  what  they  think  prin- 
ciples of  reason,  and  otherwise  they  are  not     „ 

-  ,       .  ,        .      .  1 1       •  •  Rejecters  have 

to  be  argued  with;  it  is,  really,  mconceiva-   no  jnst  notion  of 

,  ,         ,  ,  ,        ,  ,     .  .  ,  11'**  evidence. 

ble  that  they  should  imagine  they  clearly 
see  the  whole  evidence  of  it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be 
nothing  at  all ;  nor  do  they  pretend  this.  They  are  far, 
indeed,  from  having  a  just  notion  of  its  evidence ;  but 
they  would  not  say  its  evidence  was  nothing  if  they 
thought  the  system  of  it,  with  all  its  circumstances,  were 
credible,  like  other  matters  of  science  or  history.  So 
that  their  manner  of  treating  it  must  proceed  either  from 
such  kind  of  objections  against  all  religion  as  have  been 
answered  or  obviated  in  the  former  part  of  this  treatise; 
or  else  from  objections  and  difficulties  supposed  more 
peculiar  to  Christianity.  Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices 
against  the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation  and  miraculous 
interpositions.  They  find  things  in  Scripture,  whether 
in  incidental  passages  or  in  the  general  scheme  of  it, 
which  appear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take  for 
granted,  that  if  Christianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it 
must  nave  been  more  general,  and  the  evidence  of  it 
more  satisfactory,  or  rather  overbearing ;  that  it  must 
and  would  have  been,  in  some  way,  otherwise  put  and 
left  than  it  is.  Now  this  is  not  imagining  they  soe  the 
evidence  itself  to  be  nothing,  or  inconsiderable ;  but 
quite  another  thing.     It  is  being  fortified   against  the 


350  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II. 

evidence,  in  some  degree  acknowledged,  by  thinking 
they  see  the  system  of  Christianity,  or  somewhat  which 
appears  to  them  necessarily  connected  with  it,  to  be 
incredible  or  false  :  fortified  against  that  evidence, 
which  might  otherwise  make  great  impression  upon 
them  Or  lastly,  if  any  of  these  persons  are,  upon 
the  whole,  in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  Christian- 
ity; their  behavior  seems  owing  to  their  taking  for 
granted,  through  strange  inattention,  that  such  doubt- 
ing is  in  a  manner  the  same  thin^  as  being  certain 
against  it. 

5.  To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  con- 
cerning religion,  the  foregoing  treatise  is  adapted.     For 

TUs  treatiBe  all  the  general  objections  against  the  moral 
^&^  'S  system  of  nature  having  been  obviated,  it  is 
capitulation.  ghown  that  there  is  not  any  peculiar  pre- 
sumption at  all  against  Christianity,  either  considered  as 
not  discoverable  by  reason,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so 
discovered ;  nor  any  worth  mentioning  against  it  as  mi- 
raculous, if  any  at  all ;  none,  certainly,  which  can  render 
it  in  the  least  incredible.  It  is  shown  that  upon  supposi- 
tion of  a  divine  revelation,  the  analogy  of  nature  renders 
it  beforehand  highly  credible,  I  think  probable,  that  many 
things  in  it  must  appear  liable  to  great  objections,  and 
that  we  must  be  incompetent  judges  of  it,  to  a  great  de- 
gree. This  observation  is,  I  think,  unquestionably  true, 
and  of  the  very  utmost  importance  :  but  it  is  urged,  as  I 
hope  it  will  be  understood,  with  great  caution  of  not 
vilifying  the  faculty  of  reason,  which  is  "  the  candle  of 
the  Lord  within  us;"  though  it  can  afford  no  light  where 
it  does  not  shine ;  nor  judge,  where  it  has  no  principles 
to  judge  upon.  The  objections  here  spoken  of  being 
first  answered  in  the  view  of  objections  against  Chris- 
tianity as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  in  the  next  place  consid- 
ered as  urged  more  immediately  against  the  wisdom,, 
justice,   and   goodness   of  the    Christian    dispensation 


PartII.J  Conclusion.  351 

And  it  is  fully  made  out,  that  they  admit  of  exactly  the 
like  answer,  in  every  respect,  to  what  the  like  objections 
against  the  constitution  of  nature  admit  of:  that,  as  par- 
tial views  give  the  appearance  of  wrong  to  things,  which, 
upon  further  consideration  and  knowledge  of  their  rela- 
tions to  other  things,  are  found  just  and  good;  so  it  is 
perfectly  credible  that  the  things  objected  against  the 
wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Christian  dispensation  may 
be  rendered  instances  of  wisdom  and  goodness  by  their 
reference  to  other  things  beyond  our  view;  because 
Christianity  is  a  scheme  as  much  above  our  compre- 
hension as  that  of  nature ;  and  like  that,  a  scheme  in 
which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and 
which,  as  is  most  credible,  may  be  carried  on  by  gen- 
eral laws.  And  it  ought  to  be  attended  to,  that  this 
is  not  an  answer  taken  merely  or  chiefly  from  our 
ignorance ;  but  from  somewhat  positive,  which  our 
observation  shows  us.  For  to  like  objections  the 
like  answer  is  experienced  to  be  just,  in  numberless 
parallel  cases. 

The  objections  against  the  Christian  dispensation,  and 
the  method  by  which  it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus 
obviated,  in  general  and  together ;  the  chief  of  them  are 
considered  distinctly,  and  the  particular  things  objected 
to  are  shown  credible,  by  their  perfect  analogy,  each 
apart,  to  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus,  if  man  be 
fallen  from  his  primitive  state,  and  to  be  restored,  and 
infinite  wisdom  and  power  engages  in  accomplishing  our 
recovery ;  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  it  is  said,  that 
this  should  have  been  effected  at  once,  and  not  by  such 
a  long  series  of  means,  and  such  a  various  economy  of 
persons  and  things ;  one  dispensation  preparatory  to  an- 
other, this  to  a  further  one,  and  so  on  through  an  in- 
definite number  of  ages,  before  the  end  of  the  scheme 
proposed  can  be  completely  accomplished ;  a  scheme 
conducted  by  infinite  wisdom,  and  executed  by  almighty 


352  Analogy  of  Religion,         IPart  II 

power.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every 
thing  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  thus 
carried  on,  shows  such  expectations  concerning  revela- 
tion to  be  highly  unreasonable,  and  is  a  satisfactory  an- 
swer to  'them,  when  urged  as  objections  against  the 
credibility  that  the  great  scheme  of  Providence  in  the 
T'^demption  of  the  world  may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to  be 
accomplished  in  this  manner. 

As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  redemption,  the 
appointment  of  a  Mediator  between  God  and  man  ;  this 
has  been  shown  to  be  most  obviously  analogous  to  the 
general  conduct  of  nature,  that  is,  the  God  of  nature,  in 
appointing  others  to  be  the  instruments  of  his  mercy,  as 
we  experience  in  the  daily  course  of  Providence,  The 
condition  of  this  world,  which  the  doctrine  of  our  re- 
demption by  Christ  presupposes,  so  much  falls  in  with 
natural  appearances,  that  heathen  moralists  inferred  it 
from  those  appearances ;  inferred,  that  human  nature 
was  fallen  from  its  original  rectitude,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  this  degraded  from  its  primitive  happiness. 
Or,  however  this  opinion  came  into  the  world,  these  ap- 
pearances must  have  kept  up  the  tradition  and  con- 
firmed the  belief  of  it.  And  as  it  was  the  general  opin- 
ion, under  the  light  of  nature,  that  repentance  and 
leformation  alone,  and  by  itself,  was  not  sufficient  to  do 
away  sin,  and  procure  a  full  remission  of  the  penalties 
annexed  to  it ;  and  as  the  reason  of  the  thing  does  not 
at  all  lead  to  any  such  conclusion ;  so  every  day's  ex- 
perience shows  us  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any  sort 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  present  disadvantages  and  mis- 
eries which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  God  has 
annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance. 

Yet  there  may  be  ground  to  think  that  the  punish- 
ments which,  by  the  general  laws  of  divine  government, 
are  annexed  to  vice,  may  be  prevented;  that  provision 
may  have  been  even  originally  made  that  they  should 


Part  1 1.  J  Conclusion.  353 

be  prevented,  by  some  means  or  other,  though  they 
could  not  by  reformation  alone.  For  we  have  daily  in- 
stances of  such  mercy,  in  the  general  conduct  of  nature  ; 
compassion  provided  for  misery,*  medicines  for  diseases, 
friends  against  enemies.  There  is  provision  made,  in 
the  original  constitution  of  the  world,  that  much  of  the 
natural  bad  consequences  of  our  follies,  which  persons 
themselves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may  be  prevented  by 
the  assistance  of  others ;  assistance  which  nature  enables, 
and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to  afford.  By  a  method 
of  goodness  analogous  to  this,  when  the  world  lay  in 
wickedness,  and  consequently,  in  ruin,  "  God  so  loved 
the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,"  to  save 
it ;  and,  "  he  being  made  perfect  by  suffering,  became 
the  author  of  eternal  salvation  to  all  them  that  obey 
him."  John  iii,  16 ;  Heb.  v,  9.  Indeed,  neither  reason 
nor  analogy  would  lead  us  to  think  in  particular,  that 
the  interposition  of  Christ,  in  the  manner  in  which  he 
did  interpose,  would  be  of  that  efficacy  for  recovery  of 
the  world  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it  was :  but 
neither  would  reason  nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that 
other  particular  means  would  be  of  the  efficacy  which 
.experience  shows  they  are,  in  numberless  instances. 
And  therefore,  as  the  case  before  us  does  not  admit  of 
experience;  so  that  neither  reason  nor  analogy  can 
show  how,  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  interposition 
of  Christ,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy 
which  it  is  there  represented  to  be ;  this  is  no  kind  or 
degree  of  presumption  against  its  being  really  of  that 
efficacy. 

Further :  the  objections  against  Christianity,  from  the 
light  of  it  not  being  universal,  nor  its  evidence  so  strong 
as  might  possibly  be  given  us,  have  been  answered  by 
the  general  analogy  of  nature.  That  God  has  made 
such  variety  of  creatures,  is  indeed  an  answer  to  the 

•  Sermon  vi,  at  tlie  Rolls. 
23 


354  Analogy  of  Religion.        [Part  II 

former;  but  that  he  dispenses  his  gifts  in  such  variety. 
both  of  degrees  and  kinds,  among  creatures  of  the  same 
species,  and  even  to  the  same  individuals  at  different 
times,  is  a  more  obvious  and  full  answer  to  it.  And  it 
is  so  far  from  being  the  method  of  Providence,  in  other 
cases,  to  afford  us  such  overbearing  evidence,  as  some 
require  in  proof  of  Christianity,  that,  on  the  contrary, 
the  evidence  upon  which  we  are  naturally  appointed  to 
act,  in  common  matters,  throughout  a  very  great  part  of 
life,  is  doubtful  in  a  high  degree.  And  admitting  the 
fact,  that  God  has  afforded  to  some  no  more  than  doubt- 
ful evidence  of  religion,  the  same  account  may  be  given 
of  it  as  of  difficulties  and  temptations  with  regard  to 
practice.  But  as  it  is  not  impossible,  (page  284,)  surely, 
that  this  alleged  doubtfulness  may  be  men's  own  fault, 
it  deserves  their  most  serious  consideration,  whether  it 
be  not  so.  However,  it  is  certain  that  doubting  implies 
a  degree  of  evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt ;  and 
that  this  degree  of  evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  ob- 
ligations as  demonstrative  evidence. 

6.  The  whole,  then,  of  religion  is  throughout  credible; 
nor  is  there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  the  revealed 
dispensation  of  things  more  different  from  the  experi- 
enced constitution  and  course  of  nature,  than  some 
parts  of  the  constitution  of  nature  are  from  other  parts 
of  it.  And  if  so,  the  only  question  which  remains  is. 
What  positive  evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of 
Christianity  ?  This  too,  in  general,  has  been  considered 
and  the  objections  against  it  estimated.  Deduct,  there- 
fore, what  is  to  be  deducted  from  that  evidence  upon 
account  of  any  weight  which  may  be  thought  to  remain 
in  these  objections  after  what  the  analogy  of  nature  has 
suggested  in  answer  to  them ;  and  then  consider,  what 
are  the  practical  consequences  from  all  this,  upon  the 
most  skeptical  principles  one  can  argue  upon,  (for  I  am 
writing  to  persons  who  entertain  these  principles;)  and 


Part  II.]  Conclusion.  355 

upon  such  consideration  it  will  be  obvious  that  immor- 
ality, as  little  excuse  as  it  admits  of  in  itself,  is  greatly 
aggravated  in  persons  who  have  been  made   The  agOTavated 

— ,,     ...  ,       ,  ,  immorality. 

acquamted  with  Christianity,  whether  they 
believe  it  or  not ;  because  the  moral  system  of  nature, 
or  natural  religion,  which   Christianity  lays  before  us, 
approves  itself,  almost  intuitively,  to  a  reasonable  mind 
upon  seeing  it  proposed. 

In  the  next  place,  with  regard  to  Christianity,  it  will 
be  observed  that  there  is  a  middle  between  a  full  satis- 
faction of  the  truth  of  it  and  a  satisfaction  Tho  middle 
of  the  contrary.  The  middle  state  of  mind  8**^  of  mind, 
between  these  two  consists  in  a  serious  apprehension 
that  it  may  be  true,  joined  with  doubt  whether  it  be  so. 
And  this,  upon  the  best  judgment  I  am  able  to  make,  is 
as  far  toward  speculative  infidelity  as  any  skeptic  can  at 
all  be  supposed  to  go  who  has  had  true  Christianity, 
with  the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid  before  him,  and  has 
in  any  tolerable  measure  considered  them.  For  I  would 
not  be  mistaken  to  comprehend  all  who  have  ever  heard 
of  it;  because  it  seems  evident,  that  in  many  countries 
called  Christian,  neither  Christianity  nor  its  evidence 
are  fairly  laid  before  men.  And  in  places  where  both 
are,  there  appear  to  be  some  who  have  very  little  at- 
tended to  either,  and  who  reject  Christianity  with  a  scorn 
proportionate  to  their  inattention,  and  yet  are  by  no 
means  without  understanding  in  other  matters.  Now  it 
has  been  shown,  that  a  serious  apprehension  that  Chris- 
tianity may  be  true,  lays  persons  under  the  strictest  obli- 
gations of  a  serious  regard  to  it  throughout  the  whole  of 
their  life;  a  regard,  not  the  same  exactly,  but  in  many 
respects  nearly  the  same,  with  what  a  full  conviction  of 
its  truth  would  lay  them  under. 

Lastly^  it  will  appear,  that  blasphemy  and 
profaneness,  I  mean  with  regard  to  Chris-  etc.,\SSon?OT 
lianity,  are  absolutely  without  excuse.     For 


356  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Part  II. 

there  is  no  temptation  to  it,  but  from  the  wantonness 
of  vanity  or  mirth ;  and  these,  considering  the  infinite 
importance  of  the  subject,  are  no  such  temptations  as 
to  afford  any  excuse  for  it.  If  this  be  a  just  account 
of  things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or  disregard 
Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  act  as  if  they  had  a 
demonstration  of  its  falsehood,  there  is  no  reason  to 
think  they  would  alter  their  behavior  to  any  purpose, 
though  there  were  a  demonstration  of  its  truth. 


DISSERTATIONS 

ON 

PERSONAL  IDENTITY  AND  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


Dissertation  I. — Of  Personal  Identity. 

WHETHER  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it 
is  the  most  important  question  which  can  possi- 
bly be  asked,  so  it  is  the  most  intelligible  one  which  can 
be  expressed  in  language.  Yet  strange  perplexities  have 
been  raised  about  the  meaning  of  that  identity,  or  same- 
ness of  person,  which  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  liv- 
ing now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  moments. 
And  the  solution  of  these  difficulties  hath  been  stranger 
than  the  difficulties  themselves.  For,  personal  identity 
has  been  explained  so  by  some,  as  to  render  the  inquiry 
concerning  a  future  life  of  no  consequence  at  all  to  us, 
the  persons  who  are  making  it.  And  though  few  men 
can  be  misled  by  such  subtleties,  yet  it  may  be  proper 
a  little  to  consider  them. 

Now,  when  it  is  asked  wherein  personal  identity  con- 
sists, the  answer  should  be  the  same  as  if  it  were  asked, 
wherein  consists  similitude  or  equality ;  that  all  attempts 
to  define,  would  but  perplex  it.  Yet  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty at  all  in  ascertaining  the  idea.     For  as.  upon  two 

*  In  the  first  copy  of  these  Papers  I  had  inserted  the  two  folUiw- 
ing  Dissertations  into  the  chapters.  Of  a  Future  Life,  and  Of  the 
Moral  Government  of  God ;  with  which  they  are  closely  connected. 
But  as  they  do  not  directly  fall  under  the  title  of  the  foregoing 
Treatise,  and  would  have  kept  the  subject  of  it  too  long  out  of  sight 
it  seemed  more  proper  to  place  them  by  themselves. 


358  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Diss.  I. 

triangles  being  compared  or  viewed  together,  there 
arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  similitude;  or  upon  twice 
two  and  four,  the  idea  of  equality ;  so  likewise,  upon 
comparing  the  consciousness  of  one's  self,  or  one's  own 
existence  in  any  two  moments,  there  as  immediately 
arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  personal  identity.  And 
as  the  two  former  comparisons  not  only  give  us  the  ideas 
of  similitude  and  equality,  but  also  show  us  that  two 
triangles  are  alike,  and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal ;  so 
the  latter  comparison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of  per- 
sonal identity,  but  also  shows  us  the  identity  of  our- 
selves in  those  two  moments;  the  present,  suppose,  and 
that  immediately  past ;  or  the  present,  and  that  a  month, 
a  year,  or  twenty  years  past.  Or,  in  other  words,  by  re- 
flecting upon  that  which  is  myself  now,  and  that  which 
was  myself  twenty  years  ago,  I  discern  they  are  not  two, 
but  one  and  the  same  self. 

But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does  thus 
ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet  to  say 
that  it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our 
being  the  same  persons,  is  to  say  that  a  person  has  not 
existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done  one  action,  but  what 
he  can  remember;  indeed,  none  but  what  he  reflects 
upon.  And  one  should  really  think  it  self-evident,  that 
consciousness  of  personal  identity  presupposes,  and 
therefore  cannot  constitute,  personal  identity,  any  more 
than  knowledge,  in  any  other  case,  can  constitute  truth 
which  it  presupposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen  from 
hence,  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness,  is  insepara- 
ble from  the  idea  of  a  person,  or  intelligent  being.  Foi 
this  might  be  expressed  inaccurately  thus — that  con- 
sciousness makes  personality ;  and  from  hence  it  might 
be  concluded  to  make  personal  identity.  But  though 
present  consciousness  of  what  we  at  present  do  and  feel 
Is  necessary  to  our  being  the  persons  we  now  are;  yet 


Diss.  IJ  Personal  Identity.  359 

present  consciousness  of  past  actions  or  feelings  is  not 
necessary  to  our  being  the  same  persons  who  performed 
those  actions  or  had  those  feelings. 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same,  in  the 
common  acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  appear  to 
have  any  relation  to  this  of  personal  identity ;  because 
the  word  same^  when  applied  to  them  and  to  person,  is 
not  only  applied  to  different  subjects,  but  it  is  also  used 
in  different  senses.  For  when  a  man  swears  to  the  same 
tree,  as  having  stood  fifty  years  in  the  same  place,  he 
means  only  the  same  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  property 
and  uses  of  common  life,  and  not  that  the  tree  has  been 
all  that  time  the  same  in  the  strict  philosophical  sense  of 
the  word.  For  he  does  not  know  whether  any  one  par- 
ticle of  the  present  tree  be  the  same  with  any  one  parti- 
cle of  the  tree  which  stood  in  the  same  place  fifty  years 
ago.  And  if  they  have  not  one  common  particle  of 
matter,  they  cannot  be  the  same  tree,  in  the  proper  phil- 
osophic sense  of  the  word  same ;  it  being  evidently  a 
contradiction  in  terms  to  say  they  are,  when  no  part  of 
their  substance,  and  no  one  of  their  properties,  is  the 
same :  no  part  of  their  substance  by  the  supposition ; 
no  one  of  their  properties,  because  it  is  allowed  that  the 
same  property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  substance 
to  another.  And,  therefore,  when  we  say  the  identity, 
or  sameness,  of  a  plant  consists  in  a  continuation  of  the 
same  life,  communicated  under  the  same  organization, 
to  a  number  of  particles  of  matter,  whether  the  same  or 
not,  the  word  same^  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organiza- 
tion, cannot  possibly  be  understood  to  signify  what  it 
signifies  in  this  very  sentence,  when  applied  to  matter. 
In  a  loose  and  popular  sense,  then,  the  life,  and  the  or- 
ganization, and  the  plant,  are  justly  said  to  be  the  same, 
notwithstanding  the  perpetual  change  of  the  parts. 
But  in  a  strict  and  philosophical  mannejr  of  speech,  no 
man,  no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  no  any  thing,  can  be 


$6o  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Diss.  I. 

the  same  with  that  with  which  it  hath,  indeed,  nothing 
the  same.  Now,  sameness  is  used  in  this  latter  sense 
when  applied  to  persons.  The  identity  of  these,  there- 
fore, cannot  subsist  with  diversity  of  substance. 

The  thing  here  considered,  and  demonstratively,  as  I 
think,  determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr.  Locke  in  these 
words.  Whether  it^  that  is,  the  same  self  or  person,  be  the 
same  identical  substance  ?  And  he  has  suggested  what  is 
a  much  better  answer  to  the  question  than  that  which 
he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he  defines  person,  a  thinkings 
intelligent  being,  etc.,  and  personal  identity,  the  sameness 
of  a  rational  being*  The  question  then  is,  whether  the 
same  rational  being  is  the  same  substance ;  which  needs 
no  answer,  because  being  and  substance,  in  this  place, 
stand  for  the  same  idea.  The  ground  of  the  doubt, 
whether  the  same  person  be  the  same  substance,  is  said 
to  be  this :  that  the  consciousness  of  our  own  existence, 
in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two  joint  successive 
moments,  is  not  the  same  individual  action,]  that  is,  not 
the  same  consciousness,  but  different  successive  con- 
sciousnesses. Now,  it  is  strange  that  this  should  have 
occasioned  such  perplexities.  For  it  is  surely  conceiv- 
able that  a  person  may  have  a  capacity  of  knowing  some 
object  or  other  to  be  the  same  now  which  it  was  when 
he  contemplated  it  formerly ;  yet  in  this  case,  where,  by 
the  supposition,  the  object  is  perceived  to  be  the  same, 
the  perception  of  it  in  any  two  moments  cannot  be  one 
and  the  same  perception.  And  thus,  though  the  suc- 
cessive consciousnesses  which  we  have  of  our  own  exist- 
ence are  not  the  same,  yet  are  they  consciousnesses  of 
one  and  the  same  thing  or  object ;  of  the  same  person; 
self,  or  living  agent.  The  person  of  whose  existence  the 
consciousness  is  felt  now,  and  was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year 
ago,  is  discerned  to  be,  not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the 
same  person ;  and  therefore  is  one  and  the  same. 

*  Locke's  Works,  vol.  i,  page  146.         f  Locke,  pages  146,  147. 


Diss.  I.]  Personal  Identity.  361 

Mr.  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject  appear 
hasty:  and  he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissatisfied  with 
suppositions  which  he  has  made  relating  to  it.*  But 
some  of  those  hasty  observations  have  been  carried  to  a 
strange  length  by  others,  whose  notion,  when  traced  and 
examined  to  the  bottom,  amounts,  I  think,  to  this:f 
*'  That  personality  is  not  a  permanent,^but  a  transient 
thing;  that  it  lives  and  dies,  begins  and  ends,  continu- 
ally: that  no  one  can  any  more  remain  one  and  the 
same  person  two  moments  together,  than  two  successive 
moments  can  be  one  and  the  same  moment :  that  our 
substance  is,  indeed,  continually  changing ;  but  whether 
this  be  so  or  not,  is,  it  seems,  nothing  to  the  purpose ; 
since  it  is  not  substance,  but  consciousness  alone,  which 
constitutes  personality ;  which  consciousness  being  suc- 
cessive, cannot  be  the  same  in  any  two  moments,  nor 
consequently  the  personality  constituted  by  it."  And 
from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  it  is  a  fallacy  upon  our- 
selves to  charge  our  present  selves  with  any  thing 
we  did,  or  to  imagine  our  present  selves  interested  in 
any  thing  which  befell  us  yesterday,  or  that  our  present 
self  will  be  interested  in  what  will  befall  us  to-morrow : 
since  our  present  self  is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with 
the  self  of  yesterday,  but  another  like  self  or  person 
coming  in  its  room,  and  mistaken  for  it ;  to  which  an- 
other self  will  succeed  to-morrow.  This,  I  say,  must 
follow :  for  if  the  self  or  person  of  to-day,  and  that  of 
to-morrow,  are  not  the  same,  but  only  like  persons,  the 
person  of  to-day  is  really  no  more  interested  in  what  will 
befall  the  person  of  to-morrow  than  in  what  will  befall 
any  other  person. 

It  may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  rep- 
resentation of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of;  because 

♦  Locke,  page  152. 

f  See  an  answer  to  Dr.  Clarke's  third  defense  of  his  letter  to  Mr. 
Dodwell,  2d  edition,  pages  44,  56,  etc. 


362  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Diss.  I. 

tnose  who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the  same 
as  far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches.  And,  indeed, 
they  do  use  the  words  identity  and  same  person.  Nor 
will  language  permit  these  words  to  be  laid  aside:  since, 
if  they  were,' there  must  be,  I  know  not  what  ridiculous 
periphrasis  substituted  in  the  room  of  them.  But  they 
cannot,  consistently  with  themselves,  mean  that  the  per- 
son is  really  the  same.  For  it  is  self-evident  that  the 
personality  cannot  be  really  the  same,  if,  as  they  ex- 
pressly assert,  that  in  which  it  consists  is  not  the  same. 
And  as,  consistently  with  themselves,  they  cannot,  so,  I 
think,  it  appears  they  do  not,  mean  that  the  person  is 
really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a  fictitious 
sense :  in  such  a  sense  only  as  they  assert ;  for  this  they 
do  assert,  that  any  number  of  persons  whatever  may  be 
the  same  person.  The  bare  unfolding  this  notion,  and 
laying  it  thus  naked  and  open,  seems  the  best  confuta- 
tion of  it.  However,  since  great  stress  is  said  to  be  put 
upon  it,  I  add  the  following  things : — 

First,  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to  that 
certain  conviction  which  necessarily,  and  every  moment, 
rises  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  our- 
selves :  when  we  reflect  upon  what  is  past,  and  look  for- 
ward upon  what  is  to  come.  All  imagination  of  a  daily 
change  of  that  living  agent  which  each  man  calls  him- 
self for  another,  or  of  any  such  change  throughout  our 
whole  present  life,  is  entirely  borne  down  by  our  natural 
sense  of  things.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  a  person  in  his 
wits  to  alter  his  conduct,  with  regard  to  his  health  or 
affairs,  from  a  suspicion  that  though  he  should  live  to- 
morrow he  should  not,  however,  be  the  same  person  he 
is  to-day.  And  yet,  if  it  be  reasonable  to  act  with  re- 
spect to  a  future  life  upon  this  notion,  that  personality 
is  transient,  it  is  reasonable  to  act  upon  it  with  respect 
to  the  present.  Here,  then,  is  a  notion  equally  applica- 
ble to  religion  and  to  our  temporal  concerns ;  and  every 


Diss.  IJ  Personal  Identity.  363 

one  sees  and  feels  the  inexpressible  absurdity  cf  it  in 
the  latter  case.  If,  therefore,  any  can  take  up  with  it  in 
the  former,  this  cannot  proceed  from  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  but  must  be  owing  to  an  inward  unfairness,  and 
secret  corruption  of  heart. 

Secondly.  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or  qual- 
ity, but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life  and  action, 
of  happiness  and  misery.  Now  all  beings  confessedly 
continue  the  same  during  the  whole  time  of  their  exist- 
ence. Consider,  then,  a  living  being  now  existing,  and 
which  has  existed  for  any  time  alive  :  this  living  being 
must  have  done,  and  suffered,  and  enjoyed,  what  it  has 
done,  and  suffered,  and  enjoyed  formerly,  (this  living 
being,  I  say,  and  not  another,)  as  really  as  it  does,  and 
suffers,  and  enjoys  what  it  does,  and  suffers,  and  en- 
joys this  instant.  All  these  successive  actions,  enjoy- 
ments, and  sufferings,  are  actions,  enjoyments,  and 
sufferings,  of  the  same  living  being.  And  they  are  so, 
prior  to  all  consideration  of  its  remembering  or  for- 
getting; since  remembering  or  forgetting  can  make  no 
alteration  in  the  truth  of  past  matter  of  fact.  And  sup- 
pose this  being  endued  with  limited  powers  of  knowl- 
edge and  memory,  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in  con- 
ceiving it  to  have  a  power  of  knowing  itself  to  be  the 
same  living  being  which  it  was  some  time  ago,  of  re- 
membering some  of  its  actions,  sufferings,  and  enjoy- 
ments, and  forgetting  others,  than  in  conceiving  it  to 
know,  or  remember,  or  forget,  any  thing  else. 

Thirdly.  Every  person  is  conscious  that  he  is  now  the 
same  person  or  self  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  remem- 
brance reaches;  since,  when  any  one  reflects  upon  a 
pa.st  action  of  his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain  of  the  per- 
son who  did  that  action,  namely,  himself,  the  person  who 
now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain  that  the  action  was 
at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a  person's  assurance  of 
an  action  having  been  done,  of  which  he  is  absolutely 


364  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Diss.  I. 

assured,  arises  wholly  from  the  consciousness  that  he 
himself  did  it.  And  this  he,  person  or  self,  must  either 
be  a  substance  or  the  property  of  some  substance.  If 
he,  if  person,  be  a  substance;  then  consciousness  that  he 
is  the  same  person  is  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same 
substance.  If  the  person,  or  he,  be  the  property  of  a  sub- 
stance, still  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  property, 
is  as  certain  a  proof  that  his  substance  remains  the  same, 
as  consciousness  that  he  remains  the  same  substance 
would  be ;  since  the  same  property  cannot  be  trans- 
ferred from  one  substance  to  another. 

But,  though  we  are  thus  certain  that  we  are  the  same 
agents,  living  beings,  or  substances,  now,  which  we  were 
as  far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches ;  yet  it  is  asked, 
whether  we  may  not  possibly  be  deceived  in  it.?  And 
this  question  may  be  asked  at  the  end  of  any  demon- 
stration whatever ;  because  it  is  a  question  concerning 
the  truth  of  perception  by  memory.  And  he  who  can 
doubt  whether  perception  by  memory  can  in  this  case 
be  depended  upon,  may  doubt  also  whether  perception 
by  deduction  and  reasoning,  which  also  include  memory, 
or,  indeed,  whether  intuitive  perception,  can.  Here, 
then,  we  can  go  no  further.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to  at- 
tempt to  prove  the  truth  of  those  perceptions,  whose 
truth  we  can  no  otherwise  prove  than  by  other  percep- 
tions of  exactly  the  same  kind  with  them,  and  which 
there  is  just  the  same  ground  to  suspect ;  or  to  attempt 
to  prove  the  truth  of  our  faculties,  which  can  no  other- 
wise be  proved  than  by  the  use  or  means  of  those  very 
suspected  faculties  themselves. 


Diss.  II.]       The  Nature  of  Virtue.  365 


Dissertation  II. — Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 

That  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  govern- 
ment is  their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties 
of  perception  and  of  action.  Brute  creatures  are  im- 
pressed and  actuated  by  various  instincts  and  propen- 
sions ;  so  also  are  we.  But  additional  to  this,  we  have 
a  capacity  of  reflecting  upon  actions  and  characters,  and 
making  them  an  object  to  our  thought :  and  on  doing 
this,  we  naturally  and  unavoidably  approve  some  actions, 
under  the  peculiar  view  of  their  being  virtuous,  and  of 
good-desert,  and  disapprove  others,  as  vicious  and  of 
ill-desert.  That  we  have  this  moral  approving  and  dis- 
approving *  faculty  is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it 
in  ourselves,  and  recognizing  it  in  each  other.  It  ap- 
pears from  our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the  appro- 
bation and  disapprobation  even  of  feigned  characters; 
from  the  words  right  and  wrongs  odious  and  amiable^  base 
and  worthyy  with  many  others  of  like  signification  in  all 
languages,  applied  to  actions  and  characters ;  from  the 
many  written  systems  of  morals  which  suppose  it ;  since 
it  cannot  be  imagined  that  all  these  authors,  throughout 
all  these  treatises,  had  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to 
their  words,  or  a  meaning  merely  chimerical :  from  our 
*  This  way  of  speaking  is  taken  from  Epictetus,*  and  is  made  use 
of  as  seeming  the  most  full,  and  the  least  liable  to  cavil.  And  the 
moral  faculty  may  be  understood  to  have  these  two  epithets,  6oh  ifxaa- 
TiKrj  and  iiroioKifiaariKri,  upon  a  double  account ;  because,  upon  a 
survey  of  actions,  whether  before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines 
them  to  be  good  or  evil ;  and  also  because  it  determines  itself  to  be 
the  guide  of  action  and  of  life,  in  contradistinction  from  all  other  fac 
ulties  or  natural  principles  of  action :  in  the  very  same  manner,  as 
speculative  reason  directly  and  naturally  judges  of  speculative  truth 
and  falsehood  ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  is  attended  with  a  conscious- 
ness, upon  rejection,  that  the  natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs 
to  it. 

•  Arr.,  Eplot.,  lib.  I,  cap.  1. 


366  Analogy  of  Religion.         [Diss.  II. 

natural  sense  of  gratitude,  which  implies  a  distinction 
between  merely  being  the  instrument  of  good  and  in- 
tending it;  from  the  like  distinction,  every  one  makes 
between  injury  and  mere  harm,  which,  Hobbes  says,  is 
peculiar  to  mankind ;  and  between  injury  and  just  pun- 
ishment, a  distinction  plainly  natural,  prior  to  the  con 
sideration  of  human  laws. 

It  is  manifest,  great  part  of  common  language,  and  of 
common  behavior  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  sup- 
position of  such  a  moral  faculty ;  whether  called  con- 
science, moral  reason,  moral  sense,  or  divine  reason; 
whether  considered  as  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding 
or  as  a  perception  of  the  heart,  or,  which  seems  the 
truth,  as  including  both.*  Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in 
the  general,  what  course  of  action  this  faculty,  or  prac- 
tical discerning  power  within  us,  approves,  and  what  it 
disapproves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  disputed 
wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
there  may  be  about  particulars,  yet,  in  general,  there 
is  in  reality  a  universally  acknowledged  standard  of 
it.  It  is  that  which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have 
made  profession  of  in  public ;  it  is  that  which  every 
man  you  meet  puts  on  the  show  of;  it  is  that  which  the 
primary  and  fundamental  laws  of  all  civil  constitutions, 
over  the  face  of  the  earth,  make  it  their  business  and 
endeavor  to  enforce  the  practice  of  upon  mankind ; 
namely,  justice,  veracity,  and  regard  to  common  good. 
It  being  manifest,  then,  in  general,  that  we  have  such  a 

*  [Butler's  meaning  appears  to  be,  that,  if  it  be  referred  to  the  un 
derstanding.  it  differs  from  other  acts  of  the  understanding  in  partak 
ing  of  the  nature  of  feeling  ;  and  that,  if  it  be  referred  to  the  heart 
or  feelings,  it  must  be  allowed  to  partake  of  the  nature  of  perception. 
Compare  the  language  of  Adam  Smith,  in  describing  the  system  of 
Hutcheson.  '*  This  sentiment  being  of  a  peculiar  nature,  distinct 
from  every  other,  and  the  effect  of  a  particular  power  of  perception^ 
they  give  it  a  particular  name,  and  call  it  a  moral  sense." — Part  vi, 
chap,  iii,  page  356. — F.] 


Diss.  II.]       The  Nature  of  Virtue  367 

faculty  or  discernment  as  this,  it  may  be  of  use  to  re- 
mark some  things,  more  distinctly  concerning  it. 

First,  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  object  of  this 
faculty  is  actions,*  comprehending  under  that  name  act- 
ive or  practical  principles ;  those  principles  from  which 
men  ^vould  act,  if  occasions  and  circumstances  gave 
them  power;  and  which,  when  fixed  and  habitual  in  any 
person,  we  call  his  character.  It  does  not  appear  that 
brutes  have  the  least  reflex  sense  of  actions,  as  distin- 
guished from  events;  or  that  will  and  design,  which 
constitute  the  very  nature  of  actions  as  such,  are  at  all 
an  object  to  their  perception.  But  to  ours  they  are ; 
and  they  are  the  object,  and  the  only  one,  of  the  approv- 
ing and  disapproving  faculty.  Acting,  conduct,  behav- 
ior, abstracted  from  all  regard  to  what  is,  in  fact  and 
event,  the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  object 
of  the  moral  discernment,  as  speculative  truth  and  false- 
hood is  of  speculative  reason.  Intention  of  such  and 
such  consequences,  indeed,  is  always  included ;  for  it 
is  part  of  the  action  itself:  but  though  the  intended 
good  or  bad  consequences  do  not  follow,  we  have  ex- 
actly the  same  sense  of  the  action  as  if  they  did.  In 
like  manner,  we  think  well  or  ill  of  characters,  abstracted 
from  all  consideration  of  the  good  or  the  evil  which  per- 
sons of  such  characters  have  it  actually  in  their  powei 
to  do.  We  never,  in  the  moral  way,  applaud  or  blame 
either  ourselves  or  others  for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we 
suffer,  or,  for  having  impressions  made  upon  us  which 
we  consider  as  altogether  out  of  our  power ;  but  only  for 
v;hat  we  do  or  would  have  done  had  it  been  in  our 
power ;  or  for  what  we  leave  undone  which  we  might 
hive  done,  or  would  have  left  undone  though  we  could 
have  done  it. 

Secondly.  Our   sense   or   discernment   of  actions,  as 

♦  o\)St  ri  /tpenj  koI  xaKia — kv  nelaei,  aXXa  hepyeia.     M.  Anton.,  lib. 
Q,  16. — Viriutis  laus  omnis  in  actione  consistit.    Cic.  Offic,  lib.  i,  c.  6 


368  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Diss.  II 

morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discern- 
ment of  them  as  of  good  or  ill  desert.  It  may  be  diffi- 
cult to  explain  this  perception,  so  as  to  answer  all  the 
questions  which  may  be  asked  concerning  it ;  but  every 
one  sp<;aks  of  such  actions  as  deservin]^  punishment; 
and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,  pretended  that  they  have  ab- 
solutely no  meaning  at  all  to  the  expression.  Now  the 
meaning  plainly  is  not,  that  we  conceive  it  for  the  good 
of  society,  that  the  doer  of  such  actions  should  be  made 
to  suffer.  For  if,  unhappily,  it  were  resolved  that  a  man 
who,  by  some  innocent  action,  was  infected  with  the 
plague,  should  be  left  to  perish,  lest,  by  other  people's 
coming  near  him  the  infection  should  spread ;  no  one 
would  say,  he  deserved  this  treatment.  Innocence  and 
ill  desert  are  inconsistent  ideas.  Ill  desert  always  sup- 
poses guilt ;  and  if  one  be  not  part  of  the  other,  yet  they 
are  evidently  and  naturally  connected  in  our  mind. 
The  sight  of  a  man  in  misery  raises  our  compassion 
toward  him;  and,  if  this  misery  be  inflicted  on  him  by 
another,  our  indignation  against  the  author  of  it.  But 
when  we  are  informed  that  the  sufferer  is  a  villain,  and 
is  punished  only  for  his  treachery  or  cruelty,  our  com- 
passion exceedingly  lessens,  and,  in  many  instances,  our 
indignation  wholly  subsides.  Now,  what  produces  this 
effect,  is  the  conception  of  that  in  the  sufferer  which  we 
call  ill  desert.  Upon  considering,  then,  or  viewing  to- 
gether, our  notion  of  vice  and  that  of  misery,  there  re- 
sults a  third,  that  of  ill  desert.  And  thus  there  is  in 
human  creatures  an  association  of  the  two  ideas,  natural 
and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and  punishment.  If  this 
association  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental,  it  were 
nothing ;  but  being  most  unquestionably  natural,  it  great- 
ly concerns  us  to  attend  to  it,  instead  of  endeavoring  to 
explain  it  away. 

It  may  be  observed,  further,  concerning  our  percep- 
tion of  good  and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very 


Diss.  II.]       The  Nature  of  Virtue.  369 

weak  with  respect  to  common  instances  of  virtue.  One 
reason  of  which  may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear  to  a 
spectator  how  far  such  instances  of  virtue  proceed  from 
a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this  principle  is 
prevalent ;  since  a  very  weak  regard  to  virtue  may  be 
sufficient  to  make  men  act  well  in  many  common  in- 
stances. And  on  the  other  hand,  our  perception  of  ill 
desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens,  in  proportion  to  the 
temptations  men  are  thought  to  have  had  to  such  vices. 
For  vice,  in  human  creatures,  consisting  chiefly  in  the 
absence  or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle,  though  a  man 
be  overcome,  suppose,  by  tortures,  it  does  not  from 
thence  appear  to  what  degree  the  virtuous  principle  was 
wanting.  All  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  such 
a  degree  as  to  prevail  over  the  temptation ;  but  possibly 
he  had  it  in  a  degree  which  would  have  rendered  him 
proof  against  common  temptations. 

Thirdly.  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  desert  arises 
from,  and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  actions  with 
the  nature  and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For  the  mere 
neglect  of  doing  what  we  ought  to  do  would,  in  many 
cases,  be  determined  by  all  men  to  be  in  the  highest  de- 
gree vicious.  And  this  determination  must  arise  from 
such  comparison,  and  be  the  result  of  it ;  because  such 
neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures  of  other  na- 
tures and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And  it  is  the  same 
also  with  respect  to  positive  vices,  or  such  as  con- 
sist in  doing  what  we  ought  not.  For,  every  one  has  a 
different  sense  of  harm  done  by  an  idiot,  madman,  or 
child,  and  by  one  of  mature  and  common  understand- 
ing ;  though  the  action  of  both,  including  the  intention, 
which  is  part  of  the  action,  be  the  same  :  as  it  may  be, 
since  idiots  and  madmen,  as  well  as  children,  are  capa- 
ble not  only  of  doing  mischief,  but  also  of  intending  it. 
Now,  this  difference  must  arise  from  somewhat  discerned 
in  the  nature  or  capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the 
24 


370  Analogy  of  Religion.  [Diss.  II. 

action  vicious ;  and  the  want  of  tvhich  in  the  other,  ren- 
ders the  same  action  innocent  or  less  vicious;  and  this 
plainly  supposes  a  comparison,  whether  reflected  upon 
or  not,  between  the  action  and  capacities  of  the  agent, 
previous  to  our  determining  an  action  to  be  vicious 
And  hence  arises  a  proper  application  of  the  epithets, 
incongruous,  unsuitable^  disproportionate,  unfit,  to  actions 
which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to  be  vicious. 

Fourthly.  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether  men 
are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  them 
selves  miserable  without  reason,  than  to  make  other 
people  so ;  or  dissolutely  to  neglect  their  own  greater 
good  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lesser  gratification,  than 
they  are  to  neglect  the  good  of  others,  whom  nature  has 
committed  to  their  care.  It  should  seem,  that  a  due 
concern  about  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  and  a  rea- 
sonable endeavor  to  secure  and  promote  it,  which  is,  I 
think,  very  much  the  meaning  of  the  word  prudence  in 
our  language;  it  should  seem,  that  this  is  virtue,  and 
the  contrary  behavior  faulty  and  blamable :  since  in 
the  calmest  way  of  reflection,  we  approve  of  the  first  and 
condemn  the  other  conduct,  both  in  ourselves  and  oth- 
ers. This  approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether 
diff*erent  from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happi- 
ness, and  from  sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the  object 
or  occasion  of  this  last  kind  of  perception,  is  satisfaction 
or  uneasiness ;  whereas  the  object  of  the  first  is  active 
behavior.  In  one  case,  what  our  thoughts  fix  upon,  is 
our  condition  ;  in  the  other,  our  conduct. 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  us  so 
sensible  a  disapprobation  of  imprudence  and  folly  either 
in  ourselves  or  others,  as  of  falsehood,  injustice,  and  cruel- 
ty ;  I  suppose,  because  that  constant  habitual  sense  of 
private  interest  and  good,  which  we  always  carry  about 
with  us,  renders  such  sensible  disapprobation  less  neces- 
sary, less  wanting,  to  keep  us  from  imprudently  neglect 


Diss.  II.]       The  Nature  of  Virtle.  371 

ing  our  own  happiness,  and  foolishly  injuring  ourselves, 
than  it  is  necessary  and  wanting  to  keep  us  from  injur- 
ing others,  to  whose  good  we  cannot  have  so  strong  and 
constant  a  regard ;  and  also,  because  imprudence  and 
folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own  punishment  more  imme- 
diately and  constantly  than  injurious  behavior,  it  less 
needs  the  additional  punishment,  which  would  be  inflict- 
ed upon  it  by  others  had  they  the  same  sensible  indig- 
nation against  it  as  against  injustice,  and  fraud,  and 
cruelty.  Besides,  unhappiness  being  in  itself  the  natu- 
ral object  of  compassion,  the  unhappiness  which  people 
bring  upon  themselves,  though  it  be  willfully,  excites  in 
us  some  pity  for  them ;  and  this,  of  course,  lessens  our 
displeasure  against  them.  But  still  it  is  matter  of  expe- 
rience, that  we  are  formed  so,  as  to  reflect  very  severely 
upon  the  greater  instances  of  imprudent  neglects  and 
foolish  rashness,  both  in  ourselves  and  others.  In  in- 
stances of  this  kind,  men  often  say  of  themselves  with 
remorse,  and  of  others  with  some  indignation,  that  they 
deserved  to  suffer  such  calamities,  because  they  brought 
them  upon  themselves,  and  would  not  take  warning. 
Particularly,  when  persons  come  to  poverty  and  distress 
by  a  long  course  of  extravagance,  and  after  frequent 
admonitions,  though  without  falsehood  or  injustice ;  we 
plainly  do  not  regard  such  people  as  alike  objects  of 
compassion  with  those  who  are  brought  into  the  same 
condition  by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  these  things 
it  appears,  that  prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,  and  folly 
of  vice  :  meaning  hy  folly,  somewhat  quite  diff"erent  from 
mere  incapacity ;  a  thoughtless  want  of  that  reganl  and 
attention  to  our  own  happiness  which  we  had  capacity 
for.  And  this  the  word  properly  includes,  and  as  it 
seems,  in  its  usual  acceptation ;  for  we  scarce  apply  it 
lo  brute  creatures. 

However,  if  any  person   be   disposed  to  dispute  the 
matter,  I   shall   very  willingly  give  him   u])   ^ho  word? 


372  Analogy  of  Religion.         IDiss.  II 

virtue  and  vice  as  not  applicable  to  prudence  and  folly; 
but  must  beg  leave  to  insist,  that  the  faculty  within  us, 
which  is  the  judge  of  actions,  approves  of  prudent  ac- 
tions, and  disapproves  imprudent  ones ;  I  say,  prudent 
and  imprudent  actions  diS  such,  and  considered  distinctly 
from  the  happiness  or  misery  which  they  occasion.  And 
])y  the  way,  this  observation  may  help  to  determine  what 
justness  there  is  in  that  objection  against  religion,  that 
it  teaches  us  to  be  interested  and  selfish. 

Fifthly.  Without  inquiring  how  far,  and  in  what  sense, 
virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice  into  the 
want  of  it ;  it  may  be  proper  to  observe  that  benevolence, 
and  the  want  of  it,  singly  considered,  are  in  no  sort  the 
whole  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  if  this  were  the  case,  in 
the  review  of  one's  own  character,  or  that  of  others,  our 
moral  understanding  and  moral  sense  would  be  indiffer- 
ent to  every  thing  but  the  degrees  in  which  benevolence 
prevailed,  and  the  degrees  in  which  it  was  wanting. 
That  is,  we  should  neither  approve  of  benevolence  to 
some  persons  rather  than  to  others,  nor  disapprove  injus- 
tice and  falsehood  upon  any  other  account  than  merely  as 
an  overbalance  of  happiness  was  foreseen  likely  to  be 
produced  by  the  first,  and  of  misery  by  the  second.  But 
now,  on  the  contrary,  suppose  two  men  competitors  for 
any  thing  whatever,  which  would  be  of  equal  advantage 
to  each  of  them;  though  nothing,  indeed,  would  be 
more  impertinent  than  for  a  stranger  to  busy  himself  to 
get  one  of  them  preferred  to  the  other;  yet  such  en- 
deavor would  be  virtue,  in  behalf  of  a  friend  or  benefac- 
tor, abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  distant  conse 
quences  :  as  that  examples  of  gratitude  and  the  cultiva- 
tion of  friendship  would  be  of  general  good  to  the  world. 
Again,  suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or  violence, 
take  from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labor,  with  intent  to 
give  it  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought,  would  have  as  much 
pleasure  from  it  as  would  balance  the  pleasure  which 


Diss.  II.j      The  Nature  of  Virtue.  373 

the  first  possessor  would  have  had  in  the  enjoyment, 
and  his  vexation  in  the  loss  of  it ;  suppose  also  that  no 
bad  consequences  would  follow;  yet  such  an  action 
would  surely  be  vicious.  Nay,  further,  were  treachery, 
violence,  and  injustice,  no  otherwise  vicious  than  as  fore- 
seen likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  misery  to  socie- 
ty; then,  if  in  any  case  a  man  could  procure  to  himself 
as  great  advantage  by  an  act  of  injustice  as  the  whole 
foreseen  inconvenience  likely  to  be  brought  upon  others 
by  it  would  amount  to,  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would 
not  be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all,  because  it  would  be  no 
more  than,  in  any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own 
satisfaction  to  another's  in  equal  degrees. 

The  fact,  then,  appears  to  be,  that  we  are  constituted 
so  as  to  condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injus- 
tice, and  to  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  preferably 
to  others,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  which  con- 
duct is  likeliest  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness 
or  misery.  And  therefore,  were  the  Author  of  nature  to 
propose  nothing  to  himself  as  an  end  but  the  production 
of  happiness,  were  his  moral  character  merely  that  of 
benevolence ;  yet  ours  is  not  so.  Upon  that  supposi- 
tion, indeed,  the  only  reason  of  his  giving  us  the  above- 
mentioned  approbation  of  benevolence  to  some  persons 
rather  than  others,  and  disapprobation  of  falsehood,  un- 
provoked violence,  and  injustice,  must  be,  that  he  fore- 
saw this  constitution  of  our  nature  would  produce  more 
happiness  than  forming  us  with  a  temper  of  mere  general 
benevolence.  But  still,  since  this  is  our  constitution, 
falsehood,  violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us,  and 
benevolence,  to  some  preferably  to  others,  virtue,  ab- 
stracted from  all  consideration  of  the  overbalance  of 
evil  or  good  which  they  may  appear  likely  to  produce. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a  moral 
nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a  moral  fac- 
ulty the  natural  object  of  which  is  actions ;  moral  gov- 


374  Analogy  of  Religion.  Diss.  II. 

eminent  must  consist  in  rendering  them  happy  and  un- 
happy, in  rewarding  and  punishing  them,  as  they  follow, 
neglect,  or  depart  from,  the  moral  rule  of  action  inter- 
woven in  their  nature,  or  suggested  and  enforced  by  this 
moral  faculty  ;*  in  rewarding  and  punishing  them  upon 
account  of  their  so  doing. 

I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  observation, 
contradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  assert.  But 
some  of  great  and  distinguished  merit  have,  I  think,  ex- 
pressed themselves  in  a  manner  which  may  occasion 
some  danger  to  careless  readers,  of  imagining  the  whole 
of  virtue  to  consist  in  singly  aiming,  according  to  the 
best  of  their  judgment,  at  promoting  the  happiness  of 
mankind  in  the  present  state ;  and  the  whole  of  vice,  in 
doing  what  they  foresee,  or  might  foresee,  is  likely  to 
produce  an  overbalance  of  unhappiness  in  it ;  than  which 
mistakes  none  can  be  conceived  more  terrible.  For  it 
is  certain,  that  some  of  the  most  shocking  instances  of 
injustice,  adultery,  murder,  perjury,  and  even  of  perse- 
cution, may,  in  many  supposable  cases,  not  have  the 
appearance  of  being  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance 
of  misery  in  the  present  state ;  perhaps  sometimes  may 
have  the  contrary  appearance.  For  this  reflection  might 
easily  be  carried  on ;  but  I  forbear.  The  happiness  of 
the  world  is  the  concern  of  him  who  is  the  Lord  and  the 
Proprietor  of  it ;  nor  do  we  know  what  we  are  about, 
when  we  endeavor  to  promote  the  good  of  mankind  in 
any  ways,  but  those  which  he  has  directed ;  that  is,  in- 
deed, in  all  ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and  justice, 
I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  really  endeav- 
oring, in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without  regard  to  these. 
But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  supposed  endeav- 
ors proceed  almost  always  from  ambition,  the  spirit  of 
party,  or  some  indirect  principle,  concealed,  perhaps,  in 
great  measure  from  persons  themselves.  And  though  it 
*  Part  i,  chap,  vi,  page  167. 


Diss.  II.]       The  Nature  of  Virtue.  375 

is  our  business  and  our  duty  to  endeavor,  within  the 
bounds  of  veracity  and  justice,  to  contribute  to  the  ease* 
convenience,  and  even  cheerfulness  and  diversion,  of 
our  fellow-creatures ;  yet  from  our  short  '.-lews,  it  is 
greatly  uncertain  whether  this  endeavor  will,  in  partic- 
ular instances,  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness 
upon  the  whole ;  since  so  many  and  distant  things  must 
come  into  the  account.  And  that  which  makes  it  our 
duty,  is,  that  there  is  some  appearance  that  it  will,  and 
no  positive  appearance  sufficient  to  balance  this,  on  the 
contrary  side ;  and  also,  that  such  benevolent  endeavor 
is  a  cultivation  of  that  most  excellent  of  all  virtuous 
principles,  the  active  principle  of  benevolence. 

However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  justice,  is  to  be 
our  rule  of  life ;  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a  snare  will 
be  laid  in  the  way  of  some  plain  men,  that  the  use  of 
common  forms  of  speech,  generally  understood,  cannot 
be  falsehood,  and  in  general  that  there  can  be  no  de- 
signed falsehood  without  designing  to  deceive.  It  must 
likewise  be  observed,  that  in  numberless  cases  a  man 
may  be  under  the  strictest  obligations  to  what  he  fore- 
sees will  deceive,  without  his  intending  it.  For  it  is 
impossible  not  to  foresee  that  the  words  and  actions 
of  men  in  different  ranks  and  employments,  and  of  dif- 
ferent educations,  will  perpetually  be  mistaken  by  each 
other;  and  it  cannot  but  be  so,  while  they  will  judge 
with  the  utmost  carelessness,  as  they  daily  do,  of  what 
they  are  not,  perhaps,  enough  informed  to  be  competent 
judges  of,  even  though  they  considered  it  with  great 
attention. 


INDEX. 


Abstract  Reasoning, 


I  Analogy, 


May  mislead,  page  159.  I 

To  De  applied  to  practical  subjects  with 

great  caution,  159. 
May  be,  with  propriety,  ioined  with  the 

observation  of  facts,  87. 
From  the  opinion  of  necessity,  feUa- 

cious,  167,  159. 

Abstract 

Truths  and  matter  of  flwt,  how  distin- 
guished, »14. 

Accidental 

Events  of  which  we  know  not  the  laws, 
so  termed,  244. 

Action, 
This  world  a  theater  of;  150. 
As  distinguished  fh)m  the  thing  done, 
the  chief  objeet  of  religion,  289. 

Actions, 

Meaning  of  the  term  iu  moral  quea- 

tion^86& 
PleMore  and  pain  the  consequences  of 

oar,  69,  70. 
To  be  distinguished  from  theh-  moral 

quality,  as  virtuous  or  vicious,  9i^ 
The  provision  made  that  all  their  bad 

consequences  should  not  always 

tually  follow,  262. 
Will  and  design  constitute  their  nature 

as  such,  867. 
Distinguished  from  events,  86S. 
What,  exercise  the  principle  of  virtue, 

146. 
Outward  and  inward,  128. 

Aflbctions, 
Patticular,  form  part  of  our  inward 

frame,  186. 
In  what  respects  subject,  of  right,  to 

conscience,  186. 
Necessarily  excited  by  the  preeence  of 

their  objecta,  187. 
Need  reetnint,  187. 
8eePaMi(m«. 

Affliction, 
The  proper  discipline  fur  resignation, 
148.1457 


Butler's,  a  work  demanded  by  the  times 

in  which  it  was  written,  page  21. 
Force  of  the  argument  in  the,  22. 
Topics  embraced  in  the,  42. 
The  objection  against,  as  being  ansatis- 

fectory,  answered,  340,  841. 
Upon  what  principles  the  argument  in 

IS  conducted,  842,  843. 
In  general,  a  just  and  conclusive  mode 

of  reasoning,  86,  87. 
Origen's  remark  upon,  37. 
May  reasonably  be  admitted  to  deter- 
mine our  judgment,  35. 
Lays  us  under  an  obligation  to  regard 

it  in  practice,  85. 
Requires  the  cases  compared  to  be  ap- 
parently similar  in  the  respects  which 
are  the  ground  of  inference,  64, 217. 
Plan  of  the,  examined  in  this  treatise, 

42,48. 
What  is  assumed  in  this,  38. 
Can  directly  only  show  things  credible 

as  matters  of  fact,  164. 
Yet  suggests  an  answer  to  objections 
against  the  goodness  and  wisdom  of 
the  Divine  conduct,  172. 
Whether  it  would  be  lilcely  to  Influence 

men's  practice,  345. 
This  unlikelihood,  thoujjh  granted,  no 
decisive  objection  against  its  use,  842. 
Design  of;  not  to  justify  God's  provi- 
dence, but  to  show  our  duties,  887. 
When  a|)pli('d  to  religion,  superior  to 

hypothesis  and  speculation,  87-89. 
Affords  no  ground  for  believing  that 
death  will  destroy  our  living  pow- 
ers, 49. 
Confirms  the  proof  of  the  indiscerptl- 

bility  of  living  agents,  62. 
Of  the  case  of  brutes  no  objection.  68  60i 
Of  vegetables,  64. 

Gives  credibility  to  the  doctrine  of  fu- 
ture rewanls  and  pim!s)iment»,  76. 
Answers  objections  against  future  pun 

Ishmentfl,  77-81. 
Between  our  state  of  trial  in  our  teiu 

poral  and  religious  capacities,  114. 
In  respect  of  the  sources  of  danger, 

116, 116. 
In  respect   of  men's  beuavior  under 

It,  117,  118. 
In  respect  of  difficulties  mcreased  by 
outward  circumstances,  US,  119. 


378 


Inlex. 


Analogy,— continued. 

Force  of,  in  answering  objections,  and 
raising  a  positive  presumption,  page 
122. 

Suggests  that  this  life  is  a  preparation 
for  another,  124-184. 

Although  we  saw  not  how,  184. 

Leads  us  to  expect  that  the  future  state 
will  be  a  communiiy,  135. 

May  subsist  between  limitations  of  pos- 
sible perfectibility  in  moral  character, 
and  powers  bodily  and  intellectual, 

m. 

Of  the  waste  of  seeds,  as  answering  the 

objection,  that  the  present  state  is 

not,  to  many,  a  discipUne  in  virtue, 

146 

Between  the  speculative  reason  and 

the  moral  understanding,  166. 
Argument  from,  not  affected  by  the 

scheme  of  necessity,  162-172. 
Answers  objections  against  the  wisdom 
and  goodness  of  God's  government, 
indirectly,  171. 
Between  God's  natural  and  his  moral 
government,  as  to  their  vastness  and 
incomjirehensibleness,  172,  174. 
Between  the  natural  and    the  moral 
world,  as  regards  means  and  ends, 
177, 178. 
What  objections  it  cannot  answer  di 

rectly,  171. 
AfFoi-ds  no  argument  against  the  gen 

eral  scheme  of  Christianity,  212. 
No  presumption  from,  against  a  reve 
lation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world, 
considered  as  miraculous,  215-217. 
Supposed  presumptions  against  raira 

cles  answered,  217-221. 
Shows  ol)jection  gainst  Christianity  it- 
self, as  distinguished  from  objections 
against  its  evidence,  to  be  frivolous, 
22»-226. 
Makes  it  probable  that,  if  we  judge  of 
Christianity  by  preconceived  expec- 
tations, we  shall  find  many  things 
seeming  liable  to  objections,  225,  226. 
Between  natural  information  and  in- 
spiration, 226,  227. 
More  particularly  between  the  limita- 
tions and  hinderanccs  of  natural  in- 
formation and  the  instruction  afford- 
ed us  by  revelation,  230,  283. 
Between  the  use  of  miraculous  gifts 
and  the  use  of  the  gifts  of  memory 
eloquence,  etc.,  231,  232. 
Makes  it  credible  that  the  Scripture 
contains  truths  as  yet  undiscovered, 
238. 
Between  Christianity,  as  a   remedial 
system,  and  the  natural  remedies  for 
disease,  236,  286. 
Answers  objections  against  the  wisdom 
of  the  means  used  by  Christianity, 
243. 
Makes  it  credible  that  the  Christian 
dispensation  may  have  been  all  along 
carried  on  by  general  laws,  2"" 


Analogy,  —continued . 


Answers  objections  against  Christian- 
ity, as  being  a  slowly  operating  and 
complicated  scheme,  page  246,  247. 
Removes  all  presumption  against  the 

general  notion  of  a  Mediator,  249. 
Makes  it  aupposable  that  future  pun- 
ishment may  follow  vice  by  way  of 
natural  consequence,  250. 
Shows  that  we  liave  no  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  repentance  alone  will  pre 
vent  future  punishment,  255,  256, 
Answers  the  objection  that  the  death 
of  Christ  represents  God  as  indiffer 
ent  whether  he  punishes  the  inno- 
cent or  the  guilty,  266-270. 
Shows  that  we  cannot  expect  to  have 
the  like  information  concerning  God's 
conduct  as  concerning  our  own  duty, 
269,  270. 
Answers  objections  from  the  wan^  of 
universality  in    revelation   and    the 
doubtfulness  of  its  evidence,  271,272. 
Of  a  prince  sending  directions  t »  his 
servants,  whether  applicable  to  God, 
289. 
Between  prophecy  and   satirical  and 

mythologic  writing,  809,  310. 
Between  a  prophet  and  a  compilei  of 

memou's,  810. 
Objections  against  arguing  fi»m  the 
analogy  of  nature  to  religion,  888- 
346. 
See  Objections. 

Antiquity 

Of  religion,  as  one  of  its  evidences,  164, 
Antoninus,  M. 

Quoted,  63,  867  n. 
Aristotle, 

Quoted,  186,  n. 
Arnobius, 

Quoted,  800  n. 
Atonement, 

Our  ignorance  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  ancients  understood  it  to  be 
made,  265. 

See  Sacrifice. 

Attention, 
Moral,  how  exercised  and  disciplined 
by  the  circumstances  of  our  trial,  143. 
Necessary  when  we  consider  Christi- 
anity, 314. 
Anguistine, 

Quoted,  198,  n. 
Author  of  Nature, 
Eadstence  of,  assumed  in  this  treatise. 

S8. 
Rtveals  himself  to  as  as  a  righteous 

Governor,  86. 
Is  deliberate  in  his  operations,  246, 247 


Index. 


379 


Bayle,  P., 

Probably  referred  to  by  Batler^  88,  n 

Quoted,  pa^e  60,  n. 

Behavior, 

Of  men  in  their  present  state  of  trial, 
117,  118. 

Benevolence, 

Absolute,  defined:  whether  it  Is  the 

only  character  of  God,  85. 
God's,  toward  us,  how  limited,  86. 
The  want  of  It,  not  the  whole  of  virtue 

arid  Tlce,  372,  873. 
Active  principle  of,  the  most  excellent 

of  all  virtuous  principles,  875. 
True,  implies  a  regard  to  justice  and 

veracity,  101,  102. 

Berkeley,  Bishop, 
Quoted,  91  n,  15S  n. 

Body, 

Our  present,  relation  oi^  to  us  not  nec- 
essary to  thinking,  52. 

Bodies. 

Our  organized,  may  be  presumed  to  be 

no  part  of  ourselves,  62. 
Made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of 

perception  and  motion,  55-58. 

BosweU, 

His  life  of  Johnson  quoted,  828  n. 
Brahmins, 

Their  notion  of  death,  68,  n. 
Brown,  Dr.  John, 

91,  n. 
Brute  Force, 

Natural  tendency  of  reason  to  prevail 
over,  99-102. 

Brutes, 
Question  of  their  natural  Immortality 

argued,  58,  59. 
Instinct  of,  superior  in  some  things  to 

the  reason  of  men,  280. 
Have  no  reflex  sense  of  actions,  as  dis- 

ttngnished  from  events,  280. 

Oato, 

Quoted,  61. 
Certainty, 
Moral,  hl«heet  degree  of  probable  evi- 
dence, 88. 
What  it  means,  86. 

Chalmers,  Dr., 

Quoted.  84,91,  118,  117,  120,  124,  188, 
181.  219,  222,  292. 

Chance, 
la  reality  do  such  tUo*  m,  244. 


Changes, 

Which  we  ha>e  ah-eady  undergone 
afford  a  presumption  in  favor  of  a 
future  existence,  page  45,  50-68. 

The,  which  various  creatures  may  un- 
dergo without  destruction,  46,  46. 

Character, 

What  is  meant  by,  160  n. 

Our  capability  of  forming  a  new,  181 

Of  virtue  and  piety,  a  necessary  quail 
fication  for  a  ftiture  state,  184. 

Our  capacity  of  improvement  therein, 
135-142. 

Our  moral,  to  be  manifested  to  the  cre- 
ation by  means  of  a  state  of  trial,  160 

Childhood, 

A  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age,  182. 

Christ, 

Our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God, 
204. 

The  scriptural  representation  of  his  in- 
terposition as  M  ediator,  260-262. 

His  prophetical,  regal,  and  priestly  of- 
fices, 26:3,  264. 

His  sacrifice  not  an  allusion  to  the  Mo- 
saic sacrifices,  264. 

Ground  of  the  effic  \cy  of  his  sacrifice 
not  oxi)l!iined  in   .cripture,  264. 

Objection  against  the  death  of,  ass  pro- 
pitiatory sacrifice,  266-270. 

Sufferings  of,  voluntary,  267. 

Christians, 
Primitive,  their  conversion  and  zeal,  as 
proving  the  reality  of  the  Scripture 
miracles,  299,  800. 

Christianity, 

Not,  if  it  be  fh>m  God,  of  small  Impor- 
tance, 194. 

A  republication  of  natural  religion,  and 
with  what  circumstances  of  advan- 
tage, 194-201. 

Has  brought  life  and  Immortality  to 
light,  196. 

Preserves  the  knowledge  of  religion  for 
all  ages,  by  means  of  a  visible  Church, 
197. 

Good  efiects  of,  not  smaU,  and  alleged 
ill  effects  do  not  pTOj)erly  belong  to 
it,  199. 

Contains  an  account  of  a  dispensation 
not  discoverable  by  reason,  carried 
on  by  the  Son  and  Spirit,  201. 

Enjoins,  ir.  consequence,  new  duties, 
not  otherwise  to  be  ascertained,  201, 
202. 

No  presumption  against  the  general 
scheme  of,  whether  considered  mir- 
aculous or  not,  212-216.  None,  be- 
cause It  is  not  discoverable  by  reason 
or  ex|>ori('nce,  21.S,  216.  None,  be- 
cause it  is  unlike  the  known  course 
of  nature.  214.  216. 


38o 


Index. 


Christianity, — continued. 

Objections  against,  as  distinguished 
from  objections  against  Its  evidence, 
frivolous,  page  228. 

True  question  concerning  is,  whether 
it  be  a  real  revelation,  not  whether  it 
is  such  a  one  as  we  might  have  ex- 
pected, 227. 

What  objections  against,  would  be  va- 
lid, 228. 

Practical  part  of,  plain  and  obvious,  233. 

Objections  against,  from  the  long  delay 
of  its  publication  to  the  world,  234. 

Objections  against  the  goodness  and 
windom  of,  not  valid,  ^.  245. 

See  Revelation^  R&tealed  Religion. 

Cliristiaii  Dispensation, 

The,  may  appear  natural  to  some  be- 
ings in  the  universe,  66. 

OUurch, 

The  visible,  design  of  the  institution  of, 
19T,  198. 

The  caiTylng  out  of  its  design  implies 
positive  institutions,  198. 

Men  are  bound  to  become  members  of 
the,  200. 

Circumstantial  evidences  of  Christian- 
ity, 292,  314. 

Often  as  convincing  as  direct  testimo- 
ny, 830. 

Coincidence  of  natural  and  revealed  re- 
Ugion,  224,  2=33. 

Coincidences  of  Scripture,  296. 

Cicero, 

Quoted,  67. 
Clarke,  Dr.  Samuel, 

His  "  Demonstration,"  154  n. 
Coleridge, 

Quoted,  98  n,  103  n. 
Collins,  Anthony, 

Quoted,  51  n. 
Comparison, 
In  what  we  are  apt  to  be  misled  by  a 
comparison  of  things  of  greater  or 
less  impoi-tance,  210. 
What,  the  ground  of  our  moral  percep- 
tions and  ill  desert,  869. 

Compassion, 

Evidence  of,  in  the  original  constitution 
of  the  world,  252. 

Unhappiness  the  natural  object  o^  870. 
Conscience, 

What  proof  It  aflFords  of  God's  moral 
government,  92,  9S. 

How  it  appears  that  we  have  the  fecnl- 
ty  so  called,  365,  866. 

Includes  both  a  sentiment  of  the  un- 
derstanding and  a  perception  of  the 
heart,  866. 

Has  for  its  object  actions,  366,  367. 


Conscioxisness, 

Indivisibility  ol^  a  proof  of  the  indivisi  • 

bility  of  the  conscious  being,  p&ge  51. 
Does  not  constitute  personal  identity, 

but  ascertains  it  to  ourselves,  SMs 

359. 
The  doubt  on  this  subject  shown  to  be 

groundless,  859. 

Contemplation 

Of  the  theory  of  virtue  may  harden 
the  heart,  128. 

Continuance 

Of  all  things,  natural  presumption  in 
favor  of,  47. 

Correspondence 
Between  our  nature  and  our  condition 
necessary  to  life  and  happiness,  125. 
Creation, 
Scripture  begins  with  the,  in  order  to 
ascertain  for  us  the  true  object  of  our 
worship,  815. 

Creature, 
Notion  of  an  upright  and  finitely  per- 
fect one,  187. 
In  what  way  such  a  one  may  fall,  139. 

Credibility 
Of  a  truth  or  matter  of  fact,  distin- 
guished from  the  wisdom  and  good- 
ness of  it,  171. 

Crooks,  G.  R., 

Quoted,  192  n. 
Dangers, 
Implied  in  our  state  of  probation  foi  a 

future  life,  118. 
Perception  of,  a  natural  excitement  of 

passive  fear  and  active  caution,  129. 

Daniel, 

The  book  o^  referred  to,  812. 

Had  probably  greater  external  evidence 

formerly  than  what  has  come  down 

to  us,  312. 

Death, 

Known  to  us  only  in  some  cf  its  effects, 
49. 

Not  likely,  from  any  thing  we  know, 
to  destroy  living  agents,  48.  Noi 
ttiefr  present  powers  of  reflection, 
60,  61.  Nor  even  to  suspend  the  xe 
ercise  of  those  powers,  62-64. 

Like  our  birth,  may  put  us  into  a  more 
enlarged  state  of  life,  68. 

Notion  of  the  Brahmins  concerning. 
63  n. 
Definitions 

Sometimes  sei-ve  only  to  perplex,  857. 
Degradation, 

Marks  of  our  being  in  a  stato  ot  119, 
120. 


Index. 


381 


Demonstration, 
As  disUogaisbed  from  probable  evi- 
dence, page  88. 

Descartes, 

An  example  of  those  thinkers  who 
would  frame  a  world  upon  liypoth- 
esis,  8S. 

Desert, 
€k)od  and  ill,  th«  perception   o£  de- 
fined. 868. 

Deetruction 

Of  living  powers,  what  it  means,  48  n. 
Different 

Degrees  of  evidence  in  religious  mat- 
tt^rs  consistent  with  Justice,  274. 

Difference 

Of  men's  situations  in  religious  mat- 
ters, to  be  accounted  for  in  the  same 
manner  as  their  diflferent  situations 
in  other  respects,  276. 

Would  not  be  prevented,  though  reve- 
lation were  universal,  277. 

Difficulties  • 

As  to  tlie  evidence  of  religion,  are  anal- 
ogous to  those  attending  the  practice 
of  it,  282. 

These  may  be  the  principal  part  of 
some  persons'  trial,  2S4. 

In  religion,  unreasonable  to  expect  to 
have  thorn  all  cleared,  340-842. 

Discipline, 

Effect  ot,  to  improve  the  principle  of 

vhtue  in  us,  188. 
Needed  by  upright  creatures,  186-140. 
Indispensably   necessary    for    corrupt 

creatures,  142. 
This  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  place 

ot,  for  our  moral  improvement,  142- 

14Si 

Diseases 

Of  the  bo<ly  and  the  mind,  analogy  be- 
twe<»n  the  remedies  for.  286,  286. 

Mortal  diseases,  not  affecting  our  Intel- 
lectual powers,  afford  a  presumption 
that  those  powers  will  not  be  de- 
stroyed by  Uiem,  61. 

Are  sometimes  themselves  remedies, 
17». 

dome  operate  like  enthusiasm,  802. 

Distress, 

In  others,  the  perception  of  a  natural 
excitement  to  passive  piety  and  ac- 
tive reUe(  129. 

Doubt 

ImiiUes  some  degree  of  evidence  for 
that  of  which  we  doubt,  280. 

With  regard  to  religion,  implies  an  ub- 
lifstion  to  regard  It  In  practice,  282, 


Dreams, 

Ou  r  experience  of,  what  It  shows  as, 
page  06. 

Duties, 

Our,  to  the  Son  and  Spirit,  arise  out  of 
their  relations  to  us,  and  are  strictly 
moral,  202,  203. 

Moral  and  positive,  distinguished,  206 

Earth, 
Whether  its  appearance  confirms  the 
Scripture  accounts  of  the  fall,  260. 
Ecclesiastes 

Quoted,  126  n. 
End, 
We  are  greatly  Ignorant  how  far  any 
thing  is  a  final  end  in  God's  regard, 
246. 
The  whole,  for  which  God  made  and 
governs  the  world,  may  be  utterly 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties,  72. 
See  Means  and  Ends. 

Enthusiasm, 

Christianity  not  such  a  scheme  as 
would  have  been  expected  from,  288. 

As  an  objection  to  the  Christian  ev- 
idences, considered  and  answered, 
301-805. 

Will  not  account  for  the  conversion  and 
zeal  of  the  fii-st  Christians,  302. 

Religion  not  peculiarly  liable  to,  808. 

The  case  of  enthusiasm  and  knavery 
combined  considered,  803,  804. 

General  observations  upon,  cannot  over- 
throw direct  historical  evidence,  805, 
806. 

Epictetns, 

Quoted,  865  n. 
Evidence, 

Probable  and  demonstrative,  distin 
guished,  88.  See  Probable  Evidence. 

The  external  for  natural  religion,  164, 
165. 

Of  Scripture,  reason  competent  to  judge 
of,  233. 

Doubt  implies  some  degree  of,  2CC. 

Circumstantial,  often  as  convincing  as 
the  most  direct,  880. 

Not  only  Increased,  but  multiplied,  by 
the  adding  together  of  separate  prob- 
able proofs,  350. 
Evidence  of  Christianity, 

The  state  In  which  It  is  left,  not  hicon 
sUtent  with  justice,  275.  Not  Incon- 
sistent with  wisdom  and  goodness, 
276-284. 

Doubtfulness  of,  may  put  men  Into  a 
state  of  trial.  278-281.  A  state  of  trial 
similar  to  that  from  external  cir- 
cumstances of  temputlon,  282-285. 

Our  dissatisfaction  with,  may  he  our 
own  fault,  285,  288. 


382 


Index. 


Evidence  of  Christianity — ccm'd. 
Lies  level  to  men  of  common  capacity, 

pages  287,  288. 
Total  result  of  the  direct  and  collateral, 

may  be  compared  with  tht  effect  in 

architecture,  293. 
Direct  and  circuinetantial,  view  of,  as 

forming  one  argument,  318-3-32. 
Safer  to  admit  it,  than  to  reject  it,  331. 
Cannot,  from  its  nature,  be  destroyed, 

though  it  may  be  lessened,  332. 
True  question  with  regard  to,  341. 
Evil, 
Origin  of,  71,  124. 
Prevalence  of,  no  argument  against  the 

power  or  goodness  of  God,  71  n. 
Permission  of,  may  be  beneficial  to  the 

world,  178. 
Yet  would  have  been  better  if  men  had 

refrained  from  it,  179. 
Reliefs  and  remedies  originally  provided 

for,  253. 
Example  and  Education, 
Effect  of  a  bad,  in  increasing  the  dan- 
gers of  our  state  of  trial,  118. 

Existence, 

Necessary,  in  what  sense  attributed  to 
God,  158. 
Experience 

Teaches  us  the  good  and  bad  conse- 
quences of  our  actions,  269. 

How  it  confirms  the  unity  of  the  mind, 
52. 
Experimental 

Observations  cannot  prove  the  simplic- 
ity of  a  living  agent,  53. 
External 

Objects,  as  related  to  the  particular 
affections  of  our  nature,  186. 

Circumstances,  one  of  the  sources  of 
trial  in  our  present  state,  115. 
Faculties, 

Human,  not  given  us  in  their  full  per- 
fection at  our  birth,  131. 

Not  adequate  to  discover  how  the  world 
might  be  best  constituted,  89,  40. 

Ridiculous  to  attempt  to   prove  the 
truth  of,  364. 
Fall  of  Man, 

Explicable,  from  the  nature  of  particu- 
lar affections,  139. 

Not  accounted  for,  solely  from  the 
principle  of  liberty,  139,  140. 

Ap7>earance8  of  a,  in  nature,  119. 

Our  condition  resulting  from  the,  does 
not  afford  just  matter  of  complaint, 
119. 

The  Christian  dispensation  grounded 
upon  the  supposition  of  a,  257. 

The  scriptural  account  of  it  analogous 
and  conformable  to  what  we  see  and 
experience,  260. 


Falseb  t>od. 
The  several  kinds  of  it,  page  304. 
Whether  the  use  of  certain  forms  of 
speech  is,  375. 

FataUst,  The, 

His  scheme  of  the  world  stated,  158. 

Shown,  liy  pertinent  examples,  to  be 
absurd  in  practice,  156-159. 

His  objection  to  the  justice  of  punish- 
ments refuted,  160. 

Religious  and  irreligious  fataliste  (Lis 
tinguished,  169, 170. 

Fate. 

See  N'ecessity. 

Fear  and  Hope, 

Legitimate  moral  motives,  147. 

Of  future  punishment  and  reward,  can- 
not be  got  rid  of  by  greater  part  of 
the  world,  94. 

Final  Causes, 
The  notion  of,  does  not  always  implv 

that  the  end  designed  is  answered, 

146.    , 
The  pleasures  and  pains  attending  our 

actions,  instances  of,  76. 
The  proof  from,  of  the  existence  oi 

God,  not  destroyed  by  the  schemes 

of  necessity,  164,  155. 

Fitness,  Moral, 

Whether,  and  in  what  jsense,  it  deter 
mines  the  will  of  God,  168  n. 

The  proof  of  religion  from,  not  in- 
sisted on  in  this  treatise,  168,  343. 

And  unfitness  of  actions,  in  what  sense 
understood,  869,  870. 
Fitzgerald,  Professor, 

Quoted,  88,  37,  46,  71,  87,  104,  108,  111, 
130, 136, 158,  169, 171,  191,  196,  206, 
216,  283,  239,  294,  823,  366. 

FoUy, 
Defined  and  shown  to  be  akm  to  vice, 

370,  371. 
Of  mankind,  as  to  present  and  future 

interests  compared,  116, 117. 

Future  State, 
A,  will  probably  be  a  social  one,  65, 

135. 
Question  of,  why  so  important  to  us, 

69. 
Three  questions  rt  lative  to,  considered, 

62  n. 
Demonstration  at,  not  of  itnelf  a  prooj 

of  religion,  66.    Yet  implied  in  re- 
ligion, 66. 
Security  of  the  g<  od  in,  may  be  de 

rived  from   the  habits  formed  in  a 

state  of  probation,  148. 
This  Uf'  9  state  of  discipline  for,  p  1 

ch.  V 


Index  383 


Pntnre    Reward&   and    FTinish- 
ments, 

Will  differ  only  in  degree  from  those 
of  our  present  state,  page  109. 

Ab  conceived  by  natural  reason,  and 
as  specially  described  in  Scripture. 
80  n. 

Future  Pmushmentfl, 

G«neral    consideration  of,   belongs  to 

natural  religion,  110. 
Doctrine  of;  shown  by  analogy  to  be 

altogether  credible.  77-81. 
May  follow   vice,  by  way  of  natural 

consequence,  250. 
Refonnjition  and  repentance  alone  In- 

suflBcient  to  prevent  them,  2&6, 
See  runuhmenU. 

General  Laws, 
The  manifest  wisdom  of  carrying  on 

the  natural  government  of  the  world 

by  means  o^  179. 
Interruptions  of,  would  produce  evil 

and  prevent  good,  180. 
Credible  that  the  Christian  dispensation 

may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on 

bv.  24^-245. 
Mbracles  may  proceed  from,  244. 
Only  from  analogy  that  we  conclude 

the  whole  course  of  nature  to  be  car- 
ried on  by,  244. 


Gifts, 

Superior,  not  always  bestowed  on  per- 
sons of  prudence  and  decency,  281, 

God, 

True  Idea  oi;  that  of  a  governor,  76. 

His  e.xistence:  Why  taken  for  granted 
in  this  treatise,  Sa 

Hi«  existence:  Not  disproved  by  the 
scheme  of  fatalism,  153,  154. 

His  existence:  In  what  sense  necessa- 
ry, 154. 

Hl8  will:  How  determined,  163  n. 

His  will  may  be  considered  as  absolute 
or  conditional,  270. 

Resignation  to  his  will,  an  essential  part 
of  virtue.  148,  149. 

What  temper  of  mind  in  us  corre- 
sponds to  his  sovereignty,  149. 

His  ciaracter,  what  is  meant  by,  as 
applied  to  him,  160. 

Hto  goodness:  .May  seek  to  make  only 
the  good  happy,  72. 

His  goodness  shown  by  experience  to 
be  DO  good  ground  for  expecting  him 
to  make  us  happy  all  at  once,  160. 

Does  not  give  us  the  same  information 
ooDoerning  his  conduct  as  concernlnir 
otur  duty,  269.  270. 

Dictates  of  conacienoe  concerning,  the 
Uws  of;  182. 

Onr  dattes  to  God  the  Father:  to  the 
B<m  and  to  th«  Soljr  Spirit,  901-203. 


God's  Govenjment, 

End  of,  probably  beyoni  the  reach  ol 
our  faculties,  page  72. 

His  natural  government  of  us,  by  re- 
wards and  punishments,  69-82. 

The  course  of  nature  but  snothernamc 
for.  75. 

Not  the  less  certainly  established, 
though  in  it  he  act  not  immediate- 
ly, 74,  76. 

His  Moral :  Proofs  of  its  existence  and 
operation,  85-112. 

Not  yet,  in  this  present  state,  carried 
on  to  its  perfection,  87.  Yet  tends  to 
perfection,  99. 

His  natural  and  moral  government 
compared,  171-188. 

Natural  and  Moral,  may  both  together 
make  up  one  scheme,  173, 174. 

Likely  that,  as  his  natural  government 
is  a  scheme  beyond  our  comprehen- 
sion, the  moral  may  be  such  a  one 
too,  172-177. 

His  visible  government  over  the  world 
^^ercised  by  the  mediation  of  others, 

God's  Providence, 

The  series  of  his  providential  dispensa 

tions  progressive,  233,  234. 
Objections    to  his   providence  usually 

founded  on  our  ignorance,  175. 
How  far  we  are  concerned  to  answer 

objections  against,  337-339. 
Good  and  Evil, 
Natural,  the  great  variety  and  seeming 

inequality  of  their  distribution,  271, 

iii. 

Good  Men, 

Disposed  to   befriend   good   men.   m 

such,  94.  ' 

Difficulties  in  the  way  of  their  union 
with  each  other  here,  108. 
Goodness, 

The  Divine.    See  Ood. 
Government, 

The  formal  notion  of;  what  It  couslsta 

in,  74. 
Natural  and  moral  defined,  and  dlstln 

guished  from  each  other,  84,  86. 
Domestic  and  civil,  ordained  of  God. 

Punishes  vice  as  such,  and  as  hurtfl:'. 
to  society,  95. 
Grotins, 

Quoted,  2S6  n. 
Guilt, 
The  idea  of,  always  associated  in  our 
minds  with  that  of  HI  desert,  869. 
Guizot, 
I    Quoted,  248  r.. 


3^4 


Index. 


HaUts, 

Defined,  127, 

Our  capacity  of  acq  iiring  them,  127. 

Distinguished  as  habits  of  perception 

and  habits  of  action,  habits  of  body, 

and  liabita  of  nr.nd,  page  127. 
Active,  may  be  gro%ving  stronger,  while 

passive    impressions   are   becoming 

weaker,  128, 129. 
Of  mind,  produced  by  the  exertion  of 

inward  practical  principles,  128. 
The  acquisition  of,  necessary  to  us,  131 
Of  virtue,  necessarpr  to  aU  rational  crea- 
tures, whether  virtuous  or  depraved 

186. 
Happiness, 
Our  present,  mainly  depends  upon  our 

own  behavior,  69,  70. 
Why  not  given  to  all  promiscuously, 

without  regard  to  conduct,  70,  72. 
A  result  from  our  nature  and  condition 

jointly,  125. 
Of  virtue,  possibility  of  exceptions  to, 

88,  98. 
Virtue  produces,  and  tends  to  produce 

it  in  a  still  higher  degree  than  at  pres- 
ent, 89-95,  99-106. 
The  fact  that  our  present,  is  not  to 

be    secured   without   difficulty  and 

trial,  makes  it  credible  that  the  same 

may  be  true  of  our  future,  116,  117. 
Of  mankind,  the  aiming  at,  without  re 

gard  to  veracity  and  justice,  not  a 

correct  idea  of  virtue,  874. 
Heathen 
World,  state  of,  shows  the  importance 

of  revealed  religion,  191. 
Different  relations  of  the,  to  the  genu 

ine  Scripture  revelation,  274. 
Hinderances, 
The  present,  of  the  natural  tendencies 

of  virtue,  only  accidental,  111. 
History, 
What  account  it  gives  of  the  origin  of 

religion,  166,  217. 
The    whole   of   revelation,     Including 

prophecy  and  doctrine,  may  be  con 

sidered  as  a  history,  815. 
The  common,  in  Scripture,  altogether 

credible,  822. 
The  failure  to  invaUdate  the  Scripture 

history,  a  strong  argument  in  its  fa 

vor,  817,  818. 
Hume, 

Referred  to,  108  n.,  218  n. 
Identity, 
Or  sameness,  different  senses  of  the 

word,  858. 
In  what  sense  applied  to  persons,  857. 
Hfot  constituted  by  consciousness,  but 

ascertained  by  it,  358. 
Absurdity  of  the  supposition  that  we 

are  not  the  same  beings  in  successive 

periods  of  time,  862,  868. 


Ignorance,  Our, 

How  this  Ufe  is  a  preparation  for  an- 
other, no  objection  against  the  credi- 
bility of  its  being  so,  page  134. 

Of  the  scheme  of  nature  and  of  Provi- 
dence, 174, 175. 

Partial  and  total,  distinguished,  181. 

When  an  answer  to  objections  against 
God's  method  of  government,  aod 
when  not,  177, 181. 

Even  total  ignorance  of  the  conse 
qiiences  of  our  actions  would  not  In- 
validate moral  obligation,  1S2. 

The  argument  from,  cannot  be  used 
equally  for  or  against  religion,  183. 

Arguments  fi-om,  rather  taken  from 
what  analogy  teaches  us  about  it, 
183. 

In  connection  with  the  question  of  the 
credibiUty  of  miracles,  219,  244 

In  matters  of  religion,  owing  frequent- 
ly to  men's  negligence  and  prejudiced, 
285,  286. 

Of  the  nature  of  our  condition,  natural 
and  moral,  and  the  reasons  why  we 
are  placed  in  it,  275,  276. 
Imagination, 

The  source  of  erroneous  presumptions 
that  death  will  destroy  us,  50. 

Must  not  be  substituted  for  experience, 
64. 

Men  of  warm,  apt  to  fkncy  coincidences, 
830. 
Immorality, 

The  charge  of,  against  certain  precepts 
in  Scripture,  237,  238. 

Not  valid,  237. 
Improvement, 

Of  our  faculties,  in  all  respects  gradaal, 
181, 132. 

Our  capacity  for,  126-181. 

Necessity  for  our,  in  virtue,  181-184. 

Effected  by  the  acquisition  of  moral 
and  religious  habits,  186. 
Innocent, 

Persons,  are  appointed.  In  the  conrBO 
of  nature,  to  suffer  for  the  guilty, 
267. 
Inspiration, 

In  what  manner  or  degree  it   should 
he  vouchsafed  to  mankind,  not  ascer- 
tainable by  reason,  226,  227. 
Interest, 

Sense  of,  defined,  137  n. 

In  what  sense  consistent  with  vlrture 
and  part  of  its  idea,  137  n.    As  coin- 
cident with  virtue,  needs  strengthen- 
ing by  discipline,  137  n. 
Irregularities, 

Apparent,  in  natr.re  and  ir  Christian- 
ity, whence  they  arise,  245. 

Unreasonable  to  exin-ct  them  to  be 
remedied  by  occasional  Interposl- 
tions,  180. 


Index. 


385 


Irreligion, 

Ita  aggravated  guilt,  beyond  that  of 

other  vice,  page  254. 
EopeciaUy  in  persona  of  high  rank  and 

character,  280, 
Not  justifiable  upon  any  pretense  of 

want  of  evidence  In  religion,  282. 
JewB, 

A  summary  of  their  history,  as  a  na- 
tion, 824-826. 

Their  history,  as  contained  in  Script- 
ure, confirmed  by  known  fact,  824. 

God's  dealing  with  them,  825. 

Continuance  of  the,  as  a  distinct  people 
in  their  dispersion,  a  standing  mira- 
cle, and  a  confirmation  of  the  truth 
of  Scripture,  826. 

Final  restoration  of  the,  327. 
John,  Saint, 

To  what  he  probably  alludes  in  the  be- 
ginning of  his  Gospel,  815. 

His  doctrine  of  Christ's  pre-exlstence 
conformable  to  that  of  St  Paul,  816. 

His  description  of  the  perfection  of  re- 
ligion, 339. 

Kingdom, 

Idea  of  a  perfectly  vlrtaoos  and  happy, 

105,  106.  ^^'' 

Christ's,  as  described  In  Scripture,  263. 

Knowledge, 

Our,  of  Scripture,  will  be  perfected  In 
the  same  way  as  oar  knowledge  of 
nature,  28a 

Natural  and  ordinary  methods  of  im- 
proving It,  288. 

Analogy  of  the  progress  of  natural  and 
religious,  234. 

Koran, 

Quoted,  29S  n. 

Language, 

In  Its  very  nature,  liable  to  Infinite 
abuse,  280. 
Law,  Bishop, 

Quoted,  78  n. 
Liberty, 

Does  not,  of  itseli^  account  for  the  fall 


of  finite  creatures,  189. 

Why  the  proof  of  religion  fh>m,  Is 
omitted  In  this  treatise,  848,  844. 

hopUed  in  the  constitution  of  the  world, 
and  our  condition  therein,  15S. 

Doctrine  oi;  shows  where  the  fiillacy 
UeH  in  the  scheme  of  necessity,  when 
reduced  to  practice,  167. 
Lift, 

Our  preMoL  a  probation  for  a  future 
one.  As  Implying  trial  and  danger, 
limi22.  As  intended  for  moral  dis- 
cipline. 125-150.  For  the  manlfesU- 
tion  of  cliaraeter,  150. 

Bee  FiUurt  Life. 

26 


Likeness, 

Various  species  oi;  defined,  page  88  n. 
Living  Powers, 
Twofold  sense  of  the  phrase,  48  n. 
Our,   not  likely  to  be  destroyed  bv 
death,  4S-64.  '         ' 

Their  not  being  exercised,  does  nrt 
imply  their  non-existence,  49. 

Locke, 

Quotation  from  his  chapter  on  Proba- 
bility, 84. 

His  notion  of  personal  identity  exam- 
ined, 860,  86r  '  ^^ 

Locomotive 
Powers,  to  what  they  properly  belong, 

Mo  hammedanism 

Was  not  received  In  the  world  on  the 
footing  of  public  miracles,  298. 
Maimonides, 

Quoted,  174  n. 
Manasses, 

Prayer  of,  quoted,  269  n. 
Mandeville,  Dr., 

Quoted,  91  n. 
Man, 

An  Inferior  part  of  creation,  119. 

Capable  of  improvement,  185. 

Connected  wltn  present,  past,  and  fu- 
ture, 184. 

Dealt  with  as  if  free.  158. 

Has  a  moral  nature,  96. 

His  foil  not  accounted  for  by  his  bee 
agency, '"" 


Knows  nothing  fully,  174. 
"      ■  lifled  for 


new  states. 


May  become  quail 
126. 

Not  a  competent  Judge  of  the  schemes 
of  God,  175. 

Eequires  moral  culture,  185. 

Accepted  according  to  what  he  hath, 
276. 

His  circumstances  no  ground  of  com- 
plaint, 277. 

His  obligation  to  study  the  Scriptuies, 
211,290. 

Must  bo  renewed,  205. 

Martyrs, 

The  primitive :  their  sufi'erlngB  a  testi- 
mony to  the  truth  of  the  Christian 
miracles,  299,  80U. 

Matter, 

Indlscerptibllltj  of  Its  elementary  par- 
ticles by  any  natural  power,  58. 
Our  being  affected  by,  does  not  prove 


It  to  be  part  of  ourselves,  68 
See  Body. 


386 


Index. 


Matter  of  Pact, 
The  system  of  religion  viewed  as,  irre- 
spective of  all  specu.ation,  page  161. 
Distinguished  from  abstract  ti-uth,  811. 
Objections  to  Christianity  as,  answered. 
Part  II,  chap.  lii. 

Means  and  Ends, 

Events  are  related  to  each  other  as,  177. 

Our  incompetency,  prior  to  experience, 
to  judge  of  either,  178. 

No  presimiption  against  the  wisdom  of 
the  means  used  by  Christianity,  243. 

The  objection  that  they  are  complicat- 
ed, and  of  slow  operation,  answered, 


Mediator, 

No  presumption  firom  the  course  of  na- 
ture against  the  general  notion  of  a, 
249. 

Scripture  view  of  his  office,  260-264. 

Christian  doctrine  of,  in  what  respect 
most  objected  to,  266. 

This  objection  answered,  267-270. 

See  Sacrifiee. 

Microscopes  and  G-Iasses, 
Our  organs  of  perception  compared 
with,  55, 65. 

MiU,  J.  S., 

Quoted,  218  n. 
Miracles 

Prove  the  system  of  natural  religion 
as  well  as  the  revealed,  195, 196. 

No  presumption  against,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  world,  215,  216. 

The  incarnation  of  Christ  an  invisible 
mkacle,  214. 

No  argument  from  analogy  against, 
after  the  settlement  of  the  course  of 
nature,  217. 

No  greater  presumption  against,  than 
against  ordinary  fects  before  proo^ 
219. 

Occasions  may  arise  for,  in  the  coarse 
of  ages,  220. 

The  moral  system  of  the  world  gives 
distinct  reasons  for,  220. 

Must  be  compared  with  the  extraordi- 
nary phenomena  of  nature,  220. 

May  be  subject  to  general  laws,  244, 
245. 

The  Christian,  are  recorded  in  books  of 
authentic,  genuine  history,  293-296. 

The  reali^  and  truth  of,  affirmed  in 
the  epistles  of  St.  Paul,  296,  297. 

Oliristianity  first  preached  and  received 
upon  the  allegation  of,  297-300. 

Mohammedan  and  Popish  not  parallel, 
298,  299. 

Scripture  history  gives  the  same  evi- 
dence for,  as  for  common  facts,  298. 

Truth  of  them,  accounts  for  the  his- 
tory, 295. 

How  referred  to  in  St.  Paul's  epistles, 
397. 


Miracles, — coiitinued. 

What  proof  of  their  reality  from  the 
conversion  and  zeal  of  the  first  Chris- 
tians, page  299. 

Miraculous 

Gifts,  tn  the  apostolic  age;  the  objection 
from  their  disorderly  exercise  an- 
swered, 281,  232. 

What  events,  seemingly  natural,  may 
be  so  esteemed,  826. 

Mistakes 

Of  transcribers  of  Scripture:  no  more 
than  were  to  have  been  expected  In 
books  of  such  antiquity,  823. 

Moral 

Action,  whether  the  nature  of,  can  be 
altered  by  a  command,  237. 

Duties,  arise  from  revealed  relations, 
as  weU  as  from  those  made  known  by 
reason,  206. 

Faculty,  our:  its  dictates  the  laws  oi 
God,  hi  a  sense  including  sanctions, 
162. 

Hence,  aflbrds  a  proof  of  religion  not 
to  be  invalidated  by  fatalism,  162. 

See  Conscience. 

Government.    See  Government. 

Evil,  voluntary  in  its  very  notion,  124. 

Our  inability  to  account  for,  124. 

Part  of  religion,  why  preferred  in 
Scripture  to  the  positive,  208-211. 

Precepts.    See  Positi/oe. 

Understanding,  our,  Uable  to  be  im- 
paired and  perverted,  166. 

Morality, 

Of  Scripture,  reason  competent  to  judge 
of,  236,  287. 

Of  actions,  depends  chiefly  on  the  in- 
tention of  the  agent,  865,  366. 

Partly,  also,  on  a  comparison  of  his  in- 
tentions with  his  nature  and  capaci- 
ties, 367. 

Motion, 

Supposed  iadivlsible,  compared  with 

consciousness,  51. 

Mysteries 
To  be  expected,  if  we  judge  from  ox 

perience,  in  such  a  scheme  as  Chria 

tianity,  224,  248. 
As  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity, 

244,  245,  266-270. 

Nature, 

Light  of,  insufficient,  191. 

Teachings  of;  as  to  a  future  state,  and 
the  efficacy  of  repentance,  79  n,  254- 
257. 

Course  of;  implies  an  operating  agent, 
78,252. 

No  presumption  against  revealed  relig- 
ion, from  its  being  unlike  the,  218, 
214. 


Index. 


387 


N  atore, — continued . 
How  ascertained  to  be  by  general  laws, 

pages  248,  244. 
Is  not  a  fixed,  but  a  progresaiTe  scheme, 

66. 
Our  ignorance  of  the  causes,  etc.,  on 

which  it  depends  220. 
We  know  not  what  is  the,  upon  the 

first  peopling  of  worlds,  215.     As  a 

source  of  oar  trial,  115, 116. 

Natural,  - 
Trne  sense  of  the  term,  65. 
Our  notion  of  what  is,  may  be  enlarged 

by  a  greater  knowledge  of  the  works 

and  the  providence  of  God,  65. 
God's   natural  government   probably 

subservient  to  his  moral,  174. 
Religion,  Christianity  a  republication, 

and  an  external  institution,  of,  194- 

200. 
See  Oovemment— Religion. 

Necessary 
Existence  of  God,  In  what  sense  to  be 
understood,  154. 

Necessity, 

Opinion  of,  Butler's  mode  of  consider- 
ing, 152. 

Does  not  exclude  deliberation  and 
choice,  154. 

Does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelli- 
gent author  and  governor  of  nature, 
156. 

Supposed  reconcilable  with  the  coarse 
of^ture,  is  reconcilable  also  with 
the  »ystem  of  religion,  155-160. 

Does  not  destroy  the  j>roof  of  religion, 
161-164. 

However  true  in  speculatiou,  yet  shown 
by  experience  to  be  false  in  practice, 

The  attributes  of  veracity,  benevolence, 
and  justice  In  God,  reconcilable  with 
160. 

The  conclusion  fW>m,  that  it  is  incred- 
ible that  God  should  reward  and  pun- 
ish a^  fiUlacioos,  166,  168. 

In  what  sense  deetractive  of  religion, 
and  in  what  sense  not,  169. 

Negligence 

No  more  excusable  in  matters  of  re- 
vealed, than  of  natural  relitcion,  200. 

I«on«  source  of  oar  dissatisfaction  with 
the  evidence  of  religion,  286,  "^ST. 

Newman, 
Quoted,  256  n. 

Dbjeotions, 

Against  a  proof,  and  against  the  thing 
to  be  proved,  different,  49, 

How  ftu-  analogy  answers  both,  in  the 
case  of  religion,  42. 

Against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of 
things,  not  directly  answered  by  anal- 
ogy. "1. 


Objections, — continued. 

Against  the  scheme  of  Christianity,  as 
distinguished  from  its  evidence,  gen- 
erally frivolous,  pagos  212,  222-22T. 

What  would  be  valid,  228. 

Drawn  from  ignorance,  when  pecnlisr- 
ly  absurd,  269. 

What  qualifications  requisite  for  the 
due  considering,  288. 

May  be  seen  through,  though  not  cleared 
up,  288. 

Againsc  the  whole  way  of  reasoning 
fi:t)m  analogy  of  nature  to  religion, 
considered.  Part  II,  chap.  viii. 

1.  That  it  does  not  clear  up  dlfflcul 
ties,  834. 

2.  That  it  does  not  show  the  evi- 
dence of  religion  not  to  be  doubt- 
ful, S86-888. 

8.  That  it  does  not  vindicate  God's 

character,  838. 
4.  That  it  is  not  satisfactory,  840. 
6.  That  it  is  not  likely  to  have  influ- 
ence, 342. 

Against  our  natural  immortality  from 
the  case  of  brutes,  58. 

From  that  of  vegetables,  64. 

Aganst  the  credibility  of  fhturo  punish* 
ments,  77. 

Against  the  final  triumph  of  virtue,  108. 

Against  this  world's  being  a  state  of 
tri^  how  answered  by  analogy,  122. 

A  state  of  discipline  in  virtue,  from 
ignorance  of  the  mode,  134. 

From  its  proving,  in  fact,  a  discipline  in 
vice,  145. 

From  its  being  a  discipline  in  self-love, 
147. 

No  practical,  fi-om  the  scheme  of  neces- 
sity, against  religion,  152, 168. 

Against  the  scheme  of  Providence,  gen 
erally  mere  arbitrary  assertions,  176. 

Drawn  ftom  seeming  irregularities  in 
the  moral  world,  answered  by  the 
analogy  of  the  natural,  177. 

Against  the  dispensations  of  Provi- 
dence, how  far  we  are  concerned  to 
answer  them,  888. 

Against  Christianity,  fh)m  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  light  of  nature,  191, 192. 

Agahist  its  proof,  from  the  supposed 
incredibility  of  miracles,  212-220. 

Why  the  matter  of  Christianity  must 
appear  liable  to.  Part  II,  chap.  ili. 

From  the  unequal  distribution  of  relig- 
ious knowledge,  226. 

From  its  complex  contrivances  and 
slow  development,  284. 

From  supposed  immorality  of  some  of 
Its  precepts,  286. 

From  its  disappointing  sntldpatlonA, 


From  tno  abuse  of  miraouloas  gifts, 

281. 
From  its  being  perverted,  and  having 

little  influence,  1». 
From  its  mysteriousness,  241,  269. 
From  lU  want  of  universality,  «7»-27«l 


388 


Index. 


Objections, — continued. 

From  supposed  deficiency  of  proolj 
pages  2S0-291. 

Against  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  a  Me- 
diator, Part  II,  chap.  v. 

Against  Christ's  sacrifice,  as  involving 
an  unjust  punishment  of  the  inno- 
cent for  the  guilty,  266. 

This  objection,  if  of  force,  would  hold 
more  strongly  against  the  course  of 
nature.  Why?  26T. 

'Against  the  particular  evidence  for 
ChrLitianity,  Part  II,  chap.  vii. 

Against  the  evidence  for  miracles,  299- 
804. 

From  enthusiasm,  801-303. 

From  the  mixture  of  enthusiasm  and 
knavery,  803. 

From  stories  of  false  miracles,  304,  305. 

To  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  296-313. 

From  the  obscurity  of  some  parts  of 
prophecy,  807. 

From  the  application  of  particular 
prophecies  not  appearing  when  con- 
sidered each  distinctly,  308,  809. 

From  the  supposition  that  the  proph- 
ets intended  something  else,  810-812. 

Against  Christianity  offered  in  conver- 
sation, what  advantage  they  have, 
332. 

Obligations 

Of  duty,  arising  from  the  supposable- 
ness  or  credibility  of  religion,  182, 
278,  279. 

Our,  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit,  from 
what  they  arise,  202,  203. 

Obscurities 

Ln  the  Scriptures,  no  valid  objection 
against  them,  228,  229, 

Optimism, 
Keligious  and  irreligious,  distinguished, 

87  n. 

Origen, 

His  observation  relative  to  the  Script- 
ures and  nature,  87. 
Passions, 
As  making  part  of  our  state  of  trial,  116. 
Are  excited  toward  particular  objects, 

whether  we  will  or  no,  186. 
Bare  excitement  of,  not  criminal,  187. 
Yet  always  dangerous,  137. 
The  principle  of  virtue  the  intended 

security  against  this  danger,  137. 
How  the  fall  may  be  accounted  for  from 

them,  139. 
Supposable  that  they  may  remain  In  a 

future  state,  138. 
Are  often  inconsistent  with  reasonable 

self-love,  as  well  as  with  virtue  and 

religion,  116. 

Passive  Impressions 
Grow  weaker  by  repetition,  128. 
Were  intended  to  lead  to  the  formation 
of  active,  practical  habits,  128,  130. 


Paul,  Saint. 

His  testimony:  to  bo  oonsidered  as  de- 
tached  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the 
apostles,  page  297. 

His  epistles:  evidence  of  their  genu- 
ineness, 296. 

A  distinct  proof  of  Christianity  to  be 
derived  from  them,  296. 

Perception, 

Our  organs  of  sense  merely  the  instru- 
ments of,  55. 

Our  power  of,  in  dreams,  without  the 
organs  of  sense,  56. 

Ridiculous  to  dispute  the  truth  of  our 
perceptions,  864. 

Perfect 

Creatures  described,  139.    May  be  im- 
proved by  habits  of  virtue,  140. 
Moral  government,  what  is,  86. 

Perfection 

Of  religion,  what,  889. 
Of  moral  government,  85. 

Person 

Defined,  60. 

Sameness  of,  independently  of  all  con- 
sideration of  consciousness,  857. 

Personality, 

Whether  constituted  by  consciousness, 


Plato 

Quoted,  57.  93. 
Pleasure  and  pain 

The  consequence  of  our  own  actions,  70. 
The  annexing  of,  to  our  actions,  the 

proper  notion"  of  government,  75. 
Pleasure,  attending  the  gratification  of 

our  passions,  whether  and  how  far 

intended  to  put  us  upon  gratifying 

them,  74. 
Attached  to  actions  when  a  reward, 

85,98. 
Whether  our  pleasures  overbalance  our 

pains,  840. 
See  Happinesa. 

Porphyry. 

His  objections  to  the  book  of  Daniel, 
812,  813. 
Positive  Institutions 

Implied  in  the  notion  of  a  vLsiblc 
Church,  197. 

Are  founded  on  natural  religion,  as 
well  as  on  revealed,  207,  208. 

au  general,  have  the  nature  of  moral 
commands,  207. 

Mankind  prone  to  place  the  whole  of 
religion  in  the  observance  of,  with- 
out regard  to  moral,  precepts,  208. 

Great  presumption  to  make  light  of; 
210. 


Index. 


389 


Positive —CO  ntinu  cd . 

Precepts,  wherein  different  from  moral, 
paee  206. 

In  what  cases  tbey  must  yield  to  moral, 
207,  208. 

Duties,  distinguished  from  moral,  206. 

And  moral  duties  should  be  compared 
no  further  than  as  they  are  different, 
207. 

Christ's  decision  upon  the  relation  be- 
tween them,  209,  210 

Powers 
May  be  improved  by  exercise,  127. 
May  be  overtasked,  145. 
May  exist  and  not  be  exercised,  49. 
No  reason  for  suppoamg  that  death  will 
destroy  them,  50. 

Practice, 

By  what  e\idence  matters  of,  are  de- 
termined, 886,  837,  840-342. 

In  matters  of;  their  importance  is  al- 
ways to  be  considered.  36,  831. 

In  matters  of,  less  proof  than  convinces 
judgment  should  influence  behavior, 
85,  278,  279,  291. 

Precepts, 

None  in  Scripture,  contrary  to  immu- 
table morality,  237. 

Prejudices, 

Several  sorts  of^  803. 

May  hinder  us  from  being  rightly  In- 
formed upon  moral  and  reli/i^ioua  sub- 
jects, 286,  286. 

Arising  from  contempt  and  scorn,  weak- 
ness of  yielding  to  them,  813. 

Present  existence 
Affords  a  presumption  of  continuance, 
47. 

Presumption, 
A  slight,  does  not  beget  that  degree  of 

conviction,  implied  in  calling  a  thing 

proljably  true,  88. 
The  slightest  possible,  of  the  nature  of 

probability,  88. 
That  death  will  destroy  u^  50. 
Tliat  it  will  suspend  our  existence,  62. 

Presumptuousness 

UnjuBtiflAble,  88. 

Priest, 

Christ  described  as  our,  2C3,  264. 

Probable  evidence 

Defined  and  distinguished  from  demon- 
stration, 88.' 

Foundation  of,  88.  RelatlTe  to  finite 
beings  only,  85. 

M«a,  of  neoMsity,  Influenced  and  gov- 
araed  by,  both  in  .speculation  and  In 
pnctioe,  8S,  M. 

Probable  prooth,  being  added  together, 
multiply  the  erldenoe,  880. 


Probation, 

The  peculiar,  of  persons  of  a  reflective 
cast  of  mind,  page  284. 

Implied  in  religion,  290. 

Religion,  considered  as  a  probation,  has 
had  its  end  on  all  persons  to  whom  It 
has  been  proposed,  with  evidence  suf- 
ficient to  influence  practice,  842. 

See  Trial. 

Prophecy, 

The  primary  design  of  the  prophecies 
recorded  in  Scripture.  195. 

How  they  confii-m  natural  religion,  195. 

Proof  of  foresight  from  the  completion 
of  intelligible  i)arts  of  prophecy,  not 
invalidated  by  the  obscurity  of  others, 
807. 

The  proof  of  foresight  made  out  by  a 
general  completion  of,  307,  808. 

The  applicability  of  a  long  scries  o^  to 
certain  events,  a  proof  that  it  was  In- 
tended of  them,  308,  809. 

The  analogy,  in  this  respect,  between 
prophecy  and  satirical  and  mytholog- 
ical composition,  809,  810. 

How  particular  prophecies  wore  inter- 
preted by  the  ancient  Jews  and  the 
primitive  Christians,  809. 

Proof  from,  not  destroyed  bv  showing 
that  the  prophets  applied  them  to 
other  events  than  we  do,  or  that  we 
do  not  apply  them  to  right  ones,  81C, 
811. 

Of  the  future  condition  of  the  Jews, 
confirmed  by  their  past  and  present 
history,  826,  327. 

The  qualifications  requisite  to  t-ike  the 
force  of  the  argument  from,  827. 

Conformity  between  the  prophecies  and 
the  events,  not  accidental,  330. 

Prophet, 

A,  compared  with  a  compiler  of  mem- 
oirs received  from  another  person, 
810. 

Christ  a,  in  what  sense,  268. 
Providence, 

Never  hasty,  24S  n. 

Objections  to,  useless. 

The  course  of,  jirogressive^  248. 

See  God. 

Prudence, 

Meaning  of  the  word,  870. 

When  a  course  of  action  may  be  called 

prudent,  .542. 
And   impnidcnee.  akin  to  virtue  and 

vice,  90,  869,  870. 

Public  spirit. 

The  true  notion  of,  101. 
Punishment, 
The  proper  notion  of.  76. 
Natural,  circuinstanj-e.i  in,  analogous 
to  what  religion  temihes  of  future 
77-81. 


390 


Index. 


Punishment — continued 

Of  vice,  as  folly,  page  89.  As  mischiev- 
ous to  society,  90,  91.  Of  vice,  as 
sucli^  91-94. 

Of  virtuous  persons,  and  of  virtuous 
actions,  by  society  explained,  91. 

Wliy,  in  tlie  natural  course  of  things, 
punishment  does  not  always  reach 
the  vicious,  98. 

Ascribed,  In  Scripture,  to  God's  Justice, 
252. 

Future.    See  Future  Punishment. 

V'caricus,  instances  of,  in  the  daily 
course  of  Providence,  267. 

As  the  method  of  our  redemption  ;  the 
objection  against,  answered,  266-269. 

What  is  meant  by  deserving  punish- 
ment, 36S,  869. 

Reason, 

Can,  and  ought  to  judge  of  the  meaning, 
tlie  evidence,  and  the  morality  of 
Scripture,  236,  237. 

Natural  tendency  of,  to  prevail  over 
brute  force,  99,  100. 

Inability  of,  to  determine  for  us  wheth- 
er the  future  punishment  of  sin  could 
be  prevented,  254,  255. 

Hopes  and  fears  of,  confirmed  by  rev- 
elation. 257,  25S. 

A  very  incompetent  judge  of  the  con- 
duciveness  of  means  to  ends,  177. 

Could  not  have  discovered  the  scheme 
of  Christianity,  203.  No  presumption 
against  the  scheme  of  Christianity  on 
this  account,  213. 

An  incompetent  judge  of  what  was  to 
be  expected  in  revelation,  222,  228. 

Incompetent  to  judge  beforehand,  how 
revelations  should  have  been  left  in 
the  world,  226-228. 

Fouy  of  objections  to  Christianity,  upon 
supposed  principles  of  reason,  349. 

Reasoning, 

Upon  the  principles  of  others,  what  it 


Abstruse,  when  necessary  in  matters 
of  religion,  857. 

Uj-on  the  course  of  nature,  Avithout  at- 
tending to  known  facts,  apt  to  be  fal- 
lacious, 87. 

See  Abstract. 

Redemption, 

Scripture  doctrine  of,  stated,  260-265. 

Illustrated  by  the  analogy  of  natural 
remedicH,  252. 

Agreeable  to  our  natural  notions,  our 
holies  and  our  fears,  256-258. 

The  manner  of  its  efficacy  not  made 
known,  nor  discoverable  by  reason, 
etc.,  265. 

Rashness  of  seeking  to  explain  it  far- 
ther than  Scripture  has  done,  265. 

Bee  Mediator,  Puavishmeut,  tkicrU 
Jlce. 


Reflection, 

Our  present  powers  of^  not  likely  tc 
be  destroyed  or  suspended  by  des  th. 
pages  60,  61. 

Does  not  depend  upon  our  bodily  pow- 
ers of  sensation,  62. 

May  be  improved  by  death,  63. 

Reformation 
Does  not  always  preclude  punishment, 

Regard 

Due  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Sphit,  202. 
Due  to  God  as  Creator,  the  essence  of 
natural  religion,  203. 

Relations, 

Of  the  several  species  and  Individuals 
in  the  natural  world,  impossible  for 
us  to  say  how  far  they  extend,  173, 174. 

The  revealed  relations  of  the  Son  and 
the  Holy  Spirit  to  us,  201. 

Duties  arising  from,  strictly  moral, 
202,  203. 

Religion, 

The  whole  of,  consists  in  action,  288. 

A  practical  thing,  836. 

Wherein  it  consists,  836. 

External  and  internal,  202. 

Essence  of  natural  religion,  202. 

Kevealed,  202. 

Whereinthe  general  spirit  of,  consists, 
210. 

The  perception  of,  what,  339. 

The  stress  of,  where  laid  by  Scriiiture, 
209. 

In  what  view  considered  by  Butler,  340. 

How  religion  presupposes  integrity  in 
those  who  embrace  it,  341. 

If  founded  in  God's  moral  character, 
161. 

Implies  a  future  state,  66. 

Would  not  be  proved  by  even  a  demon- 
strative proof  of  one,  why,  (qIo. 

Implies  God's  government  by  rewards 
and  punishments,  76. 

Implies  God's  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment, 108. 

Proper  proof  of,  in  this  view.  109-112. 

Collateral  and  practical  proof,  108-11'i. 

Teaches  our  being  in  a  state  of  pro- 
bation, 113. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  proof  of,  161. 

Obligations  not  destroyed  by  the  opin- 
ion of  necessity,  162. 

Proper  motives  to,  189,  190. 

Affords  distinct  particular  reasons  for 
miracles.  220. 

Degrees  of  knowledge  of  religion  dlf 
ferent  among  different  men,  272-274. 

Why  its  evidence  may  have  been  left 
doubtful,  28^287. 

Such  doubtfulness  does  not  destroy  its 
obligation,  278. 

Its  importance,  189. 


Index. 


391 


Religion — eoutinued. 

Impugned  on  sapposed  principles  of 
reason,  page  848. 

Origin  of,  according  to  hisUiry  and  tra- 
dition, 165-217. 

Gener.1l  trutli  of,  proved  by  a  dilemma 
from  its  state  in  the  first  ages  of  the 
world,  166. 

Stote  of;  in  the  heathen  world,  191. 

Apparently  uncorrupted  in  the  first 
ages,  I60. 

yatural,  the  system  of,  what,  42,  48, 
164,820. 

Not  the  only  object  of  our  regard,  193. 

Hiis  external  evidences,  166. 

Whether  it  could  have  been  reasoned 
out,  191,  821. 

Taught  by  Christianity  In  Its  purity, 
194,  195. 

How  confirmed  by  the  miracles  and 
prophecies  reconied  in  Scripture,  195. 

Ilow  promoted  by  the  settlement  of  a 
visible  Church,  197,  19a 

General  proof  o£  level  to  common  men, 
287. 

The  obligations  of,  as  included  by  Chris- 
tianity, lie  obvious  to  all  apprehen- 
sions, 854. 

What  it  teaches  of  a  future  life,  and 
what  not,  79,  80  n. 

Of  the  efficacy  of  repentance.  255. 

The  profession  and  establisimient  o^ 
how  much  owing  to  Scripture,  820. 

Even  in  countries  not  acknowledging 
the  authority  of  Scripture,  821. 

Proof  ot,  from  reason,  not  destroyed 
hereby,  821. 

Analogy  o^  properly  u.sed  to  remove 
objections  to  revealed,  834,  885. 

Uevealed,  See  Revelation. 

Rbligious  knowledge.* 

See  Knowledge— Analogy. 
Remedies, 

Some  diseast-a  are,  179. 

Analogy  between  natural,  and  Chris- 
tianity, as  a  remedial  provision  for 
us,  585,  236. 

The  provision  of,  an  instance  of  com- 
pas-sion  in  the  original  constitution  of 
the  world,  353. 

Repentance, 

Its  insufficiency  to  expiate  guilt  argued 
from  analogy,  257.  Argued  also  from 
the  general  sense  of  mankind,  267. 

Its  efficacy,  whence  derived,  244. 

Resignation 

To  G<>d'B  will  an  essential  part  of  vir' 

toe,  147. 
AlOic  lions,  the  proper  discipline  for,  149. 
Prosperity  ana  imagination  may  give 

occasion  for,  14^. 
Revelation, 

The  particular  scheme  of  the  universe 

cannot  b(>  known  without,  106. 


Revelation — continaed. 

Would  not  have  been  given  if  the  light 
of  n.iture  rendered  it  superfluous, 
page  191. 

Manifestly  not  superfluous,  192. 

The  great  service  it  renders  to  natural 
religion,  194-199. 

Republishes  and  confirms  natural  re- 
ligion in  its  purity,  194-196. 

Supplies  new  means  for  its  preservation, 
197-199. 

If  really  given,  cannot  be  safely  neglect 
ed,  194. 

Itself,  in  what  sense  miraculous,  215. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  world,  whether 
miraculous,  215. 

No  presumption  from  analogy  against 
such  a,  215, 

Primitive,  bow  far  the  belief  of  pure  re- 
ligion in  the  first  age  of  the  world 
favors  the  notion  of  one,  165. 

Historical  and  traditionary  evidence  of; 
as  ancient  as  history,  165,  217. 

The  early  pretenses  of  false,  probably 
imply  a  true  one,  165. 

Supposed  presumption  against,  as  mi- 
raculous, considered.  Part  II,  cbap.  ii. 

We  are  incompetent  judges  of  .what 
were  to  be  expected  in  a,  Part  II, 
chap.  iii. 

What  reason  can  judge  of  in  a  revelation, 


Discovers    new    relations,    and    conse- 
quently imposes  new  duties,  201-20:3. 
Probable  origin  of  sacrifices,  264. 

Revealed  religion 
(The  Christian)  a  fit  subject  of  analog- 
ical reasoning,  88. 
What  is  implied  in  the  scheme  of,  42, 

48,  204,  205,  212,  241.  242, 
May  be  considered  as  wholly  historical, 

815. 
Summary  of,  under  that  view,  815-817. 
Internal,  as  distinguished  from  natural, 

wherein  the  essence  of,  consists,  198. 
No   presumption    against  its  general 

scheme  lh>m  the  analogy  of  nature, 

212. 
A  particular  scheme  under  the  general 

plan  of  Providence,  241. 
Consists  of  various  parts,  and  is  carried 

on  through  a  length  of  time,  241. 
Supposes  mankind  in  a  state  of  degrar 

datton,  284,  250,  259. 
The  help  of  tlid'Holy  Spirit  necessary 

to  renew  our  nature,  2o6. 
Bepentance    naturallv    insufficient    to 

present  alt  the  bad  consequences  of 

sin,  204,  205,  257-259. 
Its  dispensation,  whether  carried  on  by 

general  laws,  243,  244. 
Mav  appear  natural  to  some  beings,  65. 
Evidence  ot    See  Evidence. 
Objections  to.    See  Ohjecti'mn. 
Analogy  of,  t4»  natural,  and  the  oon- 

Btitution  and  course  of 

A  luilogy. 


392 


Index, 


Rewards  and  punisluneiits, 

According  to  the  natural  constitution  of 

things,  correspond  to  virtue  and  vice, 

page  98. 
Though  not  equally  distributed  now, 

yet,  in  all  probability,  will  be  hereafter, 

102. 
Hope  of  reward,  a  legitimate  motive  to 

obedience,  147. 
See  Punishment. 

Ridicule, 

How,  obstructs  men's  seeing  the  evi- 
dence of  religion,  285. 

Though  applied  to  show  the  argument 
from  analogy  in  a  disadvantageous 
light,  yet  cannot  invalidate  it,  T5,  846. 

Roman  Empire, 

Plainly,   was   divided  into  about   ten 

parts,  812. 
Bearing  of  that  circumstance  on   the 

prophecy  of  Daniel,  312. 

Rome,  Babylon,  and  Greece, 
How  noticed  in  prophecy,  816. 

SaciJ^'ifices, 

Propitiatory,  what  the  general  preva- 
lence of,  shows  us,  25T. 

How  they  originated  among  the  Jews, 
and  other  ancient  nations,  264. 

The  death  of  Christ  a  proper  sacrifice. 


Its  fefficacy,  264. 

Manner  of  its  cflScacy  not  explained,  265. 

Objections  against  it  on  tiiis  gi-ound 

highly  absurd,  265,  266. 
Bee  Mediator. 

Skepticism 

Will  not  justify  a  presumptuous  fear 
lessness  with  regard  to  what  may  be 
hereafter,  82. 

Implies  a  general  state  of  probation,  in 
the  moral  and  religious  sense,  278,  279 

The  immorality  and  UTeligion  of  skep- 
tics utterly  ine.xcusable,  318. 

How  far  toward  speculative  infidelity 
a  skeptic  can  go,  who  has  had  true 
Christianity,  with  its  proper  evidence 
laid  before  him,  and  has  considered 
them,  855. 

See  Doubting. 
Scorn 

Of  religion,  to  what  owing,  348-356. 

Qreat  weakness  to  be  influenced  by  it, 
818. 

Parts  of  the  prophetical  writings,  why 
treated  with,  223. 

Scripture 

Considered  in  an  historical  view,  315. 
How  distinguished,  by  its  design,  from 

all  other  books,  315. 
Why  it  begins  with  an  account  of  the 

creation  of  the  world,  815,  316. 


Scripture, — continued. 

In  what  view,  contains  an  abridgment 
of  the  history  of  the  world,  page  816. 

With  what  its  notices  terminate,  816, 
817. 

Considering  the  variety  and  extent  of 
its  matter,  its  not  being  confuted  fiom 
reason,  history,  or  intemalinconsist- 
ency,  is  a  strong  prebumption  of  its 
truth,  817. 

Summary  of  its  contents,  318-820. 

Antiquity  of  its  first  part,  821. 

Its  chronology  confirmed  by  the  natural 
and  civil  history  ot  the  world,  821. 

Its  common  history  as  much  confirmed 
as  we  could  expect  by  profane  history, 
822. 

Has  internal  appearance  of  credibility, 
322,  823. 

No  more  appearances  of  strangeness,  or 
mistakes  of  transcribers  in  Scripture, 
than  in  other  writings  of  like  antiq- 
uitjr,  323. 

Credibility  of  the  common  history  of 
Scripture,  how  it  gives  credibility  to 
the  miraculous,  293,  824. 

Not  always  to  be  interpreted  on  the 
same  rules  as  a  common  book,  why  ? 
211,  310,  811. 

Its  relations  of  miracles  not  easily  ac- 
counted for  on  the  supposition  of 
their  falsehood,  293,  294. 

The  truth  of  them,  the  obvious  and  di- 
rect account  of  their  composition  and 
reception,  294. 

The  profession  and  establishment  of  nat- 
ural religion,  how  far  owing  to,  320. 

Some  precepts  of^  matters  of  oflPense, 
why?  237. 

The  province  of  reason  to  judge  of  its 
morality  antf  evidence,  286-288. 

May  contain  things  not  yet  discovered, 
288. 

The  ordinary  means  of  discovering  its 
meaning,  233. 

The  duty  of  searching,  211. 

When  we  may  determine  the  seeming 
meaning,  not  the  true  one,  202. 

Its  authority,  the  only  question  con- 
cerning, 227. 

See  Analogy  —  Hintory — Inspiration 
—St.  PauPa  Epistles— PropJieey- ~ 
Revelation. 

Self, 

Invisible,  50.  Its  sameness  does  not 
depend  on  the  sameness  of  the  body 
52,  58. 

Self-denial, 

The  fact  that  it  is  necessary  for  our 
present  happiness,  makes  it  credible 
that  it  may  be  likewise  necessary  for 
our  future,  115,  116,  120-122. 

Necessity  of,  argued  from  the  nature  of 
particular  afi'ections,  139. 

Productive  of  resignation  to  God's  will, 
147. 


Index. 


393 


BeU-love, 

Reasonable,  is  cyincideut  with  virtue, 
page  13T  n. 

Is  dally  Been  to  be  overmatched  by  pas- 
sion, 116,  13T  n. 

No  cause  for  its  being  disclaimed  by 
moralists  as  a  motive,  188  n. 

H  as  need  to  be  approved  and  disciplined, 
137  n,  148. 

Shaftesbury,  Lord, 
Ilia  '.vTitings  referred  to,  87. 

iimplloity, 
Of  a  living  agent,  argument  to  prove, 
M. 

Sin, 

Why  not  kept  out  of  the  world,  179. 

Son  of  Ood 

The  gift  of  the,  to  the  worid,  268. 

Sorrow 

Cannot  of  itself  restore  abased  benefits, 
265. 
Soul, 

A  simple  substance,  51. 

Not  destroyed  with  the  body,  48. 

Not  naturally  inmiortal,  50. 

Brutes,  souls  o^  58. 

Speaking  with  tongues,  231. 

Bpecial  interpositions  of  Providence,  179, 
180. 

Speculative  dlfflcultiea  similar  to  external 
temputions,  2S2. 
The  chief  trial  of  some,  284-286. 

Spread  of  Christianity  unaccountable  if 
it  were  an  imposture,  825. 

Stages  of  existence,  46. 

Standing  ministry,  what  for,  197. 

State  of  probation,  chap.  iv. 

State  of    discipline    and    improvement, 
chap.  V. 

Strangeness  of  some  Scripture  events,  828. 

Stupidity  of  tho  martyrs,  if  insincere,  299. 

Submissive  temper  necessary,  149. 

Subordinations  exceedingly  ben^cial,  182. 

SabaonienceB  in  nature,  174. 

Sabterrifloooe,  the  world  a  system  oi;  247. 

SaeccM,  temporal,  always  uncertain,  840. 

SaffeiingB  may  be  avoided,  70. 
Not  neeeaaary  to  the  cultivation  of  vir- 
tue. 118. 


Sufferings  of  Christ  vindicate  God's  law, 
page  VJ67. 

Sufferings  of  the  early  Christians,  299. 

Sufflciency  of  light  of  nature  pretended, 
191. 

Sumoiary  of  JeAvish  history,  818. 

Of  the  historical  evidence  of  Scripture, 
823. 

Supernatunil  instructions  necessary  from 
the  first,  21& 

Temptations, 

Implied  in  the  idea  of  a  state  of  proba- 
tion, 114. 

Sources  of  our,  115-117. 

Those  of  our  temporal  and  of  our  re 
lif^ous  trial  compared,  115-122. 

A  means  of  disciplining  the  moral  prin- 
ciple, 143.  144. 

Virtuous  habits  the  proper  security 
against,  136,  187. 

The  supposition  of  them  lessens,  in  cer- 
tain cases,  the  perception  of  ill-deeert, 

Tendency, 
Ambiguity  of  the  word.  111  n. 
Tendencies  of  virtue  will  probably  here* 
after  become  effect.  111. 

Testimony, 
When  only  It  can  be  destroyed,  806. 
See  EcUIence,  Evidence  of  Christian- 

Trial, 

Our,  in  our  temporal,  compared  with 
that  in  our  religious  capacity,  115- 
118. 

Proceeds  In  both  from  the  same  causes, 
and  has  the  same  effect  upon  behav- 
ior. Ill,  118. 

DlfBculties  of,  increased  by  misbehav- 
ior of  others,  118.  Also  by  our  own 
errors  and  follies,  119. 

£quitableness  of  our  present  state  of, 
vindicated,  118, 119. 

Not  possible  for  us  to  understand  all  tho 
reasons  of  our  being  pl.-vced  In,  124. 

Eni  ct,  our  improvement  in  virtue  and 
piety,  as  a  qualification  for  a  future 
state,  125. 

May  also  be  Intended  for  the  manifes- 
tation of  our  characters  to  the  rest 
of  the  creation,  151. 

Tho  present  state  of  the  evidence  of 
rellgior^  may  be  part  of  some  men's 
trial,  276-2S7.  An<l  perhaps  the  chief 
part,  2S4,  2S5. 

Difflculties  of  belief  afford  a  trial  anal- 
o^us  to  external  temptations,  282- 


Suffertng,  ignoraooe  does  not  prevent  it ,  ,,_^, 
either  in  temporal  or  spiritual  things,  Ultimate 
90*.  I     Design  of  man,  74  a 


394 


Index. 


tTnderstanding,  I 

Our  probation  with  regard  to  tho  exer- 
cise of  the,  pages  2T7,  278. 
May  be  perverted,  166. 

Cneasiness  produced  by  former  sins,  88. 

Union  of  good  beings,  104. 

Oniversality, 

Objections    to    Christianity  from  the 
want  of,  considered,  271-291. 

Universe  and  its  government  immense, 
105. 

Unjustidableness    of  religions    indiffer- 
ence, 83. 

Upright  creatures  may  fall,  139. 
Need  good  habits,  140. 

Vegetables, 

The  destruction  of,  not  analogous  to 

the  death  of  living  agents,  64. 
What  is  meant  by  their  identity,  859, 


SCO. 
Veracity, 

Our  natural  regard  to  it,  378.    When 
violated,  875. 

Vice, 

What  it  chiefly  consists  in,  368. 

Does  not  consist  merely  in  the  inten- 
tion to  produce  un happiness,  872, 

Whether  folly  be  a  species  of  it,  869- 
372. 

Manner  in  which  the  habit  of  it  is 
formed,  189, 140. 

'I'liis  life  is  to  some  practically  a  disci- 
l>line  in,  145. 

I^inished  as  imprudent,  89.  As  hurt- 
ful, 90.    As  vice,  92-97. 

Whether  ever  rewarded  as  such,  92-98. 

How  the  ai)pearance  of  it  is  brought 
about,  98. 

The  pleasures  of  it  scarce  worth  tak 
ing  into  account,  189. 

Passion  a  sorry  excuse  for  it,  189. 

Natural  bad  consequences  of,  to  be  es 
teemed  judicial  punishments  hiflicted 
by  God,  204, 

Private,  may  be  public  benefits,  and  yet 
upon  the  whole  it  were  more  bene- 
ficial that  men  would  refrain  from 
them,  179. 

Hinderances  of  its  complete  punish- 
ment accidental,  99-109. 

Must  be  the  misery  of  every  creature. 
41. 

Considwations  showing  its  enormity, 
25:3. 

Vicious 

Actions  never  rewarded  by  society  &« 

cause  they  are  vicious,  91. 
Persons,  prosperity  of,  reconciled  with 

moral  government,  »8. 


Vicioxisness 

Of  the  world  fits  it  for  a  stite  of  triaJ 
to  good  men,  page  146, 

Virtue, 

Possibility  o€  exceptions  to  ie  happi 
ness  of,  88. 

Social  advantages  of,  a  proof  of  an  ep 
tablished  moral  government,  94. 

Conditions  necessary  to  its  complete 
triumph  over  vice,  100,  101. 

Its  natural  tendencies  hindered  in  our 
present  state,  108.  May  be  more  ad- 
vantageously situated  hereafter,  104. 

A  bond  of  union  among  all  endured 
with  it,  104. 

Happy  elTects  of,  set  forth  in  the  in- 
stance of  a  perfectly  virtuous  king- 
dom, 105,  106. 

Habit  of,  not  formed  by  merely  think- 
ing and  talking  of  virtue,  128. 

And  piety  a  necessary  qualification 
for  a  future  state,  185.  Our  capa- 
city of  improvement  therein,  by 
moral  and  religious  habits,  135.  Ne- 
cessity of  improvement  argued,  186- 
142. 

Habit  of,  the  security  against  the  undue 
operation  of  particular  afiiections,  187- 
141. 

There  is  a  universally  acknowledj?ed 
standard  of;  367. 

Corresponds  to  our  notion  of  good  de- 
sert, 868. 

Common  instances  of,  do  not  raise  a 
strong  perception  of  good  desert,  and 
why,  869. 

Prudence  a  part  of,  871,  872. 

Does  not  consist  entirely  in  benevo- 
lence, 872,  873. 

Virtuous 

Actions  never  punished  by  society  be- 
cause  they  are  virtuous,  91. 

Persons,  afflictions  of,  how  reconciled 
with  moral  government,  98. 

Beings  need  virtuous  habits,  142. 

Habits  a  security,  188.  How  formed, 
128.  Improve  virtue,  138.  Neces- 
sary in  a  future  state,  185. 

Virtue  and  Vice 

Are,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  re- 
warded and  punished,  as  ftuch,  91. 

As  qualities  of  actions,  eftects  of,  on 
men's  minds,  92,  94,  96. 

Tendency  of,  to  produce  their  effecte 
in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do  at 
present,  99-108. 

Overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery  no 
the  standard  of,  373,  374. 

Voice  of  nature  is  for  virtue,  99. 


Warburton,  Bishop, 
Quoted,  91  n,  232  ii. 

Waste  of  seedB,  146. 


Index. 


395 


Waterland,  Dr., 

Quoted,  page  202  n. 

Wliately,  Archbishop, 

Qaoted,  217  n. 

Wickedness, 
May  produce  some  benefits,  179. 
Volantory,  124 

Will  and  Character, 

Explained,  160  n. 

May  be  aflarmed  of  the  Author  of  Na- 
ture, notwithstanding  the  scheme  of 
necessity,  160. 


World, 

The  present,  fit  t  >  be  a  state  of  disci- 
pline for  morai"  impi-ovement,  pages 
142-145. 

A  theater  for  the  manifestation  of  per- 
sons' characters,  150. 

Natural,  Intended  to  be  subordinate  to 
the  moral,  174. 

History  of,  how  viewed  in  Scripture, 
315. 

Governed  by  fixed  la^':8,  90. 

Wickedness  of,  269. 

Youth. 

The  great  importance  of  right  direc- 
tion in,  78,  182, 188. 
Its  beneficial  subordinations,  182. 


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.s:^^ 


.^^t^'S 


NOV  6     135411® 
l5lan'6l0lS 

UBRARYUSE 

MOV  10  «82 

REC'D  i-i-> 
NOV  1 0  19li2 


18Maf'65BG 

IN  STACKS 

MAR  4    1955 

REC'D  Lt) 

MAR2  6'65-dpM 


LD  21-lOOm-l, '54(1887816)476 


UJ       C.\JCC^^J 


